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Erratum: 
The quote, “It would be suicide of the white race…” on page 1 (and paraphrased on pages 49 and 91) 
was erroneously attributed to Donald Macintyre in the original version of this thesis. Though Macintyre 
endorsed the statement and expressed similar sentiments at the same meeting and elsewhere, it was in fact 
Charles Olley who uttered it. The author noticed and corrected this in April, 2020. 
  
At the same time, the author amended some ambiguous phrasing in the abstract, as follows: 
Original: 
This thesis is a historical ethnographic study of late colonial planning and development in the racially 
segregated townships of a southern African city: Bulawayo, Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). It analyses how 
the municipal township administration – with its high proportion of black and white social scientists, 
under the directorship of a noted anthropologist, Dr Hugh Ashton – executed an ambitious development 
drive to stabilise and improve the African townspeople. 
Amendment: 
This thesis is a historical ethnographic study of late colonial planning and development in the racially 
segregated ‘African townships’ of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). It analyses how Bulawayo’s 
municipal township administration, which included a number of social scientists (both European and 
African) and was directed by a noted anthropologist, Dr Hugh Ashton, executed an ambitious 
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This thesis is a historical ethnographic study of late colonial planning and development in the racially 
segregated ‘African townships’ of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). It analyses how Bulawayo’s 
municipal township administration, which included a number of social scientists (both European and 
African) and was directed by a noted anthropologist, Dr Hugh Ashton, executed an ambitious development 
drive to ‘stabilise’ and ‘improve’ the African townspeople. For nearly three decades, Ashton’s department 
pursued a vision of creating modern, stratified and property-owning communities, informed by the 
teleological tenets of ‘detribalisation’, ‘urbanisation’ and ‘modernisation’ theories. This vision increasingly 
clashed with the Central Government’s segregationist agenda to re-establish the Rhodesian city as a ‘white 
space’ in the 1960s and 1970s. By systematically analysing why, and how, the Bulawayo City Council 
persisted with its township development vision, even under this reactionary regime, the thesis sheds light 
on profound ideological disjunctures within the Rhodesian state, and how the conflicts that arose therefrom 
reconfigured influence, expertise, and authority in the state bureaucracy. 
This secondary city case study contributes to the historiography of late colonial developmentalism, 
which refers to metropolitan and state interventions to stabilise and modernise African urban labour across 
colonial Africa, in response to the crises emerging from social, political and industrial changes during the 
Second World War. This process broadly entailed abandoning the half-hearted interwar approach to 
warehousing transient migrant workers, and ramping up the provision of housing, amenities and social 
programmes commensurate with the basic requirements of settled (albeit second class) communities. It 
signified an increase in the importance of upliftment and individual improvement, relative to more direct modes 
of control in managing the African population.  
The thesis contributes to this historiography, by focusing on the everyday practicalities and politics 
of getting things done at the local level, with scarce resources and under pressure from multiple stakeholders. 
It does this by analysing a significant corpus of records on the protracted negotiations, conflicts and 
experiments that characterised township development in Bulawayo, from municipal, national and 
newspaper archives. Archival research was supplemented by interviews with former ‘African’ and 
‘European’ administrators, who provided insights into the institutional culture of the township 
administration. By thus opening the ‘black box’ of the colonial state bureaucracy, the thesis reveals the 
embeddedness of contemporary analytic and moral concepts within the everyday practical struggles of 
administration. This serves to counterbalance an overly functionalist interpretation of post-war 
development as a unitary state project of domination and consent. 
The study identifies three key characteristics of township development in Bulawayo that extant 
theories of late colonial urbanism do not adequately account for. Firstly, it was significantly decentralised. 
The city council spurned government expertise, tapped into regional, continental and global knowledge 
exchange networks, and implemented policies that often contradicted central government agendas. 
Secondly, the progressive developmental ideas that defined Bulawayo’s particular approach were not only 
guides to action, but also emerged as ex post facto rationalisations for actions that were financially and 
administratively expedient. Thus, progressivism was wedded with pragmatism: more spatially integrated 
housing development reduced capital costs; extensive home ownership schemes enlisted the resources and 
energies of Africans; landscaped municipal beer gardens provided a significant and vital source of revenue. 
The resultant spectacle of impressive progress was achieved at no undue cost to either the European 
ratepayer or the industrial employer, and the skilful rationalisation of ad hoc, experimental decisions and 
compromises in terms of moral and political imperatives of modernisation imbued the development process 
with a sometimes-misleading sense of coherent intention. Thirdly, decisions made at the critical juncture of 
the 1950s had strong path-dependent effects, setting Bulawayo on a trajectory from which it was 
increasingly difficult to diverge. The combination of these factors bequeathed a localised legacy of 
autonomy, self-reliance and comparatively integrated, socially stratified townships to post-colonial 





This thesis examines how colonial urban administrators tried to bring conditions of stability and what they 
considered to be a better state of life to the segregated African communities of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, after 
the Second World War. At the head of the administration department dealing with this project, for nearly 
three decades, was an anthropologist called Dr Hugh Ashton, who with his team of anthropologically-
trained Black and White staff, executed an ambitious development campaign, informed by contemporary 
theories about social change and progress. Ashton’s vision was to help what he regarded as migrant 
‘tribespeople’ adjust to the bewildering strangeness of modern life, by creating townships for various 
income-levels, and schemes for residents to buy their own homes. This vision clashed with the reactionary 
policies of the right-wing Government in the 1960s and ‘70s, which sought to re-establish the city as a space 
exclusively for Whites, where Blacks could only reside on sufferance. The thesis seeks to understand how 
and why administrators managed to pursue their own development agenda under this reactionary regime. 
It thereby aims to shed light on the ways in which influence, expertise and authority were (re)reconfigured 
in the late colonial state bureaucracy. 
This secondary city case study contributes to the historical scholarship on developmentalism after 
the war, which refers to interventions from Metropolitan Governments (e.g. Britain) and colonial states to 
stabilise and modernise African urban labour across colonial Africa, in response to the crises emerging from 
social, political and industrial changes during the Second World War. This process broadly entailed 
abandoning the half-hearted interwar approach to warehousing transient migrant workers, and ramping up 
the provision of housing, amenities and social programmes commensurate with the basic requirements of 
settled, yet second class, communities. It signified an increase in the importance of upliftment and 
improvement – improving not only people’s welfare but also their habits and character – relative to more 
direct modes of control, in managing the African population.  
The thesis contributes to this historiography, by focusing on the everyday practicalities and politics 
of getting things done at the local level, with scarce resources and under pressure from multiple stakeholders. 
It does this by analysing a significant corpus of records on the protracted negotiations, conflicts and 
experiments that characterised township development in Bulawayo, from municipal, national and 
newspaper archives. Archival research was supplemented by interviews with former ‘African’ and 
‘European’ administrators, who provided insights into the institutional culture of the township 
administration. By thus opening the ‘black box’ of the colonial state bureaucracy, the thesis reveals the 
embeddedness of contemporary analytic and moral concepts within the everyday practical struggles of 
administration. This serves to counterbalance interpretations of post-war development that place excessive 
emphasis on the function of townships to a strategizing colonial state – conceived as a singular actor – 
seeking to maintain domination and garner consent. 
The study identifies three key characteristics of township development in Bulawayo that extant 
theories of late colonial urbanism do not adequately account for. Firstly, it was significantly decentralised. 
The city council spurned government expertise, tapped into regional, continental and global knowledge 
exchange networks, and implemented policies that often contradicted central government agendas. 
Secondly, the progressive developmental ideas that defined Bulawayo’s particular approach were not only 
guides to action, but were also used to give moral and political meaning to actions that were in fact 
financially and administratively expedient. Thus, progressivism was wedded with pragmatism: more spatially 
integrated housing development reduced capital costs; extensive home ownership schemes enlisted the 
resources and energies of Africans; landscaped municipal beer gardens provided a significant and vital 
source of revenue. The resultant spectacle of impressive progress was achieved at no undue cost to either 
the European ratepayer or the industrial employer, and the skilful rationalisation of ad hoc, experimental 
decisions and compromises in terms of moral and political imperatives of modernisation imbued the 
development process with a sometimes misleading sense of coherent intention. Thirdly, decisions made at 
the critical moment of the 1950s, when established ways of doings things were subject to drastic change, 
had strong path-dependent effects, setting Bulawayo on a trajectory from which it was increasingly difficult 
to diverge. The combination of these factors bequeathed a localised legacy of autonomy, self-reliance and 
comparatively integrated, socially stratified townships to post-colonial Bulawayo – contrasting starkly with 
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AAD:   African Administration Department (Bulawayo) 
B.A.T.: Bulawayo African Townships (umbrella term for Makokoba, Mzilikazi, 
Nguboyenja and Barbour Fields) 
BCCA:    Bulawayo City Council Archive 
BPRA:   Bulawayo Progressive Residents’ Association 
BURA:   Bulawayo United Residents’ Association 
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NAZ:    National Archives of Zimbabwe 
NDP:   National Democratic Party 
RA: Residents’ Association (incl. Leaseholders’ Associations & Tenants’ 
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UFP:   United Federal Party 
URP:   United Rhodesia Party 
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Notes on Terminology: 
 
Country names: 
Colonial Zimbabwe was called Southern Rhodesia until 1964, when it dropped the “Southern”, 
as Northern Rhodesia became Zambia. In 1969, it became the Republic of Rhodesia, and from 
1978 it was Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, until 1980 when it became independent Zimbabwe. When 
referring to colonial Zimbabwe in general, I use the name Rhodesia. 
 
Race categories:  
In the period under study, Black people were most commonly referred to as ‘Natives’ by colonial 
officials until the early 1950s; thereafter the term ‘Africans’ became the norm, but the term 
‘Natives’ remained in use. Whites were commonly referred to as ‘Europeans’. Throughout this 
thesis I use the terms ‘African’ and ‘European’, in accordance with historiographical convention. 
[The other relevant race categories in terms of Rhodesia’s segregationist legislation were 
“Coloureds” and “Asians”.] 
 
African Administration Department name changes: 
In 1949, the Bulawayo City Council established a Native Administration Department. This 
Department underwent various name changes: 
1949-53:  Native Administration Department 
1953-63:  African Administration Department  
1963-75:  Housing and Amenities Department  
1975-today:  Housing and Community Services Department  
I use the term “African Administration Department” (AAD) when referring to the department 
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Figure 1: Map of Zimbabwe [Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Atlas_of_Zimbabwe] 
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“It would be suicide of the white race in Rhodesia”,  asserted Charles Olley, mayor of the colony’s 
capital, Salisbury, at a meeting of municipalities in 1945, “to adopt the policy of an employed 
native having the right to bring his wife into town with the obligation of the white employer to 
accommodate the wife.” Indeed, it would “destroy tribal life and put nothing in its place”, 
exclaimed Donald Macintyre, mayor of the second city, Bulawayo, who was leading the protest.1 
These big city leaders were opposing government legislation aimed at ‘stabilising’ the African 
urban workforce after the Second World War, and their apocalyptic imagery reflected a deep sense 
amongst many European settlers at the time that urban areas were essentially white spaces, where 
African workers would have to temporarily reside on sufferance, but would never truly belong. As 
essentially ‘tribespeople’, these workers were expected to retain their roots in the native village.  
But the mayors’ protestations came at a turning point in the history of colonial urbanism, 
and they soon found themselves on the wrong side of history. The domineering mayor of 
Bulawayo, in particular, remained intransigent in the face of change, until a crisis at the post-war 
juncture rendered his attitudes untenable. Rapid war-time industrial growth without a concomitant 
expansion in housing and services had led to a crisis in Bulawayo’s African areas.2 Just a few 
hundred metres to the west of the town centre, approximately 15,000 Africans lived in the 
overcrowded and unsanitary municipal ‘Location’; many more occupied austere hostels, cottages 
and rudimentary shacks in the municipal workers’ compound and other industrial compounds. 
 
1 The Herald, 21 December, 1945, in T. Ranger, Bulawayo Burning: The Social History of a Southern African City, 
1893-1960 (Oxford, James Currey, 2010), p. 128. 
2 Bulawayo was the industrial hub of the colony. It is located in the south western semi-arid region of 
Matabeleland, as indicated in Fig. 1. 
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When, in 1948, a South African commissioner described these areas as “possibly the worst slums 
in the world”, Macintyre and his council finally realised that something had to change in their 
approach to ‘native urban administration’. 
And change it did. The reorientation was dramatic. Within three decades, by the eve of 
Zimbabwean independence, the landscape of western Bulawayo had been transformed. From the 
western edge of the grid-iron town centre, African townships stretched out to the horizon, 
housing a population that had increased more than tenfold. These townships had the highest rates 
of family housing, home ownership, and socioeconomic stratification in the country. Once 
deemed the most reactionary and intransigent Council in the colony, Bulawayo had come to be 
regarded as “progressive”. Why and how did this change come about? 
This thesis analyses the interesting case of African township development in Bulawayo, 
to contribute to our understanding of the new ways in which African people were accepted, 
housed, and governed by colonial authorities in the towns and cities of British Africa after the 
Second World War. Examining the activities of municipal administrators tasked with actually 
delivering the housing and services for the ‘stabilisation’ and ‘improvement’ of the African 
population in the post-war era, the inquiry focuses on the significant disjunctures between central 
and local development visions, which intensified under the right-wing Government of the 1960s 
and ‘70s. Showing how Bulawayo battled, with some success, to pursue its own township 
development vision despite limited state resources, this thesis nuances a historical narrative of 
colonial urban development as largely directed from the top.  
The historical development of African townships was always determined by colonial 
officials’ ideas about the place of Africans in the ‘white’ urban areas. The idea that Africans did 
not really belong in these areas was always in tension with the concomitant desire to extract value 
from African labour, in industry and domestic service. Until the Second World War, the solution 
to this contradiction was a cyclical migrant labour system, whereby most African workers spent 
merely a few months at a time in urban employment, before returning to the rural hinterlands or 
their countries of origin. Their transient presence was reflected in the rudimentary character of 
public housing: austere, barrack-like, crowded hostels for male workers – a warehousing solution. 
This generally resulted in inhuman living conditions, which contributed to considerable urban 
unrest in the late 1930s and 1940s. (This cyclical labour system notwithstanding, many African 
women and men did settle long-term in most early colonial towns.) 
Post-war urban development was a response to these crises. It was about creating 
conditions of stability for the African urban workforce, in order to both pacify and extract more 
value from it. But it went further than merely providing conditions for stability. In line with a very 
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long tradition of ‘civilising’ Africans, the late colonial development drive involved ‘improving’ 
Africans in the urban setting. In the post-war era, improving Africans meant helping them to 
‘detribalise’ and ‘modernise’.  
This stabilisation and improvement policy challenged not just ideas about the essence of 
Africans, but also moral geographies of race, as it threatened the ‘white cities’ with visions of 
permanent African settlement. For this reason, urban racial segregation in some colonies, such as 
Southern Rhodesia, was actually entrenched at the same time as African worker stability was 
promoted. The policies of urban stabilisation/improvement on the one hand, and segregation on 
the other, were always in tension in the late colonial period, and municipal councils and central 
government officials often disagreed about how to balance these two goals. 
Stabilising and improving Africans required heavier state intervention – in terms of effort, 
expertise and resources – than ever before. We have extensive accounts of the outcomes of such 
interventions, including the impacts on colonial subjects and how the latter resisted and reordered 
these top-down development schemes. We also have insightful functional explanations of how 
they served as direct and indirect means of rendering the population governable, in the service of 
state control. However, we have fewer accounts of municipalities’ long-term experience of actually 
delivering development, including the visions, strategies, power relations, and institutional cultures 
that emerged in the process at the local government level. Consequently, the legacy of colonial 
urbanism is often considered to be rather generic, with capital cities taken as prime exemplars of 
“the” colonial city, and the heterogeneous histories of secondary towns being overlooked. 
To nuance this picture, this study undertook to uncover the political struggles and 
everyday material resourcefulness involved in Bulawayo’s shift from being reactionary to being 
more “progressive”, pursuing a post-war developmental vision that was increasingly at odds with 
the Central Government. It examined development planning and policy formulation over a 28-
year period, focusing particularly on the activities of the new, post-war African Administration 
Department of the City Council, which had the broad remit of providing housing, services, 
recreational facilities, libraries, and welfare programmes in the African townships. All decisions 
“from above” concerning the townships passed through its Head Office. Municipal archives were 
the main source of information, supplemented by national and newspaper archives and interviews 
with former administrators. This is a “historical ethnography”3, in that it foregrounds the everyday 
 
3 Borrowing the term as used by Ilana Feldman in her study of urban administration in colonial Gaza: 




practices, relationships, and where possible even emotional attachments of state actors – regarding 
their activities as social, i.e. not imbued with some essential ‘stateness’.  
The central protagonist of this account of township development was Dr Hugh Ashton, 
the Bulawayo Council’s director of African Administration. Anthropologically trained and 
progressive in vision, he was profoundly influential in reorienting the Council’s whole approach 
to ‘African affairs’, and established a cohort of social-scientific administrators in his department 
– amongst whom were several Africans in high positions – which was exceptional for Rhodesia. 
Every major concern passed through his office, making him the ultimate authority on township 
development in Bulawayo. Leveraging this position, he exerted influence both downwards and 
upwards in the state bureaucratic hierarchy, sometimes reaching to the very top levels of 
Government. His right-hand man at the head of the township Welfare Section, Dr Eric Gargett, 
the most senior African member of his staff, Michael Ndubiwa, and the Council’s long-term town 
clerk, Eddie White, also feature in this study. 
The late colonial drive to create stability and improvement/upliftment brought new costs 
and new uncertainties, and the African Administration Department began its work, in the 1950s, 
under conditions of extreme resource and knowledge scarcity. By analysing how the Department 
tried to fulfil its mandate under these conditions, and over the protracted late colonial period in 
Rhodesia, the thesis brings to light three main characteristics of the development process: firstly, 
it was significantly decentralised – shaped by the initiative and vision of local state agents, the 
regional, continental and sometimes global knowledge exchange networks they tapped into, and 
the city’s historical resistance to top-down interference. When the Government tried to impose 
its policies, conflict often ensued.  
Secondly, it was a hugely experimental and endlessly compromised process, adapted to 
the conditions that pertained in Bulawayo in the post-war context of rapid social change, and 
responsive to an active African civil society demanding to be treated as citizens, not subjects. 
Pragmatic solutions were married with progressive ideals, such as enlisting the human and 
financial resources of African residents through self-building and home ownership, developing 
the townships in a more spatially integrated manner to reduce infrastructural costs, and 
establishing Southern Africa’s most elaborate beer garden complexes for a lucrative (though 
controversial) source of revenue. Financial, political and moral rationalisations of these strategies 
imbued the ad hoc, experimental and often contingent development process with coherent, 
modernising intent. The resultant spectacle of progress imposed no undue costs on European 
ratepayers and industrial employers, enhanced the city’s image for public relations, and offered a 
durable future for African residents to further invest in.  
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Thirdly, the trajectory of township development was subject to strong path dependent 
effects. Because the 1950s were a critical juncture at which a new approach to ‘native 
administration’ was adopted, decisions made at this time set Bulawayo on a particular 
developmental trajectory from which it was increasingly costly – economically, politically, 
administratively, and socially – to diverge. Having found common ground with the Central 
Government during the “liberal” era of Rhodesian national politics in the 1950s, the Bulawayo 
Council subsequently fell out with the right-wing Rhodesia Front Government of the 1960s and 
‘70s. Having established more spatially integrated townships, acquired extensive localised 
knowledge through trial and error, and forged its own practical norms and style of governing, the 
Council came to resist the detached, ill-conceived and reactionary policies formulated at the top. 
This experience, and the staff who were conditioned by it, bequeathed a particular localised legacy 
to post-colonial Bulawayo. 
These three factors to a significant extent account for the more progressive developments 
that arose in Bulawayo over the protracted late colonial period. Achieved at no undue economic cost 
to the European ratepayer or the industrial employer, this progressivism was highly resourceful. 
But it came at a theoretical social “cost”: of accepting permanent African settlement close to the 
town, and a proliferation of African beer gardens and recreation centres, even in European 
neighbourhoods. The capital city was less willing to impose such social costs on its European 
ratepayers.  
In the following sections, I discuss, firstly, the broader history of post-war 
developmentalism in Africa, to put this study in context; secondly, the ways in which colonial 
developmentalism has come to be understood in terms of top-down strategies to appease, pacify 
and improve Africans (in an often totalitarian manner with detrimental effects); and thirdly, the 
ways in which this thesis contributes to this literature. 
 
The origins of colonial developmentalism 
 
Bulawayo’s post-war reforms can only be understood in the context of broader continental 
reforms. In the 1940s, long-established modes of colonial rule in Africa were deemed untenable 
and in need of revision.  As this section shows, this involved more than just a new strategy of rule. 
It involved new ways of understanding colonial subjects, and their rights to settle in colonial towns 
and cities. This section examines the impetus for reform, and how it transformed colonial urban 
government and governance in ways that still have ramifications today.  
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In the interwar period, colonialism was justified in terms of the doctrine of ‘trusteeship’. 
This doctrine was about holding in trust the territories of African peoples believed to be deeply 
embedded in their static, traditional ways of life, not yet able to cope with the modern world. The 
doctrine served not only to legitimise the empire, but also to veto the calls of white settlers for 
self-government in their respective colonies. According to Robert Pearce, trusteeship was a 
“quasi-theological doctrine”; this made it heretical to reduce it to a precise definition: “vagueness 
was its strength”.4 Whilst metropolitan governments (Britain, France) were thinking about labour 
in their own societies in new ways – around issues of standards of living, wages, housing, unions 
– they were unable to think of African urban workers in those terms.5 African migrant workers 
were considered to be essentially tribal; their potential to ‘detribalise’ in urban areas was something 
officials feared. According to Werlin, this idea that Africans did not belong in the towns stemmed 
from the ideas of the 18th and 19th century philosophers Edmund Burke and Herbert Spencer, 
who thought that, “Traditional culture was an ‘organic’ structure of mutually dependent parts – a 
fragile chain of shared history and traditions – which would readily be disrupted by any radical 
reform, leaving a cultural void accompanied by violence and decadence.”6 
Although there had in fact been some early proposals by Lord Milner, a leading figure in 
the British colonial establishment, for ambitious intervention and development in the British 
colonies in 1919-20, the British Government had not been amenable to this.7 Lord Lugard, who 
most famously articulated the doctrine of ‘indirect rule’, insisted that development could disturb 
what he perceived as the delicate equilibria of African tribal societies, which should be preserved.8 
Such a stultifying view of African society ignored dynamic changes taking place.  
This steadfast belief that Britain’s trusteeship role would last for centuries was shattered 
by a wave of workers’ strikes in several parts of the Empire in the latter half of the 1930s. This 
“shock from below” forced officials to address the ‘labour question’. There was a genuine belief 
in the British Colonial Office that it was not just unemployment, but poor housing and services, 
that had provoked unrest. Officials therefore stressed the need for some tangible improvements to 
the lives of the colonised. As George Creasy of the Colonial Office complained in 1939, there had 
been:  
 
4 R. Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy, 1938-48 (London, Frank Cass, 1982), p. 4 
5 F. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labour Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 23-56 
6 H. Werlin, ‘The Nairobi City Council: a study in comparative local government,’ Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 8, 2 (1966) p. 187 
7 F. Cooper, ‘Development, modernization, and the social sciences in the era of decolonization: the 
examples of British and French Africa’, Revue d'histoire des sciences humaines, 1 (2004), pp.11-12  
8 Ibid.  
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too much emphasis on the desirability of making the African (or West Indian, etc.) into 
a more efficient producer or labourer for the needs of the country. This is a point which, 
of course, will appeal to the Treasury… I feel, however, that so far as the Colonial Office 
is concerned our real aim should be the more general one of turning the African into a 
happier, healthier, more prosperous individual in which case all the other subsidiary 
objects will automatically be attained.9 
And another key official, Malcolm MacDonald, claimed that unless proper social services were 
soon provided, Britain would deserve to lose her colonies.10 But the Treasury took a very different 
view; it wanted to keep the colonies self-sufficient, and avoid elevating Africans’ expectations of 
social services to a level that the colonies could not themselves sustain. The Treasury regarded 
metropolitan expenditure on colonial welfare as putting the colonies “on the dole”.11  
Indeed, the colonies up to 1940 had been subject to a rigid system of economic self-
sufficiency. In the 11 years since the old Colonial Development Act of 1929, a mere £9m had 
been approved by the Treasury for all the British colonies (and only £6.4m actually spent by them). 
This 1929 Act had a landowners’ conception of development – to develop the “imperial estates” 
so they could trade with the United Kingdom. But after 1939, the Colonial Office began to view 
social welfare and economic growth as mutually supportive.12 This formula came to be known as 
“development”. Development was inspired by three key imperatives: to legitimise colonialism in 
the eyes of both the colonised and the wider world; to improve the efficiency of labour; and to 
socially, economically and morally “uplift” African subjects. These were all mutually supportive, 
but it was the spectre of further strikes and riots that brought the last of these to the fore, for the 
first time. Putting it starkly, Cooper argues that, “In 1939, the labour question was assimilated into 
the development question. And in those terms it remained.”13 
Therefore, from 1940, there was a massive escalation of metropolitan funding to the 
colonies. The Colonial Welfare and Development Act of 1940 was the first time that money was 
pledged purely for improving the living standards of the colonised. The Act pledged an annual 
£5m for development and £0.5m for research, for the next 10 years.14 Whilst the British Treasury 
was sceptical about “putting the colonies on the dole”, the Colonial Office tentatively suggested 
 
9 George Creasy, Minute, 30 November 1939, to Draft Outline of Statement of Policy, quoted in F. Cooper, 
‘Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept’, in Frederick Cooper and 
Randall Packard (eds.), International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge 
(Berkeley, University of California Press 1997), p. 67 
10 MacDonald, Minute, 14 January 1940, CO 859/19/7475, PRO, in Cooper, ibid. 
11 J. Lewis, Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52 (Oxford, James Currey, 2000), pp. 42-50 
12 Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, p. 69-73 
13 Ibid. p. 111 
14 (Actual expenditure remained far lower than these limits, but increased rapidly from 1943.) 
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that welfare and economic development went together. The 1945 CW&D Act ramped the amount 
up to £120m for the period 1946-56 (and an additional £80m was approved for 1955-60), and 
there was much more flexibility in how these funds could be spent.15  
Although an emerging younger generation of Colonial Office officials in the early 1940s 
had moved discussion at the CO towards “a colony-centred understanding of development… not 
obviously dictated by an overriding concern for Britain's economic interests,”16 after the war 
(which had been used as justification for continued but temporary economic exploitation of the 
colonies), the promise of true colony-centred development did not materialise. The Metropolitan 
Government had massive post-war reconstruction costs and was seriously financially dependent 
on the US, whose lend-lease scheme to aid in the war effort was terminated in 1945, requiring 
repayment. The post-war Labour Government of Clement Attlee continued to employ welfarist 
rhetoric about colony-centred development, but in practice welfare and development were 
conceived as a way to boost economic productivity and the export of much-needed raw materials 
to Britain, especially after the country’s balance of payments crisis in August, 1947.17 (This 
economic imperative constituted a shift from the initial conception of colonial welfare as an 
antidote to disorder.18) 
But the post-war development drive also involved a new technocratic approach to 
‘modernising’ African societies. Certainly, the increased sophistication of colonial administration 
had already begun in the interwar period when the Colonial Office attempted to apply 
“metropolitan standards of government to colonial bureaucratic practice”19, but during the 
Second World War, officials in the CO had increasingly come to regard the colonial ‘Native 
Administration’ systems as rather primitive. Therefore, from 1946, the CO began to transform 
colonial administrations into the English-style local government system. A central figure in this 
reform effort was Arthur Creech-Jones, who was promoted to Secretary of State for the Colonies 
in 1946. Whilst he and his officials in London accepted the need for reform, convincing the 
Colonial Service – the administrators on the ground in Africa – of the desirability of these changes, 
was another matter. In a famous Despatch to the African Governors on 25th Feb, 1947, Creech-
Jones pronounced the end of ‘Indirect Rule’, and called for “efficient and democratic local 
government” as the key to success.20  
 
15 E.R. Wicker, ‘Colonial Development and Welfare, 1929-1957: The evolution of a policy’, Social and 
Economic Studies, 7, 4 (1958), pp. 170-192. 
16 L. Butler, ‘The Ambiguities of British Colonial Development Policy, 1938-48’, in A.Gorst, L. Johnmann 
and W. Lucas (eds), Contemporary British History, 1931-1961 (London, Pinter, 1991), p. 121 and  
17 Ibid., pp. 119-140. 
18 Cooper, ‘Modernizing Bureaucrats’, p. 70-71 
19 Lewis, Empire State Building, p. 35 
20 Pearce, The Turning Point, pp. 141-159; Lewis, Empire State-building., pp. 95-6. 
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There is general scholarly consensus that these post-war reforms signified a turning point 
in colonial Africa, characterised as a shift from trusteeship to development21, from a laissez-faire 
approach to modes of heavy interventionism22, or, most famously (and cynically) – as a “second 
colonial occupation”.23 As Richard Stren put it for the case of Kenya, African urban 
administration in the interwar period had been “characterized by a predisposition toward control”, 
whereas after 1944, “a much more sophisticated appreciation of the interrelated problems of 
development and administration clearly emerged…”24 A dissenting view on this period is held by 
Joanna Lewis, who claims that in Kenya, whilst intentions and initiatives changed significantly, in 
terms of administrative practices and outcomes “the reality was closer to continuity rather than 
marked by cleavage.”25 And on the topic of continuity, it is worth remembering that this post-war 
development drive did have deeper roots in earlier ideas about developing Africa, “stretch[ing] 
back to the mission civilisatrice and constructive imperialism doctrines of the late nineteenth 
century.”26 
Continuities notwithstanding, a key change was that colonial bureaucrats no longer 
stymied, but indeed tried to encourage, the emergence of a stable African working class in the late 
1940s.27 The strikes and protests of that decade had not constituted a linear process of class 
formation and worker unity; in fact, they had been most effective when they involved mass 
mobilisation of petty traders and the unemployed, not just workers. But by actively intervening to 
create a working class, colonial bureaucrats ceased to blur the distinctions between Africans of 
various occupation, skill and inclination. They began “to separate workers vertically and 
horizontally into hierarchies and occupations and to separate workers from other Africans.”28 
Labour policy changed as officials re-imagined Africans.  
This re-imagining of Africans now meant that urbanisation and ‘detribalisation’ were no 
longer feared, but instead carefully managed. Social scientists, notably researchers at the Rhodes 
Livingstone Institute (RLI) in Northern Rhodesia, began to take an interest in these processes. 
 
21 R. Harris, ‘From Trusteeship to Development: How Class and Gender Complicated Kenya’s Housing 
Policy’, Journal of Historical Geography, 34 (2008), pp. 311-337 
22 A. Burton, ‘Townsmen in the making: social engineering and citizenship in Dar es Salaam, c.1945-1960’, 
The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 36, 2 (2003) 
23 D. Low and J. Lonsdale, ‘Introduction: Towards the New Order, 1945-63’ in D. Low and A. Smith (eds), 
History of East Africa, 3 (Oxford, 1976), pp. 1-63 
24 R. Stren, ‘The Evolution of Housing Policy in Kenya’, in J. Hutton (ed.), Urban Challenge in East Africa 
(Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1970), p. 61 
25 J. Lewis, ‘The Ruling Compassions of the Late Colonial State: Welfare versus force, Kenya, 1945-52’, 
Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, 2, 2 (2011), n.p.  
26 Hodge, (2018) Developing Africa 
27 F. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, p. 273 
28 Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, p. 262 
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For example, the RLI researcher James Clyde Mitchell entered this field just as the old attitude 
that Africans were mere workers on sufferance was being revised. He noted how,  
This point of view has led to inadequate family accommodation and a preponderance of 
housing for single men, a general lack of provision for old age care, inadequate provisions 
for land ownership and for invalidism. These conditions have done nothing to encourage 
a settled family life in the towns.29 
The new focus on managing rather than preventing these processes of social change inspired 
government ministries and municipalities to launch ambitious projects in housing, services, 
amenities and activities for social upliftment. This was about turning tribal Africans into second 
class citizens – never on a par with Europeans – who would enjoy some limited political, civic 
and social rights, but also acquire a sense of financial, moral, and political “responsibility”. 
Managing this process of detribalisation required a shift from the earlier direct forms of control, 
to more indirect modes of improvement.30  
 
Stabilisation and improvement 
 
The building of townships to stabilise migrant communities was determined by the ways in which 
colonial governments and municipal councils conceptualised African urban citizenship. I use the 
term ‘urban citizenship’ to include political rights to vote, civil rights to own property and speak 
freely, and social entitlements to health and housing, as well as the obligations to behave and 
participate in certain ways.31  It was also determined by African acts of citizenship, i.e. claiming a 
citizenship status and refusing to be treated as subjects.  
Late colonial authorities regarded the entitlements of public housing and services to come 
with obligations to take on some of the financial, moral and governing “responsibilities” 
associated with “modern” urban life. As Andrew Burton explains, “[C]olonial administrators 
abandoned the static notion of the ‘tribesman’ for a discourse that identified Africans as in the 
process of becoming citizens, with corresponding rights and responsibilities derived from and 
 
29 J. Clyde-Mitchell, ‘Labour and Population Movements’, in K. M. Barbour and R. M. Prothero (eds), Essays 
on African Population (New York, 1962) p. 237, in Ferguson, ‘Modernist narratives, conventional wisdoms, 
and colonial liberalism: reply to a Straw Man’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 20,4, (1994) p. 636 
30 This does not mean that direct control disappeared, indeed it often increased, but its importance relative 
to indirect modes of governing diminished.  
31 A. Marston, and K. Mitchell, ‘Citizens and the state: citizenship formations in space and time’ In C. 
Barnett and M. Low (eds), Spaces of democracy: Geographical perspectives on citizenship, participation and 
representation (London, Sage, 2004), pp. 93-112. 
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owed to the state”.32 However, official discourses about rights, entitlements and “responsibilities” 
in the city were often inflected by both a lingering hostility to African urban settlement, and a 
strong paternalistic impulse to guide the process of Africans becoming citizens. Through 
organised programmes as well as through the spaces of the built environment itself, the modern 
urban African was to be socially engineered.  
Applied in a hubristic top-down manner by developmental “experts”, such interventions 
often had destructive effects. These top-down impositions of order “virtually ignored the 
everyday spatial life-world of the majority of the residents.”33 This was not incidental but inherent 
to a top-down approach: the “absolute faith in the power of the state to plan, direct, implement, 
and manage development schemes” often resulted in what Jennings calls a “coercive utopia”.34 
Residents both confronted colonial authorities with demands for improved housing, services and 
freedom of movement, and physically and symbolically reordered the built environment through 
the practices of everyday life. Such actions by residents are best captured in the more dynamic 
concept of citizenship as “not merely a legal fact” but also “an everyday act that operates at 
multiple scales.”35 However, the power of African civil society was usually undermined by 
structures of discrimination and disempowerment.36 
In the following subsections, I present an overview of these perspectives on late colonial 
urban development, drawing particularly on studies of Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa – where the historiography is richest, and with whom the 
Bulawayo Council shared the most lessons and experiences. This is followed by a critique and 
explanation of how this thesis contributes to the historiography of this period. I argue that this 
rich and insightful literature on singular overarching state strategies of development on the one 
hand, and its outcomes and impacts on the other, would be enhanced by greater focus on the 
mid-level municipal actors who played such a significant role in formulating and implementing 
urban development policies in the course of their often decades-long careers, often in opposition 
to central governments. 
 
 
32 Burton, ‘Townsmen in the making’, p. 331 
33 G. Myers, ‘Designing Power: Forms and Purposes of Colonial Model Neighborhoods in British Africa’, 
Habitat International, 27, 2 (2003) p. 201 
34 M. Jennings, ‘Building Better People - Modernity and Utopia in Late Colonial Tanganyika’, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies, 3, 1 (2009), pp. 94-111 
35 C. Lemanski, ‘Infrastructural citizenship: Spaces of living in Cape Town, South Africa,’ in K. Ward, A. 
Jonas, B. Miller, D. Wilson, (eds), The Routledge Handbook on Spaces of Urban Politics. (London, Routledge, 
2018), p. 351.  
36 Jennings, ‘Building better people’, p. 96. 
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Stabilisation: family housing and secure tenure 
 
To what extent did the post-war stabilisation policy, discussed above, actually manifest in better 
housing and improved security for renters and home owners? Did the rhetoric and intention 
translate into action? And how did central government or municipal housing authorities find the 
resources and means to achieve this? This section addresses these questions for British Africa at 
large, whilst chapters 3 and 4 address them for Rhodesia specifically.  
Scholars have documented a relative surge in urban public housing projects in most 
British colonies after the war, and in primary as well as secondary cities, albeit with significant 
variation between and within colonies. In most colonies, employers had played a major role in 
housing their employees in the interwar period, and after the war, the state – mostly municipal 
councils and sometimes central governments through ministries or housing boards – stepped up 
to play the major role. In Nairobi, for example, 12,000 units were built by the city council in the 
boom period between 1945-52.37 Dar es Salaam, on the other hand, was less well-resourced; 
despite population growth of 121,000 between 1948 and 1962, only 4,839 housing units were 
built.38 But even ambitious building programmes were rarely sufficient to keep up with housing 
demand in rapidly expanding cities. The small but rapidly growing town of Lusaka built 4,440 
African houses with 1-4 rooms in 1950-52, yet by 1957, 20% of the city lived in unauthorised 
compounds.39  And as for Nairobi, “By the eve of independence, in 1963, the Nairobi cityscape 
was already characterized not by ‘model’ housing estates, but by burgeoning shanties…”40 
It was not just capital cities that ramped up efforts. Secondary cities also joined in and 
were sometimes even more proactive. In the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, according to a Ten 
Year Development Plan of 1947 to build a “settled urban society”, African labour camps were 
“transformed into mosquito-free towns with water-borne sanitation, tarmac roads, street lighting, 
over-crowded but well-built houses, clean open spaces, public transport for Africans and civic 
administration” by municipalities and mining companies.41 Indeed, far more resources in N. 
Rhodesia were ploughed into urban than rural development in the 1950s, accentuating the rural-
 
37Stren, ‘The Evolution of Housing Policy’, p. 71 
38 R. Stren, Urban Inequality and Housing Policy in Tanzania (Berkeley, Uni California Press, 1975) p. 37, quoted 
in A. Burton, ‘The Haven of Peace Purged: Tackling the Undesirable and Unproductive Poor in Dar es 
Salaam, ca.1950s-1980s’, Journal of African Historical Studies, 40, 1 (2007), p. 125 
39 C. Rakodi, ‘Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and its Legacy’, Third World Planning 
Review, 8, 3 (1986) p. 210 
40 D. Anderson, ‘Corruption at City Hall: African housing and urban development in colonial Nairobi’, 
Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa, 36-37, 1 (2001), p. 140. 
41 H. Heisler, ‘The creation of a stabilised urban society: a turning point in the development of N. Rhodesia’, 
African Affairs, 70, 279 (1971), pp. 125-145; see also R. Prain, ‘The Stabilization of Labour in the Rhodesian 
Copperbelt’, African Affairs, 55.221  (1956), pp. 305-312 
13 
 
urban divide.42 Even in less resourced colonies like Uganda, secondary towns, such as Jinja, had 
their existing mud and wattle houses, deemed impermanent because built by indigenous methods, 
cleared and replaced with municipal housing schemes.43 The results amongst secondary cities were 
varied. And in the case of Rhodesia, the second city of Bulawayo became even more proactive 
than the capital, as this thesis bears out. 
As well as general increases in house-building, there were changes to housing styles, as 
the stabilisation policy prioritised married accommodation.  The early archetypal form of worker 
housing was the barrack-like block or “hostel” for single male workers. This was a cheap 
warehousing strategy and an easy way to maintain control. In the 1940s and ‘50s, single-family 
cottages increasingly replaced single men’s hostels. According to Robert Home, the hostel and 
the family cottage were “collectively the commonest built element in the colonial landscape”.44 
But there were many exceptions to the standard range of colonial African house designs. For 
example, Mombasa had a scheme with low-cost “Swahili-style” houses.45 In several colonies there 
were experiments with “hybrid” designs, combining indigenous designs and materials, such as 
thatch and bush-pole roofs, with bricks and concrete.46 (These were often considered to be “semi-
permanent” due to the inclusion of indigenous materials.) And as important as changes in house 
design, were the addition of “modern” services, such as electricity, running water and sewerage 
reticulation. These service infrastructures developed incrementally, and their invariable inferiority 
to those in the European ratepaying areas reflected their different citizenship statuses.  
African housing also began to reflect socioeconomic stratification.47 This was an answer 
to the demands of the emergent African middle class. As Michael West argues, “[T]here were 
fewer areas in which the ‘progressive’ urbanized African in Southern Rhodesia felt more restricted 
than in choice of housing. Indeed, housing was a touchstone of the ability of the African middle 
class to control its own destiny.”48 Wealthier households could finally enjoy some social and spatial 
differentiation from lower classes, in townships intended to cultivate European bourgeois 
 
42 Heisler, ibid. 
43 A. Byerley, ‘Mind the Gap! Seeking Stability Beyond the ‘Tribal’ Threshold in Late-Colonial Uganda: The 
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Natal and Northern Rhodesia’, Planning Perspectives, 15 (2000), p. 327.  
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(Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1970), p. 98. 
46 See e.g. R. Harris, ‘Development and hybridity made concrete in the colonies’, Environment and Planning 
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domestic habits (see the next section on ‘improvement’). For this class, semi-detached houses 
with a yard were a favourite design in many colonies.49  
These better-class neighbourhoods were often called ‘model townships’. Most model 
townships were built after 1945, displaying “more extensive, involved, integrated plans with more 
elaborate forms” than earlier grid-iron bachelor schemes.50 Sometimes they involved transforming 
existing pre-colonial urban areas, as in the case of Ng’ambo in Zanzibar, which had existed since 
the mid-1850s, and was redesigned and segmented along race and class lines in the late 1940s.51 
More often they were built from scratch. In Nairobi, for example, a number of schemes with 
shops, schools, social centres and sports facilities popped up after the war, starting with an 
“experimental” scheme called Ziwani.52 And it was not just municipalities and central government 
agencies that built model townships. Employers often copied them for their own workers, such 
as Makongeni in Nairobi, which was built by the railways for its 5,000 workers, and boasted “welfare 
clinics, a club, a library and reading room, a dance hall and tea room, football grounds and even 
tennis courts.”53 Similarly in Bulawayo, both municipal and employer-built model townships were 
constructed from the 1950s.  
Once the policy of labour stabilisation was under way, and it was to some extent accepted 
that permanent African communities would grow in the urban areas, the right to buy homes on 
leasehold or freehold title was tentatively introduced. This was considered an important way to 
appease the emergent middle class and further stabilise communities, and is the subject of chapter 
4. Many colonial officials debated the various merits of home ownership, seeing it as a way to root 
people in the town and abandon their rural roots.54 The extension of tenure rights to urban 
Africans was not a linear process, however. In Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the legislation 
periodically changed, such that tenure rights were extended and then later curtailed again.55  
In these ways, evidently, the post-war development drive did translate into significant 
tangible outcomes in many cities. Whilst there is still a lot of work required to document 
 
49 S. Dalberto, H. Charton and O. Goerg, ‘Urban Planning, housing and the making of ‘responsible citizens’ 
in the late colonial period: Dakar, Nairobi and Conakry’, in S. Bekker and L. Fourchard (eds.), Governing 
Cities in Africa (Cape Town, HSRC Press, 2013),’ p. 51 
50 Myers, ‘Designing Power’, p. 201 
51 Ibid., p. 199 
52 Anderson, ‘Corruption at City Hall’, p. 147. 
53 L.W. Thornton White, L. Silberman & P.R. Anderson, Nairobi: Master Plan for a Colonial Capital. A 
Report Prepared for the Municipal Council of Nairobi (London, HMSO, 1948), p. 18, quoted in Anderson, 
‘Corruption at City Hall’, p. 147.  
54 A notable proponent of these views was Sir Ernst Vasey, of the Nairobi City Council, who wrote a lengthy 
and influential report on the matter in 1950. 
55 See R. Davenport, ‘African Townsmen? South African Natives (Urban Areas) Legislation through the 
Years’, African Affairs, 68, 271 (1969), pp. 95-109. 
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systematically how Africans were housed and the extent to which the development promise was 
delivered, much of the scholarly interest is on how development was conceived as a way to 
improve and uplift African townspeople, a project framed by colonial authorities as one of their 
moral obligations, but usually analysed in a post-structural framework as a way to render Africans 
more governable. 
 
Improvement: making responsible citizens 
 
To colonial authorities, building stable communities involved more than the provision of 
entitlements such as modern housing and amenities.  It also meant helping tribal Africans adjust 
to this new environment by moulding them into modern townspeople. This was attempted 
through modifications to the built environment and careful management of the private and public 
activities of the residents. Hence, it involved more elaborate and sophisticated state interventions 
in the lives of Africans to guide and shape their conduct than had hitherto taken place in the 
comparatively laissez-faire interwar period. 
 
Improvement through Space 
 
The colonial obsession with imposing a top-down ‘order’ on urban space represented a strong 
environmental determinist philosophy. As Garth Myers phrased it, colonial officials always saw 
the work of rule as “a highly geographical project”.56 Colonial planners were inspired to seek 
“physicalist solutions to social, economic and political ills”.57 This geographical project entailed a 
range of direct and indirect modes of governing through space, from segregation and surveillance 
to the ‘model townships’ believed to improve the character of their inhabitants. This sub-section 
discusses some of the “spatial strategies” universally employed, and how they changed in the late 
colonial period.  
Most colonial towns shared a number of generic spatial forms after the 1840s, when a 
planning model that had evolved since the early 1600s was replicated across the empire. This 
model included the following features: planning and laying out the town in advance of occupation; 
laying wide streets in geometric gridiron form; demarcating a central public square; demarcating 
 
56 G. Myers, Verandahs of Power: Colonialism and Space in Urban Africa (New York, Syracuse University Press, 
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spacious, rectangular plots of standard size; allocating some plots for public purposes; and leaving 
a commonage or green belt encircling the town to distinguish it from the countryside.58  
From early on, racial segregation was a key feature of colonial towns. Africans were 
confined to certain areas, known as ‘locations’, separated by buffer zones from European, and 
sometimes also ‘Asian’ and ‘Coloured’, residential areas. Dualism was one of the defining feature 
of colonial cities (although in recent decades there has been more recognition of the actual 
hybridity of colonial urban space59). One reason for keeping the colonised separate from the 
settler population was health concerns, namely the spread of disease. This planning feature is 
therefore often referred to as the “sanitation syndrome”.60 Africans in the locations would be 
subject to compulsory medical checks.  
Another interpretation of why Africans were restricted to locations, was that they 
facilitated a ready cheap labour supply for industrialists. This Marxian interpretation was based on 
the assumption that the colonial state was entirely “captured” by capital. However, this 
reductionist account of the state as “a sentient being organising capital’s hegemony”61 has since 
been revised. More sophisticated understandings of the state’s relation to capital see the former 
as the “protector of capitalist social relations” but not a blind “servant of capital”.62 Jennifer 
Robinson argues that the colonial state was a semi-autonomous actor.63 It used locations as a 
“territorial strategy” to enhance its relatively weak control over the colonised, which she calls the 
“Location strategy”.64  This functionalist, centralised interpretation of colonial planning remains 
popular.  
Influx controls through pass laws and registration systems ensured that only people in 
productive employment resided in towns. South Africa stuck to its guns on this policy, but other 
colonies loosened these systems of control from the mid-1950s. For example, the East Africa 
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Royal Commission (1955) and the Southern Rhodesia Urban Affairs Commission (1958) regarded 
them as both impracticable and inhibiting of the exchange economy.65  
A less strategic, less direct, and more diffuse form of spatial power is identified by 
Timothy Mitchell in his study of colonial Egypt. He argues that modern practices of drawing up 
plans – of streets, rooms, courtyards with exact dimensions and magnitudes – “introduce space as 
something apparently abstract and neutral, a series of inert frames or containers”, within which 
things and people can be divided and contained.66  This produces certain effects which Mitchell 
calls ‘enframing’.  Enframing makes the isolated subject feel contained and surveyed, and thereby 
induces self-regulatory behaviours. Other ways of ordering space that do not have this enframing 
effect, then appear as fundamental disorder.  
Whilst Mitchell’s cogent account of governance in Egypt cannot be so neatly applied to 
many other colonies in Africa (such as Swaziland or Uganda67),  it is a useful way to understand 
the common perception that colonial planners had of pre-colonial and unregulated colonial-era 
African settlements as fundamentally disorderly and undisciplined. Colonial planners perceived a 
number of ills resulting therefrom, such as a lack of social conscience and sense of responsibility,68 
requiring “physicalist solutions” in the form of top-down impositions of grid-like order.69 For this 
reason, they often razed unregulated settlements and replaced them with grid-iron ones, or 
embarked on “clearing out and cleaning up” campaigns in existing urban areas such as around 
Stone Town in Zanzibar.70 The overall effect in many new colonial African townships was a sense 
of ‘containment’ and surveillance. Indeed, a leading African nationalist in Rhodesia described 
them as “nothing but enlarged and consolidated back quarters for servants”.71  
The concept of ‘enframing’ applies at the scale of the individual house, too. Plans for 
colonial houses conjured a neutral framework within which things could be precisely placed, with 
a clear distinction between “inside” and “outside”. This usually contrasted with different senses 
of order in precolonial homes, where objects were not just arranged differently, but the whole 
space was not conceived as a neutral container of things. Colonial planners, of course, did not 
consciously view the order they imposed in terms of its ‘enframing’ effects. However, they did 
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regard African housing as a “vital instructional space” for managing detribalisation and 
modernisation.72 This explicit connection between domestic design and the improvement of 
moral character had its origins in 19th century Britain and her early colonies. For example, in 19th 
century Lahore, British officials had believed that traditional domestic architecture “eschewed 
progressive change”.73  
In the late colonial period, it was particularly the emergent middle class who were induced 
to “voluntarily and freely submit themselves to certain forms of behaviour”74 through their 
occupation of model townships and homes. As Dalberto et al. argue, “government housing 
programmes were developed to encourage specific social, economic and cultural groups to 
internalise the anticipated roles and behaviours of the new ‘responsible’ urban African citizen.”75 
The concept of model townships had its roots in turn-of-the-century utopian planning ideologies, 
such as the English planner Sir Howard Ebenezer’s concept of a garden city.  The Scottish planner 
Patrick Geddes conceived of the planner as a “miracle-worker” who would create “wonders of 
beauty and veritable transformation schemes”.76  
An early example of a model township inspired by these utopian ideas was McNamee 
Village in Port Elizabeth, Union of South Africa, built in 1936. Robinson describes how the 
planning process was “surrounded by a self-consciously noble, liberal, and even religious 
rhetoric”, and the resultant township was hailed as “a model throughout the Union and beyond”.77  
Each house had “a closed-in front garden, fenced in by trim hedges, in which residents grew grass 
lawns and flowers or cultivated vegetables.”78  It resembled a garden city with a central open space 
from which roads radiated outward: 
The houses were to be situated on numerous cul-de-sacs which were on the one hand 
intended to provide privacy, variation in appearance and safe playing areas for children. 
On the other hand they were employed in order significantly to reduce the costs of service 
provision (water, sewerage, electricity) by cutting down the road frontage.79 
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Here, Robinson succinctly presents the interplay of utopian ideals with very material imperatives, 
namely to reduce costs. It is something that the post-structural focus on the late colonial rationalities 
of government tends to occlude; namely, the practicalities of actually delivering housing and 
services.   
 
Responsibilisation through Social Programmes 
 
If spatial strategies to discipline and improve were subtle and not always verbally articulated, social 
programmes to inculcate a sense of financial, political, cultural and moral responsibility in Africans 
were more explicit. Officials moved “far beyond the narrow economic focus of early colonial 
planning” in their attempts to improve the “entire world of the African”.80 These concerted post-
war efforts to make African people modern reflected fundamental changes in race-thinking. The 
scientific racism that had been prevalent until the Second World War held that only those who 
were phenotypically ‘White’ could achieve “White genius and Western civilizational prowess”. 
However, this gave way to a more meritocratic post-war idea that Black Africans could reach 
levels of “White genius” too.81 This was reflected in the post-war idea of modernisation as a 
universal process, which, as Cooper argues, “had a liberating element to it which gave it 
considerable credibility among people emerging from colonial rule and those sympathetic to their 
actions: all people, regardless of origins, could participate in progress and enjoy its fruits.”82  
The most explicit techniques for social engineering in the late colonial period were 
organised home making, recreational and cultural activities. Churches had played an important 
role in this regard until municipalities became more proactive in the late colonial period, especially 
through their ‘social welfare departments’. Domestic science classes and home-craft clubs targeted 
women to become good housewives and home makers, modelled on European bourgeois 
domesticity.83 They also organised recreational activities and other participatory activities, “aimed 
at nurturing responsible African townsmen, implanting a new civic identity among the formerly 
‘detribalized.’”84 Officials often believed that with these activities they were filling a cultural 
vacuum in these detribalising communities, apparently oblivious to grassroots initiatives in 
cultural, associational and political life. African townspeople often resented the paternalism of 
official programmes, and repurposed community facilities for their own self-organised activities, 
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or battled with authorities to be allowed to run their own organisations, as happened with 
organised African football in Bulawayo.85  
Chapter 5 deals with this moral notion of making Africans ‘responsible’. But in order to 
complement existing literature which has focused more on the social engineering programmes 
just mentioned, the chapter instead examines less programmatic and more politically contested 
types of responsibility – namely financial and governing responsibility. Financial responsibility was 
associated with the essence of “economic man”, which was what many officials began to promote 
in British Africa in the 1950s. Across Eastern and Southern Africa, conferences and commissions 
began talking about “the need for the native to become and be treated as an economic person”, 
through the ownership of his own home.86   
Home ownership was therefore rationalised not only as a convenient way to offload 
housing costs from municipalities onto individuals (discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis), and to 
create stability and contentment especially in middle class communities (chapter 4 of this thesis), 
but also, crucially, as a way to help Africans absorb the “cultivating influences of our modern 
civilisation” (as a Nairobi municipal officer put it in 194587) and take up an entrepreneurial spirit, 
which is the way it is examined in chapter 5. By thus acquiring a sense of “economic value”, 
Africans were expected to become more industrious and less tempted by the lures of communism.  
Governing responsibility, acquired through participation in ‘urban management’, is the 
second type discussed in chapter 5. The universal system for training Africans in urban 
management was the ‘African Advisory Board’ system, or some variant of this. Such boards were 
conceived both as a form of indirect representation for Africans in local government, in lieu of 
full political rights, and a form of apprenticeship in urban management for the Board Members. 
Restricted to an advisory role, these boards were usually toothless, and a far cry from full political 
rights of the urban citizen that African nationalists demanded in most colonies in the 1950s. Even 
Europeans recognised the obsolescence of these advisory systems but were reluctant to offer 
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direct representation on municipal councils.88  In Rhodesia, the advisory board system remained 
in operation until 1978 just 2 years before independence.  
In some colonies, forms of limited direct representation in local government were 
tentatively offered to Africans. For example, in Northern Rhodesia, there was some 
experimentation with creating self-governing African towns,89 but in most of its urban areas the 
Government tried to introduce direct representation and faced obstruction from the municipal 
councils until independence.90 In Dar es Salaam, the African areas were converted into ward 
councils under the municipal council. But their powers were negligible; the government placed no 
faith in elected African representatives, and African interest in the system was not successfully 
stimulated.91 In Rhodesia, various heavily contested options of direct representation on the ‘parent 
council’ or the creation of semi-self-governing townships were mooted, but never came to much. 
 
Nurturing Responsible Drinkers 
 
Colonial authorities were also particularly concerned with encouraging morally ‘responsible’ and 
‘respectable’ behaviour around the consumption of alcohol. They felt that alcohol consumption 
should be carefully monitored, and they demonised illicit drinking for its socially degenerative 
effects. Alcohol legislation discriminated against Africans, and law breakers were punished 
harshly, sometimes with eviction. Therefore, alcohol was deeply connected with African urban 
citizenship, and is the subject of chapter 6. 
Discriminatory liquor legislation in most colonies meant the only alcoholic beverage on 
offer to Africans was traditional, opaque ‘African beer’92 made from sorghum and rapoko, with a 
weaker alcohol content. They were prohibited from drinking clear ‘European beer’, wines and 
spirits. It was only in the 1950s that such restrictions were relaxed. In Southern Rhodesia, the 
lifting of restrictions happened incrementally and on a social class basis: first European beer and 
wines were allowed, then spirits a few years later, with educated Africans being given permits 
some years ahead of the rest.  
In order to control drinking whilst profiting in the process, a universal system was 
developed, whereby colonial municipal councils monopolised the sale of African beer and made 
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sure it was consumed in municipal amenities. This beer monopoly system generated substantial 
revenues for municipalities, to fund township development. It was pioneered in Durban, and has 
therefore come to be known as the “Durban system”. Its origins go back to the 1908 Natal Native 
Beer Act, which enabled municipalities to exercise a monopoly on beer sales within their 
jurisdictions, with revenues going to a special ‘Native Administration’ fund, to be used for African 
welfare provisions (schools, hospitals, hostels, etc.). Durban jumped at this opportunity, and 
according to Swanson, “Beer revenues became the key financial support of a more intensive and 
comprehensive programme of paternalistic administration than ever before…”93 It spread to 
several colonies to the north, including the Rhodesias, and as far north as Uganda and Sudan.94 
This system produced the classic “municipal beer hall” in most colonial towns. Municipal 
beer halls tended to be austere, were only open during daylight hours, and only sold African beer 
(until legislative changes came in). They were especially uninviting to elite men, who came to 
favour the illicit drinking dens in people’s homes, known as ‘shebeens’, where they could 
clandestinely enjoy ‘European beer’ or home-brewed spirits in cosy surroundings, unsupervised.95 
Some municipalities, such as Bulawayo, therefore adopted a dual strategy of crackdowns on 
shebeens and illicit brewing, and putting in extra effort to improve the atmosphere of municipal 
facilities to try to entice punters away from shebeens. 
The combination of discriminatory liquor legislation, uninviting municipal beer halls, and 
heavy-handed crackdowns on shebeens and illicit brewing tended to provoke moral and political 
struggles between authorities and residents in many urban areas. These battles were waged along 
class and anti-colonial lines. In the 1930s and ‘40s the emerging African middle classes made 
demands for equal drinking rights to the European settlers on the basis that they were now as 
‘civilised’ as them; but they were less inclined to defend these rights for their uneducated African 
brethren.96 From the 1950s, African nationalists encouraged (and sometimes pressured) township 
residents to boycott or even sabotage municipal drinking facilities as symbols of state oppression, 
and valorised the shebeen as a site of resistance.97 For example, in the Northern Rhodesian 
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Legislative Assembly in 1962, one African member proclaimed: “I think as soon as we have an 
African government in this country, [beerhalls] will be the first thing it will hit at.”98  
This section has presented post-war trends in state-led urban development across British 
Africa – from laissez-faire to more sophisticated interventions, in order to promote stabilisation 
and improvement of African townspeople, usually within their own segregated areas. As Myers 
states, “We must be cautious about making a blanket argument, but there are enough 
commonalities, especially for the British colonies, to speak of a general pattern”.99 Commonalities 
resulted from the spreading of ideas and lessons through several key institutions. There was of 
course the Colonial Office in London, from which top-down directives were issued to the 
colonies. Then there were also horizontal connections between cities across the continent, 
through direct correspondence and sharing of ideas and experiences; through the Journal of African 
Administration (est. 1949); and through regional organisations such as the Southern African Institute 
of Administrators of Non-European Affairs (est. 1952), whose members would meet at annual 
conferences and also acquire standardised administrators’ diplomas. 
But what is also important, and in need of explanation, is the variations in urban 
development policy and practice. Firstly, there were obvious variations between colonies. The 
Colonial Office did not impose blanket policies on the colonies. Its officials realised that, “It was 
always necessary to strike a balance between the need for a general pan-African advance and the 
recognition of the tremendous variety of conditions in the individual colonies”.100 As Berman 
argues: “The relationship between the Colonial Office and individual colonies tended to be less 
one of direct command and more a complex and often protracted process of bargaining and 
negotiation”.101 Indeed, colonial officials often circumvented directives from London for 
ideological and practical reasons, realising how difficult it was to implement Colonial Office 
modernisation projects.102 Southern Rhodesia, which attained responsible self-government in 
1923, was a dominion in all but name, and therefore enjoyed considerable independence in African 
affairs.103  
 
98 Job Michello, Proceedings of the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council (NRLC), 18 June 1962, para. 804. In C. 
Ambler, ‘Alcohol, Racial Segregation and Popular Politics in Northern Rhodesia’, Journal of African History, 
31 (1990), p. 295 
99 Myers, ‘Designing Power’, p.194 
100 Pearce, The Turning Point, p. 49 
101 B. Berman, Control and crisis in colonial Kenya: The dialectic of domination. (Nairobi, East African Publishers, 
1992). p. 76 
102 A. Eckert, ‘Regulating the social: social security, social welfare and the state in late colonial Tanzania.’ The 
Journal of African History 45,3 (2004), pp. 467-489. 
103 The Colonial Office could veto discriminatory legislation, but never did, until the European settler 
regime unilaterally declared independence from Britain on 11th November, 1965. 
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Secondly, colonial states were themselves decentralised to varying degrees, giving 
municipalities space to formulate their own development agendas and strategies, which resulted 
in internal variation between towns and cities. In Rhodesia, with its English-style local government 
system, municipalities enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Indeed, they had much more 
responsibility in terms of housing provision than English councils, as well as significant powers 
in terms of administering and legislating in their areas.104  This enabled municipal councils not 
only to unite in a ‘Local Government Association’ which challenged Central Government on 
urban policy and legislation, but also to pursue their own agendas which sometimes challenged 
the urban policy framework of Central Government. To understand this, we need more focus on 
municipal actors and agendas over a sustained period. 
  
Seeing like a second city 
 
Since the state came to play a much greater interventionist role in urban African affairs after the 
war, new urban policy frameworks were devised. But within these national frameworks there was 
always room for municipal manoeuvre. In Rhodesia, this room for manoeuvre enabled 
municipalities to do more than just execute Government policies with a greater or lesser degree 
of enthusiasm. It allowed the municipal councils – and especially an autonomous one like 
Bulawayo’s – to establish their own institutional cultures and local ways of doing things, to 
formulate a local development vision and tap into decentralised knowledge exchange networks.  
This section makes the case for longer-term processual analyses of township development, as 
planned and carried out at the municipal level. It furthermore explains why it is important to 
counterbalance the predominant focus on ‘power over’ colonial subjects, with accounts of local state 
actors’ ‘power to’ mobilise resources in order to get things done.105  
 
104On the other hand, they had fewer responsibilities in the domains of health and education, though the 
Bulawayo Council did begin to build schools with beer profits from the 1950s. C. Palley, The Constitutional 
History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965 (Oxford, OUP, 1966), p. 644 
105 Cf. theories of urban governance in modern Western cities, and particularly Clarence Stone’s ‘regime 
theory’: e,g. B. Peters and J. Pierre, ‘Urban Governance’, in P. John, K. Mossberger and S. Clarke, The 
Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics (Oxford, OUP, 2012), pp. 71-86; C. Stone, Regime Politics: Governing 
Atlanta 1946-1988 (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1989). 
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In recent decades it has become a truism to say that the state was not a “monolithic agent 
of domination”106, thanks to some historians’ efforts to “thoroughly unpick” the colonial state.107  
An excellent example of this disaggregation of the state is Saul Dubow’s pioneering analysis of 
ideological tensions between different Central Government departments in South Africa, with 
respect to their approaches to ‘native affairs’ and race relations.108 But most of the literature on 
intra-state tensions is concerned with rural development policy, rather than urban development 
policy.109 This is the case for the Zimbabwean historiography, where in recent decades scholars 
have increasingly shed light on the significant tensions within the Rhodesian state, but particularly 
with regards to rural development policy: agrarian policy, conservation policy, land redistribution, 
the creation of reserves, etc.110 William Munro was early to recognise this character of the 
Rhodesian state, writing in 1998:   
In general, scholarly depictions of the “colonial settler state” have implied a cohesion, 
continuity, and institutional effectiveness that an analysis of rural development policy 
calls into question… [Community development] highlights not only a growing 
incoherence and ineffectiveness of social control strategies, but also a state profoundly 
weakened by internal tensions.111 
However, in the historiography of colonial urbanism in Rhodesia and beyond, intra-state tensions 
are often elided in depictions of the colonial city as an ideal-type – a space shaped by the coherent, 
intentional efforts of a unitary state to render the subject population legible and manageable, in 
the high modernist manner reminiscent of James Scott’s “Seeing Like a State”.112  This approach 
elides the different ways of “seeing” at the central and municipal government levels, and the 
financially, administratively and ideologically-based conflicts that these differences gave rise to. 
Often taking capital cities as exemplars of “the” colonial city, the scholarship has focused on 
identifying the general functionality of the African townships to an overarching state strategy of 
 
106 J. Alexander, ‘Rethinking the state and political opposition through the prism of the prison,’ Critical 
African Studies 4,6 (2011), p. 70 
107 A. Burton and M. Jennings, ‘Introduction: The Emperor’s New Clothes? Continuities in Governance in 
Late Colonial and Early Postcolonial East Africa’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 40, 1 (2007), 
p. 1 
108 S. Dubow, ‘Holding ‘a just balance between white and black’: the native affairs department in South 
Africa c. 1920–33’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 12,2, (1986), pp. 217-239. 
109 See e.g. F. Becker, ‘The Bureaucratic Performance of Development in Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Tanzania’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 35, 1 (2014), pp. 61-76; and the special issue of the Journal 
of African History, 41, 1 (2000): ‘Lessons Learned: Development Experiences in the Late Colonial Period’. 
All of the studies are rural. 
110 For further discussion of the pinnacle of technocratic intervention in the rural context – the Native 
Land Husbandry Act – and its impact on urban areas, see chapter 4. 
111 W. Munro, The Moral Economy of the State: Conservation, Community Development, and State Making in 
Zimbabwe (Centre for International Studies, Ohio, 1998), p. 143 
112 J. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have failed (New Haven, 
Yale Uni Press, 1999). 
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maintaining control and garnering consent. For example, Robinson refers to townships/locations 
as a “state territorial strategy”113; Myers seeks to uncover the “forms and purposes of model 
townships”;114 Jennings claims: “Development in Tanganyika in the 1940s and 1950s was at heart 
an attempt to create a new form of society, a new identity, forged by the state, and oriented 
towards the vision of that state,”115 and connects this to “efforts to create systems and structures 
of power and control.”116 And Hickel talks about a singular state vision, for example: 
Recognizing that urban Africans – who were needed as labour – could not be 
“retribalized”, and fearing that social anomie would give rise to political unrest, the state 
undertook to forcibly relocate slum residents into segregated planned townships, where 
they could be “civilized” for the purposes of control. This was a reluctant colonialism – 
an unwilling embrace of the civilizing mission – and a considerably more expensive back-
up plan devised to deal with the leakages of indirect rule. It was the state’s perception of 
urban Africans as “in-between” and “polluted” that propelled this new modernizing 
project.117 
Some post-structuralist frameworks of analysis present late colonial reforms in an even more 
schematic fashion, as a shift from one universal governmental rationality to another. For example, 
in his analysis of changing official justifications for African township housing in late colonial 
Uganda, Andrew Byerley identifies a clear shift in the “operative rationality of colonial 
governmentality”, from a “sovereign diagram that crudely won extractive-effects from indistinct 
colonial bodies” (pre-WWII), to an “anatomo-political diagram” that formed “docile” and 
“productive” bodies (1945-53), to a “bio-political diagram” where “a modern rationality of power 
aimed to conduct the conduct of a population in the seemingly self-regulating field of the social…” 
(1953-60).118 Inspired by Foucault’s totalising conceptions of power (biopower and 
governmentality), such studies focus on the state’s “political, regulatory and disciplinary practices 
as opposed to other functions like service delivery”. 119   
Whilst earlier generations of urban geographers, anthropologists and historians must be 
given due credit for their empirical work on African township development, there is still a lack of 
 
113 Robinson, ‘A Perfect System of Control?’.  
114 Myers, ‘Designing Power’. 
115 Jennings, ‘Building Better People’, p. 94 
116 Jennings, ‘Building Better People’, p. 97 
117 J. Hickel, ‘Social Engineering and Revolutionary Consciousness: Domestic Transformations in Colonial 
South Africa’, History and Anthropology, 23, 3 (2012), p. 309 
118 Byerley, ‘Mind the Gap!’, p. 431. See also D. Scott, ‘Colonial governmentality, Social text, 43 (1995), pp. 
191-220. See also D. Scott, ‘Colonial governmentality’, Social text 43 (1995), pp. 191-220. 
119 T. Bierschenk and J-P. Olivier de Sardan, ‘Ethnographies of Public Services in Africa: An Emerging 
Research Paradigm’ in T. Bierschenk and J-P. Olivier de Sardan (eds), States at work: Dynamics of African 
Bureaucracies (Leiden, Brill, 2014) p. 53 
27 
 
systematic analysis of how these townships were actually built up over time, and the key agents, 
development visions, institutional norms and practices, and knowledge exchange networks, that 
emerged in different towns through these processes. Harris and Hay noted in 2007 that, “No 
systematic attempt has been made, for any of the colonies in question [Kenya, Tanganyika, 
Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia], to document how urban Africans were housed.”120 
And Kirsten Rüther et al. point out that, still, “No systematic and comparative attempt has been 
made so far to document in a long-term perspective how the implementation of housing for 
Africans worked.”121 Thus, the legacy of colonial urbanism is usually conceived in rather generic 
terms,122 something Natalie Moss notes in her recent study of local government in Kenya: “The 
legacies bequeathed to local authorities differed immensely between councils, and this had 
important consequences for the post-colonial trajectories of local government in different 
regions”.123  
In this respect, the literature on apartheid South Africa has paid the most attention to 
tensions between municipal councils and central government.124 For example, whilst Jennifer 
Robinson ultimately views African townships in quite functional terms (see above), her in-depth 
studies of Port Elizabeth’s City Council do emphasise the “competing and fragmenting tendencies 
within the institutional apparatus” of the state.125  Just like Bulawayo, PE had been singled out for 
its neglect of African housing in the interwar period, before it switched to become one of the 
models of progressive township administration in SA.126  Having thus reformed, the PE Council 
found itself resisting apartheid policies and resenting the “high-handed manner” of policy 
making.127 Thus, the PE council had to find ways of gaining access to development resources 
“without being co-opted into implementing undesirable and ‘unreasonable’ policies.”128 Even 
when PE’s urban African administration became more aligned with central government in the 
 
120 A. Hay and R. Harris. "‘Shauri ya Sera Kali’: the colonial regime of urban housing in Kenya to 1939." 
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1950s, it retained a local character, and “attachments to the interests and needs of the locality and 
the people who lived there remained important.”129  Particularly important in Robinson’s analysis 
is her attention to key local administrators, notably John McNamee.130  
Urban histories of Rhodesia, by contrast, have focused more on the experiences and 
resistances of township residents. Thus, we have richly detailed accounts of urban political 
movements131, residents’ associations132, municipal beer hall boycotts133, culture and sporting 
associations134; struggles of the urban poor135 and women136, residents’ unequal access to 
municipal water infrastructure137 and electricity infrastructure138, and other everyday social 
histories139. There has been little sustained interest in the state actors and processes involved in 
urban development and governance. Busani Mpofu’s insightful study of African housing and 
services in Bulawayo140 and Patel and Adams’ case study of the Chirambuhayo settlement in 
Salisbury141 are among the few exceptions. Yet, if the post-WWII period is important for 
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understanding colonial legacies of administration and governance on the continent at large, then 
it is particularly important in the case of Rhodesia, where independence was achieved only 35 
years after the war – an extended period for the consolidation of late colonial developmental ideas, 
norms, and practices. 
The consequence for the post-colonial scholarship on Zimbabwe has been a reference to 
a rather generic Rhodesian legacy, citing Salisbury as an exemplar of “the” Rhodesian city, with 
scant attention to the alternative development trajectories of Bulawayo and smaller secondary 
towns. A notable exception is Preben Kaarsholm, who observed that: 
One thing which seems particular to the history of Bulawayo is the ‘liberalism’ and the 
high-profile modernisation ideology which was characteristic of the City Council's 
African Administration (later Welfare and Amenities) Department from about 1953 
onwards…Many people in Bulawayo also tend to be proud of what they claim to be the 
relatively higher standards of their townships as compared to those of Harare, of the 
housing provided and of the municipal welfare and community services offered.142 
But as the evidence in this thesis bears out, we cannot make sense of Bulawayo’s comparatively 
progressive developments in terms of disembedded ‘liberal’ and ‘modernist’ ideas alone. These 
ideas were deeply embedded in struggles to mobilise resources and get things done. They were as 
much about rationalising pragmatic actions as they were guiding principles for action.143  In order 
to examine this embeddedness of developmental ideas in everyday problem-solving practices, the 
thesis opens the ‘black box’ of the machinery of the state144, to uncover the protracted planning 
and negotiation processes involved in township development. 
Bulawayo presents a particularly interesting case of urban administrators wielding 
significant agency and authority in local development, to the extent of influencing national policy 
‘from below’. The findings of this inquiry confirm Bernstein and Mertz’s observation that,  
[I]t is simply not the case that some parts of the state decide while others merely carry 
out those decisions in a humdrum, mechanical fashion. Actual bureaucrats in actual 
bureaucracies, just like people in all sorts of other settings, constantly make decisions, 
 
142 Kaarsholm, ‘Si Ye Pambili?’, pp. 226 and 232.  
143 Cf. Nicholas Rose on modern governmental rationalities in Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2004), pp. 24-28 
144 This notion is discussed by Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, ‘Ethnographies of Public Services in 
Africa’, p. 41 
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interact with others, exceed their own control. As a lived social world, the administrative 
setting is not as drab and lifeless as it appears from the outside.145 
This approach resonates with recent ethnographies of state bureaucracies in present-day Africa146 
and the Indian subcontinent.147 As the anthropologist Nayanika Mathur points out, bureaucratic 
practices: 
do not occur mechanically despite that oft-repeated metaphor of the machine of the 
state…with all its connotations of a unitary system working on automatic. The 
intentionality that is often attributed to the state-as-monolith collapses once the 
ethnographic black box… is opened up...148 
Examining the social world of the local state bureaucracy in this way provides insights into 
Bulawayo’s particularism, and the particular legacy it bequeathed to the post-colony, which is 
vitally important for both historical and contemporary urban studies in the country.149  The next 
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This thesis is based upon archival research and oral history interviews conducted in Zimbabwe 
and the UK. I visited Zimbabwe four times between 2015-18 for a total of 11 months.150 In this 




Archives were my main source of information. The major part of my inquiry was conducted at 
the Bulawayo City Council archive (BCCA). The Chronicle Newspaper archive (Bulawayo) and 
National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ, Harare and Bulawayo branches) were also invaluable 
sources of information. Additionally, I retrieved a few documents and magazines from the Oxford 
Bodleian Library and the Edinburgh University Special Collections.  
My project took shape at the BCCA. But this was not a linear process, and I was not the 
only one directing its course.  Out of tens of thousands of intricate and endlessly repetitive details 
of daily administration obtained at the City Hall archive – from council and committee minutes, 
reports, and numerous official correspondences on issues of housing, recreation, schools, trading, 
beer gardens, clinics, schools, etc. – a sense of the council’s routine functioning and rhythm began 
to emerge. Faced with more information available than I could ever begin to process, I decided 
to set the parameters of the study in the last decades of white rule in Rhodesia. I compiled an 
extensive digital archive of housing, the liquor undertaking, recreation, welfare, trading and 
industry – but subsequently narrowed the focus to housing schemes, and the integral beer gardens 
(an appendage to every scheme) and township advisory boards.  Yet the broader range of my data 
was always useful for a holistic overview of township administration.  
Even the narrower focus left me with an overwhelming amount of documentation to 
process, as I was not interested in the mere outcomes of specific schemes, but rather in following 
protracted development processes over time. Even a fairly minor decision might pass through 
multiple departments (e.g. Town Clerk’s, City Engineer’s, African Admin), and committees (e.g. 
Finance, African Admin., Works, General Purposes, etc.) before finally arriving in the Council 
 
150 I also spent three months in Zambia conducting research at the National Archives in Lusaka and in the 
second city of Ndola, on African housing in Ndola in the 1950s. I used these documents to get a sense of 




Chamber for a vote. Often decisions fizzled out or were deferred somewhere along this process, 
but usually endlessly renegotiated. Whilst there was often a master folder(s) dedicated to any one 
housing scheme or issue, to follow every step in the policy process usually involved following the 
paper trail through multiple folders and minutes. Given the time involved, I created a digital 
archive of many thousands of documents from relevant folders, to consult throughout the writing 
up process.  
At the BCCA, I was not the only active agent in the research process. The Senior Records 
Assistant, Elias Mdluli, played an important role, since, in the absence of a complete archive 
catalogue151, he retrieved folders that he deemed both directly relevant, and of potential tangential 
interest, based on my initially vague inquiries. This meant that, especially in the early stages of 
research, he played a significant role in directing the course of my inquiry into areas I did not 
know existed. But even as my later inquiries became more specific, he would occasionally surprise 
me with interesting documents, reports, folders that I could not know to ask for. For this I am 
very grateful. The experience of working at the City Hall was educative in itself. Through informal 
conversations with several officers, clerks, and typists, I learnt about the historical identity of the 
institution and was put in touch with several informants.  
I treated the Council archive not just as a source, but also as a subject, by analysing the 
affective quality of the bureaucratic correspondence and report-writing. This approach has been 
called “reading along the archival grain” by Ann Stoler, who questions the common assumption 
in colonial studies that colonial states were characterised by efficient scientific management, and 
that they were therefore “information-hungry machines” and “laboratories of modernity”.152 She 
draws attention to the sentiments, such as doubt, expressed in the archive. Rather than treating these 
affective dimensions as a smokescreen of rule, she argues for taking them seriously as constitutive 
of colonial rationalities of rule. Although she focuses on 19th century Dutch colonialism which 
differs in important ways from modes of rule in post-war Rhodesia, I found this way of 
approaching the archive to be useful. It drew my attention to the leveraging of different notions 
of ‘common sense’ to make a point (even in the most mundane correspondences), the anxieties 
around conceptual categories upon which urban governance was based, and some of the 
deliberate strategies of not-knowing.    
 
151 It is currently being digitalised and completed. 
152 A. Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2009). 
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I also paid attention to the materiality of the bureaucracy.153 Bureaucrats claim to 
“represent, engage with, or constitute realities ‘in the world’ independent of the processes that 
produce documents,” but this is not the case.154 Regimes of paper documents and filing systems 
actually shape governance. Hull refers to such documents as “graphic artefacts”. I paid attention 
to the role that graphic artefacts such as rent cards and lease agreements played in the process of 
establishing the citizenship status of Africans in the city. For example, Bulawayo’s unique rent 
card system was said to give Africans some sense of “proprietorship” and “responsibility”; lease 
agreements were vital evidence of tenure rights for residents, but they often failed to materialise 
for a long time after occupation, during which time lease conditions were altered, creating 
contestation between officials and African home owners. 
At the Chronicle archive, hundreds of themed boxes full of newspaper clippings, dating 
back to the early colonial period, made for efficient searches on key topics, ranging from township 
housing, industrial development, and city council affairs, to news about politics and development 
in Salisbury City and the nation at large. This newspaper proved an invaluable source. At the NAZ 
and the Bodleian, I obtained information on the Rhodesian Government’s African housing policy, 




The interviews played an important part in my understanding of the more ephemeral aspects of 
colonial governance that the archives omit (even when read along the grain), such as the 
institutional culture of the City Council and its African Administration Department, racial 
privilege and prejudice within the administration, the way Council African employees were 
regarded by their communities during the anti-colonial struggle, etc. The interview data is not as 
central to the final analysis as the archive data, due to the study’s fine-grained focus on particular 
development processes.  
I conducted oral history interviews in English with seven former employees of the AAD 
(5 Black, 2 White), three former residents’ association leaders, the son of the African 
Administration Director (Ashton), one former councillor, a few post-independence mayors and 
 
153 Inspired esp. by Matthew Hull’s Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 2012). 
154 Hull, Government of Paper, p. 5. 
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town clerks, and a number of civilians who had been politically active in the past and present.155 
Apart from correspondence with three interviewees via email, all of the interviews were conducted 
in person and were between 40 minutes and 1.5 hours duration, but mostly over an hour. With 
two key interviewees I conducted follow-up interviews a year after the first. My interviews were 
unstructured, except that I had a pre-determined set of topics that I aimed to cover during the 
course of the conversation. For employees of the AAD this pertained to their professional lives 
including their working relationship with Hugh Ashton, the way they perceived the township 
administration, how others perceived it and them, the relations between Bulawayo and 
government/Salisbury CC, and the post-independence continuities and changes. For others, we 
discussed their relationships to the administration, township life and colonial-era politics. 
Although this project is not a social history of township life as experienced by African 
residents,156 I spent considerable amounts of time in the townships, at markets, beer gardens, 
shebeens157 and in friends’ homes, to acquaint myself with the places about which I was writing. 
Informal conversations with residents about the past helped my understanding of the lived 
experience of township life, past and present. Everyone I spoke with was critical of white minority 
rule in Rhodesia, and the racialized nature of urban government, unsurprisingly. However, some 
judged certain aspects and people of the colonial city council favourably, especially the director, 
Ashton, who was held in very high regard and remembered fondly by Black, Indian and White 
residents. Some remembered the oppressiveness of segregation at the same time as reminiscing 
about the recreational amenities that have since fallen into disuse. Such mixed sentiments probably 
partly reflect disillusionment with the current situation in the country at large, and I interpret them 
as partial indictments of the present context. As Bissell argues, “Rather than viewing nostalgia as 
poor history, we need to engage with it as a social practice that mobilizes various signs of the past 
(colonial and otherwise) in the context of contemporary struggles.”158  But these mixed 
recollections no doubt also reflect the varied and complex experiences of colonial rule, that did 
not at all times conform to the master narrative of struggle, as Jacob Dlamini cogently argues.159   
 
 
155 Amongst the latter group, whom I do not cite directly but with whom I had deeply insightful 
conversations, are Pathisa Nyathi, Cont Mhlanga, Styx Mhlanga, Judith Todd, Mmeli Dube, Rashid Jogee, 
Jafara Ncube. 
156 I do not take colonial archival depictions of township life to necessarily be accurate representations of 
residents’ lived experience. 
157 Unlicensed drinking dens in high-density residential homes. 
158 W. Bissell, ‘Engaging colonial nostalgia’, Cultural Anthropology 20,2 (2005), p. 218 





My positionality as a former resident of Bulawayo, and a white male in my late 20s to early 30s 
during fieldwork, influenced my choice of Bulawayo as a case study, my interpretations of its 
history, and the way people discussed these topics with me. A simple insider/outsider dichotomy 
used to be attributed to the typical research situation, but as Merriam et al. point out, “In the real 
world of data collection, there is a good bit of slippage and fluidity between these two states.”160 
This was particularly the case for me. Having spent 13 formative years in Bulawayo (aged 3 to 16) 
with periodic visits since, I have a deep personal connection with, and intimate knowledge of, the 
city. A certain parochial pride no doubt colours my interpretations, particularly of its historical 
rivalry with Salisbury/Harare, despite my best efforts to assess the evidence objectively.  
My Bulawayo upbringing facilitated connection with local residents whom I interviewed; 
but I was aware that my localness might have also provoked suspicions that I held uncritical or 
sympathetic views to the Rhodesian era – not uncommon in white society still today. I therefore 
found ways to convey my critical stance (short of announcing it directly), and indicated my 
openness to hearing any value judgments, negative or positive, about the country’s colonial past. 
Nevertheless, I am aware that people I spoke with may have subtly modified their accounts of the 
colonial past, given my identity. Conversely, my own interpretations of interviews and archival 
sources were undoubtedly inflected by my white male identity. For this reason, I have chosen to 




This following chapters present, firstly, an analysis of the organisational reforms that occurred in 
the Bulawayo Council after the second world war, in response to its African housing crisis (chapter 
2). Subsequent chapters examine the various ways in which this reformed Council worked to fulfil 
its mandate of stabilising and uplifting/improving the African population. The timeframe of 1949 
to 1977 spans the 28-year career of the City’s first Director of African Administration, whose 
retirement in 1977 coincided with legislative changes that precipitated the breakdown of racial 
segregation. Below is an expanded outline of each chapter: 
 
160 S. Merriam, J. Johnson-Bailey, M. Lee, Y. Kee, G. Ntseane, and M. Muhamad, ‘Power and positionality: 
negotiating insider/outsider status within and across cultures’, International Journal of Lifelong Education, 20,5, 
(2001), pp. 405-416. 
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Chapter 2 examines the early history of the Bulawayo Council’s policies on African settlement in 
the town, and how it restructured and reoriented its entire approach to African affairs shortly after 
the Second World War. The chapter contrasts the Council’s earlier reactionary attitude to African 
migrant workers, with its post-war progressivism, under the influence of the anthropologist and 
zealous moderniser, Hugh Ashton. It examines his efforts to establish a new ethos and esprit de 
corps in the township administration, and to Africanise it. It analyses how these reforms entailed a 
new approach, from laissez-faire to heavy interventionism in township development, with some 
easing off of strict forms of control. In addition to highlighting these ruptures, the chapter also 
shows important continuities, in terms of Bulawayo’s antagonistic relation to the central state, and 
rivalry with the capital city.   
Chapter 3 examines how home ownership was found to be an effective way to enlist the resources 
and energies of Africans in resolving the housing shortage. Its promotion was rationalised in 
economic terms. A self-build home ownership scheme was pioneered in 1952, and thereafter 
home ownership schemes became a distinguishing feature of Bulawayo’s townships. Africans 
came to be regarded partly as “consumers” whose “consumer preferences” had to be taken into 
account. Their preferences, combined with the need to lower infrastructural costs, led to a more 
integrated pattern of township development. Developing these home ownership schemes 
involved endless negotiation, experimentation and compromise, as officials and residents had 
different views on the housing and service standards acceptable to African urban citizens, and 
costs had to be reduced in every way possible. Over time, the transformation of the urban 
landscape was presented as a spectacle of steady progress, attracting industry and enhancing public 
relations. By evoking pre-colonial Ndebele royal and political figures in the naming of these new, 
raw townships, they were given a sense of history and permanence.  
Chapter 4 looks at another rationalisation of home ownership – to stabilise communities and 
appease the middle class in particular, allowing them to “share in the rewards of progress”. Here 
it was rationalised in political terms. Secure tenure in the form of long lease and freehold title for 
Africans contravened the spirit of the Land Apportionment Act, which designated urban areas as 
‘European’ land. The issue was highly political. The Bulawayo Council was a strong advocate of 
tenure security (unlike the capital city council), but these rights had to be defended against 
increasing attack from the reactionary Rhodesia Front Government, leading to a number of 
confrontations between Ashton, councillors, and the Local Government Minister. Under tense 
political and economic conditions and innumerable regulations, the experience of residents with 
leasehold or freehold property was often one of considerable insecurity. 
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Chapter 5 examines the ‘responsibilisation’ of the African middle class. Both local and central 
government officials – even when their policies were in fundamental opposition – claimed that 
they nurtured a sense of ‘responsibility’ in African townspeople. Debates around home ownership 
and subsidised housing were framed in terms of financial responsibility vs paternalism. Similarly, 
debates about whether to give Africans direct representation in local government, or self-
governing powers in semi-autonomous townships, or to simply empower the existing African 
Advisory Boards, were also framed in terms of a moral notion of ‘responsibility’ in 
governance/urban management. In these policy disputes, the Council and Government’s 
differences pivoted on the former’s more integrationist, state-directed vision of development, 
versus the latter’s segregationist, privatised vision of development. 
Chapter 6 examines how pragmatism and idealism came together in the Council’s beer garden 
system. This system was designed to create a stable and respectable setting for the traditional 
pastime of beer drinking, and more exclusive venues for the sophisticates, away from the “socially 
degenerate” illegal drinking dens (“shebeens”). At the same time, it ensured a vital source of 
revenue for welfare, health and home ownership loans. The result was a proliferation of beer 
gardens in the urban landscape; indeed, it was the most elaborate beer garden system in southern 
Africa, embodying a moral and logical contradiction: how could the Council claim to be a 
progressive promoter of health, housing and welfare, whilst at the same time heavily promoting 
the consumption of alcohol? Ashton attempted to resolve this contradiction by beautifying these 
recreational spaces, adding elaborate facilities and marketing them as wholesome places of 
upliftment, whilst stigmatising the shebeens. But ultimately, the beer gardens were managed as a 
lucrative enterprise, and the moral qualms of administrators were never quite banished. 
In conclusion, I re-state the case for analysing post-war urban development from the perspective 
of the urban administrators that dealt most closely with this highly charged project of accepting, 
settling and assimilating (or not) African workers and their families into the ‘white cities’ of 
colonial Africa. I discuss the legacy of having a liberal anthropologist at the helm, directing these 












































2. The Post-war Reorientation of the Bulawayo 
City Council 
 
In the early days, Bulawayo was the primary city in Southern Rhodesia – the centre of industry, 
African and European cultural activity, a “laboratory for new African political ideas”,161 and the 
headquarters of the Rhodesian Railways, connecting the colony to South Africa and later 
Northern Rhodesia. It was in Bulawayo that the lawyer, Charles Coghlan, campaigned to shift 
from British South Africa Company administration to ‘responsible government’, instead of 
incorporating into the Union of South Africa. This campaign won the day, and the declaration of 
Southern Rhodesia’s new semi-independent status within the British Empire was made in 
Bulawayo in October, 1923. But the patriots of Bulawayo desired more than autonomy for the 
nation; they also desired autonomy for the town. Bulawayo’s white working class (which almost 
brought down the Government with strikes in 1929) united with the white commercial elites, who 
dominated the Municipal Council, to assert the city’s autonomy from the “effete, bureaucratic 
capital”.162   
The Bulawayo Council’s assertion of autonomy made it particularly averse to any top-
down interference in its ‘native affairs’ policy.  And until the late 1940s, its policy, or at least 
practice, was to commit the minimum of resources and expertise to developing the African side 
 
161 T. Yoshikuni, ‘Linking urban history with precolonial and rural history: from the Zimbabwean 
experience’, Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa, 36-37, 1 (2001), p.  169. 
162 Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 107 
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of town. Indeed, the Bulawayo Council gained a reputation for being the most neglectful in the 
country with respect to housing and services provision to the African community. The humiliating 
consequence was that it was singled out for periodic investigations by Government-appointed 
commissions of inquiry, to which the councillors reacted with defensiveness and intransigence.  
Shortly after the Second World War, however, the Council’s reactionary attitude became 
untenable. Facing an epic African housing crisis and huge pressure to implement reforms, the 
Council undertook structural changes that were to result in a complete reorientation in African 
affairs. Whilst this impetus to reform came ‘from above’, the new developmental vision was largely 
formulated ‘from below’, by the first Director of Native Administration, Dr Hugh Ashton, who 
served for 28 years in this role. The Council’s approach changed from reactionary to progressive, 
at least by Rhodesian standards. Its long-standing desire for autonomy, however, persisted.  
This chapter examines how this reorientation came about. The first part presents a 
historical overview of housing and services in the African urban area from the town’s inception 
in 1893, until the moment of reform in 1949. This history reveals how the Council’s housing 
policy was shaped by its perception of Africans as essentially tribespeople, merely temporary 
migrants to the town. The second part examines institutional reforms from 1949 and the switch 
from laissez-faire to heavy interventionism in township development.  
 
 
Part 1: African administration in early Bulawayo, 1894-
1949 
 
King Lobengula of the amaNdebele founded two Bulawayos: the first in 1875, burnt down 
ceremonially by his lieutenant, Magwegwe, in 1881, to destroy its medicine secrets; the second a 
few miles away (where Government House now stands), blown up and set alight by the King’s 
men in November, 1893, as the European column from Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa 
Company was spotted approaching the great kraal from the north east.163 This kraal was over half 
a mile in diameter, surrounded by a wooden palisade with four big gates, wherein woven huts 
accommodated approximately 20,000 people. Lobengula’s house stood on the edge of the central 
 
163 The Company had acquired a Royal Charter from the British Government. (J. Cobbing, ‘The Ndebele 
Under the Khumalos, 1820-1896’ (PhD thesis, Lancaster University, 1976), p. 347) 
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ceremonial space, next to the famous ndaba tree where the Rudd Concession for mineral rights was 
signed.  
After this conquest of the 
Matabele, the third – European – 
Bulawayo was established three 
miles from the ruins of the old 
kraal.164 Patrick Fletcher surveyed 
the new town, placing the central 
market square on a flattened 
mealie patch with a perfect 
rectangular (north-south) grid of 
streets and avenues, wide enough 
for a span of oxen to turn full 
circle. Here, the white settlers 
built wattle and daub huts with 
thatch pulled from the remains of 
the abandoned Matabele kraal. 
But the architecture of this 
settlement, nicknamed 
“Grasstown”, quickly changed 
when the newly established Sanitary Board decreed in May, 1894 that straw huts were forbidden, 
for practical and symbolic reasons.165 
 
164 According to Ranger, Rhodes chose the location of ‘his’ new town more for its symbolism than its 
practicality. And there were contemporary critics who wondered why on earth he chose that “barren 
dreariness of the high veld, the bleak wind-swept central plateau.” (Stanley Portal Hyatt quoted in Ranger, 
p. 15).  But according to a professional town planning assessment in 1973, though the situation had natural 
disadvantages, the site was very well chosen and developed with clarity. (Bulawayo City Council Archive 
(BCCA)/Mallows, Louw, Hoffe and Partners, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Planning Problems: City of 
Bulawayo, 1972’, p. 10) 
165 Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 16 
Figure 3: Lobengula's kraal, 1888 [Source: Matabele Thompson: An 





Stands were auctioned off in the 
new Bulawayo, but the eastern 
side flanked by Borrow Street 
was more popular than the 
downwind western side flanked 
by Lobengula Street, which 
consequently ended up marking 
the boundary between white and 
black Bulawayo. On the 1st of 
June, 1894, the town was 
officially declared open by 
Leander Starr Jameson. Just two 
years later, the defeated Matabele 
launched an uprising, besieging 
the European population (and a 
number of Africans) behind 
sacks and carts in the town 
square. Just a year later, in 1897, 
the town was declared a 
municipality, and the Sanitary 
Board was replaced with a 
Municipal Council comprising 9 
councillors.166 This council 
quickly established departments 
of the Town Clerk, Treasury, 
Public Works and Parks. In its first year the Council also established a public electricity supply.167 
To the west of Lobengula Street was Commonage “bush”, with no plans for urban 
development. Yet, already in 1894, just a few hundred metres into this Terra Incognita which did 
not appear on the Annual Directory maps until 1935168, the Native Location was established by 
the Sanitary Board. It comprised undemarcated plots of roughly 40 ft x 60 ft., leased at 5/- per 
month, on which Africans could build their own huts of wattle and daub (sometimes known as 
“pondokkies”) in a context of limited official regulation.169 From the beginning, it was populated 
 
166 E. H. Ashton, African Administration in Bulawayo (City of Bulawayo, 1957), p. 2 
167 16 years ahead of Salisbury, according to Chikowero, ‘Subalternating Currents’, p. 288.). 
168 Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 16 
169 Ashton, African Administration in Bulawayo, p. 30  
Figure 4: Fletcher's Plan of Bulawayo township and Eastern suburbs, 
1894. [ Source: O. Ransford, Bulawayo: Historic Battleground of 
Rhodesia (Cape Town, Balkema, 1968)] 
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by both amaNdebele and immigrants of other ethnic groups from as far as the Cape Colony. By 
1899, the population was 300. Boris Gussman noted that, “The Africans were left largely to their 
own devices and one scans municipal records in vain for references to African affairs.”170 Because 
this Location was accorded legal status so early, it remained in place, just a few hundred metres 
from the CBD, even as it grew to a size and character that the European settlers were perplexed 
by. Unlike in Salisbury, Bulawayo’s Location was not subject to the 1906 Native Urban Locations 
Ordinance, meaning the Central Government and the British South Africa Police had no 
involvement in Bulawayo’s Location and its regulations, until 1946. In Salisbury, by contrast, the 
 
170 B. Gussman, African Life in an Urban Area: A Study of the African Population of Bulawayo, 1948-50 (Bulawayo, 
The Federation of African Welfare Societies in Southern Rhodesia), p. 3 
Figure 5: Bulawayo Commonage Map, 1897 [Source: NAZ/courtesy of Paul Hubbard] 
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earliest African settlement was dismantled and moved well away from the CBD in 1907; with the 
new Location being subject to the Native Urban Locations Ordinance.171  
It was only in 1912 that the Bulawayo municipal council stepped in and started building 
African housing out of brick. House-building was incentivised by public health concerns, 
conforming to the general colonial hysteria often referred to as the “sanitation syndrome” (see 
chapter 1), which inspired segregation and health checks for Africans.172 In 1897, the District 
Surgeon had reported that, “Venereal Disease is rife in [Bulawayo], particularly with regard to 
natives, who are a source of great danger to the public.”173 But little was done about this, as 
Council and Government squabbled over who should pay for medical examinations. In 1901, the 
Government declined to cover half the costs, as the Council had requested, and it was only in 
1918 that a part-time Medical Officer of Health was finally appointed. He did not begin with 
medical examinations until 1925, when a VD hospital was opened, but in the meantime turned 
his attention to housing and sanitation.  
Location development was deemed disorderly and unhygienic. The rented plots were of 
a reasonable size but there were no restrictions on the type or number of dwellings built thereon. 
Therefore, the Council’s 1912 house-building programme, which had stalled, was revived again 
for the first time in 1920. Standard dwellings for tenants who could not (or would not) build a 
“suitable” house of their own were erected. These dwellings included bachelor blocks that were 
reserved for employees of particular companies (known as ‘tied accommodation’), and two-
roomed cottages with kitchens. Whilst the rate of house-building fluctuated over the first half of 
the 20th century, it was always inadequate, as the municipality was particularly obsessed with 
economy and wanted no changes to the status quo of a migratory labour system.174 The Salisbury 
Council was always more proactive, building Kaytor huts until 1921175, and then 4-room brick 
dwellings.176 
But despite its unwillingness to commit expertise and resources, the Bulawayo Council 
still tried to impose an enframing order on the Location. In 1922, a complete survey was carried 
out, and “proper” development plans drawn up so the place could be laid out “properly”, with 
better roads. Between this time and 1937, fireplaces, and additional street lights, latrines, wash 
houses, and piped water and sewerage were all installed. Some plot-holders chose to build their 
own cottages. Indeed, there were a high proportion of home owners, with women well-
 
171 West, The Rise of the African Middle Class, p. 103 
172 See Swanson, ‘The Sanitation Syndrome’. 
173 Quoted in Ashton, African Administration in Bulawayo, p. 8. 
174 Ashton, ibid. 
175 Circular corrugated iron huts, 12 feet in diameter. 
176 West, The Rise of the African Middle Class, p. 103 
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represented. Women home owners often made a living from taking in lodgers or renting out huts, 
whilst men dominated the cottage rental business.177 But not all houses were deemed up to 
standard, so in 1929 the Council resolved to end private ownership (facing protestations from the 
Bantu Women’s League). Any building work that did not conform to the Council’s new building 
programme was halted; old buildings were gradually demolished and the occupants rehoused in 
new ones178; a programme of 15 cottages per month was launched. The Council also continued 
to expropriate home owners quietly and smoothly until the last house was acquired in 1955.179  
But there were 24 old widow landladies who vehemently opposed this policy, and they were 
granted some grace.   
Much of the Bulawayo Location, Commonage and private compounds remained in a 
state of dire poverty and overcrowding in the interwar period, and for this the Council was singled 
out through periodic commissions of inquiry, and reprimanded for its failings. One prominent 
Location activist, Martha Ngano, called for a Government commission of inquiry in 1925, and 
the outspoken trade unionist, Masotsha Ndlovu, also implored the Prime Minister, Howard 
Moffat, in 1928 and 1929 to visit the Location and hear their grievances. Moffat was certainly 
more sympathetic to such pleas than the Government’s Native Department, who distrusted 
African trade unionists.180 He had tried in vain to implement urban reforms in Bulawayo 
throughout the 1920s, always facing severe resistance from the Town Council. But finally, in 
February, 1930, he appointed the Jackson Commission to look into African affairs, starting with 
Bulawayo. Because it was headed by openly “liberal” individuals, the Bulawayo councillors and 
residents were immediately suspicious and hostile to the inquiry. As one European resident wrote, 
“We want more rule as far as the natives are concerned and less teaching”.181 The commissioners 
reported that the Location had been managed with the bare minimum of accountability, as if it 
were the “private estate of the ratepayers”. It described the Location as “an ill-defined and 
unfenced part of the Commonage” that was only loosely controlled. And it blamed both the 
“apathetic corporate conscience” of Bulawayo’s whites and the lack of legislative stimulus from 
Government for this state of affairs.182  
The Council not only ignored the commission’s recommendations; it also responded 
furiously to its indictments, with “one of the most ferocious documents in the whole history of 
 
177 Ibid., p. 104 
178 House owners’ compensation would be based on a valuation agreed between the owner, the Location 
Superintendent and the Government’s Native Department. 
179 Ashton, African Administration in Bulawayo, p. 9 
180 Moffat was the grandson of the famous missionary Robert Moffat, who was a friend of King Mzilikazi.  
181 Bulawayo Chronicle, 22 February, 1930, in Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 109. 
182 From two NAZ files: ZAN 2/1/1 and S 235/394; quoted in Ranger, 2010: 112 
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city/state relations in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.”183 It warned that the report’s “claptrap” could incite 
some kind of uprising from Africans, and threatened an end to all cooperation with government. 
This was Moffat’s opportunity to push through legislation that he had been preparing, but in the 
end he failed to exert any influence on Bulawayo. The Jackson Commission was much less 
contested in the towns of Salisbury and Gatooma. But it was clear that “white Bulawayo was 
determined to do its own thing.” Indeed, Bulawayo’s opposition precipitated Moffat’s downfall.184   
It was then the turn of Moffat’s successor, Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins, to endure 
20 years of wrangling with the Bulawayo Council (1933-53). As Ranger so vividly shows, this often 
played out as a personal stand-off between “Huggie” and the “Big City Boss” of Bulawayo – 
Donald Macintyre. This was because, “In Southern Rhodesia’s tiny municipal councils and equally 
tiny parliament, large issues easily became a joust between two rival champions.”185 From 1933-
53, Macintyre was the on-and-off Mayor of Bulawayo as well as Chairman of the Finance 
Committee. Meanwhile, he also had the politically contradictory identities of being a baker, 
industrialist and socialist MP. He shifted his allegiances between white artisans and white 
industrialists, but never sided with African workers. His most consistent position was being in 
opposition to Central Government.  
In 1936, the Government decided it would take some responsibility, by stepping in to 
build a higher class ‘native village settlement’ called Luveve, 12kms from Bulawayo’s CBD, on the 
Commonage boundary.  This was in fact a superior ‘model’ township (akin to those discussed in 
chapter 1), where each home had 2 or 3 bedrooms, a kitchen and washroom, to serve as a model 
for the Bulawayo municipality to aspire to. It accommodated mostly government teachers. 
However, according to West, Huggins envisaged Luveve like an urban reserve to which the 
emergent African middle class could be safely consigned.186 Although it was hailed by the 
European press as “transplanting natives from huts to homes”, African residents were generally 
less impressed, not least because it was so far from town and work, and some feared it would be 
subject to heavier control. They boycotted it at first, but eventually saw it as a way to escape the 
undesirable, overcrowded ‘lower class’ townships.187  
Meanwhile, the Bulawayo Council did not entirely abdicate its own housing 
responsibilities at this time. It built some houses, playing fields, a clinic and new hall in the 1930s. 
However, this state of affairs reversed suddenly at the onset of World War II, due to two 
 
183 Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 112.  
184 In that period government had to take these furiously autonomous city voters seriously, since most of 
the electorate was urban. (Ranger, ‘City versus State’, p. 163) 
185 Ranger, ‘City vs State’, p. 172. 
186 West, The Rise of the African Middle Class, p. 108 
187 Ibid, p. 110 
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contradictory Council policies: firstly, the prioritisation of industrial growth, and secondly, the de-
prioritisation of African house-building. The first policy was highly successful. Between 1941 and 
1946, industry grew by 90% in Bulawayo, and 80% in Salisbury.188 This resulted in a massive influx 
of African male workers as well as women to Bulawayo (which acquired city status in 1943.189) 
The second policy, however, was disastrous. Apart from a spurt of building in 1939 and 1940, the 
rate of council building slowed and private building was prohibited. Thus, by the early 1940s, 
unprecedented slum conditions had arisen.190  
One problem was a war-time shortage of building materials, but there was also an 
ongoing dispute between the Council and Government about how to spend municipal beer 
profits. There was never enough money for basic African housing and amenities, and the Council 
therefore used a portion of beer profits for that purpose. But the Government always insisted that 
these profits should be reserved exclusively for welfare expenditure (clinics, football fields, etc.). 
Under the 1942 Native Beer Act, the Government finally tried to impose its will. This imposition 
was argued back and forth. “Principle, as well as Municipal pride were at stake”, and eventually, 
in 1945, the Government allowed the Council to use 50% of beer profits to meet capital costs for 
housing, which temporarily doubled the rate of construction. Surplus on the beer account soon 
dried up, but at least for the Bulawayo Council, “honour had been restored”. 191 Yet still, the rate 
of house-building was completely inadequate. The Council was apathetic and preoccupied with 
other things.192  
Because of this hopeless housing situation, the Howman Commission came to investigate 
Bulawayo’s African affairs in November, 1943. Its indictment of Bulawayo was not taken well. 
Councillor Macintyre attacked the idea of “stabilising” the African workforce, saying this was what 
the industrialists selfishly wanted. In the interests of European ratepayers, he wanted to minimise 
African housing costs and ensure that Africans returned to where they “belonged” – the rural 
areas: “I think the best thing is for them to live in the open spaces of the Colony, running their 
 
188 P. Ibbotson, The African in Industry (Historical Ref. Collection of the Bulawayo Public Library, 
unpublished manuscript, 9th November, 1948), p. 4) 
189 Between 1936 and 1946 the African working population rose from 15,322 to 33,322. By 1951 it was 56 
988. (D. J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 315.)  
190 Ashton, African Administration, p. 3 
191 Ashton, African Administration, p. 12. 
192 In 1943, capital outlay on Bulawayo’s Native Affairs was 2.2% of total capital outlay; whereas in Salisbury 
it was 10.7%. The consequence was that, “Bulawayo’s Location is not as pleasing to the eye as is Salisbury’s”, 
but the calculation did not include beer profit expenditure; furthermore, Bulawayo employed African labour 
which was cheaper. However, all the major municipalities in South Africa, including Durban (which also 
used beer profits for housing) spent a higher proportion on African housing than Bulawayo, with the 
notable exception of Cape Town (1.2%) (Town Clerk’s report to Council, ‘Native Affairs Administration’, 
7th July, 1944/BCCA/Transfer Box 4/rent, native admin.). 
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cattle.”193 This could not have been a clearer expression of the sentiment that towns were for 
whites; Africans were not to be regarded as urban citizens. Despite the persistent efforts of Prime 
Ministers Moffat and then Huggins to cajole the Bulawayo Council to fulfil its municipal 
responsibilities in public housing and service provision, and to update its unsatisfactory Location 
Regulations from the 1890s, Bulawayo fought until the bitter end to maintain the status quo, whilst 
Macintyre boasted to parliament that only Bulawayo had entire control of its location, unlike 
Salisbury, where Government poked its nose in.  
 
The housing crisis and the Council’s last stand  
 
The Council was shaken from its reactionary and blasé attitude when the African Railway 
employees struck in 1945, demanding better pay and housing. Yet still it did not adequately address 
their demands, with the mayor blaming the housing crisis on an excess of unemployed Africans, 
and calling for proper influx controls to prevent this. He also complained that by providing 
subsidised housing for employees the Council’s ratepayers were in effect subsidising the railways 
and industrialists.194 The solution should be higher wages, he argued. This issue of who should 
bear the financial burden of housing African workers was, and remained, highly charged (see 
chapter 5).195  
Whilst Macintyre theatrically rejected the reformist pressures from above and came up 
with clever ways to quell African unrest, his Council faced criticism from other quarters, and alarm 
bells were ringing within the ranks, too. The Reverend Percy Ibbotson – founder of the Native 
Welfare Society (NWS) of Bulawayo – periodically investigated African living conditions and was 
not afraid to expose the dire state of Bulawayo’s African housing196, to which Macintyre retaliated 
by snubbing the NWS. In 1946, Ibbotson added to the chorus of voices claiming that the 
municipal laissez-faire approach to African housing was no longer tenable.197 From inside the 
council, the Medical Officer of Health said the same: 
Industrialisation of the City is progressing at a speed which many people do not realise, 
and though the temporary accommodation provided by the Council has done much to 
meet immediate needs, the urgency of the whole question is only partly abated. Natives 
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are still living around their places of employment in shacks of all descriptions and 
unauthorised and insanitary villages are springing up in various places in the neighbouring 
Commonage. Many natives are unwilling to abandon their shacks and their families for 
the monastic seclusion of the temporary Municipal Locations, and it would be entirely 
unreasonable to blame them. A new location or native township on a large scale… is 
probably the most urgent necessity which the Municipality has to face; extraordinary 
measures on expenditure are required for it now.198 
But the rates of municipal housing construction continued to be grossly inadequate. Indeed, 
between 1943 and 1949, the number of African men in employment in Bulawayo nearly doubled, 
from 25,000 to 48,000. Yet in that 6-year period, only 1,218 cottages, 228 rooms, and 2,528 
temporary bed spaces for bachelors were built in total. In the Municipal Location, there were 
15,362 inhabitants in 1949, and it was a slum.199 With increasing exasperation, Huggins asserted 
that “we have to realize that a permanent urban class is arising”, and rather than view African 
housing as a national (=taxpayer) or municipal (=ratepayer) liability, he argued that the employer 
should be financially liable and the local authority should be administratively responsible.200 The 
Natives (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (“Urban Areas Act”) was to be the 
legislative impetus, and if “recalcitrant” local authorities did not fulfil their housing 
responsibilities, Government would step in, he warned.  Characteristically, Bulawayo resisted this 
legislation whilst other councils acquiesced.  Bulawayo councillors felt that neither the Council 
nor industrialists should be responsible. Rather, it should be a Central Government responsibility. 
In his role as a Southern Rhodesia Labour Party MP, Macintyre came from various ideological 
angles to attack the draft Bill.  
He not only defended the town as a ‘white space’, but also took the African perspective, 
portraying the legislation as turning “the native into a feudal serf” in the town201, because he would 
be tied to his employer, whilst in the villages tribal life would be destabilised..202 In short, the 
Bulawayo Council favoured the status quo, and if anything was to change, it should be the 
Government taking more responsibility. Macintyre argued: 
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It is no cure, no solution of the problem to pass it on to someone else… You cannot 
pass it on as a solution to someone else who is in a much less advantageous position to 
deal with it than the central government themselves.203 
Ultimately, what incensed Macintyre the most was the Government’s attempt to compel Bulawayo 
to do something. He specifically asked what powers the Government had to “compel” 
municipalities to implement the Urban Areas Act. Clearly, there was a deep structural tension here 
– the Government believed Bulawayo should do its bidding, whilst the latter believed it was an 
independent city. One MP summed this up in his rebuttal to Macintyre:  
Some hon. Members seem to have found the use of the word “compel” offensive. That 
objection is symptomatic of a state of mind in this Colony. It shows that there are 
numbers of people who have completely misunderstood the position of the local 
authorities vis-à-vis the central Government. It does not seem to be appreciated in 
Southern Rhodesia that the local authority is simply the delegate or the nominee of the 
central Government; it is there to carry out the dictates and the wishes of the central 
Government.204  
 
Huggins was exasperated: “I have been negotiating with these people for ten years”, he 
complained.205  He knew that there would be “calm waters” in Salisbury when the Bill was finally 
introduced into parliament in January 1946, and that the main opposition would come from 
Bulawayo. And indeed, Macintyre “called on all his resilience and rudeness to carry a doomed 
fight through the committee stages of the Bill”;206 and he kept on fear mongering about the cities 
being swamped by “natives”. Nevertheless, the Bill was passed in February, 1946, with Macintyre 
the only dissenter. Although Salisbury had also put up some resistance207, it complied with the 
Urban Areas Act from 1946. Bulawayo only did so from 1948. 
Interestingly, African political and trade union leaders in Bulawayo aligned with Macintyre 
in opposing the new legislation, because they feared it would lead to more Council control and a 
 
203D. MacIntyre, Extract from Hansard, 24th November, 1944. Motion: Natives in Urban Areas. 
(BCCA/Transfer Box 4/rent, native admin) 
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produced a more satisfactory state of affairs in the Union [of South Africa]...”. (Town Clerk to the Mayor 
and Members of the City Council of Salisbury, 7th July, 1944. (BCCA/Transfer Box 4/rent, native admin). 
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new burdensome rent structure. In fact, the Southern Rhodesian Bantu Congress had petitioned 
the British government, alongside Macintyre, to disallow the Act; and the African Voters League 
even urged members to vote for Macintyre’s Southern Rhodesia Labour Party in protest against 
the Act.  But by 1948, their allegiance had shifted. As Ranger notes: “The Bulawayo Council, and 
Macintyre in particular, had become the villains”.208 Whilst the government was trying to set up a 
Municipal Labour Board to resolve issues over Municipal African workers’ pay, Macintyre was at 
a round-table in Salisbury trying to obstruct it. The Federation of African Trade Unions “called 
for an instant strike in support of Government against the municipalities”.209 The strike spread 
nationwide, but appears to have been very different in Salisbury and Bulawayo.210 In Bulawayo 
the protestors clearly targeted the municipality, and it had little choice but to give up its 
intransigent defence of the status quo, and initiate reform.  
The first step that the Council took, was to invite an administrator from Port Elizabeth, 
John McNamee, to assess the situation.211 McNamee was appalled at the Bulawayo Location 
conditions, but especially some of the private compounds, which he described as “possibly the 
worst slums in the world”.212 He explained that:  
Labour drawn from these settlements cannot possibly be efficient, and living under such 
conditions must unquestionably be a factor in the creation of a spirit of hopelessness, 
sullenness, and desperation. And this spirit can early develop into mass disaffection.213 
With no other option, the Council reluctantly began to implement the Urban Areas Act. By doing 
so two years after Salisbury, it was able to learn some lessons about how not to hastily and 
aggressively displace residents to achieve full segregation, as Salisbury had done. The Bulawayo 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce, the British African Voice Association and the Federation 
of Trade Unions were pivotal in helping to “iron out” all the differences and accept the new 
legislation.214  
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This signified the end of half a century of laissez-faire administration of the African areas, 
and therefore a critical juncture in the history of Bulawayo. Thenceforth, the Council came to be 
known for pursuing the most proactive and progressive African development policies in the 
colony. This represented a significant reorientation both in the way Africans were regarded as 
urban citizens, and the manner in which they were thus governed and provided for.  
 
 
Part 2: Post-war reform 
 
Having seen how the Council was unwilling to accept and provide for permanent African 
communities until 1949, this second part of the chapter analyses how, at the critical mid-century 
juncture, the Council underwent a profound reorientation, setting township development on a 
new course. These redirection, however, was accompanied by continuities from the earlier period 
– namely the city’s fierce independence and its rivalry with the capital city. Whilst part one was 
presented chronologically, the following sections are thematic, elaborating different aspects of 
municipal reform after 1949. 
The Urban Areas Act, which precipitated these major urban reforms, obliged Rhodesian 
municipalities to construct and administer new ‘native urban areas’, i.e. African townships. The 
finances of these areas were to be kept in a separate ‘Native Revenue Account’, which was 
subdivided into a Capital Account and an Income & Expenditure Account.215 This meant that 
councils were not obliged to spend anything from the rate fund (i.e. European ratepayers’ money) 
on the African townships, and they rarely did. In the case of Bulawayo, further Government arm-
twisting was required to kick-start African housing: the sale of industrial sites in the town was 
banned in 1951-2, until the City Council had proven that significant housing construction was 
underway (see chapter three).  
In addition to the separation of accounts, the major organisational change introduced by 
the Urban Areas Act was to oblige the municipal councils of the larger urban centres to establish 
their own municipal ‘native administration departments’. These municipal departments would 
assume nearly full control of African administration and housing, and all ‘registration of service’ 
contracts for African workers in the town were transferred to them from the Central 
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The African Administration Department 
 
The Bulawayo Council founded its Native Administration Department in 1949, soon renamed 
the African Administration Department (AAD).217 This Department was designed to be the “sole 
channel of communication” between the Council and the African public, according its director a 
powerful gatekeeper status. Its purpose was to become, 
more intimately and continuously connected with Africans than any other single 
organisation, in many ways the buffer between the two races, [tasked with] easing 
tensions, particularly on the African side.218  
As we have seen, there were indeed tensions between council and residents, built up over decades, 
that needed “easing”. As John McNamee had stated sarcastically in 1948, “the relations between 
the native people and the local authority here are just a little bit strained”.219 This new department 
of the council, designed to improve race relations, improve township living conditions, and 
improve Africans themselves, grew to over 100 graded employees and over a thousand ungraded, 
enabling far more varied and sophisticated “expert” interventions in the lives of African 
townspeople than ever before. Figure 1 shows the administrative structure of the AAD’s Head 
Office, and figure 2 shows the structure of each specific township office. The Department’s Head 
Office was located in the Heavy Industrial Areas to the south west of the town centre, several 
miles from the City Hall, where most council departments were headquartered. This symbolised 




217 Hereafter referred to as the African Administration Department (AAD) or “the Department”.  Note: in 
1953, the Native Administration Department was renamed the ‘African Administration Department’. In 
February 1963, it was renamed ‘Housing and Amenities’, and in 1975 became ‘Housing and Community 
Services’. The name change from African Admin to Housing and Amenities in 1963 was intended to signify 
the trend away from racial differentiation. It was believed that “it was wrong in principle that the department 
should continue to be a segregated one, dealing with only one section of the community…” (Director’s 
annual report, 1963). However, in reality the name change was more symbol than substance. The renamed 
department was to be responsible for non-African housing schemes, although in practice it continued to 
deal overwhelmingly with the African townships and Coloured housing, but it did also take over some 
European and Asian housing responsibilities. Also, concomitant with the 1963 name change, the Council 
abolished its ‘African Administration Committee’ and replaced it with two committees: ‘Housing and 
Amenities’ and ‘Liquor Undertaking’.  
218 Ashton, African Administration in Bulawayo, p. 51 




Figure 6: Organisational Structure of the African Administration Department Head Office [Source: Adapted from 
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Figure 7: Organisational Structure of Township Office [Source: Adapted from Ndubiwa, ‘African Participation in 
Urban Management’, p. 12] 
 
The first thing to do was appoint a director for this new department. The director was to be 
“someone who the natives see as their head, someone who is accessible to them”.220 Thus, the 
directorship was conceived as a fatherly role, both authoritative and yet accessible. The Council 
had a round of 4 interviews with 3 South Africans and 1 Rhodesian candidate221, but remained 
unsatisfied. Two councillors then went to Johannesburg to interview a further two candidates222, 
one of whom dropped out, so they ended up by default with Dr Edmund Hugo Ashton. At the 
age of 37, married and with two children, Ashton moved up to Bulawayo in August, 1949, to take 
on the last and longest job of his career. His profound influence over African township 
development in Bulawayo warrants some detailed discussion of his training, previous work 
experience, and political inclinations, because these factors shaped the way he built his 
Department and ended up running the townships.  
Hugh Ashton was born in 1912, in Qacha’s Nek, Lesotho, where his father was a district 
commissioner. He claims to have spoken better Sotho than English as a child, and for the rest of 
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his life felt he was “a Southern African through and through.”223  Ashton went to Rondebosch 
Bishops school, from where he obtained a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford. At Oxford he read 
Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE), and became good friends with a fellow Rhodes 
scholar at New College, Bram Fischer, who was to become the famous anti-apartheid activist 
lawyer, best known for defending Nelson Mandela at the Rivonia Trial.224 After Oxford, Ashton 
went to the London School of Economics to complete a further undergraduate degree in 
anthropology in 2 years (1934-5). At LSE he was a regular attendee of Malinowski’s seminars, 
alongside Jomo Kenyatta, Max Gluckman, Meyer Fortes and other prominent anthropologists.225 
He then proceeded to Cape Town, where he undertook his PhD in anthropology, supervised by 
Isaac Schapera. He conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Lesotho and submitted his thesis in 
1939; it was later published as a respected monograph: The Basuto: A Social Study of Traditional and 
Modern Lesotho.226  
But whilst training and researching as an anthropologist, Ashton racked up 10 years in 
the colonial service as a district officer in Bechuanaland.227 With his academic and practical 
knowledge, he assisted his mentor, Schapera, during fieldwork expeditions in 1939  and ’42. 228 
They maintained a lifelong friendship, with “Schap” visiting the Ashtons annually in Bulawayo.229 
Another connection from the Bechuanaland days was the Khamas (Seretse and Ruth), who also 
visited the Ashtons in Bulawayo. 
Ashton had also been private secretary to Sir William Clark, who was the British High 
Commissioner for Bechuanaland Protectorate, Swaziland, Basutoland and the Union of South 
Africa (1934-39), and whose daughter, Diana, Ashton married in 1941.230 In 1946, Ashton joined 
the African welfare department of the Johannesburg City Council, working in the African 
townships.231 It is worth noting that this was actually a period of welfarist reform in the Union of 
South Africa, before the rise of Afrikaaner nationalism in 1949.232 As a welfare officer, Ashton 
lectured for two years on African administration to some eminent students, such as Joshua 
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Nkomo, who was to become the “father of African nationalism” a few years later in Bulawayo. 
Ashton maintained a friendship with Nkomo in Bulawayo, hosting him on occasion at his Hillside 
residence.233 
When Ashton applied for the 
Bulawayo director’s position in 
1949, the Afrikaner nationalist 
party of D.F. Malan had just taken 
power in South Africa, and 
Ashton was eager to leave a 
political climate that he “did not 
like at all”.234 Ashton’s academic 
credentials and close association 
with prominent African leaders 
meant the Bulawayo councillors 
initially regarded him, with 
suspicion, as a “liberal”.235 He 
certainly got the seal of approval 
from several prominent white 
liberal contemporaries. For 
example, Doris Lessing described 
him as “courteous and liberal” 
after meeting him in 1955236; 
historian Richard Gray referred to Ashton as a “far-sighted administrator”;237 Hardwicke 
Holderness, a liberal member of Garfield Todd’s Cabinet, also found Ashton to be a “highly 
civilised man”, and a “different kettle of fish” from his authoritarian Salisbury counterpart238; and 
the feminist academic, Gerda Siann, described Ashton as “a great deal more liberal than most of 
his counterparts throughout the Territory”.239  
The reason these biographical details matter, is that in Southern Rhodesia, as this thesis 
aims to demonstrate, local state administrators could wield considerable influence over African 
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township policies and development, and at the same time, they could be of considerably different 
political inclination and vision.  
Indeed, having an anthropologist in municipal African administration in Rhodesia was 
unusual. According to Ewen Greenfield, who worked for 10 years in the Department in the 1960s 
and at an administrators’ training school, African administration jobs were often regarded as a 
“chuck away kind of thing” in Rhodesia; municipalities would typically hire “an old policeman or 
something like that to head up their African Administration Department”. Consequently, 
Salisbury’s Director in the 1960s and 70s, Rory Briggs, was “very impressed by Ashton. And he 
did recognise Ashton’s total superiority, and he’d contact Ashton from time to time for advice 




The first thing that Ashton began to reform in Bulawayo was the attitudes of existing township 
staff. On his arrival in 1949, he noticed a pervasive “negative” attitude. In particular, he identified 
Donald Macintyre – “the big city boss” discussed in part one – to be the most “negative” and 
“reactionary”. He found most councillors “insular and racist”, “not at all helpful”, and even 
“unbelievable”, such as a railway trade unionist, John McNeillie, who felt compelled to wash his 
hands after meeting Africans.241 These reactionary attitudes and poor manners were anathema to 
progress and cooperation. Apparently unwilling to hire people “sunk in the old Rhodesian right-
wing attitudes”, Ashton recruited some staff directly from England.242 A Black former 
administrator who began his 36-year career in the Housing Department as a clerk in 1964, recalls 
that:  
Ashton was different. You felt that difference. He looked at you as a human being. And 
similarly the staff that he employed was encouraged to adopt those attitudes, you know? 
He wanted fair treatment. And in fact, he regularly told his white counterparts, his staff, 
to respect Blacks.243  
Much Masunda, who worked vacation jobs in the AAD in the 1960s, before landing a senior 
position with his law degree in 1970, says that: 
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He would sit down with you either at his office or he would come to your office – he had 
no issues about that – and you would have a constructive discussion as to what it is that 
he wanted to be done and why he wanted it done. His approach was disarmingly simple, 
but behind that veneer of simplicity, he was a very determined individual, he knew exactly 
what he wanted.244 
There were several converts to this new approach, such as a Township Superintendent called 
Deric Cleary, who was at first sceptical, but ended up taking an active part in promoting African 
staff to leading positions.245 In his township reports in the late 1950s, it is evident that Cleary 
embraced his new paternalistic mission of helping African migrants transition to a “modern, 
Western” way of life.246  
Ashton himself visited the USA, West Africa and the Congos for 6 months in 1959 to 
observe race relations and decolonisation, paying close attention to public administrations. In 
New York he noted with surprise how black and white clerks and typists in government offices 
got along on equal terms, “with what seemed perfectly natural and friendly relations between 
them”.247 And in West Africa he noted that the ‘Africanised’ public administrations were 
“probably more satisfactory than earlier Western forms,”  because, he believed, they placed more 
emphasis on social relations than precision, impersonality, orthodoxy and urgency.248 Yet he also 
noted new young African officials and ministers who brought “considerably more drive, energy 
and ruthlessness to their office than occurred in Colonial days. Many of them work extremely 
hard, and expect comparable efforts from their subordinates.”249 He regarded many of these 
changes in West Africa favourably, and advocated much more “racial cooperation” and 
desegregation in the Central African Federation, but did not go so far as to advocate the end of 
colonial rule there. 
To exert authority ‘upwards’ on councillors and ministers, he needed the collaboration of 
the Town Clerk.250 From 1952 to 1973, this was Eddie White.251 White had the power to endorse 
 
244 Author interview with Much Masunda, Harare, 24th June, 2018.  
245 Personal correspondence with Ewen Greenfield, 10th December, 2016 
246 In his later career in the 1970s, Cleary moved to Port Elizabeth and became its Director of African 
Administration. 
247 But he noted extreme racial hostility in other areas. (E.H. Ashton, Report on trip to USA (personal 
collection of Hugo Ashton, 1959) 
248  
249 E.H. Ashton, Report on trip to West Africa (personal collection of Hugo Ashton, 1959) 
250 The town clerk is the most senior salaried employee of a city council in the English local government 
system, effectively the chief executive. 
251 White was considered a regional expert on local government and was internationally respected, earning 
him the presidency of the Institute of Town Clerks of Southern Africa, and in 1965 the presidency of the 
Association of Town Clerks of the British Commonwealth. He was born and educated in Cape Town, and 
moved to Southern Rhodesia in 1930, when he immediately joined the Council as a secretary; in 1938 he 
60 
 
Ashton’s proposals, and he often served as a conduit between Ashton and cabinet ministers. In 
1961, Ashton helped to arrange a US ‘Leader Grant’ for White to visit the US to examine race 
relations and the civil rights movement. Apparently, “This opened White’s eyes to the wider world 
and its problems, and it was after this that he actively helped to steer through some of Ashton’s 
reforms…”252 However, White was by no means progressive; after retirement, he stood for 
parliament on a Rhodesia Front ticket. Whilst the relationship between White and Ashton was 
congenial and usually cooperative, Ashton was often frustrated that they did not see eye to eye on 
many issues.253 
 
Africanising the Department 
 
The most significant change to the staffing of Bulawayo’s township administration was a policy 
of ‘Africanisation’, meaning the hiring of Africans to graded positions. This began in 1958, with 
the controversial hiring of four African graduates to the AAD. For this, Ashton was branded a 
“negrophile” and the graduates were called “agitators”, by a right-wing councillor, Jack Pain.254  
In 1960, the notion of opening public administrations to all races was becoming a national 
conversation.255 In December 1960, a panel was convened to report confidentially on the 
promotion of “non-European advancement” in the municipal service in Bulawayo, i.e. on ways 
to remove the barriers that Africans faced to attaining higher grade positions.256 A special council 
committee considered the report for 3 months, wondering whether it was “really necessary at this 
stage” to actively promote non-European advancement, and asked for a follow-up report.  
Finally, on the 7th of February, 1962, the Council adopted all of the non-European 
advancement recommendations, opening up positions in the Health Department and African 
Administration Department “as far as possible” to Non-Europeans, on the same terms and 
conditions as applied to Europeans – equal salaries, pensions, medical benefits and general 
conditions.257 This was implemented by:  
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a) transferring existing African employees with appropriate qualifications to the European 
grading scheme (which meant a significant salary boost);  
b) placing unqualified but promising candidates (with ability, experience, commitment 
and/or integrity) on six months’ probation;  
c) offering all future vacancies in the higher grades (in Health and African Admin.) to the 
best candidate, irrespective of race.  
The all-European Municipal Employees’ Association was consulted and had no objections to the 
advancement of non-Europeans “based on merit and responsibility”, so long as “standards” were 
not lowered and jobs were not fragmented, and existing European staff were not displaced.258  
In the 1960s, the AAD went furthest in Southern Rhodesia, in promoting Africans with 
higher degrees to higher grade positions. A few examples are: Miss Iwani Mothobi – a 22-year old 
with a degree in social anthropology and psychology from Fort Hare – appointed as a social 
worker in 1960 (after having worked vacation jobs)259; Miss Theodora Malaba, a 26-year old with 
a BSc in psychology and zoology from Roma University College with teaching experience and an 
excellent reference260; Miss E. Cicero, with a 3-year Diploma in Social Work from the Jan 
Hofmeyer School; Mr. E. Bulle, with a B.A degree and postgraduate diploma in education, became 
the Acting Manager of Stanley Hall – the most iconic social and political venue of the townships; 
Mr Phezulu, with a Bachelors in Social Science from the University of South Africa; Miss U. 
Dzivane, with a BA and postgraduate diploma in Education and Native Administration261; Mr 
Mtshena Sidile, a long-term employee since 1950, obtained his BA in Social Science from the 
University of South Africa, and was awarded paid study leave by the Council262 to study for a 
Masters in Social Work from Adelphi College in the US on an American scholarship (1961), which 
also allowed him to become a visiting scholar at Yale. In 1962, an African senior research assistant 
from the Rhodes Livingstone Institute was appointed to the Welfare section.263  
Many of the African staff hired in this period were to remain in the Housing Department 
long after independence. Mtshena Sidile was to become the first African Director of Housing in 
1982, retiring in 1990.  Jimmy Ncube was hired in 1964 as a clerical assistant (short-hand typist), 
 
258 The Association also requested that those who underwent probation sit an exam at the end, with two 
members of the Association being on the exam committee. (Confidential Report by the Town Clerk’s Office 
to the Councillors, 2nd Feb 1962/BCCA) 
259 General purposes committee minutes, 24th March, 1960 p. 732/BCCA. Mothobi shortly thereafter took 
leave to do a postgraduate course in social work in Wales.  
260 Ibid.  
261 ‘Non-European Advancement in Municipal Service’, Confidential report to the General Purposes 
Committee, 17th Dec, 1960, Appendix 1/BCCA 
262 General Purposes Committee minutes, 23rd June, 1960, p. 2357/BCCA 
263 African Administration Committee minutes, 9th April, 1962, p. 725/BCCA 
62 
 
and worked his way up to Senior Housing Officer, retiring only in 2000.264 Michael Ndubiwa’s 
connection to the Bulawayo City Council began when he was still in high school. He came from 
a humble background, living in an overcrowded home in the Old Location of Makokoba, when 
he won a Council bursary in 1958. He then joined the Council as a clerk in 1962, and soon became 
Ashton’s protégé. He completed a BA in 1964 (University of Lesotho), became the first African 
Area Controller in the liquor undertaking, then worked 
his way up through Assistant Superintendent, 
Superintendent, Admin Officer, and Senior Admin 
Officer in the 1970s.265 He obtained an MA in Public 
Administration in 1972 from Birmingham (partly 
funded by a city council scholarship), was the first 
Black person in southern Africa to receive a diploma 
from the Southern Africa Institute of Town Clerks in 
1978, became Deputy Town Clerk of Bulawayo in 
1979266, and by 1984 was the first African Town Clerk 
in independent Zimbabwe, serving until 1999, when he 
retired after nearly 40 years of service to the Council. 
Some high profile African politicians also passed 
through the Department in the 1960s, including Mike 
Hove, who joined the Housing Department after 
being one of two S. Rhodesian Africans in the Federal 
Parliament; Dumiso Dabengwa, who became leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU) armed wing and a prominent politician after independence; and Josiah Gumede, who 
was later to become the only president of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1979. Starting with a graded 
staff of 8 in 1949, the department had reached 108 by 1970, plus many hundreds of ungraded 
employees.267 By the end of his career, Ashton boasted that in terms of Africanisation, “My own 
Department in the Bulawayo Municipality would pass this test with about a 95% mark. It is 
possibly the most advanced in the country in this respect, though others are coming on.”268  
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In addition to reforming some of the most negative staff attitudes, and Africanising the 
Department, Ashton and some of his colleagues introduced a more scientific, modernising ethos 
to urban administration. 
  
Modernising the Administration 
 
The 1950s saw an expansion and revamping of state bureaucracies in Southern Rhodesia, both in 
the urban and rural context. In the rural context this happened with respect to the Native Land 
Husbandry Act, which heralded a new technical and scientific approach to managing conservation 
and land tenure. As Michael Drinkwater put it: “The belief in the superiority of formal scientific 
knowledge was institutionalized in dogmatic form.”269   This high-modernist, coercive approach 
provoked huge backlashes from African farmers, and by the end of the 1950s it was deemed 
highly problematic. A shift occurred towards recognising the ‘human factor’, including Africans’ 
alleged spiritual connection to the land. This heralded a new policy of ‘community development’. 
The implications of this are discussed in chapter 5. 
Meanwhile, in the urban areas there was considerable variation in the degree to which 
scientific approaches to administration were incorporated at the local level. Each municipal 
administration reformed and ‘modernised’ in different ways, with their respective directors of 
African Administration playing a pivotal role in this regard. Abe Abrahamson, a leading Bulawayo 
industrialist and Minister of Housing from 1958-62, remarked on how the “calibre” of municipal 
township directors varied considerably. He described Ashton as a “noted anthropologist” who 
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was “most helpful and cooperative”, and contrasted him to Salisbury’s township director in the 
1950s, Colonel George Hartley, who “presided over the lives of thousands upon thousands of 
people with an attitude exactly the opposite of Ashton’s.” Abrahamson claimed that the material 
outcomes of their different approaches were only too visible “if you went into the townships.”270 
A right-wing Local Government Minister of the Rhodesia Front in the 1960s “disagreed with 
[Ashton’s] politics” but admitted (in private) that he felt he “must take his hat off” to Ashton for 
his “active and intelligent role.”271 He found Salisbury’s main townships “deplorable”, and 
Bulawayo’s much better off, “thanks chiefly” to Ashton.272 
Under Ashton’s stewardship, a number of professional anthropologists joined the 
African Administration Department in the 1950s, embodying its modernising ethos. Among them 
was Dr Johan ‘Hans’ Holleman, who, like Ashton, had been supervised by Isaac Schapera in Cape 
Town. He worked in the Welfare Section. As Doris Lessing observed during a visit to the 
Department in 1955, Holleman represented a new progressive and scientific approach to African 
administration.  She noted, with a hint of irony, how in a lecture that Holleman gave to 30 African 
welfare workers and three white officials, he referred to the audience as “gentlemen”, and “spoke 
well and clearly, and not at all in the patronising way that is so common to white officials. He 
might have been delivering a lecture to a group of fellow-anthropologists.” Lessing contrasted 
Holleman to some other Superintendents, observing how, “The difference between the old type 
of Native Department official and the new was clearly seen in the way they spoke of the Africans 
– one paternal, having no nonsense; one half-proud, half-apprehensive, the New Deal spirit.”273  
Holleman gave lectures immersed in the sociological and anthropological theories of 
social change at the time, exemplified by the work of the Rhodes Livingstone’s Institute in 
Livingstone, with which Holleman was closely affiliated. In one “very cerebral” lecture that 
Lessing describes, he talked about the effects of industrialisation on “tribal patterns”, arguing that 
a woman in the rural setting was empowered, “secure in her place in the fabric of the tribe, with 
all her responsibilities and duties well marked out for her”, but when she comes to town she is 
reduced to being a mere wife and mother. Thus, addressing the listeners who were stirring with 
agreement, “the fabric of the tribe is broken, gentlemen, the fabric of the community is destroyed; 
and it is you who must rebuild it. It is your task, gentlemen, to create the new feeling of 
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cohesion.”274 This summed up the paternal role that expert administrators saw for themselves, in 
helping to ease the transition from tribal to urban life. 
Another prominent anthropologist who joined the Department in the early days, was 
David Brokensha. With a DPhil in anthropology from Oxford, Brokensha had worked in district 
administration in Tanganyika, before making the move to Bulawayo in 1956, whereupon his 
mentor E.E. Evans-Pritchard told him, “The chap [Ashton] you are going to work with is, 
Schapera tells me, most delightful. Schapera knows him well”. 275 He was supplied with a Harley 
Davidson to patrol “his” home ownership scheme of Mpopoma, and in his memoire he gushes 
that Ashton was, “An inspirational man to work with, an outstanding administrator who had 
created the best housing and amenities for Africans in southern Africa.”276 Brokensha’s 
enthusiastic sense of mission is reminiscent of administrators in Kenya, described as having “a 
strong sense of mission to these untutored wards…”.277 
In the 1960s, more freshly minted anthropologists and sociologists joined the 
Department (in addition to those mentioned in the ‘Africanisation’ section above), such as Ewen 
Greenfield, who had degrees in anthropology and law and joined the Department because he was 
intrigued by the sense that Western Bulawayo was as “an area of rapid social change”.278  But the 
Department still struggled to get enough qualified staff, exacerbated by immigration restrictions 
on hiring South Africans. The Council made “urgent representations” to the Minister to be 
allowed to hire 4 qualified South African social workers in 1961.279 If they spoke isiZulu, 
isiNdebele, Chinyjanja or Shona it was a bonus. (All European employees were expected to take 
courses in an African language,280 and when staffed passed an exam in one of the major African 
languages they would receive bonus pay.281) One of the most enthusiastic modernisers to join the 
Department in the 1960s was Eric Gargett. He soon became the Senior Welfare Officer, and he 
took a sabbatical in 1970 to write a PhD at the University of London on “Welfare Services in an 
African Urban Area”, later publishing a book called The Administration of Transition: African Urban 
Settlement in Rhodesia, which analysed the transition from ‘tribal’ to ‘modern’ urban life.282  
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Thus, as Ranger notes, “Ashton, with his team of ‘doctors’ in anthropology and sociology, 
was running the new African Bulawayo on ‘scientific’ lines”.283 Scientific administration was based 
on contemporary theories about social change, such as ‘urbanisation’, ‘detribalisation’, 
‘modernisation’, ‘industrialisation’ and ‘Westernisation’. These theories were all to some degree 
teleological, representing social change as a self-propelled, linear, and homogenising process 
leading to a clear end goal. In South-Central Africa, the Rhodes Livingstone Institute was 
producing the most cutting edge knowledge on these processes, identifying them as an early stage 
of a universal process through which other parts of the world had all been. The RLI’s research 
directly informed Ashton’s sense that social change in Bulawayo was not unique, but universal.284 
These theories, especially modernisation theory, were “both analytic and normative”, in 
that they identified the inevitability of these processes whilst at the same time advocating “jumping 
on the bandwagon” and hurrying them along.285 These theories partially displaced the earlier 
perception of Africans as essentially tribal, and inspired a new sense that urban migrant 
communities were at an insecure in-between stage of transition. Adjectives like bewildering, confusing, 
and insecure were frequently applied to the urban environment in administrative discourse in 
Bulawayo. Targeted both as communities and now also as individuals, Africans were said to 
require tutelage and assistance in nearly every domain of urban life. As Ashton explained:  
[O]ur immigrants are not only being urbanized and detribalized, they are also becoming 
Westernized. The objective of my department is to help these sundry processes of change 
along as smoothly and painlessly as possible.286  
This task of helping Africans adjust to the urban environment meant more than just 
supplying welfare and housing. It was about helping them acculturate, an intervention often 
referred to in the literature as “social engineering”. The Department’s Welfare Section was most 
explicitly concerned with social engineering but also social security, covering case work and 
counselling, youth clubs, dance clubs, home making, etc. It was overseen for most of the period 
in question by Dr Gargett, who was said to have “espoused the most fashionable tenets of 
modernisation theory”,287 and like many such welfare officers in late colonial towns, he regarded 
expert intervention as vital to preventing communities from disintegrating288, whilst tending to 
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overlook the initiative of Africans in creating their own political, cultural, sporting and financial 
associations.289 Gargett called for explicit social engineering, saying: 
Houses were urgently needed to avert slums and the evolution of a new society called for 
skilled social engineering if the houses were to become homes, and migrants citizens.290  
Of course, many (especially educated) Africans resented this general atmosphere of paternalism. 
As a prominent Bulawayo township personality, and editor of a local newspaper, Charlton 
Ngcebetsha, wrote in 1954, 
When are the white people of this country going to make themselves understand, very 
clearly, that the Africans are no longer mental children who must be mentally spoon-fed? 
Someone is pulling too much wool over their eyes.291 
In Bulawayo, tutelage took place in many more domains than just the explicit civic education and 
home making programmes. It happened through practices around housing, advisory boards, beer 
gardens, trading, etc. Greenfield recalls that Ashton “definitely wanted to create a totally modern 
environment in which people could experience everything that came with good urbanisation. And 
so there were so many things that were done which were kind of frills.”292 These frills went down 
to the most mundane procedures, such as creating a special rent card system which, apart from 
administrative convenience, was also justified as giving the tenant “some feeling of proprietorship 
in his house or lodging” and turning the township office into “a cheerful place of public resort” 
when rent was paid, creating an “invaluable” sense of community.293  
It was not the case that in trying to create a modern environment, every remnant of 
tradition was discouraged. In Bulawayo, the inter-play of tradition and modernity was critical, 
reflecting the administrators’ sense that people still had strong and stabilising cultural roots in the 
village. For example, when the Council wanted to promote traditional dancing to keep adolescent 
girls busy and fit, it resolved “to assist the African community to develop a form of dance which 
would retain the traditional pattern but which could be wedded to modern conditions.”294  Tribal 
dancing was also encouraged through competitions. 
The Department’s staff were schooled in these theories and this sense of mission to 
intervene and help migrants in their “transition” to urban life. This schooling was designed not 
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only to provide a common basis of understanding about social change, but also a departmental 
esprit de corps. Since the African Administration Department staff came from diverse backgrounds, 
it was considered of primary importance to “weld new members of the Department into a team”  
and to “build up a deep loyalty to the Council.”295 Until 1962, this was encouraged through a 
voluntary departmental lecture series for European staff only, the primary purpose of which was 
team building, the secondary objective being to help them pass the Departmental Examination. 
From 1962, when the higher grade positions were opened to Africans on the same terms, the 
lecture series was incorporated into a compulsory 6-month probationary course for all junior staff 
in the African Administration Department. The lectures covered:  
1. Function of the African Administration Department 
2. African Society: (a) Kinship organisation (b) Political organisation 
3. Labour migration 
4. Demographic composition of the urban areas. 
5. Brief political history of Southern Rhodesia 
6. Governmental institutions 
7. Local Govt. 
8. Land Apportionment Act 
9. Land Husbandry Act 
10. Social Change 
11. Housing and Administration 
12. Financial Control 
13. Special urban problems (employment, crime, etc.)296 
Staff were also encouraged to take vocational training courses and attain a diploma accredited by 
the South African Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs. By 1960, more than a 
dozen staff were members of this institute and were encouraged to attend its annual general 
meetings (on paid leave).297 In 1974, the AAD was re-organised and a “far greater emphasis on 
staff training at all levels” was introduced.298  
 This section has shown how the African Administration Department built its team and 
mission around a modernising and yet paternalistic ethos. Its mission of creating modern, 
stratified, home owning African township communities contrasted with the reactionary and 
negligent attitude to township administration of earlier times. But there has been a tendency in 
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the literature to slot such ideologies and programmes into a universal late colonial ‘developmental 
rationality’, in the process eliding local particularity and the complex agency of low-level 
bureaucrats like Ashton. In the following five subsections, I elaborate five ways in which the 
developmental project took on particular local inflections in Bulawayo, distinguishing it 
particularly from the capital. 
 
Social theories in practice 
 
Firstly, local state administrators had their idiosyncrasies, and this significantly shaped the way the 
townships were administered. The township Head Office staff in Bulawayo embraced popular 
contemporary ideas about detribalisation, urbanisation, etc., but they did so in specifically critical, 
experimental, and rhetorical ways.  
Eric Gargett, who, as noted above, was known for espousing fashionable tenets of 
modernisation theory, was in fact quite critically reflective. To be sure, it took a visit by the 
prominent anthropologist, Dr Lucy Mair, to help to shatter the Department’s hubris. She mocked 
them for thinking they were spearheading social change, suggesting that even if they worked flat 
out, they might just be able to keep up with it. Gargett was humbled by this observation: “We can 
oil the wheels of change”, he mused, “but we are not the initiators and originators that we 
sometimes imagine ourselves to be.”299 In talks and lectures he critically analysed the teleological 
assumptions and reductionist tendencies of the time. For example, in 1968 he argued that, 
What we observe in the individual is not that he is either detribalised or not, but how in 
different settings he responds in terms of old or new patterns of living… It is a man’s 
aspirations, his orientation, which are the measure of his detribalisation: not how far he 
has travelled, but the direction in which he has set his face.300  
This resembles James Ferguson’s arguments several decades later, with respect to the modernist 
narratives about urbanisation on the Zambian Copperbelt.301 Gargett argued that the debate about 
‘detribalisation’ had become “sterile”. He furthermore emphasised in one of his lectures that no 
social scientist could capture the complexity of African urban life: “We are talking of people. 
People who are by nature as diverse as any people are. People who are rapidly changing their way 
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of life, under tremendous pressures, so that our study of them is moving out-of-date even as we 
make it.”302 
Prevalent ideas about tribal identity as the basis of communal solidarity were also regarded 
by Ashton and Gargett as too rigid. For example, in 1954, Ashton experimented with “cultural 
grouping” in a new large married housing scheme called Njube. In various sections of the 
township, rather than adhering slavishly to the order of the waiting list, he offered tenants the 
choice to cluster according to some kind of common identity, believing that this might be better 
than throwing people “pell-mell” together, wherein their customs would break down and 
community spirit would falter.303 But he was at pains to explain, even to a local newspaper, that 
he was not thinking about “culture” in some rigid sense like tribal affiliation, but rather in the 
broadest and most flexible sense.304 He believed,  “Quite simply, that birds of a feather should be 
enabled to flock together”, to ease their adjustment to the “confusing and strange urban 
environment.”305 He proposed that, instead of tribal affiliation, people might prefer educational, 
occupational, religious, kinship or home origin groupings. As it turned out, the prospective tenants 
were not remotely interested in tribal grouping. The only grouping option that elicited some 
interest was to live amongst friends and church members.306 And so Ashton dropped this idea in 
future schemes. 
However, even as the analytic usefulness of rigid concepts like ‘detribalisation’ were being 
questioned by these administrators, these concepts were nevertheless deployed for rhetorical 
effect, in order to legitimise paternalistic interventions, rationalise particular redistributions of 
responsibility, and mobilise financial and human resources in township development, as the 
following chapters demonstrate. 
 
Control and upliftment 
 
Secondly, the emphasis on social upliftment and individual improvement, rather than direct 
control, in late colonial urban administration also took on a particular inflection in Bulawayo. 
Ashton’s pragmatism meant simplifying and thereby easing off on harsh regulations wherever 
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possible, generally reducing heavy-handed approaches, and taking a nonchalant attitude to 
security. This contrasted with his counterparts in Salisbury.  
On taking office, Ashton accepted that the Old Location of Makokoba was a slum, and 
focused resources instead on new townships. He therefore decided to give up the home raids that 
were meant to flush out illegal occupants at Makokoba, believing them to cause unnecessary 
grievance. One Makokoba resident, cited in Ranger’s social history, Gogo Madamu, remembers 
being raided at 4am by police, and dragged to Ashton’s office, accused of being a prostitute. 
Ashton noticed that she was pregnant and rebuked the police sergeant, saying that if the woman 
had given birth, he would have had the sergeant and township superintendent arrested. The 
woman recalls: “The raids were stopped on that day…From there life began to be normal, we 
were living peacefully. Dr Hugh was a very good man”.307 Due to such actions, the early 
indictments of Ashton “began to slacken and then to cease”.308 As we see below, they did not 
cease entirely. However, a degree of mutual trust had been restored, perhaps well captured in the 
response of an old man in a shebeen in Makokoba, when I asked whether the name “Ashton” 
rang a bell: “Dr Hugh! We used to say he was more black than white!”, he exclaimed.309 
Ashton sought to make the township bye-laws simpler and less penalising. He was not 
convinced by the South African systems for drafting bye-laws (which most Rhodesian 
municipalities were following), which made “extensive use of penal sanctions” and contained all  
kinds of regulations already covered by other legislation, and prescribed rules for purely 
administrative matters.310 Ashton could not see why all these matters had to be codified in the 
bye-laws, which should be kept “as brief as possible”, leaving out what was already covered by 
other legislation and civil law. South Africa had a detailed framework of what Location/township 
regulations should embody, whereas Rhodesia’s framework was simply that municipal bye-laws 
should be “for the good rule, government, control, use and occupation” of the ‘Native Urban 
Areas’. Ashton wanted to make the most of this opportunity for simplicity: 
 
Would this simplicity and generality permit us to get away from the detail that seems to 
have been required by the Union Act, and limit the bye-laws to the bare essentials for the 
“good rule” of the area? 311 
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He proposed using the common law that applied to landlord and tenant to deal with all tenancy 
matters. So long as the Council retained the right to evict a tenant under the due process of law, 
“We should adopt the civil approach where we can, and frame bye-laws where we cannot, or 
where administration can be facilitated without being duly restrictive or penalty-minded.”312 Later, 
in 1953, when discussing the township regulations with Advisory Board members, he again 
stressed that whilst other municipalities had cumbersome regulations, he felt they should be kept 
simple in Bulawayo, and he assured the Boards that they “should not feel that the native areas 
were being singled out for the imposition of a whole lot of regulation.”313  
The Department expended little energy on matters of law and order. Very little space is 
actually taken up in everyday paperwork with issues of crime and unrest. Furthermore, the African 
Administration Department’s annual reports, which were usually 9-10 pages long (plus 
appendices), rarely contained more than a paragraph or two on ‘Policing and Control’, and 
sometimes an appendix with simple crime statistics. The Department’s strategy with respect to 
crime was more cause than symptom-oriented, by employing both infrastructural solutions –  
installing street lighting in the main arterial roads; high tower lights from the mid-1960s – and a 
general policy of social upliftment. 
 Social upliftment was a solution to security problems, not just in general, but sometimes 
in direct response to a specific problem. For example, when men were getting rowdy at a beer 
garden and boxing ring in the most austere single men’s township, Ashton immediately proposed 
leisure pursuits “of a more cultural type”. It was 1952, and this austere scheme, later dismantled, 
was a legacy of the earlier attitude that African workers were in the town on sufferance. These 
men had been restricted to boxing, beer, once-a-week cinema and the occasional dance evening, 
and Ashton proposed introducing literacy, handicraft and woodwork classes immediately, even 
using decommissioned asbestos to erect two temporary huts for the purpose.314 This symbolised 
the changing attitude to Africans’ place in the city and the sorts of lives they should live there. He 
made the connection between social upliftment and peace and order very clear in his 1957 treatise 
on African administration, stating that “the contribution of the Municipal housing policy, and the 
provision of sports fields, boxing tournaments, beer gardens and other social amenities… towards 
the reduction of crime…should not be ignored.”315  
This approach contrasted with that of Salisbury’s Director of African Administration in 
the 1950s, Colonel Hartley. Hartley depicted the “the very great majority” of Africans in Salisbury 
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as comprising “a conglomerate and uncultivated mass whose horizon is still rural, tribal, and 
communal”. Dealing with this “mass” required direct control: 
In the interests of law and order one unpalatable characteristic of this group has perforce 
to be recognised. Beneath a veneer of rustic simplicity the great body of this class of 
African comprises an unsophisticated mass which still requires administrative control, 
guidance and discipline. Thus, administration is obliged always to recognise that these 
form in our midst a volatile mob of primitive and undisciplined beings whose actions are 
quite unpredictable and whose attitude to the emotional stimulations of life are so naïve 
that unwittingly, but nevertheless inevitably, they may at any time become a menace to 
peace and security.316 
Another important aspect of control was the Pass Laws, and again here the two major cities 
differed in their policies. The Pass Laws were instituted in the early colonial period to control the 
influx of Africans to urban areas of the colony, and responsibility for their implementation was 
handed to municipalities with the Urban Areas Act. Although Ashton favoured some influx 
controls earlier on to build up “a more responsible, responsive and law abiding native 
population”,317  he had in practice always been lax about the pass laws. Doris Lessing noticed the 
difference with Salisbury: “It is always a question of grace and favour, the disposition of a 
particular official. Thus, Salisbury is oppressive in the matter of pass offences; whereas in 
Bulawayo, under the liberal Dr. Ashton, things are much better.”318 At the behest of the Bulawayo 
City Council, the pass law was repealed in 1961. Once it had been repealed, Ashton described this 
“discriminatory legislation” as having had “debatable administrative value”, not to say adverse 
political effects.319  
The Central Government’s actions often disrupted this more conciliatory approach of 
Bulawayo’s African Administration Department. As George Karekwaivanane points out, 
throughout the 1950s a number of often overlooked repressive laws were enacted – including the 
Subversive Activities Act (1950), the Public Order Act (1955), the Unlawful Organisations and 
the Preventive Detention Acts (1959) and the most notorious Law and Order Maintenance Act 
 
316 City of Salisbury: Annual Report of the Director of Native Administration for the Municipal Year 1st 
July 1956 to 30th June 1957. Weston Library (Oxford Bodleian). Box 625, File 5, SR II.  Nat. admin. - 
Salisbury material, 1956, page 1-2.  (Emphasis mine.) 
317 Ashton Report on IANA conference, 1952/BCCA/A13/20 (Transfer Box 479). 
318 D. Lessing, Going Home, p. 128. 
319 Annual Report of the Director, 1961/BCCA 
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of 1960  – whilst “government officials and legislators debated amongst themselves what actions 
they could legitimately take without betraying British legal traditions.”320  
In this context, racial tensions heated up in Southern Rhodesia in the 1950s, as racial 
partnership increasingly seemed a farce, Garfield Todd was removed in a Cabinet revolt because 
of his ‘pro-African policies’, and in February, 1959, the Prime Minister, Edgar Whitehead, declared 
a state of emergency and banned the African National Congress under the Unlawful Organisations 
Act.321 This was the first major disruption in Bulawayo since 1948, leading to sweeping arrests of 
township leaders, including 11 African Advisory Board members and 3 municipal employees, who 
were detained at Khami prison. As Ranger put it, “Ashton was outraged that his politics of 
collaboration had been senselessly disrupted.”322 Ashton remarked that the leading lights in the 
African community whom he had come to know quite well were “generally responsible people, 
who did not fall into the category of ‘rabble rousers’. [They were] very different from the 
extremists in other parts of the country”.323 As he was heading out of the country, he instructed 
an administrator to check on the detainees at Khami Prison. The Welfare Department set up a 
system for relatives of detainees to be bussed to the prison;324 and on their release, the Council 
re-hired them.  
It is evident that Ashton was ambivalent about the security situation as the racial tensions 
heated up. Whilst he accused the white electorate of being much too slow in “facing the new 
Africa” and ending racial discrimination, he seemed naïve about the level of support for African 
nationalist parties and movements, suggesting for example in 1959 that Joshua Nkomo did not 
“cut much ice in Bulawayo”.325  When a major disturbance broke out in Bulawayo in 1960, known 
as the zhii riots326, causing £80,000 of damage to Council property, Ashton’s response was 
somewhat blasé.. The riots were sparked off when a meeting of the National Democratic Party – 
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322 Ranger. Bulawayo Burning, p. 208. 
323 Annual Report of the Director, 1959/BCCA. (Interestingly, he believed the rounding up of “rabble 
rousers” would have actually been a legitimate exercise in the eyes of the African community if it hadn’t 
been done indiscriminately.) 
324 Ironically, it was whilst helping detainees’ families, that a 20-year old Dumiso Dabengwa, junior welfare 
assistant, was exposed to nationalist ideas that inspired him to join the anti-colonial struggle. (Interview 
with Dumiso Dabengwa, Bulawayo, 19th June, 2018). 
325 Ashton meeting with George Loft, Salisbury Club, 23rd Feb, 1959. Hoover Institution 
Archives/2006C21/ George Loft Papers [courtesy of Brooks Marmon]. 
326 See F. Nehwati, ‘The Social and Communal Background to ‘Zhii’: The African riots in Bulawayo, 




to which Ashton had given the go-ahead despite rioting in Salisbury a week earlier –  was banned 
in the last minute by the civil commissioner, unbeknownst to Ashton and without prior notice to 
the organisers of the meeting.327 Ashton attributed the cause of the zhii riots to mostly economic 
and social factors rather than political factors; namely, the unprecedented rates of unemployment, 
exacerbated by an influx of job seekers into Bulawayo (caused by drought and the Land 
Husbandry Act) combined with economic recession. He also attributed them to tensions arising 
between married and single tenants, between lodgers and home owners, and between “Matabeles” 
and “Mashonas” over perceived unequal shop allocations.328 He observed fairly casually that,  
These riots, painful experience though they were, did prove of value in shaking the 
complacency of some who had accepted the unemployment situation and other 
grievances of the African people without further thought. They also promoted salutary 
investigation and improvement of the Security situation.329 
Confidential reports after these riots show that security had been completely uncoordinated. The 
incensed Town Clerk resigned from the Government’s “farcical” local security committee as a 
result. The Town Clerk wrote,  
I have come to the conclusion that the only way to get anything effective done is to work 
on our own and advise the Government of what we have done so that they can try and 
merge it into any overall plan they may be preparing.330 
He proposed ways that the African Administration Department could “contain, dominate and 
suppress lawless elements” until the BSAP arrived at the scene, whereupon all responsibilities 
would transfer to the latter.331 But the municipal police force was always feeble, concerned as it 
was only with minor issues. In 1959, the entire African Administration police force numbered just 
180 (for a township population of 122,000332), and even when combined with the staff of the 
BSAP, the numbers were insufficient to carry out 24-hour patrols. Following the 1960 zhii riots, 
the Department’s police force was increased to 252 men. But the cash-strapped Department was 
never happy doing policing functions, especially without Government financial assistance. After 
 
327 The day before the riots broke out, Ashton was seen by a Government informant escorting Guy Clutton-
Brock (a supporter of the liberation struggle) and Professor Rousseau (a radical professor at the University 
College of Rhodesias and Nyasaland) around the townships.  The Federal Minister of Finance, Donald 
Macintyre, sent a memo to Sir Roy Welensky reporting this and suggesting Ashton be questioned. (Donald 
Macintyre to Sir Roy Welensky, 1960, General Records of the US Department of State, RG59, Box 1696 
[Courtesy of Brooks Marmon].) 
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329 Annual Report of the Director, 1961/BCCA 
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the BSAP had opened two sub-stations at Mzilikazi township and the Western Commonage in 
1961, there was a gradual handover over of nearly all crime prevention duties to the BSAP.333 The 
municipal police retained its main function of policing the beer gardens.  
Political tensions in Bulawayo’s townships increased in the 1960s, whilst African 
nationalist movements turned to armed struggle in the countryside from 1964. This civil war was 
fought primarily in ‘the bush’ between the two main guerilla armies of ZIPRA and ZANLA, and 
the Rhodesian National Army. However, support for nationalists was widespread amongst 
workers in the African townships (as well as African domestic servants in the European 
neighbourhoods334), whence the political parties and their leaders sprung.335 Whilst Ashton 
appeared fairly sympathetic to the African nationalist cause, he often attributed the politicisation 
of ordinary township dwellers to tactics of intimidation or group pressure, no doubt 
underestimating genuine autonomous support for the liberation struggle.  
Although various protests occurred in the urban areas (particularly at the time of the 1972 
Pearce Commission, although Bulawayo remained peaceful then336), and there were tactics such 
as beerhall boycotts (again more in Salisbury than Bulawayo337),  the towns were not nearly as 
affected by the violence of war. Therefore, a detailed account of the liberation war’s complexities 
and fluctuating intensities is beyond the scope of the present analysis, but it is interesting to note 
how rarely the broader context of war appears in the archives of day-to-day urban administration 
in Bulawayo, or even the more reflective annual reports of the various Council departments, even 
as the war escalated in the 1970s (especially after the independence of Mozambique in 1975).   
The annual reports of Ashton and of the mayor rarely included more than a cursory 
mention of the “security situation”, let alone “war”. Remarkably apolitical, mayors’ reports were 
usually only concerned with summarising mundane developments such as infrastructural 
improvements, supply dam levels, rate increases, general township development, frivolous events 
of the year, etc., whilst Ashton’s reports detailed African housing progress, advisory boards, 
trading, health, family casework, recreation, sports, schools, libraries, arts and crafts, and the beer 
brewery. A brief one-line “thanks” to the police and the army would usually suffice. In fact, 
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Ashton’s more controversial reflections on national politics in the introductions to his 1960s 
reports338 actually diminished in the 1970s, despite the war escalatating in that decade. For 
example, his comprehensive 30-page annual report for 1974, when the bushwar was raging and 
the death toll rising339, contained no mention of conflict and just two sentences on Police and 
Control: “1. The general atmosphere in the townships during the year has been relaxed and 
peaceful. 2. Our municipal police continued its main function of preserving law and order in the 
beer gardens and the odd few incidents that did occur from time to time were successfully dealt 
with.”340  
In 1976, when the war had escalated further, following Mozambique’s independence and 
guerilla incursions at multiple points on the eastern border, the mayor made the briefest of 
mentions of this situation, and casually regretted that, “From the security point of view, this has 
been a most troublesome year and it has been virtually impossible for the police or the military to 
devote any time to civic affairs.”341 It was the troubled economy that was given far more attention 
than the security situation.  
Although, as we shall see in the following chapters, Ashton was clearly exasperated by 
the politicisation of the African Advisory Boards and residents’ associations from the 1960s, he 
and other councillors and officials used remarkably understated language in the way they reported 
violent incidents – such as grenade attacks in beer gardens or the sabotaging of water meters. This 
reflects their presumption that these were isolated incidents that lacked legitimacy or ideological 
conviction. 
Again, by contrast, Salisbury Council was more willing to rationalise its actions in terms 
of security. In the 1970s, it justified removing African townships that were close to the CBD for 
security reasons, whilst Bulawayo was defending the rights of Africans to own homes in townships 
close to the CBD (see chapters 3 and 4). The Central Government also introduced new, distinctly 
authoritarian African township regulations in the 1970s, but Bulawayo chose not to adopt them, 
and the Minister of Local Government indicated that he would not intervene, “provided the 
municipality does not appear in danger of losing control.”342 
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Ambivalent relations between administrators and residents 
 
Thirdly, the increased sophistication and “scientific” basis of administration in the late colonial 
period did not mean that highly personalised modes of engagement with residents ceased. As 
paternalistic attitudes were increasingly challenged by residents, these engagements became ever 
more sensitive. However, they were often strangely ambivalent. Even vociferous and 
confrontational nationalist leaders sometimes forged genuine friendships with administrators, 
particularly Ashton. 
The clearest role requiring personal connection was that of the township superintendent, 
who was expected to know the social dynamics of “his” township intimately. This paternal role 
was evident in the superintendent’s broad remit, which ranged from practical tasks such as rent 
collection, to welfare cases such as domestic disputes, to the more ephemeral task of “encouraging 
the development of a community spirit”.343 Some superintendents enjoyed congenial relations, 
whilst others made themselves deeply unpopular, and some residents who cooperated or assisted 
them were regarded as sell-outs.  
But even head office staff valued personal interaction. There were remnants of the 
familial model upon which early colonial administration was based, and it was perhaps telling that 
a newspaper feature on Ashton some years after his retirement was entitled, “Father of the African 
Townships.”344  He must have carried with him some of the experience of 10 years as a District 
Commissioner in Bechuanaland, at a time when colonial administration was “looked on as an art 
to be developed, not a science to be applied,”345 and his interactions with residents ranged from 
visiting the beer gardens for a performative and demonstratively satisfying swig of ‘African beer’ 
amongst the punters, to imbibing an after-work European beer at the more exclusive township 
‘cocktail bars’, to forging genuine and sometimes lifelong friendships, with residents and staff 
alike. 
There was a sense in which township residents wanted more interaction with officials: they 
wanted officials to be more in touch with residents’ experiences, and sometimes said the Council 
“does not care about our feelings”. For example, the Senior Welfare Officer and his colleague was 
once directly challenged by the residents of Makokoba, for not relating to their experiences. He 
reported:  
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They criticised both myself and the welfare officer [a woman] for being too detached, 
and invited me to spend more time on foot in the township, learning at first hand how 
many people are forced to eke out their existence; they felt that the welfare officer’s 
treatment, both of themselves and of people who came to get their rations, was often 
abrupt and cavalier…346  
The most intense forum of interaction between Department officials and residents was the 
Residents’ Association meeting. RAs were established by residents themselves, in every township 
(there were sometimes more than one, and some exclusive to women), to support and supplement 
the Advisory Boards, which were usually regarded as toothless. The RAs needed to present a 
constitution for formal approval, before the Council’s administrators would engage with them. 
However, Ashton always preferred to engage with Advisory Boards, whom he considered a more 
“official channel”, and he discouraged RAs from becoming political, but in vain. Ndubiwa noted 
that the Department was generally “extremely cautious” in its dealings with RAs, seeing them as 
“attempting to usurp the role of the Board”.347 
The RAs were generally very proactive, popular and pulled no punches in their demands 
for better services from the Council. Their strong community support is evidenced by meetings 
attended by several hundred residents, with dynamic speakers. An umbrella organisation, the 
Bulawayo African Residents’ Association (BURA), became a front for the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union.348 They increasingly became frustrated at their powerlessness in changing some 
key policies, such as rent increases and the denial of direct representation on Council to Africans. 
For this reason and in the context of the liberation struggle, many became quite non-collaborative 
with the AAD from the 1960s.  
The Council’s files detail hundreds of meetings with RAs. The RA meeting reports, 
written by superintendents, unsurprisingly tend to portray a scene of passion and posturing by 
community leaders, until the dispassionate, rational and impartial official finally intervened to 
deliver the “hard truths” about how the Council works and what is feasible or not. The patronising 
attitude of some officials greatly aggravated RA leaders. In the 1960s, as the nationalist movement 
geared up, the RAs became increasingly confrontational in their demands, and the meetings 
became a tussle for authority between community leaders and Council administrators.  
 
346 Report on Meeting with Makokoba Tenants’ Association, 7th October, 1964/BCCA/SO3/Transfer Box 
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The African Advisory Boards also had a chequered history. Given more powers in 
Bulawayo than in other towns, they were nevertheless fairly toothless in the 1940s and ‘50s. In 
the 1960s, they were dominated by Nationalist leaders and, unable to prevent a rent rise and 
negotiate a suitable arrangement for direct representation on the Council (see chapter 5), 
disbanded from 1964-68. In the absence of the Boards, the Department needed some channel of 
communication, and so established a free magazine called Masiyepambili (“Let’s move forward” 
– the city’s motto), which is still published today. Along with entertainment and township gossip, 
it served to propagandise development progress and gloss over political tensions. It was therefore 
frequently criticised by nationalists as a propaganda rag. 
Yet at the same time, some of the most vociferous of the RA leaders, and some Advisory 
Board members, befriended Ashton. Naison Ndlovu, who co-founded the umbrella organisation, 
BURA in 1962, which became a front for ZAPU, frequently confronted the Council to demand 
better treatment and services for African residents.349  Yet, he told me, Ashton “was for the 
advancement of the black people, both commercial and political. But he had his own way of 
approaching; he looked unaggressive but his influence was felt.”350  Their relationship was also 
ambivalent. Although Ndlovu took an oppositional stance to Council, he recalls also warning 
Ashton of impending violence on one occasion, and Ashton asking him to try to “tap the tail of 
the fish” to make it change its course, i.e. defuse the situation.351 
Ashton also befriended Joshua Malinga, who was involved with BURA and ZAPU. In 
these roles, Malinga took an oppositional stance to the Council’s policies. But he, too, told me of 
his friendship with Ashton, who had known him since he was a small child. When later Malinga 
became CEO of the Jairos Jiri Association for the Blind and Handicapped (he is disabled from 
polio), they became colleagues as Ashton was the chairman of Jairos Jiri. Malinga recalls: “Hugh 
Ashton was my friend at the end, we were best friends; also Dr Eric Gargett …We came from 
primitive administration to the best administration.”.352   
The African staff of the AAD were in a potentially tricky position. Michael Ndubiwa, for 
example, was a supporter of ZAPU, and even went on barefoot marches across the townships 
with Joshua Nkomo; but Ashton also regarded him as a protégé, and the two developed a lifelong 
friendship that their families continue to this day.353 I asked several Black former staff of the AAD 
 
349 Ndlovu was detained at Gonakudzingwa Prison in 1965.  
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about how their position, working for the Council, was perceived in their communities; none 
reported any particular controversy about their position. As Jimmy Ncube explained: 
 
No but we had no clashes at all with nationalists. Well people were entitled to their views 
but in general we were accepted. We were accepted. We were not accused of being sell-
outs and so on. We were doing our job; we were straightforward, and people appreciated 
what was right.354 
 
Ashton, however, suspecting that staff might be subjected to political pressures, banned political 
affiliation amongst both African and European staff whose work required “manifest impartiality”, 
such as allocating shops and houses, or dealing with rent arrears.355 He claimed these restrictive 
rules would in effect be protective rules, as employees would feel freer to carry out duties without 
reprisal.   
This account of relationships that existed between officials and residents is by no means 
comprehensive. There were some Council officials who made themselves deeply unpopular with 
their patronising approach; or who tried to spy on or co-opt residents as informants, and this 
often created suspicion in the African communities. On the other hand, as this discussion has 
shown, some of the interactions were characterised by ambivalence, and townspeople came to 
distinguish particular local state actors from “the state” at large.  
 
 
The political agency of low-level state actors 
 
Fourthly, the statements and actions of Head Office staff in Bulawayo’s township administration 
confirm the observation by Bernstein and Mertz that, “[I]t is simply not the case that some parts 
of the state decide while others merely carry out those decisions in a humdrum, mechanical 
fashion.”356  Lowly as they were in the state bureaucratic hierarchy, Ashton, Gargett and even the 
lower ranked officer, Mike Ndubiwa, infused political ideas into their work, and also vocalised 
their political opinions and thereby tried to effect policy changes.  
Ndubiwa was in a lower-ranked position, but still used the opportunities he was given of 
conducting township surveys, to present a critical perspective on the hardships and indignities of 
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many a township dweller. Gargett published and lectured in a way that was critical of many 
development policies in the colony. And finally Ashton, who had by far the most clout in 
Bulawayo’s township administration, was engaged with various liberal organisations that sought 
to influence national politics and legislation, with respect to issues that impinged directly on his 
development vision, including racialised land laws, labour laws, liquor laws, etc. He came to be 
diametrically opposed to the Rhodesia Front Government, and pushed back against its policies.  
Ashton claimed that he was not a reformer, and that he left reform to the politicians. His 
goal, rather, was “encouraging the new places to be happy, comfortable, beautiful…for the 
townships to be places people were happy to be in.”357 However, this claim belies the many subtle 
and less subtle ways in which he sought to influence or circumvent unwanted policies. Ndubiwa 
recalls that in his daily work, “Ashton used all those strictures, you know the Land Apportionment 
Act [etc.] as an opportunity to actually do the reverse of what was intended…He found ways 
around things he didn’t like.”358   
One liberal group with whom he was affiliated was the South African Institute of Race 
Relations (SAIRR), of which he was the Southern Rhodesian representative from 1956 (remaining 
on its executive committee for many years).359 Another was the Bulawayo Action Group, of which 
he was honorary secretary in the 1950s. The Bulawayo Action Group was a political pressure 
group affiliated with Prime Minister Garfield Todd and his United Rhodesia Party (URP) from 
1953-58, then with Todd’s successor, Edgar Whitehead until 1962, when it disaffiliated from all 
parties. It comprised about 30 civic leaders in business, law and politics (including several 
territorial and federal ministers), most of whom were men. It was only in 1957 that the Group 
acquired its first two African members.  
This was the most elite and impactful pressure group in the city, addressed fortnightly by 
top political figures, including prime minister (from whom the group members demanded policy 
explanations), often exerting some influence over policy.360 They regarded themselves as “sane 
and pragmatic liberals”.361 The Group discussed mostly the politics of racial discrimination, 
including African wage levels, the franchise, and the Industrial Conciliation Act (workers’ rights). 
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As we see in chapter 4, Ashton lobbied through this group to whittle away at the legislation that 
was excluding Africans from enjoying tenure security in the city.  
Ashton’s counterpart in Salisbury, Colonel Hartley, was entirely opposed to such liberal 
organisations. He suggested that they would be “led by their ideals into disillusionment”, because 
they did not understand the psychological makeup of “the African”. He placed the onus on 
Africans to resolve racial tensions, by being more industrious, saying they were “congenitally 
incapable of recognising that they have any contribution to make if race relations here are not to 
deteriorate”.362  
In any case, the emptiness of the liberal ‘racial partnership’ rhetoric of the 1950s became 
obvious to African elites, who increasingly asserted that inter-racial socialising was no substitute 
for political and economic rights. As Joshua Nkomo quipped in 1959, “We don’t want to swim 
with them in the pools – we want to swim with them in Parliament.”363  Ashton appears to have 
been more aware of this than most Action Group members – the chairman praised him for driving 
the point home – and he tried to express to some leading figures, such as the Federal Prime 
Minister, Roy Welensky, that much less rhetoric and more substance in ending discrimination was 
required.364  
Ashton was a gradualist sympathiser with anti-colonial sentiments, but not a radical 
supporter of the armed struggle. This gradualism has exposed liberals to the criticism that they 
legitimised colonial rule. Whether Ashton’s actions were intended to legitimise, ameliorate, or 
undermine colonial rule, is not easy to adjudicate, nor is that the purpose of this discussion. Rather, 
it is to emphasise that he was not just an impartial administrator doing “the state’s” bidding, but 
had political agency that impacted his work and, therefore, the development of the townships. 
Thus, when the Rhodesia Front came to power, and it was clear that the post-war pretensions of 
“polite governance and directed development” were unravelling,365 Ashton took an increasingly 
oppositional stance to many Government policies, both through bureaucratic correspondence 
and newspapers, portraying his Department as a pragmatic and reasonable mediator between 
extremist blacks and whites on both sides. This is reminiscent of Dubow’s description of the 
South African liberal tradition as “a mediator between strongly opposed ethno-nationalisms”.366 
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Conversely, Ashton’s counterpart in Salisbury, Colonel Hartley, went on to become a Rhodesia 
Front speaker of the House. 
 
Defending local knowledge 
 
Fifthly, long-tenured urban administrators acquired a high-definition perspective, and emotional 
investment, in local matters, from which they believed officials and technocrats at Central 
Government level were detached. This led to intense defensiveness of local ways of doing things. 
This belief was stated clearly by a speaker at a conference of the South African Institute 
of Administrators of Non-European Affairs in 1958. He argued that urban administrators were 
“virtually the sole custodians of the practical knowledge of dealing with the bewildering 
complexity of urban African administration”. The Central Government’s knowledge of Africans 
was “conditioned by its experience of rural (tribal) affairs”, meaning that Government officials 
only thought in terms of communities, and were “never required to minister so closely…to the 
needs of the individual as the urban administrator is called upon to do”.367  
This led to a sense that Government officials were detached, motivated by other things, 
and therefore should not interfere with local ways of doing things. Ashton expressed such a view 
clearly to the Urban Affairs Commission of 1957, when it asked all municipalities to provide their 
views on the structures and policies of urban governance: 
The conduct of native affairs is a dynamic ever-changing matter. It is not a purely 
technical, impersonal matter such as the supply of water or electricity [etc.]. It is a highly 
complex subject, dealing with the day to day and long-term relation between peoples and 
communities... Local initiative and variation will help keep the administration and 
conduct of native affairs flexible, whereas centralisation runs the risk of rigidity and 
eventually arterio-sclerosis. Moreover it will remove it from the hurly-burly of local 
politics and so miss their stimulating effects and realistic approach: it would also run the 
risk of becoming so divorced from local opinion as to lead to a serious rift and alienation 
of public support.368  
It was not just the township administrators who defended their locally-honed expertise against 
top-down interference. Officers in other departments of the Council had a strong sense that their 
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local knowledge was superior. For example, when the Government insisted on its own planners 
being involved in Bulawayo’s development, the Town Clerk rebutted: “[T]here is far too much 
central control and interference with local town planning schemes…Do they know more about 
the local conditions than the people on the spot?369 
This defensiveness of local ways of doing things undergirded every aspect of Bulawayo’s 
township development. It enabled a local development vision, along with particular governing 
practices, relationships, expertise and esprit de corps to become established at this critical juncture 
in the city’s history, forming patterns in the 1950s, which, like those of the built environment 
itself, became entrenched and resistant to change. 
 
Late colonial continuities: autonomy and inter-city rivalry 
 
Underlying the changes from the early colonial period in Bulawayo’s African administration, were 
two long-standing continuities: resistance to interference from the Central Government, and 
rivalry with Salisbury. The desire for autonomy was evident in Bulawayo Council’s reactions to 
every attempt by ministers of Native Affairs or Local Government to enhance their own powers 
and issue directives to Bulawayo. This became particularly acute in the 1960s and ‘70s, under the 
Rhodesia Front regime. In 1968 the councillors warned of the “dangers” that the 1968 Municipal 
Bill might allow the minister to misuse his power,370 and they noted his “dictatorial attitude”371. 
On the 1971 Municipal Amendment Bill, the Town Clerk hit out at the “mandatory” and 
“dictatorial” powers it would give the minister.372 Even the City Engineer wrote with concern to 
the Town Clerk, “It appears that the Minister intends to transfer to himself, where he considers 
necessary, many of the powers of a local authority, and I feel our objection to this is timely and 
well-founded.”373  
So persistent was the general tendency to defend local autonomy, that the Rhodesian 
President, Clifford Dupont, pleaded with municipalities to be more accepting of Government 
decisions: “The dividing line between loyal pride and parochialism is very narrow”.374 But Ashton 
mused that Bulawayo’s particularly strong tradition of autonomy may have something to do with the 
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fact that the Council and the Government were “400 km apart instead of in the same locality.”375 
It is a long independent tradition which, Ranger argues, still persists today.376  Although Bulawayo 
Council was not easy to cajole, the minister of Local Government still found it easier to deal with 
them than the capital’s council, saying it “arrived at decisions speedily, while delay was common 
in Salisbury.”377 
Bulawayo faced a dilemma: whilst resisting interference from Government, the city has 
also resented being economically marginalised – with the Government channelling national 
resources to the capital and the Mashonaland provinces. As the opening to this chapter explains, 
Bulawayo had once been the primary city, and it remained the industrial hub. It marketed itself as 
the “City of Enterprise”, and to this end cheap, good African housing was an important part of 
the sales pitch. But Bulawayo’s development was completely outstripped by Salisbury’s during the 
Central African Federation years (1953-63). Salisbury experienced a boom in commerce and high-
rise development, leaving the residents, newspapers and council in Bulawayo complaining that 
Salisbury “takes everything” – captured in the isiNdebele phrase “bamba zonke”.378 In 1967, the 
Mayor complained, “We have not yet seen the end of the fight for our rightful place in the 
development scene.” 379 In 1971, another Bulawayo Mayor warned: 
[I]t is essential to keep a constant eye on developments and particularly the actions of 
Government to see that what we have was not eroded…[C]entralisation of so many 
things in the Capital has a tendency to draw things to it and to make those concerned 
forget the existence of other areas.  
In 1975, the Mayor found it “disquieting” that Salisbury had acquired so many advantages over 
time. “All the pleas in the past that Salisbury was getting too much and Bulawayo too little have 
not been heard.”380 In many the desire for autonomy and yet also resentment that the capital takes 
all the resources was a typical situation for a second city. Exactly the same kind of rivalry was 
playing out in Northern Rhodesia between the second city of Ndola, once the industrial and 
commercial hub, which was losing its status to the capital, Lusaka.381 The Ndola Council accused 
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the Government of “artificially fostering” Lusaka’s development and said that “the rivalry 
between Lusaka and Ndola could not be described as ‘healthy’”.382 
Not only did Salisbury seem to take everything, but its Council was perceived as being 
entitled, and for this it was accused of behaving like a “spoilt child”. A classic example of this 
rivalry was in 1954, when there was a bitter struggle between the two main cities over which would 
become territorial capital of Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury was already capital of the Federation). 
Salisbury won, after which it came to light that its Council had lied about the city’s water supply 
situation. At this point Bulawayo councillors, backed by Government ministers from Bulawayo, 
united in condemnation of the capital. One minister insisted that, “the country must resist strongly 
any attempt by the Salisbury Municipality to obtain a greater allocation of loan money than is their 
due.” A Salisbury councillor retorted that the minister should go back to Bulawayo and swing on 
his parish pump. Another minister described this response as sounding like “the wailing of a 
pampered child.”.383  Bulawayo’s mayor admitted in his annual address of that year, “[W]e should 
get away from parochial inter-city rivalry which at times strikes a somewhat petulant and 
depressing note.”384  
The “spoilt child” epithet stuck and was repeated over the years. At a Local Government 
Association Conference of 1969, which comprised all local authorities, the Salisbury City Council 
was so offended that its chosen candidate was not elected to the presidency of the Association, 
that it pulled out of the LGA altogether.385 A Bulawayo councillor accused them of acting like a 
spoilt child, whereupon a Salisbury councillor marched over to him and told him to “stop his 
nonsense”. 
Bulawayo’s longing for more state resources was always in tension with its desire to avoid 
Government interference. The result was that the Council built and ran all of its African 
townships, with the exception of Luveve, built by Government in the 1930s, which the BCC took 
over in 1971. In contrast, Salisbury CC in the late colonial period focussed on rental schemes, and 
did not prioritise married housing. Apart from the municipal leasehold scheme of Mufakose, all 
of Salisbury’s home ownership schemes until the 1970s were administered by central 
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government.386 In this way, the two cities projected different identities and devised policies around 
different ideas about Africans’ place in the city. 
Another distinction between the two cities, was that Bulawayo avoided having a 
politicised Council, whereas Salisbury became heavily politicised in the 1960s. Until the 1960s, 
local government everywhere was fairly detached from national party politics. It had been all about 
individual personalities.387 But from the mid-60s, some candidates began to seek unofficial 
backing from a political party. In 1966, the Rhodesia Front campaigned to introduce party politics 
into local government, with Ian Smith arguing that he wished to harmonise and coordinate his 
central government policies with local authority policies, which alarmed many.388 It would mean 
signing a pledge to the party that if one crossed the floor or did not support party policy, one 
would resign from office. The Salisbury City Council candidates began officially vying for ruling 
party support, and the SCC soon became heavily politicised, dominated by RF councillors.389 The 
politicisation of Salisbury City Council created some problems for its townships administration. 
When the Salisbury African Admin director, Rory Briggs, made a number of “controversial 
statements” criticising his own Council’s African township policies (including the lack of family 
accommodation) in his 1967 annual report, the RF caucus tried to get him to apologise.390  
Whilst the RF formed caucuses in Salisbury and Gatooma, it did not do so in Bulawayo. 
The Bulawayo Council, by contrast, identified as apolitical. A Bulawayo Councillor proclaimed at 
a local government conference: “In Bulawayo we are of one mind, namely, we will not have 
politics in the Council. It is anathema to us. In Salisbury it has proved an abysmal failure and 
councillors are elected to outside offices by caucus and not on merit.” 391 Yet, the Bulawayo 
Council was known for having more progressive councillors (but there were some RF members 
in the BCC392). One RF MP even described the Council as “almost communist” in the early 1960s, 
though this was a gross exaggeration.393 One factor to which this progressivism has been 
attributed was the dominant presence of members of the Jewish community.394 The Jewish 
 
386 D. Davis, Race Relations in Rhodesia: A Survey for 1972-3 (London, Rex Collings, 1975); Patel and 
Adams, Chirambuhayo, p. 15 
387 C. Palley, The constitutional history and law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960) 
p. 630-1 
388 ‘Smith defends party politics in councils’, The Chronicle, 7th May, 1966.  
389 By 1968, the RF had a 9-7 majority on the Salisbury City Council, and all 5 committee chairmen were 
Rhodesia Front. (‘RF Men elected again in Salisbury’, The Chronicle, 3rd September, 1968) 
390 ‘Salisbury Front Caucus Defeated’, The Chronicle, 22nd May, 1968 
391 ‘Salisbury is still sulking’, The Chronicle, 15 December, 1969 
392 See e.g. ‘Land Act is RF plank in local elections battle’, The Chronicle, 10th April, 1966. 
393 R. F. James to the House of Parliament ‘Gondo pleads: drop advisory board system’, The Chronicle, 24th 
August, 1967. 
394 In the post-war period Bulawayo had the largest Jewish community, which was particularly involved in 
the furniture and clothing sectors in Bulawayo.  Between 1965 and 1973 there were 5 Jewish mayors in 
89 
 
community was by no means politically homogeneous, but the tendency was for Jewish 
Rhodesians to “veer toward a liberal attitude”.395 According to Barry Kosmin,  
This heavy Jewish representation in Bulawayo municipal politics contributed to what was 
often regarded as one of the most liberal and far-sighted social and housing policies of 
any city in Southern Africa. This was in contrast with the extreme right-wing domination 
of politics in Salisbury local government. The result was that Bulawayo was unique in its 
avoidance of rioting during the Pearce Commission of 1971, whereas the Salisbury 
African townships have been a powderkeg and the scene of serious bloodshed during the 
1970s.396 
Whilst this explanation for the different situations of Bulawayo and Salisbury is somewhat 
conjectural, it does give an indication of how the two councils were perceived to have very 




This chapter has traced how the Bulawayo Council, once deeply reluctant to commit resources to 
African housing and services, and to accept the principle of permanent African settlements being 
established in the proximity of the ‘white’ town, underwent a significant reorientation mid-
century. The establishment of the African Administration Department was instrumental to this, 
and the agent who most defined its approach and ethos was its director, Dr Hugh Ashton. He 
came to play a dominant role in defining how Bulawayo’s townships would develop, as the 
following chapters demonstrate. His influence was such that by the early 1970s, an ethnographer 
who spent some time in the Department observed that: “the personality of the Department was 
his personality, its conscience was his conscience…The townships had developed largely under 
his direction, and the problems which they in turn had created plagued and worried him.”  The 
ethnographer furthermore noted that Ashton’s “integrity, skill and careful decision-making”, and 
also sometimes “authoritarian” and “capricious” tendencies, determined the Department’s whole 
style of administration.397  
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 The Department hired many social scientists and, from the 1960s, African graduates to 
salaried positions (but not the top positions), so that it had the highest ratio of African graded 
staff in the country by the 1970s.398 Staff were acculturated into its modernising ethos and social 
scientific approach, through lectures and team-building efforts. Whilst Bulawayo’s reforms 
reflected the new post-war developmentalism taking place across the continent, there were many 
local idiosyncrasies that came to define the way African townspeople were controlled, housed and 
governed in the city. The next chapters examine how the Council’s pursuit of a localised post-war 
development vision – based on a more progressive notion of African citizenship – was shaped 
over the longue durée by conflicts with Government and other stakeholders, practical obstacles 






























3. Housing Expansion and the Financial 
Imperative to Minimise the Costs of 
Reproducing the Stabilised Labour Force 
 
In the 28-year time-frame of this study, the physical landscape of Western Bulawayo was 
transformed, whilst the population in municipal housing increased more than 10-fold. In this 
period, Bulawayo’s housing development was characterised by high rates of married rental 
housing and home ownership schemes, and a comparatively spatially integrated pattern of 
township development, which represented a remarkable turnaround in both policy and practice, 
given that in 1945 the mayor had so vociferously opposed the principle of housing African families 
in the town.  
Urban housing development in late colonial Rhodesia was generally framed in terms of 
three fundamental imperatives – financial, sociopolitical and moral. The financial imperative was 
to keep costs down and place no undue burden on white ratepayers, taxpayers, or industrial 
employers; the sociopolitical imperative was to ensure the African population remained stable and 
apolitical; and the moral imperative was to help Africans transition from ‘tribespeople’ into 
modern, ‘responsible’ and productive urban citizens. Both Government and the municipalities 
tended to rationalise their policies in terms of these imperatives, even as they often espoused 
profoundly different visions of development. The result was perpetual tension, especially between 
Government and Bulawayo (also within the Government and Council, though to a lesser degree). 
Through fierce negotiation, officials and politicians at both levels of the state attempted to assert 
their expert authority in addressing these key developmental imperatives.  
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This chapter examines the first imperative – to keep costs low and optimise limited 
resources in the drive to ramp up housing construction. The chapter focuses on the origins and 
maturation of the Council’s African ‘home ownership’ programme, which enlisted the energies 
and resources of African residents to “share the burden” of housing costs. It examines how 
constant experimentation, learning and compromise were required in the context of extreme 
resource and knowledge scarcity. Despite the sometimes ad hoc and contingent nature of this 
development process, it was imbued ex post facto with coherence and progressive intentionality. 
And the resulting spectacle of progress sold the city to industrialists and African workers alike as 
a place to belong and invest in.  
The chapter begins by discussing the broader context of the changing political economy 
of labour at mid-century, when policies of stabilisation meant the costs of socially reproducing 
the labour force were shifted from rural African society onto (primarily) industrial employers, who 
in turn pressured municipal councils to keep these costs to a minimum. Following this, the chapter 
proceeds with a long-term processual analysis of the construction of home ownership schemes in 
the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s in Bulawayo. By conducting a processual analysis – focusing on the long-
term processes of planning, constructing, maintaining, auditing and symbolically representing 
these housing schemes, rather than a policy and/or outcomes analysis – the chapter opens up the 
‘black box’ of the everyday “state at work”399, shedding light on some of the circuits of (technical 
and administrative) knowledge exchange involved, modes of bureaucratic negotiation and 
(re)configurations of authority. The final sections of the chapter analyse various technical 
experiments to reduce costs, disagreements between state officials and residents over housing 
standards, and how the townships were symbolically represented as places of belonging, 
investment value and modern progress.  
 
Bearing the financial costs of stabilisation 
 
The circular migrant labour system of the interwar period had ensured that the costs of social 
reproduction of the urban labour force were borne by rural Africans operating in the subsistence 
economy. This had suited both the industrialists and the European ratepayers; neither wanted to 
bear the financial costs of providing adequate housing, clothing and food for the African labour 
force, and the ratepayers were also reluctant to tolerate the perceived social cost of permanent 
African encroachment on the ‘white space’ of the city. Thus, as we saw in the last chapter, the 
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first half-century of Bulawayo’s development was characterised by a totally inadequate rate of 
municipal, government or employer-built housing for Africans. Despite a massive population 
increase during the war, the Council only built 263 houses in 1946; 242 in 1947; 244 in 1948; and 
166 in 1949.  The “Old Location” population alone had reached 15,362 by 1949, and it was a 
slum.400 The total Council housing stock by 1949 comprised 2,000 rooms and 2,000 cottages in 
the Location, as well as accommodation for 3,000 single men at the Rhodesian African Rifles and 
C.M.U (former Royal Air Force Central Maintenance Unit) Compounds, and special 
accommodation for 2,500 municipal employees – housing a total of 10 400 single men, 1 846 
families, and 61 single women (in the Gertrud Macintyre hostel).401  
As Teresa Barnes points out, lists of African workers’ demands in 1940s Southern 
Rhodesia show that they “were making more than narrow economistic demands”: 
[T]hey wanted nothing less than for the state and their employers to shoulder a greater 
part of the burden of their reproduction and that of their families. The evidence suggests 
that the workers of the 1940s had no illusions about the extent to which the colonial 
order was ripping apart the reproductive fabric of their societies.402  
It is worth bearing in mind that there were some differences in the ways African communities of 
the various towns of the colony were connected to their respective rural hinterlands. For example, 
according to Yoshikuni, the Shona peasantry were very much divorced from, and antipathetic 
towards, Salisbury, which was regarded simply as “the bastion of European colonisers”, and a 
place of foreign migrants (of whom the longer-term dwellers were predominantly Malawians). In 
Bulawayo, by contrast, there was a much greater “urban-rural continuum”, with many young 
AmaNdebele settling longer-term in the town from its inception.403 Enocent Msindo contests this 
demographic account of early Bulawayo, claiming that it was largely a “foreign” town in the early 
days404, but it seems clear that it still differed from Salisbury. 
In any case, the considerable discontent and resultant unrest405 arising from the squalid 
living conditions and low wages in the urban areas during and after the Second World War  
“forced the settler state itself to acquiesce in the formation of a system in which a greater (although 
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still small) degree of responsibility was taken for African social reproduction.”406 The industrialists 
also came to see the value of a stable and suitably housed labour force in terms of increased 
productivity, but this shift in their attitude caused much controversy in Bulawayo. Councillor 
Donald Macintyre – the on-and-off mayor and “big city boss” whose allegiances had always 
shifted between ratepayers and industrialists – began to chastise the latter for “selfishly” 
advocating a permanent labour force on the white town’s doorstep. (Recall Macintyre’s belief that 
the best thing for Africans was “to live in the open spaces of the Colony, running their cattle.”407). 
Yet, as we saw in chapter two, even Macintyre and the notoriously intransigent Council had to 
admit by the end of the 1940s that the status quo was no longer tenable. In July, 1949 (just a month 
before Ashton arrived and redefined the city’s development vision), the Mayor acknowledged 
that:  
The movement to replace migrant labour by a stable Native labour force has set in, and 
the need to consider accommodation for Natives as permanent urban dwellers with 
families must be taken into account.408 
In any case, the Urban Areas Act, which Bulawayo had reluctantly acceded to in 1948, had given 
them no choice in the matter: it obliged the Council to construct and manage new housing 
schemes, and obliged the industrialists to pay a standard rent, in respect of each employee, to the 
Council. This shifted the economic burden of socially reproducing the urban workforce from 
rural society onto (primarily) industrial employers, effectively settling the decades-long dispute 
about whether they, or the European ratepayers, or the nation’s taxpayers, should bear these costs. 
Only occasional and very minimal funds were drawn from the Council’s “rate fund” (to which 
European property owners paid monthly rates) to cover some township admin and engineering 
costs, and the Central Government (i.e. the taxpayer) made some low interest loans and grants 
for African housing. But as we shall see below, Africans contributed considerable amounts of 
their own limited resources through the purchase of houses at full economic cost, and the 
consumption of considerable quantities of municipal beer, the profits of which were used for 
home ownership loans, rental housing grants, and other welfare expenditure. 
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When the Bulawayo Council had no choice but to adapt to these important structural 
changes in the political economy of labour, it finally began to undertake some large-scale African 
housing programmes, in fulfilment of its obligations under the Urban Areas Act. Nevertheless, 
the Prime Minister had become distrustful after nearly 20 years of dealing with Bulawayo’s 
intransigence, and so in 1949 he had imposed a ban on the further sale of industrial stands in 
Bulawayo until he was satisfied that sufficient housing to cope with industrial expansion had been 
erected. The councillors were incensed at being singled out in this manner (even though they had 
gotten away with transferring 67 industrial stands that year before the ban was applied). The mayor 
protested that the ban came “without warning”, and insisted that the Council was doing 
“everything in its power” to alleviate the African housing crisis, which would not be solved with 
“a policy of frustrating industrial development.”409 Nevertheless, this ban did kick Bulawayo into 
action, and the Council gave full details of its housing plans to the Minister of Native Affairs so 
that, after 2 years, in 1951, the ban was lifted. 
These obligations, threats and incentives imposed on the municipalities (but especially Bulawayo) 
at this post-war juncture, promoted a dramatic increase in the rate of house-building across the 
country: until 1946, total expenditure on African housing in the colony had amounted to a mere 
£721,382. Between 1946 and 1953, a further £3,476,466 was spent, bringing the total to 
£4,197,845.410 But it still was not sufficient to tackle the housing backlog created initially by the 
war-time urban influx.  
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Additionally, the promulgation of the Native Land Husbandry Act in 1951 had further 
severed the ties between the urban economy and the rural subsistence economy. Its aim of forcing 
Africans to decide between being “farmers or industrialists”411 was rationalised by Arthur 
Pendered – a key official in the expanded Government bureaucracy tasked with implementing 
this land reform – as follows: 
The time has now come when all indigenous natives can no longer continue to maintain 
a dual existence as part-time employment in the European areas and part-time farming in 
the Native Reserves for, apart from its impossibility, it does not conduce to efficiency in 
either area, nor can the economy of the colony afford to offer satisfactory conditions in 
both areas for the dual mode of life.412 
It was presupposed that industrial development would help to take into employment the surplus 
rural population displaced by the Act who could not be accommodated in the Reserves and 
‘special native areas’. It was estimated that 20,000 to 25,000 men per year would head for the 
urban areas of Southern Rhodesia to become permanent industrial workers (although this turned 
out to be an overestimate).  
A minister warned the PM in 1953, “With the rapid industrialisation in the two main 
centres [Bulawayo and Salisbury] the position is deteriorating daily.”413  Several Government 
departments raised the spectre of African uprisings. By 1953, the 6 largest towns had provided 
housing for 52,940 single men and 11,828 families, but there was a shortfall of 19,000 single and 
7,500 married units. Since the war, the stringency on loan funds had forced Government not only 
to control local borrowings but drastically to curtail expenditure. Just addressing this backlog 
would cost £6 million, let alone keeping up with annual population increases, which would require 
capital of £2,5 million annually. Internal financial resources were deemed inadequate. External 
funding was therefore required, but Federal loans to Southern Rhodesia were so inadequate that 
the Government had to cut down loans to municipalities by a million pounds in 1954. The housing 
crisis became a serious threat to the success of the Federation414. In 1955, the Minister of Trade 
and Industrial Development, warned that, “[T]he success of Federation and our endeavours to 
preserve racial harmony will depend very largely on our ability to employ the ever increasing 
Native overflow from the reserves.” He was deeply concerned that, “until reasonable 
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accommodation could be provided for the Native urban population the racial harmony which was 
so desirable for the success of Federation would not be achieved.”415 The PM was advised in 
private that urban African housing should be regarded as “a special financial problem on its own” 
and no longer subject to “piecemeal treatment”.416  
Therefore, in 1954, Prime Minister Garfield Todd headed to the UK to appeal for £6 
million for African housing in Southern Rhodesia. Doris Lessing, who was visiting Southern 
Rhodesia at this time and keenly observed African urban housing developments, cynically 
commented that, instead of taxing the country’s big companies and privileged whites, “the 
Government goes hat in hand overseas…as if the natives were a kind of responsibility for the 
international conscience”.417 As it happened, Todd returned with a mere £1 million loan from the 
Colonial Development Corporation418, which was a “bitter disappointment to 
municipalities…”419  The Government then amended the Town and Country Planning Act to try 
to encourage township development by private enterprise.420 Arrangements were made with 
Building Societies, with Government providing a 90% guarantee. But there was little interest from 
the private sector.  
Meanwhile, the Bulawayo Chamber of Industries continued lobbying to keep municipal 
housing rents in Bulawayo’s African townships low. In 1955, it requested an inquiry into 
administration and staffing of the Council’s African Administration Department to see if costs 
could be minimised, because it begrudged the £1/month standard rent charges for African 
housing. The Committee of Inquiry found that to house an average African individual or family 
(including services) for £1 per month was in fact a significant accomplishment on the part of the 
AAD! Yet, with manufacturing industry being the backbone of Bulawayo’s economy, the Mayor 
felt compelled to apologise to the industrialists, saying that with current costs it would not be 
possible to get the rent any lower, though he had “every sympathy with the view that rents should 
be kept as low as possible”. He reiterated that “Bulawayo’s future lies in industrialisation and every 
attraction must be offered towards this end. An important advantage is well-sited African housing 
readily available and we must not fall behind in this respect…”421 
 
415 Minister of Trade and Industrial Development, George Ellman-Brown, quoted in ibid. 
416 Minister of Roads and Irrigation memorandum to Prime Minister Todd, 24th June, 
1954/NAZ/S3615/1/1/1/1. ‘Housing Policy’ 
417 Lessing, Going Home, p. 54 
418 Extract from Cabinet Meeting, 1st Nov. 1954: ‘Native Housing: Report on the Prime Minister’s visit to 
London’/NAZ/3602/35/2. Volume 2. ‘Native Housing Policy’ 
419 Government report on Native affairs, 1954, quoted in D. Lessing, Going Home, p. 194. 
420 Minister of Local Govt. to J. Braham, London, 12th Nov, 1954/NAZ/S3615/1/1/1/1. Housing Policy 
421 Mayor’s Minute (Councillor J.M. McDonald, MP) for the year ended 31st July, 1955, page 2/BCCA 
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In this context, the AAD had to struggle on with limited capital funds, and much less 
involvement from Central Government than the capital city experienced. The Finance Committee 
only budgeted one year ahead, which meant that Ashton’s 5-year plans were always subject to cuts 
and adjustments. This made township development incremental and ad hoc, and forced the AAD 
to be resourceful, experimental and adaptive. Progressive policies such as embracing the notion 
of African permanent settlement and accepting more spatially integrated development, were also 
pragmatic – minimising service infrastructure costs and allowing the AAD to enlist the energies 
and financial resources of Africans.   
These processes were, to be sure, significantly driven by the enthusiasm, pragmatism and 
progressivism of Ashton in a bottom-up manner. As Ashton claimed: “One of the major things 
that we got across to the Council and then the Government was to accept home ownership”.422 
But they were also shaped by structural factors – Bulawayo’s autonomy and need to be self-reliant, 
its stronger industrial lobby and its lower ratio of European to African residents.  
 
The rise of ‘modern’ townships 
 
When Ashton arrived at the Council in August of 1949, he encountered negative attitudes, stifling 
racial stereotypes and an unimaginative, segregationist vision for future African township 
development. For one thing, the councillors were not even that convinced that there was such a 
high demand for housing. They claimed that it was actually inflated by the presence of 
unemployed Africans, whose expulsion from the town would do much to solve the housing 
problem. They were even having trouble letting some municipal accommodation that had been 
recently erected. This, Ashton opined, showed how blinded they were by the “traditional difficulty 
of Europeans to realise that native attitudes to housing are basically the same as any other racial 
group”.423  The reason the houses had been so difficult to let, he argued, was not that demand 
was low, but that the houses were “crude, unpopular and far from town.”424 It turned out that the 
Council needed to pay more attention to African “consumer preferences”, and this was something 
the AAD began to do in the 1950s. 
The Council’s grand plan for future African township development was segregationist 
and unimaginative. A 23,000-acre European farm called Hyde Park had been purchased in 1947, 
in anticipation of future housing needs. The farm was 8 miles West of the town centre. Initial 
 
422 Interview by Mark Ncube with Ashton, 1 June 1994, NAZ Byo branch.  




development at this so-called ‘native village’ would be for 20,000 people, but the long-term 
objective was to accommodate 100,000 Africans there!425 By moving Africans from the Old 
Location to this remote site, it was hoped to secure residential segregation for Africans, Indians, 
Asians, Coloureds and Europeans “in separate suburbs but with equal amenities in each 
suburb.”426 The promise of equal amenities for Africans, despite their lack of representation on 
the City Council, and no access to the economic resources of the European population, was, of 
course, disingenuous. But as it turned out, these plans to restrict African housing to the urban 
periphery proved unaffordable, impractical and unpopular, and so a much more integrated pattern 
of development took place, closer to town.  
Not only was there increased pressure to properly house the average low-skilled worker 
who would no longer rely on rural support, but the emergent African middle class clamoured ever 
louder for superior urban housing options commensurate to their social status.427 As Michael West 
put it: 
Their objective was spatial separation from the African workers with whom they had 
been forced to live. They sought removal to a place - suburbia - where they could build 
homes, both physically and culturally, that would become the basis of a settled family life; 
in short, the members of the emerging African petty bourgeoisie desired a place to work 
out the middle-class domestic ideal as it had been transmitted to and transformed by 
them.428  
The only distinctly more privileged neighbourhood for this class in Bulawayo, before mid-century, 
had been the Government-built “native village” of Luveve, reserved for Government teachers 
and nurses. But it was not ideal, as it was 12 kms from town. The rest had had to carve out spaces 
of exclusivity within the overcrowded Old Location – for example by booking out public venues 
like the iconic Stanley Hall for elite weddings.429 This class needed to be catered for, with an 
extremely tight budget and limited experience of housing stable, stratified African communities. 
Pursuant to the policy of stabilisation embodied in the Urban Areas Act, the 1950s saw significant 
changes in the types of African housing constructed in Bulawayo. 
 
 
425 Mayor’s Minute, 1949/BCCA 
426 Mayor’s minute, 1950/BCCA 
427 As well as their calls for greater security of tenure (discussed in chapter 4). 
428 West, The Rise of the African Middle Class, pp 99-100 
429 West, The Rise of the African Middle Class, chapter 3 
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There were 4 types of African housing in the urban areas of Rhodesia:  
1) Public rental housing  
2) Home Ownership  
3) Large employer housing  
4) Domestic employer housing 
With respect to the first type, the City came to distinguish itself (especially from Salisbury) with 
its particular emphasis on massively expanding the ratio of “married” (family) accommodation in 
the African townships, as well as providing for a range of socioeconomic strata. Thus, although 
there was an initial spurt in the construction of austere “bachelor” (single-men’s) housing in the 
early 1950s – a crisis-management measure to tackle the housing backlog (see appendix A) – the 
construction of single men’s schemes was scaled down thereafter; many of the existing schemes 
were either converted to married housing or, if sub-standard, demolished.430 The capital city, in 
stark contrast, continued to build a high ratio of bachelor accommodation.  
The focus on married housing was facilitated by the departure of Donald Macintyre in 
1953, signifying the end of an era. His successor to the Chair of the Council’s Finance Committee, 
Mayor Newman, immediately approved Ashton’s request to double the number of units at a 
proposed married housing scheme at Western Commonage No.3, from 1,400 to 2,800 units. This 
made it the largest housing contract that had ever been placed in the colony.431 It was built in 19 
months and came to be known as Njube. The Council successfully applied to the minister to 
approve its use of £100,000 from its accumulated beer profits to contribute to the £640,000 cost 
of this scheme.432 Ashton later reminisced that this was the point when the Council finally “began 
to realise that housing was necessary”.433 
For the second type of housing – the type elaborated in this chapter – Bulawayo was a 
pioneer in Rhodesia, and came to be known for having the highest rates of home ownership (40%) 
in the colony, if not the continent. The third type – large employer housing – dwindled in 
importance in the post-war period, as the Bulawayo Council gradually took over housing 
responsibilities from most industrial employers. Indeed, the Council found industrial employers 
were only willing to build cheap accommodation for their single employees, and extremely 
 
430 See appendix A for an overview of rental housing development from 1949-77.   
431 A £421 817 contract was awarded to Messrs. Laing and Roberts to build 2440 semi-detached cottages 
(2 rooms and kitchen, 334 sq. feet / 31 m2) and 360 cottages (1 room and kitchen, 188 sq. feet / 17.5 m2) 
and a £51, 900 contract to Messrs. C.E. Braum to build individual aqua privies for each cottage. In total 
with all infrastructure the scheme would cost £640,000. 
432 £100,000 Grant for Native Housing Confirmed, mid-June 1954, in NAZ/S3609/35/2/ vol. 2. Native 
Housing Policy, 153-4 [p. 24] 
433 Ncube interview with Ashton, quoted in Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 187. 
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reluctant to build adequately for married employees, for whom accommodation tied to employers 
(whose employment requirements fluctuated and who were often regarded by the Council to be 
“unscrupulous”) was in any case not ideal.434 Therefore, in the 1950s the Council began to 
discourage and then cease to entertain offers from employers to build for their employees. The 
major exception was the Rhodesian Railways, to whom large areas of municipal land were leased 
for the building of high standard Railway accommodation.435 
Finally, the fourth type – domestic worker accommodation – grew along with the size of 
the European population. By the mid-1950s, a significant number of African domestic workers 
(25,000) lived on the private premises of their European domestic employers on the eastern side 
of the city. This housing was not the responsibility of the Municipality, except that it ensured that 
regulations were adhered to. 
Ashton’s first few years in office were about crisis-management. He had to strike a 
balance between rapidly building new schemes to reduce the backlog, and improving the appalling 
conditions of the existing Location.  He did not just have to work this out himself, but in turn 
had to persuade the Council that the balancing act he proposed was the optimal use of limited 
resources.436 This was not a merely technical administrative process; it involved the deployment 
of skilled rhetoric in constant bureaucratic negotiation, as well as constant learning and 
experimentation. 
The general state of Makokoba (the “Old Location”), the Municipal Compound and 
industrialists’ worker compounds in 1949, by Ashton’s own account, was horrific: 
The housing was unbelievable, it was horrible. I went into the Municipal Compound. It 
was so disgusting there that I felt sick…Makokoba was grossly overcrowded…There was 
a great big quarry in the middle of where Barbour Fields comes round and I had never 
seen people living in such conditions… Terrible. I’m not surprised that people struck.437 
Ashton decided to leave Makokoba’s development in abeyance, and focus on establishing new 
townships elsewhere. Despite the need for a great many accommodation units to reduce 
overcrowding, one of his Department’s first actions was to foray into superior housing for “the 
better type of native” at Barbour Fields (adjacent to the existing Mzilikazi married rental 
 
434 Recall from chapter 2 that it was some of the employers’ own worker compounds that had the most 
squalid living conditions of all. 
435 ‘Bulawayo’s answers to the Urban Affairs Commission questionnaire’ (Sept. 1957), p. 28/Oxford 
Bodleian Library 
436 This usually entailed reporting firstly to the Native Administration and Finance Committees who would 
then adopt or amend his recommendations and put them to the Council for a vote. But he also 
corresponded directly with Council officials like the Town Clerk, City Engineer etc. all the time.  
437 Interview by Mark Ncube, in Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 169.  
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township). Here, the City Engineer built 294 cottages (of the same type as in Mzilikazi, but on 
larger stands), with individual waterborne sewerage, which was a “radical departure” from 
traditional sanitation facilities. This scheme took advantage of an option in the Urban Areas Act 
for the building of ‘special accommodation’, charged at a higher rent than the ‘standard’ rent. 
Throughout the 1950s, Bulawayo was the only municipality to provide rental housing of different 
standards using the ‘special rent option’ (in Salisbury the Government stepped in to do so).   
At first, a number of hawkers and second hand clothes dealers from N. Rhodesia and the 
Congo settled at Barbour Fields. They were not considered “a success” as tenants, because “they 
make no effort to improve their dwellings or gardens and tend to overcrowd their houses with 
relatives and friends.” 438 Thereafter, a minimum income threshold and vetting of the “character” 
of applicants – people who would be more interested in maintaining their gardens and homes – 
was done to make it more “successful.” It soon became a popular choice of residence for teachers 
and nurses. The Council encouraged home improvements, but offered no compensation for this 
–  except that the Superintendent would help tenants to find suitable successors who would 
compensate them adequately. This signified Bulawayo’s new approach of encouraging social 
stratification, and enlisting the energies and resources of the tenants. But Barbour Fields was still 
a rental scheme. The next experiment was with home ownership. 
 
Pioneering home ownership 
 
Although the Urban Areas Act was intended to improve the living situation in the townships, it 
created much upheaval at first. Many unauthorised occupants of overcrowded Makokoba and 
dwellers on European farms and properties on the urban periphery began to be ejected, and sent 
to an emergency camp set up at Hyde Park in 1951 (on the Minister of Native Affairs’ 
recommendation.439) There were already long-term squatter encampments on Hyde Park, 
consisting of families that had been evicted from the Location since 1929. Implementing the 
Urban Areas Act also involved removing Europeans and Asians from the African areas, 
expropriating European plots on the Western Commonage to incorporate them into the African 
urban area, and expropriating many Indian trading premises to give them to African tenants. Just 
a few still remained in the Old Location by 1952.440 
 
438 Annual report of the Director, 1952/BCCA 
439 NAZ/S2609/35/2; Vol. 1. Native Housing Policy, 1946-53 
440 Annual Report of the Director, 1952/BCCA 
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Many families did not move to Hyde Park as instructed, and instead returned to 
Makokoba,441  but there were still a total of 4,000 squatters at Hyde Park, living in ‘pole and dagga’ 
(pole and mud) huts and shacks, without sanitation. The idea was that they would be allowed to 
settle temporarily at the emergency squatter camp until “proper” council housing had been built. 
The Government Health Secretary identified the situation as a matter of “extreme urgency”.442 
During the prolonged inception of the Hyde Park scheme, however, its character changed 
completely, as it became the country’s first official African ‘home ownership’ scheme, beginning 
a trend that was to define Bulawayo’s African township development vision in the late colonial 
period… 
 
Pumula: the unglamorous origins of post-war African ‘home ownership’  
 
Realising that it would be years before these squatters could be “properly” housed elsewhere, the 
Council decided to declare part of Hyde Park a ‘Native Urban Area’ (under the Urban Areas Act), 
lay out 2,400 stands (40 x 80 ft), water infrastructure (one standpipe per 32 cottages), an aqua 
privy443 for each cottage, roads, offices, shops etc., and allow families to erect their own temporary 
dwellings, which, over time, could be modified, or else replaced by permanent Council cottages. 
The scheme was inspired by Moroka, in Johannesburg.444 There was a sense of improvisation here 
– the mayor said “it will be interesting to follow its development”.445 Then the Council decided 
to offer 10-year leases to these families, the first of which were signed in April 1952. The Bulawayo 
African Township Advisory Board unanimously supported the scheme, but suggested the leases 
be 25 years with option of renewal, and preferably freehold.446 (However, the Land 
Apportionment Act at this time still prohibited African freehold in urban areas, which were 
designated “European”.) In this ad hoc way, significantly shaped by circumstance, the first “home 
ownership” scheme in Rhodesia came into existence.  
Applicants had to complete a declaration that they were: 
a) of good character 
 
441 Ibid. 
442 Extract from Dr M.H. Webster annual report, 1952, NAZ/s2609/35/2 volume 1. Native Housing 
Policy, 1946-53.  
443 An aqua privy is a small shelter with a squat plate erected over a septic tank, with a mechanism to prevent 
odour, flies and mosquitos. 
444 E.H. Ashton, ‘Urban Native Administration in Southern Rhodesia’, Presentation to the Institute of 
Administrators of Non-European Affairs Annual Conference (1955), p. 10, NAZ/GEN-1/ASH  
445 Mayor’s Minute, 1951/BCCA 
446 BAT Advisory Board minutes, 6th December, 1951/BCCA 
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b) married to an approved wife as defined by the Natives (Urban Areas) Accommodation 
and registration Act or widowed or divorced, with minor children or other dependents 
living together as a family. 
c) following “some lawful occupation” within the proclaimed area of Bulawayo, and had 
been doing so for 2 years, or, if retired, had been working for at least 3 years immediately 
prior to the application.447 
d) earning above £8/month (preferably). 
The suitability of applicants was judged by Ashton. He was able to exercise discretion to accept 
“very deserving cases” that did not meet the minimum 2 years working requirement. Because 
much of the scheme had been laid out before applicants moved in, they were allowed to choose 
which stands they wanted and could therefore live amongst friends. But most African community 
leaders were not fans of this scheme, and it was not a roaring success, which the authorities 
attributed to the following reasons: it was peri-urban and very far from the CBD and industrial 
sites; the costs were too high for many of the target families; aliens would not want to make a 10-
year commitment; the supervised nature of the scheme meant that illicit brewing would be 
difficult. With respect to these shortcomings, there was conflict between the Council and the 
Government Health Secretary. The latter felt the Bulawayo administrators were being sticklers by 
insisting on a formal marriage certificate, arguing that, 
The “myth” of the “single” native should be forgotten for all practical purposes. Nearly 
all adult natives have “wives” and there is no valid reason why they should also have a 
scrap of paper which does not alter their attitude to women in any way. 448 
Lessees at this new Hyde Park home ownership scheme were each given a loan from ‘Native Beer 
reserves’ of £30 for materials to build their own 2-roomed cottages, to be paid back at 2% interest 
over 9.5 years. Bulawayo was thus the first to take advantage of the Government’s amendment of 
the Native Beer Act in 1952, allowing beer profits to be loaned by the Municipality to Africans 
for self-building. As a Ministry memorandum in 1953 noted,  
In Bulawayo, the Council which has accumulated a large surplus of native beer profits 
has obtained the consent of the Minister to make loans to natives to acquire their own 
 
447 Native Admin Committee minutes, 9th April, 1952, p. 14/BCCA 
448 Extract from Dr M.H. Webster annual report, 1952, NAZ/s2609/35/2 volume 1. Native Housing 
Policy, 1946-53.  
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homes in the native urban area…No other local authority has at the moment sufficient 
beer moneys to follow Bulawayo’s lead.449  
This was the first example of the beer garden system becoming an integral part of the progressive 
development vision (elaborated in chapter 6).  
The Bulawayo Council decided that if this scheme was to be more permanent than 
hitherto planned, houses should be made of Kimberley brick or other “suitable” materials, not 
wattle and daub. The Kimberley bricks could be made in a nearby area, and moulds, wheelbarrows 
and other equipment borrowed from the Council. Aided self-help housing (also known as ‘site 
and service schemes’) is conventionally regarded as a 1960s innovation that took off in the 1970s 
after the World Bank cottoned onto it. But it was in fact pioneered in the 1940s, notably in Puerto 
Rico, and was still an experimental phenomenon in some colonies in the 1950s.450 This Bulawayo 
experiment was an early one in the global history of aided self-help/self-build/sites-and-services 
housing. These were the unglamorous origins of Southern Rhodesia’s first official “home-
ownership” scheme for Africans, which soon came to be known as Pumula (“place of rest”) as it 
was popular with retirees. It also soon entered the mythology of the “progressive city”, giving 
Africans an opportunity to become modern propertied citizens – despite the fact they had built 
and owned their own huts in the Old Location a few decades earlier, before private property 
ownership had been prohibited in 1929. 
 
Pelandaba: a scheme for “better-to-do Natives” 
 
Meanwhile, members of the emerging African urban middle class were clamouring for housing in 
some way commensurate to their status. It was discovered that home ownership schemes were an 
effective way to offload the financial burden of housing onto lessees, whilst at the same time 
satisfying their demands for secure tenure and exclusive neighbourhoods. Ashton was keenly 
aware of the potential of home ownership schemes as a way to address financial, sociopolitical 
and moral imperatives at once. With Pumula still an experimental project, he began promoting a 
“more ambitious and solid scheme of home ownership” for the “better-to-do” resident451 – the 
 
449 Dept. of Internal Affairs, Salisbury, 7th May, 1954/NAZ/S3615/1/1/1/1. Housing Policy. The reason 
the municipality needed authorisation, was that beer hall profits were regarded as a “trust fund” for African 
welfare, and only once the municipality had proven satisfactory provision of amenities, could it borrow the 
money at sub-economic interest rates for housing loans. 
450 R. Harris, ‘The Silence of the Experts: “Aided Self-help Housing”, 1939-1954’, Habitat Intl., 22, 2 (1998), 
pp. 165-189. 
451 Annual Report of the Director, 1952/BCCA 
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scheme that came to be known as Pelandaba – clearly explaining how it would address these 
imperatives: firstly, he argued, the Council was in a situation of “financial stringency”, and could 
not undertake any further largescale rental schemes. This was a financial justification for home 
ownership – to offload costs onto residents. Secondly, home ownership would be “a considerable 
step forward in the meeting of the genuine need for security of tenure in the urban areas”452 and 
also address the “growing frustration and bitterness among the better class Africans who resent 
the denial of so many of the rewards of progress and enterprise”453. This was a socio-political 
justification – to appease and pacify the middle class. Thirdly, home ownership would give the 
African man “an appreciation of value”, and an “opportunity of helping himself and of learning 
that he must pay for, and therefore work for, what he wants”.454 This was a moral reason – to 
improve the African citizen. 
As this section demonstrates, actually determining the specifications of Pelandaba ended 
up being a very complicated process, constantly revised in the face of financial constraints and 
uncertainty about the interest and financial situation of the prospective home buyers. When 
Bulawayo’s Native Administration Committee convened to discuss Ashton’s first report on this 
scheme, what concerned them was that this higher class scheme was essentially an experiment 
involving about 500 families, with no guarantee of success. They wanted to ascertain levels of 
interest before committing to any fixed plans, and agreed on the following list of key principles 
to enable “an outline scheme to be placed before the natives and their reaction judged”:455  
• Siting at Hyde Park. 
• Payment of a nominal ground rent plus essential services on an economic (i.e. non-
subsidised) basis. 
• Entering a lease of 25 years. 
• Provisional lease conditions to include strictly residential purposes, building according to 
approved designs with approved materials, transfer of lease under certain conditions. 
• House of minimum £300 in value, using a £150 loan raised from African beer profits, 
bearing interest of 2%, repayable over 15 years. 
Between the laying out of this set up of principles, and the final establishment of the scheme, were 
23 months of consultations and negotiations between Ashton, prospective tenants and African 
organisations, the Council’s Native Administration Committee, the Finance Committee, and the 
City Engineer. All of the “key principles” changed: the site, the loan period, the value of the loans 
 
452 Annual Report of the Director, 1954/BCCA 
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and loan interest rates, the lease conditions, and the minimum value of the houses, and even after 
construction was underway the physical structures needed redesigning. All of these adjustments 
were made in response to learning through practice about consumer preferences, soil conditions, 
new financial constraints, etc.  
Firstly, Ashton consulted with the Advisory Boards, the secretary of the Federation of 
African Welfare Societies, and the Editor of the Bantu Mirror, on the “principles” of the scheme 
outlined above. They recognised a genuine desire among some African residents for a scheme of 
this nature, but only if the lease period was much longer. Therefore, since it was deemed 
“necessary to make the scheme as attractive as possible”, the scheme’s lease period and distant 
siting were reconsidered: Ashton recommended to the Finance Committee to make it a 40-year 
lease, but the Committee declined, to Ashton’s annoyance. “The length of lease goes to the very 
root of the matter as far as Africans are concerned”, he argued, and anything shorter would elicit 
a very poor response from eligible candidates, who in any case already had accommodation in the 
townships, and so would require “a fairly considerable attraction before agreeing to investing at 
least £300 which, to an African, was a lot of money” (not to mention the additional transport 
costs of commuting from Hyde Park).456   Ironically, Ashton was at this time still able to cite the 
Union of South Africa as a model to emulate: South African municipalities had offered long leases 
to Africans ranging from 30 years to 99 years, he pointed out, and “Pietermaritzburg had even 
granted freehold tenure”.457  
Plans were altered, decisions were deferred; Ashton continued to reconsider and consult. 
The African Advisory Boards were instructed in June, 1952, to “go into this matter with great 
care”, to find out how many people may be interested in a 30, 40 or 99-year lease scheme, with 
houses costing at least £200-£300, and report back soon.458 In August, Ashton proposed 
relocating the entire scheme to the Western Commonage at site No. 6. He argued that relocating 
it closer to town would make it easier to sell: it would be 2½ miles from the industrial areas, 
therefore more convenient and cheaper in terms of transport; it would be adjacent to Western 
Commonage Nos. 1 and 2 (the bachelor schemes also known as Iminyela and Mabutweni), which 
would allow progressive development, meaning lower capital outlay and lower capital charges to 
tenants.  
Furthermore, it would provide a “better frontage” to the European area on the other side 
of the Khami road, than if an ordinary township were built. This may have satisfied Europeans 
who felt threatened by African encroachment; but it did not satisfy the prospective better-to-do 
 
456 Native Affairs Committee Meeting, 9th April, 1952/BCCA 
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African tenants who were threatened by the proximity of single men’s townships. When they did 
eventually move in, there was considerable anxiety that the womenfolk would face harassment 
and other dangers when traversing these bachelor townships, which they had to do to buy 
groceries. (It was only in 1954 that this was eased when an enterprising African businessman 
established a mobile dry canteen in this home ownership scheme.459) 
In addition to moving the site of the scheme, Ashton proposed other compromises, as 
he was eager to “press on with the scheme”, given the lack of funds to build sub-economic 
housing at that time. He therefore proposed reducing the minimum value of houses from £300 
to £150 to enable more families to participate. (Note that this was in fact lower than the value of 
the best rental housing at Barbour Fields, where each house cost £250 to build, plus £100 for 
sewerage connections.) 
Ashton then recommended that the City Engineer build “demonstration cottages” (with 
2 and 3 rooms) to “get the scheme started and to demonstrate the practical side of the scheme to 
the natives”.460 These recommendations were all adopted by the Council.461 In November, the 
City Treasurer then submitted a cost plan for a scheme of 500 houses, beginning initially with 86 
houses. If the Government did not agree to this option,  the City Treasurer suggested diverting 
funds from a different scheme.462  
These frequent alterations and compromises show the complicated balancing act that was 
required of the African Administration Department: trying to consider multiple conflicting 
stakeholder interests – European residents, African tenants, Government ministers, industrial 
employers, and those who held the purse strings.  At the same time as balancing these conflicting 
stakeholder interests, the administration was trying to put this scheme in the context of a long-
term physical housing plan to provide for the estimated 5100 families and 5000 single men who 
would need housing in the next 4 years, whilst the Finance Committee refused to approve any 
capital expenditure beyond the next year.  
In April, 1953, Ashton suddenly changed tack completely. He wrote to the Council’s 
Native Administration Committee arguing that the only way to address the housing backlog would 
be to scrap the idea of an exclusive “better-to-do” scheme, and instead seek a compromise, by 
building an austerity scheme that would appeal to middle and lower income groups. He thought the 
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Council should cover 100% of the loan, rather than 50%, so as to “bring in those natives who 
have no capital”. The maximum loan amount should be £150 (enough to build a basic house of 
2 rooms and an aqua privy), the 2% interest on the beer loans for building materials should be 
slashed, and/or the loan repayment period extended to 20 years. Water and electricity to each 
home would have to come later. The scheme should no longer be fully economic; sub-economic 
rates for services and other charges would enable more people to participate. However, the 
scheme should still only be subsidised by 9/- per month rather than the full 28/- as in the 
Bulawayo African Township areas (BAT)463. In other words, the whole “better-to-do” scheme 
was now expected to be much the same as Pumula. But Pumula had been handicapped by the fact 
that many lessees had neither time nor ability to build their own suitable houses, so here at 
Western Commonage number 6, it would be better if Council simply hired a contractor.  
Loans for 500 houses at £150 would amount to £75,000 from beer profits. This would 
be a good solution until Council could build ordinary rental townships again: 
The more houses Council can have built without incurring the heavy capital charges that 
are now inseparable from ordinary letting schemes built with loan capital, the better for 
the economic health of the City. Finally, the more the Council can develop Home-
ownership, the better will be the social consequences.464  
This justification succinctly shows how home ownership conveniently resolved financial and 
social problems at once. But by July 1953, the scheme had yet another set of specifications: 600 
two-roomed cottages (expandable to 3 or 4 rooms) payable over 20 years with a 90% loan; 40 by 
60 feet stands, ground rent equivalent to elsewhere (10 shillings); blocks of 16 stands, central ring 
road; provision for schools, shops, fields as a buffer zone against the adjacent Western 
Commonage No.1 bachelor townships, and (of course!) a beer garden. This required housing 
loans from Native Beer Funds of £90,000.  
Ashton interviewed around 40 Africans representing different interests and income 
levels, and showed them the three prototype houses at the Western Commonage site. But with 
little time to consider the scheme, these viewers “had to use their imagination to visualise what it 
will be like when properly developed.” Ashton reported that,  
Without exception, their reception to the proposals was enthusiastically favourable, and 
most of the comments were constructive and appreciative…When they can see with their 
 
463 Makokoba, Mzilikazi, Nguboyenja. 
464 Ashton report to Native Admin Committee, 8th April, 1953/BCCA/Transfer Box 180 - Home 
ownership scheme - Western Commonage 
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own eyes how the scheme develops, very many more will come forward to take advantage 
of it.465  
There is a sense here that the aesthetics of modern development would enthral and inspire 
Africans. Ashton was excited about the scheme’s prospects and thought there would be “no 
problem” getting 600 applicants. He even noted some who had £300 capital to put down up front, 
and so he now proposed raising the maximum loan amount from £150 to £400, to once again 
attract the wealthier. The Native Administration Committee resolved to proceed with 
development immediately and called for applicants.466  
But the Finance Committee threw cold water on these ambitions, deciding that only 100 
cheaper houses should be built to begin with (80 two-bedroom, 10 three-bedroom, 10 four-
bedroom). Ashton relented, but insisted that “in view of the urgency of proceeding with 
permanent native housing”, the scheme should proceed immediately, without Government 
approval. Agreements with the Minister were “final enough” and it was pointless to delay 
inauguration of the scheme.467 The lease was an un-concluded draft document, but this had 
worked fine in the case of Pumula.   On 7th October, 1953, the Council adopted this 
recommendation.468 In November, Ashton wrote to an administrator in Ndola, Northern 
Rhodesia, asking for numerous details of its scheme: the size of sites, nature of services, nature of 
tenure, size and plan of houses, breakdown of charges to owners, type of financial and materials 
assistance to the owner.469  
The Western Commonage No. 6 scheme finally got under way in December, 1953, 23 
months after it had first been proposed. The first cottages were built of burnt brick with 
corrugated iron roofing, constructed either by African building contractors supervised by the City 
Engineer, or lessees themselves. A basic unit was 2 rooms (200 sq. feet / 18.5 m2) plus aqua privy. 
Tenants could extend or build larger cottages. Loans for this scheme were provided from beer 
profits at 2% interest over 20 years. The charge for “ground rent” (of the land) and services was 
12s. 6d. per month.  
 
465 Native Admin. Committee Minutes, 11th Aug, 1953/BCCA/Transfer Box 180 - Home ownership 
scheme - Western Commonage 
466 Ibid. 
467 Ashton special report to Finance Committee, 19th September, 1953, in BCCA/Transfer Box 180 - Home 
ownership scheme - Western Commonage 
468 Extract from Council Minutes/BCCA/Transfer Box 180 - Home ownership scheme - Western 
Commonage 
469 Ashton to R. Walker (supervisor of cooperative societies, Ndola), 7th Nov. 
1955/BCCA/H4/4/1/Transfer Box 210). Western Commonage Number 6 Housing scheme 
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Because the scheme was funded from Council beer profits, it was subject to ministerial 
approval, which also meant the development plans had to be submitted to a Government Senior 
Town Planning Officer. This Ashton was willing to do, but when the Town Planning Office asked 
to see the plans for the surrounding townships (Western Commonage 1-5) to get an overview of 
where this one (W.C. 6) fitted in, Ashton resisted. He asked the City Engineer and Town Clerk 
“whether Government really has any jurisdiction or authority over our planning with the rest of 
these areas”.470 The Town Clerk checked the legislation and asserted that it did not have authority, 
and promptly declined the Government Town Planning Office’s request.471 The TPO insisted 
with trepidation, “I trust that my request…will not be interpreted as an intention to interfere with 
your Council’s rights as a Planning Authority”.472 This brief vignette provides an insight into the 
Central Government’s difficulties in exerting authority over municipalities, particularly Bulawayo.   
Two years on, Ashton reported optimistically about lessees’ own development of this 
scheme: “Although small, it is proving most successful. Many tenants have added one or two extra 
rooms to the basic unit and several have built large and pleasing houses to their own design.”473  
The scheme had come to be known as Pelandaba by the residents – meaning “our problems are 
over” – and the name stuck. But it turned out that the problems were far from over. Both the 
Pelandaba and Pumula schemes grew slowly due to a number of issues. Pumula was no longer a 
“glorified squatter camp”, but it was far from town, and so Ashton felt that “every 
encouragement” should be made to attract more people, by raising the loan amount, lengthening 
the repayment period, enlarging the core house size, allowing lodgers and offering freehold. 
Similarly, he found that Pelandaba needed to be better tailored to specific consumers: 
Although it was meant to attract the better-to-do, the basic unit is too small, too rigid, 
and too difficult to extend to appeal to these people, and too expensive to appeal to 
poorer people.474 
The main problems were that the loan limit of £150 in Pelandaba was too low, and there were 
rigid Treasury regulations on the sale of building materials, so departures from the core design 
were not encouraged; and finally, after the scheme had started, a clause for cancelling the lease due to 
liquor convictions was inserted into the lease.475 Ashton implored the Committee to remove such 
 
470 Ashton memo to Town clerk, 2nd November, 1954/BCCA/H4/4/1 (transfer box 210). Western 
Commonage no. 6 housing scheme 
471 Town clerk to Senior Town Planning Officer, Matabeleland, 4th December, 1954/BCCA/H4/4/1 
(transfer box 210). Western Commonage no. 6 housing scheme 
472 Senior Town Planning Officer, Matabeleland to the Town Clerk, 8th December, 1954, in BCCA/Transfer 
Box 180 - Home ownership scheme - Western Commonage 
473 Annual Report of the Director, 1955/BCCA 
474 RS 10-3 (TB298) African Admin Dept. four year plan [1955-57]/BCCA 
475 This “double punishment” is discussed in chapter 4. 
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defects and give the scheme “freedom and encouragement”, because it was an important way of 
fostering “social segregation” and a stable middle class.476 
He recommended increasing the loan amount to £250477, reducing the deposit to 5%, 
enlarging plots, allowing greater choice in home design, permitting lodgers, providing street 
lighting and reticulated sewerage to those who could afford it. And so the negotiations and 
alterations went on. Like the other housing schemes, it was not an outcome, but an ongoing 
process.  
By the end of the decade, some leading businessmen and political figures, including the 
‘father of African nationalism’, Joshua Nkomo, had built some fairly lavish houses. In 1959, the 
Bantu Mirror described how the City’s business elite had built houses at Pelandaba:  
which compare favourably with any other houses in the poshest European suburbs of 
Bulawayo. Leading Africans too who are not businessmen have built their own houses 
which have turned this township into one of the most beautiful African suburbs in 
Bulawayo.478  
The Council began to recognise that more “sophisticated” African residents harboured potential 
energy and resources that could be harnessed for their own good as well as the Council’s, rather 
than remaining a financial burden: 
Africans have been building for themselves since Bulawayo started, except for the break 
from 1930 to 1952, and they are doing so today at Pumula and Pelandaba. Experience 
shows where there is careful supervision, they build solid and attractive homes. They have 
a wealth of talent and energy waiting to be released, and can also contribute their own 
private resources, which in aggregate can make a substantial contribution towards solving 
the housing problem.479  
Despite the messy genesis of these first two home ownership schemes at Pumula and Pelandaba, 
they came to be symbols of pride and progressiveness for the Bulawayo Council. To its frustration, 
the Government did not always recognise its achievements. So when in 1956 the Prime Minister 
was reported in the Chronicle boasting that his Government had created the country’s “first” 
African home ownership scheme in New Highfields, Salisbury, Ashton was perplexed.480 He 
 
476 RS 10-3 (Transfer Box 298) African Admin Dept. four year plan/BCCA 
477 Which Council agreed to in March, 1958. 
478 Bantu Mirror, 30th May, 1959. Quoted in West, The Rise of the African Middle Class, p. 116. 
479 ‘Urban African Affairs Commission, Bulawayo’s answers to the questionnaire’, (1957), p. 29/Oxford 
Bodleian. 
480 BCCA/Transfer Box 310/ Home ownership schemes - Native areas  
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notified the Town Clerk, who wrote to the PM’s Secretary reminding him of Bulawayo’s 
pioneering schemes: 
I may say that since this Municipality piloted these schemes, other Municipalities have 
shown a great interest in the experiment and have from time to time sent officials to 
Bulawayo to see the schemes and get information about them.481  
The Secretary replied to say that the PM did not mean to overlook Bulawayo, he had merely 
referred to Highfields as the first home ownership scheme because it had a 99 years’ lease. But 
the PM would be pleased to have more information on Bulawayo’s schemes.482 The Town Clerk 
persisted, belabouring the point that Bulawayo was the first in this field: 
While I fully appreciate what you say in your letter, I think we are getting into an academic 
argument over the points of difference in the respective leases which, in my humble 
opinion, hardly support the original unqualified reference to Highfields that “the first 100 
families in Southern Rhodesia to be able to buy their own houses in town have moved 
in...”. The fundamental point remains that long before the Highfields scheme, the two 
Bulawayo Home Ownership Schemes provided for Africans to buy or build their own 
houses.483 
With that, the Town Clerk submitted detailed information on Pumula and Pelandaba, and said 
that the correspondence “can now be allowed to rest”. But even Bulawayo’s mayor weighed in, 
stating in his year-end speech of 1956 that, “Some emphasis was placed recently by the Prime 
Minister on the Government’s Home Ownership Scheme at Highfield, Salisbury, as being the 
first. It possibly was the first for a very long lease of 99 years, but we must claim to be first in the 
field with our 1952 scheme.”484 The Local Government and Housing Secretary did not even know 
how the self-building model worked at Pumula. He had seen a self-building scheme in the Congo, 




481 Town Clerk to PM’s Secretary, 27 March, 1956/BCCA/Transfer Box 310/ Home ownership schemes - 
Native areas 
482 Secretary to Town Clerk, 17th April, 1956/BCCA/Transfer Box 310/ Home ownership schemes - Native 
areas 
483 Town Clerk to PM’s secretary, 1st May, 1956/BCCA/Transfer Box 310/ Home ownership schemes - 
Native areas. 
484 BCCA/Mayors Minutes for the Year Ending 31st July, 1956.  
485 NAZ/S3609/35/2 volume 2. Native Housing Policy, 1953-55. 
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The mid-1950s planning situation 
 
By the mid-1950s, Bulawayo’s mayor was able to announce, “[W]e can justifiably point with pride 
to the fact that over the last five years the Council has provided and planned more housing for 
Africans than during the whole of its previous existence since 1897”.486 It had been a low bar to 
beat, but this positive attitude was still a profound turnaround from the beginning of the decade.  
With the acquisition and surveying of Commonage and adjacent farmland for future 
township development, the mayor said, “It is safe to say that no other centre is as well placed in 
respect of land and future native development as Bulawayo”.487  This was Bulawayo’s boast in its 
campaign to become the territorial capital of Southern Rhodesia at this time. It boasted the 
massive Njube married scheme underway, the “unique” home ownership schemes, and the fact 
that it had much surveyed land available for African housing on the Western Commonage, as well 
as three adjacent farms, acquired specifically for African housing, totalling 29,000 acres. The 
Council argued that, “As this area is contiguous to the Western Commonage, progressive, orderly 
development can take place and be economical in costs of service and transport.”488 It was this 
progressive development that came to distinguish Bulawayo’s townships from the ribbon 
development of Salisbury’s. Even Salisbury’s Director of African Administration admitted that 
Bulawayo had a major land advantage: 
In Bulawayo, the City Council has some thousands of acres in the Western Commonage 
and Hyde Park regions on which to pursue development. Bulawayo has been fortunate 
too in that post-war development has taken place chiefly within its municipal 
commonage, so that comparatively little peri-urban development has resulted…It is 
Salisbury and its peri-urban areas which present the Colony’s major problem.489  
Part of this resulted from the original siting of the two cities. Bulawayo’s original siting laid good 
foundations for future development. According to a professional town planning assessment, 
Bulawayo’s overall situation in Zimbabwe had natural disadvantages, but its site was “very well 
chosen and developed with great clarity and imagination.” Salisbury had a better overall situation, 
but its site was “wrongly chosen and badly developed”.490 
 
486 BCCA/Mayor’s Minute, 1955 
487 BCCA/Mayor’s Minute, 1954 
488 City of Bulawayo: Memorandum on the Siting of the Territorial Capital, Prepared for Submission to the 
Select Committee (July, 1954), p. 11/BCCA 
489 Colonel Hartley’s annual report for 1957, Oxford Bodleian Library/Marjory Perham papers/Box 625, 
File 7, SR II. Nat. admin. - Urban African Affairs Comm., 1957. 
490 Mallows et al. (1972). ‘Preliminary Assessment of Planning Problems. City of Bulawayo’, p. 10 
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In 1955, six top officials of the Bulawayo Council – Town Clerk, City Engineer, City 
Treasurer, Medical Officer of Health, City Electrical Engineer and Director of African 
Administration – compiled a report on the siting of future African housing in Western Bulawayo.  
Whilst considering natural factors (such as topography), social factors (such as European and 
African preferences), and productivity factors (such as the effect of travel fatigue on workers), 
their primary consideration was cost-cutting in order to make schemes viable.  
In short: services were cheaper if they were extended from adjacent townships, and transport 
costs were cheaper if accommodation was closer to industrial sites. Sometimes African housing 
might even displace a designated European housing area, which was justified as follows:  
[D]evelopment of industry and commerce, without which the ‘European’ areas would be 
practically worthless, is dependent upon native labour. The better the condition of the 
latter, the better for industry and commerce. Far from being harmful to European 
Figure 12: Planning the Bulawayo African Township [Source: NAZ/Undated, courtesy of Paul Hubbard] 
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interests, the use of these areas for native housing seems to us to be in the best interests 
of Bulawayo.491  
Salisbury’s planning vision appears to have been quite different at this time. There was significant 
Government and judicial intervention. African housing schemes were planned for the urban 
periphery to avoid concentrated development, for security reasons. This was the Council’s 
decision; the military had given no input to this plan and the police had assured the planners that 
they were not too concerned with concentrated development, provided certain safeguards were 
in place.492 These divergences in the planning visions of the capital and the second city only 
became more pronounced down the line. 
 
Mpopoma 99-year lease scheme 
 
In the mid-50s, the Minister of Justice, Internal Affairs and Housing, George Ellman-
Brown, had to come up with a persuasive African housing project to secure the £1 million loan 
that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had offered Prime Minister Todd’s Government. 
Ellman-Brown conceived two massive 99-year lease schemes for Salisbury and Bulawayo, of 
approximately 3000 units each. The important difference between the two cities’ schemes was 
that Salisbury’s was located on Government land (at New Highfield, 2.5 miles from the nearest 
industrial area) and administered entirely by Government. To do this, the Government established 
an ad hoc departmental committee called the ‘Highfield Management Committee’.493 This was the 
first home ownership scheme in Salisbury (the one the PM had boasted about), and it began a 
trend of the Government running home ownership schemes in Salisbury, whilst its City Council 
focussed on rental housing.494 
 
491 Report of the Town Clerk to the Mayor, 1st March 1955, p. 5, in Council and Committee Minutes, 
January to March, 1955/BCCA 
492 An inter-departmental committee was established to try and coordinate better with Salisbury City 
Council. The minister of justice and internal affairs favoured expanding existing schemes to the east and 
west along the railway lines. In any case, he pointed out, “An authoritative Government statement on the 
siting of native townships in the Salisbury area is long over-due and the uncertainty which exists in regard 
to the matter is impeding development in the area.” (NAZ/S3609/35/2 volume 2. Native Housing Policy, 
1953-55). 
493 It consisted of representatives of the Department of Native Affairs, Local Government and Housing, 
Lands and Townships, Engineering and Construction and the Treasury 
494 By the 1960s, the Central Government administered multiple schemes in Salisbury: St Mary’s, Seki, 
Dzivaresikwa and the home ownership schemes of New Highfields and Kambazuma. The Urban Affairs 
Commission regarded this combination of the Government and Salisbury Council managing adjacent 
schemes as a defective system. (G. Passmore, Local Government Legislation in Rhodesia up to 30th September, 1963 
(Salisbury, Dept. Of Government, 1966), p. 10). 
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In Bulawayo, on the other hand, the nearest Government land was more than 6 miles 
from the industrial areas.495 The Bulawayo scheme was therefore sited on 800 acres of municipal 
land, closer to the industrial areas. Whilst the loan came from Government, the scheme was 
administered entirely by the Council. As the Mayor proclaimed, this was “a handsome offer. Its 
acceptance was vital to Bulawayo’s prosperity. Bulawayo’s future lies in industrialisation and every 
attraction must be offered towards this end. An important advantage is well-sited African housing 
readily available and we must not fall behind in this respect…”496 This scheme was called 
Mpopoma, and it comprised 2,580 four-roomed houses, built from 1956-58 at a cost of over half 
a million pounds497.  
Bulawayo’s administrators tended to feel that they had the best understanding, from trial, 
error and inquiry, of what prospective African tenants and home buyers actually wanted in a home. 
So when presented with the Mpopoma plans prepared by Central Government Planners up in 
Salisbury, they noticed a major problem: the stands were too small, and 80% of units were semi-
detached, versus 20% detached. This, they pointed out, showed “little experience of consumer 
preferences”, and too much focus on cost.498 Government officials finally acknowledged that 
Bulawayo was right, and the plans were quickly altered to provide detached houses only. However, 
by this time, sewerage installation was underway, and so only minor adjustments could be made, 
such that the detached houses ended up being cramped on unduly small plots which had originally 
been designed for the semi-detached houses.499 Mpopoma’s superintendent opined that although 
the scheme was “otherwise excellent”, these small plots were a “serious flaw”.500 And the 
residents’ disappointed reactions proved them right: “People wanted to get a place where they 
have their small garden they can grow vegetables, they can have their own orange or mango fruit 
trees or something like that. But they thought the space was rather small.”501  
Mpopoma was the first township to be connected to a reticulated sewerage system, and 
each house had its own lavatory. 502 But lessees had to pay for the installation of a domestic 
metered water supply, or rely on the stand pipes at the end of each block of houses, which could 
be up to 109 yards away. Not only did this lower capital outlay for the scheme, but also served as 
 
495 With the attainment of Settler Responsible Government in 1923, the Government granted Municipalities 
full title to the Commonage (Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 61) 
496 Mayor’s Minute, 1955/BCCA 
497 The house building was contracted to Laing and Roberts. 
498 Report on Mpopoma Township, 1958/BCCA 
499 They were mostly 33.5’ x 72.5’, although several plots were larger or included additional half-plots due 
to the uneven topography of the land. 
500 Report on Mpopoma Township. 1958/BCCA 
501 Author interview with Dumiso Dabengwa, whose family were amongst the first tenants at Mpopoma, 
Bulawayo, June 2018.  
502 Built by Messrs. Kilburn and Co. at a cost of £74,841. 
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“a deterrent against excessive use of water”.503 Bulawayo has a semi-arid climate and suffers 
perennial water shortages, but this restriction evinces the second class status of African citizens, 
whose European counterparts on the other side of town enjoyed much higher consumption 
levels.504  
Since Mpopoma was the first fully “economic” (i.e. non-subsidised) home ownership 
scheme505, the houses were specifically designed to take up to 2 lodgers, to help owners offset the 
high monthly loan repayments and service charges. The monthly charges were broken down as 
follows: 
Lodger 1: £1. 0. 0   (remitted by the employer) 
Lodger 2:  £1. 0. 0   (remitted by the employer) 
Lessee:   £1. 0. 0   (remitted by the employer) 
Lessee:        11. 3  (remitted by lessee) 
Total:  £3.11.3 
Of this total monthly payment, £2. 2. 9 was for redemption on the loan to cover capital costs plus 
interest (6%), payable over 25 years to the City Council, which forwarded it to the Central 
Government. The remainder was for service charges (administration, cleansing, lighting, water, 
sewerage and service maintenance) and lease of land, which went to the Council. As it turned out, 
there were rarely more than 3,500 lodgers, though there was space for 5,160.  
During its first year running the scheme made a loss of £10,230 due to the extra staff 
needed for getting it all going and the capital outlay for cleaning equipment and transport. But 
this deficit was simply carried forward so that the scheme would indeed remain “economic”.  
There were also 12 sites made available to lessees who wished to “self-build”, using loans from 
beer profits rather than Government.  
At Mpopoma, because it was the biggest home ownership experiment to date (see 
previous chapter), finding suitable applicants was a major exercise. Circulars were sent to 
applicants for waiting lists in other married housing schemes (Njube, Mzilikazi, Makokoba), 
mainly to tenants with higher incomes. Superintendents of other townships also spread the word 
to tenants in their townships (both legal and illegal occupants), sometimes using the public address 
 
503 Report on Mpopoma, 1958/BCCA 
504 Cf. Musemwa, Water, History and Politics in Zimbabwe, (NJ, Africa World Press, 2014). 
505 Pelandaba remained sub-economic until the early 1960s, and Pumula remained sub-economic for longer 
because it was not deemed “sufficiently attractive”. 
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systems, to consider applying at Mpopoma. The Chambers of Industry and Commerce, as we well 
as individual employers, were approached directly, and encouraged to send along suitable African 
employees to apply for an Mpopoma house. An illustrated brochure on the three home ownership 
schemes – Pumula, Pelandaba and Mpopoma506 – was distributed to them, with photographs of 
the first two and an artist’s impression of what Mpopoma would look like.  
The brochure (figure 13) stated that, 
“Each housing scheme forms a self-
contained township; each has, or will 
have, provision for schools, churches, 
medical facilities, social halls, beer 
gardens and trading premises to cater 
for every need”.  Many employers 
persuaded their African senior 
employees to apply. The Bulawayo 
Chronicle, African Daily News, Bantu 
Mirror and Home News also helped to 
publicise the scheme. 
The application process for Mpopoma 
began in July 1956, at a rate of about 120 
a month, with the first lessees moving in 
in December, and the process continued 
at this rate until March 1958, when the 
scheme was full.507  Applicants were 
carefully vetted by the superintendent 
and an advisory committee. They had to 
fulfil the following criteria: 
• They had to be African. Exceptions, 
however, were made for two coloured 
women with African husbands.  
• The favoured applicants were married 
men, but the superintendent considered 
 
506 See Appendix A.  
507 There were in fact an excess of applications so several hundred had to be rejected. 
Figure 13: Home Ownership pamphlet inside cover 
AFRICAn HOmE omnERSHIP SCHEmES 
ol 
THE CIT\' OF BULAUJA\'O 
The Mpopoma Home Ownership Scheme has now started and 
this, combined with the two townships of Pumula and Pelendaba, 
gives Africans the opportunity of purchasing a home within the 
l imi t s of their income. 
Each of these three schemes provide low-cost houses. Details 
of each scheme are given separat el y : here is some info r mation on 
aspects commo n to each scheme. 
Whu r.an Buy a Hunsu? 
Any African may apply fo r a house, providing t hat he or she is 
employed, or has been em ployed, in Bul awayo, and is living under 
conditions of family li fe . that is , a marr ied couple and their ch il d ren , 
or a batchelor who suppor ts his w idowed mother, or one who 
supports his brother o r sisters, or a widow and he r chil d re n - all 
t hese people wou ld be eligible for the schemes. 
PHOTOGRA PH OF PUMULA 
How Biq arc the Houses? 
I. Pumula The basic house consists of three rooms. each room 
being about 11 ft . X 9 ft . Th is can be read il y 
e x panded . 
2. Pelendaba These houses are 2◄ ft . X IO ft .. and are d ivided 
into two rooms. and are so const r ucte d as to allow 
for additions . 
3. Mpopoma The houses he re measure 19 ft . 6 in. x 22 ft . 8 in. 
a~d consist of fo.~r rooms - a bedroom livingroom , 
kitchen, and a lodgers-room," wh ich is another 
bedroom, with a sepa rate e nt rance reached from 
outside. 
Can llrn Dusiqn uf tlw Honsus bu Varied? 
I. Pumula Yes_. Some tenants have built houses to their own 
des ign and others have added additional rooms co 
the orig inal design. 
2 . Pelendaba Same as Pumula. 
3. Mpopoma. No, except for the addit ion of verandas. A few 
fre~ stands are available where tenants can build 
their own houses. 
All designs and additions must be approved by the Director. 
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some exceptional cases, accepting 55 single men, 21 widows, 6 widowers, 1 male divorcee 
and 6 female divorcees within the first batch of home owners. 
• Applicants required a cash income of at least £8/month (wife’s income not taken into 
account). It was thought at first that a lower income might suffice but “experience” 
showed this not to be true. In the end, the average income of lessees was £10.13.5d. per 
month, with some exceptions for domestic servants receiving £5 or £6 plus food rations.  
• They had to provide an employment or self-employment certificate, unless they were 
widows or divorcees. 
• Applicants had to be living in Bulawayo, but again there were a few exceptions for those 
who had special connections with the city, e.g. mission and government teachers or 
government servants, who could install sub-tenants until they returned to Bulawayo.  
Applicants provided numerous details of their origins, work, family, etc., and when the scheme 
opened, the Advisory Committee recommended that the applicants be free to choose where they 
would like to live within the township, based on ethnic, religious or income groupings. But as the 
superintendent reported: 
Experience has borne out the wisdom of this decision. Not one applicant enquired to 
ascertain either tribe or religion of neighbours, and the only factors which appeared to 
carry weight were:  
a) Proximity to main road or place of employment; 
b) A distaste for living adjacent to a beer garden.508 
The “experience” referred to here, was the attempt by Ashton in 1954 to allocate housing at the 
Njube married scheme according to “cultural groupings” (see chapter 2). Despite this vetting, it 
turned out that it was the poorer residents, after all, who were more diligent with their payments. 
The superintendent complained wryly that, “The sophisticates of both sexes who have lived for 
some time in the urban areas are usually the least reliable in moral standards. This is borne out by 
the fact that many of the defaulters of monthly payments are among this group...509 Meanwhile, 
the single men, widows, widowers, and divorcees for whom “exceptions” had been made to allow 
them to join the scheme, turned out to be, “good lessees, who have been regular payers, and who 
have managed their homes quietly and without trouble”.510 
 
508 Recall how Ashton had offered compatible identity grouping in Western Commonage Number 3 a few 
years prior, discovering no interest in such groupings.  




Once schemes were underway, the AAD looked for indications that these new home 
owners really embraced and believed in these schemes. For example, as soon as Pelandaba was 
underway, the superintendent claimed that through extensions to their houses, the residents were 
“materially shewing their confidence in Western Commonage 6. They are also making their stands 
attractive by keeping them clean and growing vegetables and flowers.”511 The superintendent of 
Mpopoma reported how, “some individuality was manifested by the bright colours painted over 
doorways and sills by the lessees”. 512  
But the lessees themselves often complained about aspects of the schemes that 
undermined their exclusivity. For example, at Mpopoma, they felt that the lodger system brought 
an unsatisfactory “moral tone” to the scheme. Jerry Vera, a prominent socialite, sportsman and 
civic leader, even feared that the lodgers might turn the township into a slum.513 At Pelandaba, 
the RA expressed great unease at living in close proximity to a large single men’s township 
(Iminyela), and asked that the men of Iminyela be switched with married couples from 
Makokoba.514 Ashton responded that this would be impossible, but promised to build more 
amenities for Pelandaba residents to compensate. As Michael West states: “For some middle-class 
Africans, the joys of suburbia, along with its snobbishness, finally were becoming real.”515  
 
511 BCCA/SO4 (Transfer Box 152), Residents’ Associations W.A.T.,  
512 Report on Mpopoma Township. 1958/BCCA (The houses had originally been sprayed grey, white, 
cream or terracotta based on a “cross section of African opinion”). 
513 West, The Rise of an African Middle Class, pp. 110-115 
514 Superintendent Weeden report to Ashton, ‘Delegation: Residents’ Association Pelandaba’, 7 June, 1956/ 
BCCA/SO4 (Transfer Box 152)/Residents’ Association W.A.T. 
515 West, The Rise of an African Middle Class, p. 117 
Figure 14: Housing at Mpopoma [Source: Director's Annual Report, 1960] 
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With Pumula, Pelandaba and Mpopoma growing and developing, the Chief Native 
Commissioner commended Bulawayo in 1957 for its “vigorous” policy on home ownership and 
the fact it had embarked on an ambitious programme for clubs, halls, sports grounds, and a wide 
range of medical and social services.516 These schemes were ongoing processes and they interacted 
with one another – each scheme providing lessons for subsequent development. For example, at 
Pelandaba, the African Advisory Board (AAB) had been pushing for the lease to be extended 
from 30 to 99 years as at Mpopoma. The Council deferred decision on this matter until the success 
of Mpopoma had been ascertained. It was not expected that all units at Mpopoma would be sold 
so easily. Once its success was apparent, the AAB brought the matter up again, and Ashton 
recommended to Council that Pelandaba become a 99-year scheme, because the “standard of 
housing has risen considerably in spite of the handicap of the short term lease. If this were 
extended to 99 years, an appreciable impetus would be given to the scheme”.517  
But Ashton felt that a lease extension at Pelandaba should mean making the scheme truly 
economic like Mpopoma, by removing subsidies on service charges. The charges of 12/6d were 
insufficient to cover services and administration, which were about 25/- per month. It was, 
however, complicated to work out the economic service charges, because Pelandaba at that time 
still had very basic infrastructure – aqua privies – and the impending installation of water-borne 
sewerage infrastructure would make charges higher, which tenants should be forewarned of in 
their leases. So economic charges were not fully introduced,518 but the Council in any case 
approved extension of the lease from 30 years to 99 years519. As Ashton reported in June of that 
year: 
The standard of building has risen progressively in both areas [Pumula and Pelandaba]. 
Pelandaba is now attracting some of the wealthiest Africans in Bulawayo and some 
houses costing over £2,000 are being built. The atmosphere at both townships continues 
to be excellent.520 
 
516 Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native 
Development for the year 1957, p. 13, The National Archives online. 
517 Ashton report to African Administration Committee, 5th May, 1958. BCCA/H4 - 4,1 (TB210) Western 
Commonage no.6 Housing scheme. 
518 Ibid. In 1962, Ashton wrote that since “Pelandaba is becoming a select area for the better-to-do, 
subsidisation to any degree is not justifiable…”. Because interest rates nationwide had gone up, 
consideration was given to bringing Pelandaba finally onto an “economic basis” by increasing service 
charges and interest rates for any new loan agreements from 2% to 6% or 6.25%.  The European rate was 
7.5%. (The Chronicle, 8th March 1962) 
519 Council resolution on the 21st May, 1958. BCC/H7 (PP 310; TB 397) - Location home ownership scheme 
- native areas. 
520 Annual Report of the Director,1958/BCCA 
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By the end of the decade, the home ownership schemes of Pumula and Pelandaba stood 
at 587 and 331 houses respectively. In 1958, a few other municipalities experimented with home 
ownership: Gwelo developed a scheme called Ascot; and Que Que developed a scheme that was 
“initially met with unenthusiastic reception” because the houses were very small and it was sited 
near a cemetery.521   
By this time, Bulawayo’s home ownership schemes were symbolic capital of the City 
Council. It was starting to be hailed as progressive, with its home ownership schemes winning 
accolades, predictably from the white Press, public and politicians. A Parade magazine journalist 
gushed in August, 1954 that “whole townships have sprung up almost overnight” in Bulawayo, 
that the home ownership schemes were a “great turning point in the history of Southern 
Rhodesia”, and it described how visiting the Hyde Park (Pumula) and Western Commonage 
Number 6 (Pelandaba) schemes was “one of my greatest experiences…a noble act that is going 
to transform and shape human relationships in this country towards a good end.”522  
The first 99-year lease schemes of Mpopoma and New Highfields finally won over some 
African sceptics, although some argued that freehold would have been better.523  Even the 
sceptical Charlton Ngcebetsha was finally won over by Mpopoma. He argued, “Those who own 
houses in Mpopoma will be there for ever and ever. There is no unless about it at all. That is a 
fact. They will be there for all time.”524 But some wrote letters to the African Home News, saying 
that Ngcebetsha was being too positive of the scheme and fawning of Ashton. He was also 
accused of over-hyping tenurial security, whilst overlooking other issues. But the Council was able 
to present to the African community a durable future to invest in, which meant the Council could 
offload some of the financial burden of housing onto them.  
The official African population housed in municipal schemes by the end of the 1950s 
was 9,498 families (about 45,000 men, women, children), 25,347 single men, and 133 single 
women, but the actual number of dwellers was estimated to be about 15% higher than this. An 
additional 500 families were estimated to be squatting on Hyde Park Farm.525  
 
 
521 Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native 
Development for the year 1958, p. 9, The National Archives online. 
522 Parade, August 1954, in Ranger, Bulawayo Burning. 2010: 189.  
523 Bantu Mirror, 12 March 1955 in West, 2002: 113.  
524 Home News, 6 April 1957.  
525 For comprehensive housing statistics for the year 1959, see appendix B1. 
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Home ownership in the 1960s 
 
The African labour situation in Bulawayo at the beginning of the 1960s was more stable than it 
had ever been. A survey of 1835 employees at 10 firms found the situation as follows: 
Length of Service Percentage of employees (n=1835 from 10 firms) 
12 months’ service 25 
12 to 24 months 20.8 
2 years to 5 years 29.5 
5 years to 10 years 16.9 
10 years to 15 years 5.4 
15 years to 20 years  1.5 
More than 20 years 0.9 
Table 1: Stability of African labour, 1961. [Source: African Administration Committee minutes, 8 Nov. 1961, p. 
2464] 
The increased stability of the labour force meant married housing was much more important than 
single men’s housing. Ashton emphasised the “crying need” for more subeconomic married 
housing. It was particularly hard for workers earning less than £10 a month to find 
accommodation. Despite the prioritisation of married schemes (both rental and home ownership) 
in the 1950s,  there were still 5,000 applicants on the married housing waiting list, a backlog that 
would cost about £3 million to address.526 Ashton therefore asked the Council in 1960 to accept, 
in principle and before funding had been considered, the necessity of building housing for a 
further 10,000 families and 3,000 single men (in two areas on the Commonage called Curti’s Farm 
and Paradise Farm).527   
The Council realised that ordinary Government loans for the plans would not suffice; 
special funds from overseas would be required – preferably £1 million per year for 5 years. It 
seems Ashton and the councillors were putting forward somewhat arbitrary figures. As it turned 
out, these funds were not forthcoming, and so cost-saving strategies took place, including 
converting rental schemes to home ownership, both existing ones, and ones that were still in the 
planning stage. 
The Nguboyenja rental cottages, for example, got converted to home ownership. And on 
the 14th April, 1961, the Land Apportionment Act was amended to allow African freehold in the 
 
526 Council Meeting Minutes, 18.10.61, p. 2255/BCCA 
527 Joint Finance and Special African Housing Committee, 29.11.60, p. 3596/BCCA 
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urban areas. The Council immediately took advantage of this, by converting Barbour Fields 
township, which had always been for the better-to-do, to freehold tenure on the 17th of May, 
1961. To Ashton this was the most significant event of the year. The Barbour Fields houses were 
sold at prices ranging from £405 to £475.528 Most tenants accepted conversion to freehold, but 
23 chose to swop their homes with applicants from Mzilikazi. Two years after this conversion, 
Ashton reported that, “Barbour Fields…has proved popular. The majority of the purchasers are 
extremely house proud and several have extended and improved their houses”.529  A major scheme 
built at the beginning of the decade was Tshabalala. Its development story shows how outcomes 
never reflected a pre-conceived plan. 
 
Tshabalala: a pre-fabricated “model township” 
 
A strongly segregationist Councillor, Jack Pain, had assured European residents that there would 
be no African housing on the South West Commonage, which was adjacent to some European 
residential areas, because of poor soil conditions. All further development would be further north 
and west. But the City Engineer had made a mistake when he identified the poor soils, and so the 
Council had to announce that, indeed, African housing would appear on the South West 
Commonage. Pain was furious, and European residents felt betrayed, but could not prevent the 
scheme going ahead. It came to be known as Tshabalala. 
Like every other scheme examined thusfar, the plans for Tshabalala (and even its name) 
changed constantly through negotiation and compromise. The first step was to make an 
announcement in the Chronicle, that a 386-acre site on the South West Commonage was about 
to be proclaimed a Native Urban Area for the purpose of building a large rental township.530 The 
announcement immediately prompted paranoid objections from European residents, who feared 
that it would devalue their properties in the suburb of Bellevue, which was three quarters of a 
mile away. They insisted that the distant areas of Luveve and Hyde Park would be more suitable, 
citing Jack Pain’s assurance. Ashton promised residents that a “special service” would ensure that 
“drunk Africans” would be under supervision on the access roads so as not to “disturb the peace 
and security”, but objectors were not convinced. One objector even questioned whether this 
township could be called a “model” when it crammed 16 houses into each acre: “Where does our 
ideal of political partnership for all races come in when one has 1 acre per house and the other 
 
528 Repayable 6.5% over 25 years.  
529 Annual report of the Director, 1963/BCCA 
530 The Chronicle, 2nd December, 1959 
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1/16 acre only?”531  The Council was intransigent, however, and even the Chronicle defended this 
type of integrated development, claiming that it would “prevent the ribbon growth of African 
townships as in Salisbury.”532  
The township was designed to accommodate 2,500 families in 250 detached houses, 1,500 semi-
detached, and 750 double-storey terraced flats.533 It would cost £1,368,000 and be completed in 
15 months.534 It was to be a “model township”, with ancillary schools, shops, markets, girls’ hostel, 
cottage hospital, community centre complete with open air theatre and swimming pool, beer 
gardens, welfare centres and sports fields. A particular effort was made to preserve the indigenous 
trees, making it “relatively green and pleasant on occupation.”535 Inevitably, almost every aspect 
of the plans – the number of units, the rate of construction, the costs, and even its status as a 
rental scheme – changed.  
 
531 Minutes of Council Meeting held on 3rd Feb., 1960/BCCA  
532 “City Council will go ahead with new township”, The Chronicle, 3 Dec 1959 
533 Minutes of the Town Lands Committee meeting, 6th May, 1960, p. 1049/BCCA 
534 The houses were contracted to Lewis Construction Co. (Rhodesia) Ltd  and the double-storey flats would 
be constructed by the Council/Council resolution, 20 July, 1960/BCCA 
535 African Housing: Tshabalala Township (Bulawayo City Council: City Engineer’s Building Branch)/NAZ 





Figure 16: Tshabalala Plans [Source: NAZ Byo/City of Bulawayo Engineer's Department plan: African Housing 
Tshabalala Township (Courtesy Paul Hubbard) 
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The first hitch was a delay in getting started on the houses, much to Ashton’s frustration. 
He therefore tried to persuade the Council that it was necessary “in view of the real urgency to 
proceed with African housing” to proceed immediately with at least 100 double-storey flats, and 
that a number of petty “savings” on financial estimates for that year could be used. It was also 
desirable to retain the services of a highly efficient construction gang that had just done “an 
excellent job of work” completing Mpopoma South. Since it would be “a pity, as well as wasteful, 
to disband this specialised group”536, Ashton proposed transferring them to this new scheme 
forthwith. The progressive Mayoress, Margo Brett (a co-member of Ashton’s in the political 
Action Group) supported Ashton’s points and felt “perturbed at the thought of laying off labour”, 
but the chairman of the finance committee was not convinced, and insisted that Ashton’s 
recommendations would be “too severe for Council’s financial resources at the present time”.537    
In the end, they all agreed that housing was a priority, but only 32 double-storey units, 
instead of 100, should be approved for the time being, as there was much uncertainty about the 
loan situation.538 The 32 flats turned out to be all that was built of the double-storey housing until 
many years later. Meanwhile, the single storey housing was also reduced by 10% due to funding 
constraints. These were the typical niggly negotiations whereby Ashton would try to coax 
councillors into proceeding with ambitious plans, but would often achieve partial success and 
partial deferral.  
 
536 (comprising 6 Europeans, 42 African artisans and 132 labourers) 
537 Finance Committee minutes, 7 Feb 1961 and 11th April, 1961/BCCA  
538 Ibid. 
Figure 17: Houses at Tshabalala, 1960 [Source: Bulawayo: Centenary of Development magazine, 1994] 
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Particularly striking in the Tshabalala case, is that it was suddenly decided, in the late planning 
stage, to convert the whole scheme to home ownership on an economic basis.539 The Council 
simply could not afford to subsidise Tshabalala, as this would incur an annual deficit of £80,000. 
There was doubt about whether there would be sufficient uptake if it was converted to home 
ownership, but Ashton was confident that there would be no problem selling the flats, because 
“The African community is becoming more and more anxious to own property”.540 Therefore the 
City Treasurer, in consultation with Ashton, came up with prices of £450, £510, and £565 for 
flats, semi-detached and detached houses respectively, and decided to model the whole scheme 
on Mpopoma and Mpopoma South, which had been such a success.541 Each household would 
similarly have a 99 year lease, 3,000 gallons of water per month, and maximum 2 lodgers.542  
Within the Tshabalala township, a unique cooperative scheme also arose, called the 
Mhlahlandlela Housing Cooperative Society, occupying 38 houses and 2 shops in an area of 
Tshabalala township, purchased freehold from the Council. The scheme was funded by a loan of 
£52,269 from the Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust.543 The Society took out a mortgage bond 
against its land title to cover the Rowntree loan, and selected a Management Committee to 
 
539 Proposed by the City Treasurer on 7th March, 1961/BCCA 
540 African Admin Committee meeting, 4th April, 1961, p. 697/BCCA 
541 Ibid. 
542 Council Finance Committee Minutes, 11 April, 1961, p. 772/BCCA 
543 Repayable over 40 years at 5%.  
Figure 18: Mhlahlandlela Cooperative Housing [Source: Director's annual report, 1966] 
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administer the housing estate, which Ashton described as a “pilot experiment which will be 
watched with considerable interest all over the world”.544  
 
Magwegwe: low-income home ownership 
 
Whilst Tshabalala absorbed many families who could just about afford to buy homes (provided 
they took in lodgers), there remained the major problem in the early 1960s of those earning 
between £8 and £10 who simply could not afford to own homes, and the Council struggled to 
build substantial sub-economic married housing schemes because of the reduction in revenue 
from supra-economic single men’s schemes. However, in 1963, the Council launched a low-cost 
married rental scheme on an area of the Commonage called Curti’s Farm, partly using a British 
loan (£360,000), of 975 four-roomed houses for 1,950 families (2 per house).545 This township 
came to be known as Magwegwe. Rent was sub-economic, the shortfall met from the Services 
Levy.546 It was the first township to have all ancilliary buildings in place – beer garden, welfare 
hall, shops, office and school – before the houses were even occupied.547  
The scheme expanded by 461 houses (for 922 families) in 1966-7. In 1968-9, a proposed 
expansion of 600 four-roomed houses for 1,200 families was suddenly altered. The whole scheme 
was converted to home ownership, with each house having three rooms for one family and the 
fourth room for one or two lodgers.548 To convince the Local Government and Housing 
Secretary, who wanted to maximise numbers of units, the Council proposed to omit from the 
plans the second toilet and second sewerage, water and electricity connections, and use the savings 
to provide 65 additional houses. This would reduce the cost of each house to within 
Government’s maximum cost limit, and it would be in line with Government’s avowed support 
for bringing housing on an economic footing.  
 
544 Annual Report of the Director, 1963/BCCA 
545 Constructed by Lewis Construction Co. Ltd (contract: £545 486.) 
546 See chapter 5 for a discussion of the services levy. 
547 Annual Report of the Director, 1964/BCCA 







Figure 20: Magwegwe houses under construction. [Source: Chronicle, 10 Sept., 1968.] 
Figure 19: Occupied Magwegwe house [Source: Director’s Annual Report, 1970] 
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Extending existing schemes 
 
The existing scheme of Mpopoma was only expanded by 51 houses over the decade, but the 
township acquired an extension – Mpopoma South – in 1960-61. Here, 228 detached houses and 
280 double-storey flats (all with 4 rooms) were built.  They were sold for £515 and £506 
respectively.549  
All houses were installed 
with electricity load 
limiters and water 
meters, with an 
allocation of 3,000 
gallons per month 
(covered by the service 
charge). The double-
storey flats created some 
legal issues with regards 
to the leases, because, as far as was known by the Department, this double-storey leasehold set 
up was “the first such attempted in Southern Africa.”550   
Pelandaba grew gradually from 340 houses in 1960 to end the decade with 805 houses. 
But despite having been upgraded to 99 year leases at the end of the 1950s, there were still 
constraints on luxury development there. At the end of 1961, a private construction firm was very 
eager to acquire land in the Townships to erect 200 to 300 “high class” houses for African families. 
Pelendaba was the logical place to locate this superior housing scheme, but since the township 
already had a variety of building designs, Ashton considered the company’s “almost stereotyped 
design” would “spoil” the township.  
Instead, in 1962, the AAD embarked on Pelandaba Extension for the wealthy. This 
extension comprised 40 new fully-serviced stands to be available for houses costing not less than 
£750, financed by building societies with Government guarantee.551 Ashton proposed at least 40 
loans of £1000 each from the Beer Fund, but the Council imposed a limit of 10 loans per year.552  
These loans were £1,250 each, at 6% interest, repayable over 25 years, and required a 10% deposit. 
 
549 (paid off at a rate of £5 5 0 and £4 10 0 respectively per month, including service charges of £1 8s 6d 
which was again a non-subsidised (fully economic) rate) 
550 Annual Report of the Director, 1961/BCCA 
551 BCCA/H7 (PP 310; TB 397) - Location home ownership scheme - native areas. 
552 Finance Committee minutes, 7 Feb 1961/BCCA 
Figure 21: Flats at Mpopoma South [Annual report of the director, 1960] 
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Purchasers could choose their own method of building and who to contract. But these progressive 
developments were hampered by uncertainty in both European and African politics and policy. 
By 1962, only 2 of these loans had been taken out, which Ashton attributed to unsettled conditions 
in the city, as well as the hope that the Land Apportionment Act would soon be repealed and 
wealthier Africans would be able to escape the townships altogether.553 This, of course, did not 
happen, as the RF came to power that year, and halted all progress towards desegregation. 
 
Meanwhile, by the mid-60s the home ownership schemes in Bulawayo saw a three-fold increase 
in building plans submitted by the individual owners, for additions and alterations to their houses, 
as conditions seemed to improve economically and politically.554 It is worth noting at this point, 
that in fact the great majority of the population were still in unskilled or semi-skilled work. A 
survey in 1968 found that only 5% of household heads in Bulawayo were in “professional, 
technical, administrative, executive or managerial roles”, with high incomes. The next income 
level was clerks, at 4%, then transport, manufacturing and service workers making up the middle-
income majority at 56%; labourers comprising 25% and the final 8% being sales workers, the 
 
553 Annual Report of the Director, 1962/BCCA 
554 Annual Report of the Director, 1966/BCCA 
Figure 22: Pelandaba House, 1960s [Source: Director’s Annual Report, 1966] 
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lowest paid group.555 The total population at the end of the 1960s in municipal housing of all 
kinds was 141,600.556  
 
Home ownership in the 1970s 
 
On the 1st of April, 1970, Greater Bulawayo was born.557 By incorporating all European peri-
urban authorities (known as town management boards) into the municipality, the Council’s 
administrative area more than doubled, from 29,346 acres to 59,383 acres. Thus, the European 
population under the jurisdiction of the City Council expanded from 38,290 to just over 50,000, 
and this made Greater Bulawayo the largest municipality in Rhodesia, until Salisbury followed suit 
shortly after, by incorporating its surrounding areas into Greater Salisbury.558 The total authorised 
African population in municipal housing was 147,900 in 1970. But the actual population was 
estimated to be approximately 159,900.559 An additional 36,000 Africans resided in non-municipal 
housing.560 
The 1970s saw a great increase in African home owners’ own extensions and expansions.  
There was also some attempt to woo the private sector – as per Central Government policy – but 
to little avail. For example, Council acquired Luveve township from the Government in October 
1971, converting four fifths of the 1,559 tenants from rentals to 99-year long lease. Within a few 
years the whole township had been converted to leasehold with option to buy on freehold.561 For 
Luveve’s phase III development in 1975, private developers were meant to get involved. On the 
minister’s exhortation, the Council had built high quality speculative housing there; the stands 
were surveyed and serviced “ready for the expected rush from the private sector”, but “these 
hopes had not materialised.”562 
 
555 Gargett, The Administration of Transition, p. 23 
556 For comprehensive housing statistics for the year 1969, see Appendix B2 
557 ‘Greater Bulawayo is Born Today’, Chronicle, 1st April, 1970. 
558 Bulawayo reported a smooth consolidation process in the creation of Greater Bulawayo. In Salisbury 
there were serious complications. A commission had to be appointed because of “23 years of irresolution, 
attempted compromise, changing attitudes and intractable opposition” between the SCC and the peri-urban 
town councils. In giving evidence, one leading personality said, “if we had to deal with Bulawayo City 
Council, and not Salisbury City Council, then there would not be any necessity for [the commission] to be 
here.” (‘One Authority Urged for ‘New’ Salisbury’, Chronicle, no date available.) 
559 Annual Report of the Director, 1970 / BCCA  
560 11,400 on Railway premises, 20, 000 in domestic and commercial premises, and the remainder at the 
Cold Storage Commission, hospitals, police and prisons. 
561 Salisbury in the same year took over Tafara, Dzivaresikwa, Highfield, Kambazuma, St Mary’s, Marimba 
Park and Glen Norah – all former Government-controlled townships. (Patel and Adams, Chirambuhayo, p. 
15. 
562 Finance Committee minutes, 10th Nov., 1975/BCCA 
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However, home owners themselves began investing considerable amounts in their own 
homes, reflecting an increase in private arrangements for the financing and construction of house 
additions and extensions, as the following estimated values (in Rhodesian dollars) show:  
Building Plans Approved563 
Year No. of Plans Estimated value 
1969/70 59 22 000 
1970/71: 96 44 900 
1971/72 148 64 000 
1972/73 174 168 343 
1973/74 220 257 515 
1974/75 282 445 992 
1975/76 348 481 576 
1976/77 375 446 890 
1977/78 402 708 747 
1978/79 469 671 042 
 
These figures include some plans submitted for entirely new houses. E.g. the 1979 figure includes 
plans for 2 houses at Luveve ($50,000), 1 at Pelandaba Ext. ($16 000) and 5 at Pumula ($13,700). 
These entirely privately arranged house constructions applied to about 6-9 dwellings per year (with 
an outlier of 26 in 1974-5).  
 
563 Taken from annual reports of the Director of African Administration. 
Figure 23: prototype house built at Pelandaba Extension [Source: Chronicle archive,  28 Feb, 1972] 
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Dr Eric Gargett observed “a great interest and confidence in home ownership”, and at the same 
time, a low turnover in house occupancy, “suggest[ing] an attachment to the accommodation”. In 
1972, only 4% of homes changed hands.564 However, he also pointed out that these trends were 
undoubtedly affected by the general shortage of housing available.  
 
 
Meanwhile, several more rental schemes were converted to leasehold schemes. For example, in 
1976, Mzilikazi, Nguboyenja and Njube rental townships were converted to 15, 25 and 30-year 
lease respectively, after much lobbying by the City Council to the Minister of Local Government 
and Housing. By the end of the decade, as the country transitioned to independence, Makokoba 
was the only township which had not been at least partly converted to home ownership.  
 
564 Gargett, The Administration of Transition, p. 21 





But whilst residents were investing large sums in their own homes, and the Bulawayo Council was 
converting many of its schemes to home ownership, the Government (and Salisbury) were 
pursuing very different development agendas. The Government wanted to curtail African housing 
development near town centres and industrial areas, and move it to peri-urban areas or even 
growth points in the ‘Tribal Trust Lands’ outside urban areas. This was a vision that Salisbury City 
Council embraced with even more fervour than the Local Government Minister. 
Figure 25: Rebuilt house in Barbour Fields, 1976 [Source: Chronicle, Chronicle, 23 Aug, 1976] 




Figure 28: Benjamin and Vivian Muvuti in their new home in Luveve, designed by an architect and 
costing approx. R$20, 000. [Source: Chronicle, 5th Aug, 1975] 
Figure 27: Mrs S. Patsika, a widow who ran a filling station, in her home in Pelandaba Extension, with 




In 1971, Salisbury City Council called for a ban on the buying or allocation of any more land for 
African housing within its boundaries, and for the townships of Harari and Rugare (a railway 
township) to be disestablished. It was concerned about security. The chairman of its Health, 
Housing and African Administration Committee warned that with 8 large townships ringing the 
city, “What would happen if the residents become politically motivated? Salisbury could be caught 
in a stranglehold of strikes and mob violence.”565 
At a Local Government Association conference in 1973, the Salisbury delegates 
presented views that were diametrically opposed to those of the Bulawayo Council. Salisbury’s 
Councillor Mr Thomas Ward gave a presentation in which he painted a vivid picture of Africans 
flooding to the towns, the reasons for which were “easily understood – the lure of money, 
beerhalls, football stadia, large shopping areas, swimming pools, medical facilities, education and 
a permissive society far removed from tribal discipline…”.566 He claimed that the surplus African 
population would flow from overcrowded townships into the European residential areas, creating 
lawlessness, nuisances and other social problems.  
The crux of Ward’s argument was that more housing was not a solution, and that 
subsidised housing was economically impracticable and had created slums. The solution was 
rather to remove the “surplus” African population from the urban centres, halt the acquisition of 
any more municipal land for African housing, impose strict influx control measures, require that 
all Africans in urban areas carry identification cards with photograph and fingerprints, and 
introduce stricter tenancy regulations, such as expulsion of residents from the urban area after 2 
months of unemployment. The money thus saved from diminished urban housing requirements 
should be channelled to the Tribal Trust Lands “to encourage the rural Africans to stay there.” 
Optimally, Africans would develop industrial growth points “in their own areas”. This view was 
profoundly segregationist – suggesting that Africans did not belong in ‘white’ cities.  
Bulawayo’s delegates to the conference opposed this view. Bulawayo Councillor, Mr A. 
Menashe, said Ward’s thinking was out of date. He questioned why Africans should be sent back 
to the rural areas, especially after just two months of being out of work, whilst “the white man 
enjoyed the bright lights”.567 Bulawayo Councillor Mrs J.L. Sharland avidly endorsed a 
presentation by Professor Marshall Murphree of the University of Rhodesia – whose argument 
was exactly the opposite of Councillor Ward’s. Murphree had argued, with astounding teleological 
 
565 Rhodesia Herald, 27 April, 1972, quoted in Davis, Race Relations in Rhodesia p. 303 
566 T. Ward, ‘Influx control of the indigenous population from the tribal trust lands to urban centres’, paper 
presented to the Local Government Association Annual Conference, 22nd-24th May, Vic Falls, 1972./NAZ. 
Proceedings of the Local Government Assoc. Conf. 
567 Local Government Association Annual Conference, 22nd-24th May, Vic Falls, 1972/NAZ Proceedings 
of the Local Government Assoc. Conf. 
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certainty (backed up with continental case studies, statistics and precise metrics) that rural to urban 
migration was essential to get the country onto the linear path to modernisation – “the rational, 
individualistic model of mechanized efficiency which most of us, rather vaguely, subscribe to.”568  
Murphree cited the classic modernisation theorist, Daniel Lerner, to explain how rates of 
urbanisation and literacy must reach a certain precise threshold to achieve “take-off”:  
If we are to modernize our African people, the process cannot be effectively delegated to 
the schools and the rural administrators alone. The locus of the modernization process 
does not lie there; it exists rather in the urban crucible.569 
But the Rhodesia Front ministers and the Salisbury delegates were not primarily concerned with 
modernising “their” Africans; they were concerned with removing them, so the cities would return 
to being white spaces. The crux of Murphree’s argument, however, was that urbanisation was not 
just desirable but basically inevitable, because “take-off” was nigh: “Urbanization is an inescapable 
correlate of the modern industrial development of this Country…It is an irreversible, one-way 
phenomenon that cannot be stopped, only controlled and directed”.   
Whilst everyone congratulated Murphree on his excellent presentation, Bulawayo’s 
Councillor Sharland made the most extensive commentary, imploring delegates to revise their 
entrenched views in light of his arguments. She suggested that instead of complaining about too 
many Africans, councils should admit that they had too few houses, and took the opportunity to 
hit out at Salisbury Council’s policies, particularly its failure to ensure security of tenure, which 
would exacerbate Africans’ “psychological withdrawal” from urban life. She accused the Salisbury 
Council of resorting to symptomatic, ad hoc responses to systemic urban change, which she argued, 
quoting Murphree, “is about as effective a therapy as the treatment of incipient pains of gangrene 
with aspirin”. Indeed, Salisbury was facing a serious housing crisis, and even the Local 
Government Minister rebuked the Salisbury councillors at the conference for “evading their 
responsibilities” by trying to relegate urban Africans to the peri-urban Tribal Trust Lands. The 
Salisbury Council found this attack “unfortunate”, and retorted that, if anything, the minister had 
abrogated his responsibilities.570  
In 1973, the SCC established an industrial growth point at Seki township, far from the 
CBD. The Minister of Local Government was surprised that, despite having the lowest ratio of 
Africans to Europeans within its jurisdiction, of all the municipalities, the Salisbury Council was 
the most concerned about African encroachment. He pointed out that Salisbury’s housing situation 
 
568 ‘Community Development in the Urban Crucible’, LGA Conference, 22nd-24th May, 1972/NAZ 
569 Ibid. 
570 ‘Partridge raps councillors on urbanisation’, Chronicle, 24th May, 1972. 
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was truly dire, that he had had to step in to build a large tied housing scheme – Glen Norah – and 
was minded to step in again.571 In 1975, the Salisbury Council paid a team of foreign planning 
consultants to propose 6 development strategies. The strategies proposed varying degrees of 
integrated township development, and in 1979 Salisbury Council chose Strategy 6, to establish 
“towns of African character” in the Tribal Trust Lands – which was the most segregationist of 
all.572 They chose this, despite the planners saying, “Apart from a substantial saving in existing 
good landscape and, in the first few decades, of fertile soils, this strategy has nothing to commend 
it, from the point of view of accepted developmental goals and objectives.”573 Patel and Adams 
reported at the end of the colonial period that, “Over the years, it would appear that the Salisbury 
City Council has not changed its approach to housing the Black population; in other words, it is 
still an attempt to off-load the problem elsewhere.”574 
This analysis of the incremental development of the African township housing schemes 
of Bulawayo, with some comparisons to Salisbury, has drawn attention to the specificity of 
Bulawayo’s housing policies, and the combination of progressive ideas and pragmatic solutions 
that shaped them. Reducing this development to a “state strategy” of control, misses the interplay 
of idealism and practicality under local conditions.575  
 
571 LGA conference, 1973, p. 66/BCCA 
572 Patel and Adams, Chirambahuyo, p. 19 
573 Salisbury City Council, ‘Strategic Planning Report No. 11’ (Salisbury, City Engineer’s Department, 
Strategic Planning Team, 1976), p. 42, quoted in Ibid. 
574 Ibid. 
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Engineering experiments: the quest for cheap yet 
sturdy house designs 
 
Whilst home ownership was a convenient way to offload some of the financial burden onto the 
residents, problems arose in the need to economise on the house structures, to reduce costs so 
prospective buyers could actually afford them. In the sandy soils of Bulawayo, taking any shortcuts 
with the foundations of the house was risky. Nevertheless, this was done, the result being that 
numerous houses in home ownership schemes cracked. Cracking was so prevalent that it was 
factored into the design. Meanwhile, the City Engineer engaged in constant experimentation in 
house design to build an adaptable structure at minimal cost. 
The municipalities in Rhodesia had room for manoeuvre in house design, unlike in South 
Africa, for example, where standards were enacted into law to ensure compliance by all housing 
authorities. These South African standards were established, from 1947, by the National Building 
Research Institute, which tried to determine appropriate minimum standards of accommodation 
based on a sociological analysis of the target groups.576 Rhodesia had no such centralised 
standards. Whilst the National Building and Housing Board did experiment with various house 
types and materials, finding that the traditional brick building with asbestos roof was the most 
sturdy, low-cost to maintain, and liveable,577 Bulawayo Council had to do its own experiments to 
adapt to local soil conditions. This search for the optimal design – sturdy, cheap, built from readily 
available materials, and fit for purpose – was typical in other colonial cities too. For example, a 
British Civil Engineer who visited Nairobi in 1953 remarked that, 
Too much hope is put on a new method of building to produce a ‘cheap house’…There 
is no magic material which will build the perfect, permanent house for only a few pounds, 
though quite a few people in East Africa still seem to believe there is.578 
Rather than consulting Government experts, the AAD sought inspiration from other colonies. 
For example, Ashton visited Germiston in South Africa to find out all about its home ownership 
 
576 Deric Cleary, ‘An Overview of Low-Cost Housing’, Local Government Association Annual Conference 
(Umtali, 1976).  
577 F. Cox, ‘The Southern Rhodesia African Home Ownership Schemes’, Ekistics, 8, 48 (1959) 
578 Quoted in Anderson, ‘Corruption at City Hall’, p. 149. 
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scheme and was given permission to use some of its house designs.579 The Council’s City Engineer 
was always leaning from abroad, too, especially Johannesburg.580  
A cheap design, however, was not necessarily transferable from one place to another. As 
Bulawayo’s Housing Department found out, the local soil conditions would cause no end of 
problems, particularly for “economic” housing schemes, where the capital costs were kept to a 
minimum in order to make the houses affordable. They required constant structural experiments 
by the City Engineer and Building Director, in collaboration with soil scientists, and it was decided 
that cracking should be accepted as inevitable, and factored into the cost/benefit analysis, 
especially for ‘economic’ schemes where the capital costs had to be reduced as much as possible 
with thinner walls and shallower foundations. But this not only created liability hassles for the 
Council, but could be disillusioning to tenants.  Whilst home ownership was all about creating 
stability, the actual instability of the African home owners’ status as an urban citizen manifested 
not just symbolically, but very tangibly in the visible cracks in the façades of their houses, in which 
they had invested considerable resources.  
At Pelandaba, the first 150 houses were built with thinner walls (4.5’’), lighter foundations 
and lower rooves to make them more affordable, but in the mopane soils (typical of mopane 
woodland), these foundations were unsatisfactory. During the first year several houses cracked. 
The City Engineer found that one of the test houses at Pelandaba was “completely unserviceable”, 
and feared it could be a widespread problem. 581 He therefore conducted further experiments on 
the house to see if the failures could be overcome at a cost of just £25. Later houses were built 
with 9’’ walls. 
Council paid for repairs to 62 cracked houses, but then more houses cracked, including 
the repaired ones.  Apportioning financial liability became a contentious issue. Ashton insisted 
that the lessees could not be held responsible “in any way” for the cracks developing in their 
houses.582 Therefore, the repairs were charged to the Native Revenue Account instead.583 The City 
Engineer carefully examined the area and also confirmed that the Council was obligated to repair 
the cracked houses, “by virtue of the encouragement it gave to the development of the scheme.” 
But after this first round of repairs, he suggested the Council should disclaim any further 
responsibility. The Engineer argued that mopane soils were always liable to cause some cracking, 
 
579 Ashton letter to F. Buitendag (Germiston Council), 10th Sept., 1952. BCCA/H4/4/1. (Transfer Box 
210). Western Commonage Number 6 Housing scheme 
580 Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Council, 8th December, 1960. p. 3636/BCCA 
581 AAD report to the Finance Committee, 18th February 1955, BCCA/H4/4/1 (TB210) Western 
Commonage No.6 Housing Scheme. 
582 African Admin Committee minutes, 13th Feb, 1957, BCCA/Transfer box 310 
583 Finance Committee minutes, 21st March, 1957, BCCA/Transfer Box 310  
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but it would not be dangerous, and would require periodic maintenance. Measures to prevent 
cracking completely were possible, but “not economically feasible”. Other measures, such as 
altering the design to place doors and windows as near to the ends of houses as possible, were 
implemented instead.584  
In the home ownership scheme of Tshabalala, 865 houses cracked – 12% due to subsoil 
movement, the rest being minor and non-structural. The Council hired a soil scientist to inspect 
the area, and he noted that, “The soil conditions were far from ideal and varied considerably over 
short distances”.585 But, like the City Engineer, he believed that economic housing schemes should 
have up to 10% of all houses cracking. If no houses cracked it was “not good design but over-
conservatism which results in unnecessarily extravagant construction.” The calculation was that 
overall repairs (£2 per unit) would cost less than building crack-proof houses, and after 8 years, 
soil movement would slow. Here, mutual responsibility was apportioned: for minor cracks the 
Council would supply the materials and the tenants their labour; for major cracks council would 
be fully responsible, but only for 2 or 3 rainy seasons; thereafter, tenants were fully responsible. 
The problem was that there were various types of cracking, and it was therefore difficult to decide 
whether the Council was liable or not in terms of the ‘agreement of sale’ contract. 
Under these conditions, municipal engineers never ceased experimenting with ways to 
economise on foundations, structures and fittings whilst retaining a sound structure. For example, 
the City Engineer presented a unique house design whereby each room is built on a slab with 
some expansion joints between slabs: 
This is a theory and I am unaware of any previous building designed on these lines so it 
is very important that we obtain some practical results before the idea is incorporated in 
any large scale building programme. 586  
He made it clear that all of these cracking problems could be solved by building excessively deep 
foundations, or by building on a rigid raft, but that these solutions were simply too expensive for 
economic housing schemes. The rejection of traditional architecture and framing of home 
ownership as the benevolent provision of “modern homes” was, quite literally, on shaky ground, 
as cracks appeared in the façade of the ‘home ownership experience’.  
 
584 Extract from African Admin Committee minutes, 12th June, 1957/ BCCA/Transfer Box 310, p. 99 
585 Extract from Housing and Amenities Committee minutes, 10th Feb, 1964, BCCA/H7 (PP 310; TB 397) 
- Location home ownership scheme - native areas [p.160-] 
586 Extract from Director’s Report, 10th August, 1964, citing memo from City Engineer/BCCA/H7 (PP 
310; TB 397) - Location home ownership scheme - native areas 
146 
 
Contesting housing standards 
 
The specifications for a suitable ‘modern home’, in terms of living space, fittings, structural 
sturdiness and garden, were not just technical questions, of course. They were deeply ideological, 
based on ideas about African entitlements and requirements in the urban setting. The nature of 
these clashes was born out at a Housing Conference in Salisbury, 1968, where the main speakers 
were four Bulawayo officials and the Local Government Secretary, each defining African housing 
requirements according to a different rationality. The first speaker was the Local Government 
secretary. He framed housing as essentially an economic problem: 
In pure economic and development terms, housing per se is not a top priority in that it 
has little if any ‘multiplier effect’ on productivity or national wealth… Although we would 
like to see more capital for housing, we have got to acknowledge the other real competing 
demands.587 
His policy was simply “to build as many units of accommodation, albeit small in size, with the 
available resources”.588 The main focus should be on “essential health factors” – water, sewerage, 
refuse and roads. This vision of development was entirely devoid of any utopian imagery and did 
not consider residents’ preferences to be a relevant factor. 
Bulawayo’s Building Director, Richard Agnew, then presented his analysis, framing 
African housing as fundamentally a technical problem.589 He went into great detail about the 
technicalities of house designs to ensure sturdiness, on expansive soils, at minimal cost. But 
Agnew argued that many of the standards in place in Bulawayo were unnecessarily extravagant. 
He found it “infuriating” that engineers like himself went to great lengths to design the optimal 
house within the upper price limit set by policy makers, only to discover that a luxury like 
electricity was installed afterwards. “The money could probably be better spent on the basic 
house”. 
Agnew even considered the living space in terms of technical rationalities. He questioned 
whether a family of 6 required a 4-roomed house (as was the standard) of 360 square feet, when 
it could be suitably accommodated in one room of 180 square feet with bunks. He wondered why 
the minimum height of room ceilings had ever been 8’6’’, and was glad it had been lowered to 
 
587 Garmany, ‘Urban African Housing’, paper delivered at National Conference on Homes and Social 
Planning, 1968 
588 Eric Garmany, ‘Urban African Housing’, presentation given at National Conference on Homes and 
Social Planning, (Salisbury, 1968), p. 26 




7’6’’. He claimed that township stands were generally “not put to much beneficial use” and could 
therefore be reduced in size, which would reduce both housing costs and service costs.590 He 
questioned whether the current Bulawayo minimum standard of one water point per housing unit 
was really necessary for basic low-cost housing. Sharing this facility between two families would 
reduce rentals and leave more money for essential food and clothing. Agnew questioned whether 
electricity was justified in low-cost housing. The capital cost of electricity installation increased 
rents. To get 2½ amps, “which is barely enough for a small hot plate”, the charge was 12/6 
monthly. In Agnew’s opinion, “coal and candles would provide a more economic alternative.”  
Ashton then followed with his own presentation, drawing attention to the different 
competing rationalities of different speakers: “The rights and wrongs of one were not infrequently 
the wrongs and rights of another”.591 And he aptly put it, “Through all this welter of conflicting 
interests, the housing authority has to steer its perilous way.”592He then proceeded to disagree 
vehemently with Agnew’s technical rationality: 
Mr Agnew questions our insistence in Bulawayo on providing electricity at a cost of £60 
which increases the rent by 22/6d for a 2 ½ amp supply. “Coal and candles”, he says, 
“would provide a more economic alternative.” Would they? Perhaps on their own they 
would, but what of the convenience of electricity, its adaptability, the readiness with 
which higher amperages can be obtained, the cleanliness factor, the benefit to the 
township on a whole from the profit obtained from its sale, its relationship to street 
lighting and the people’s own wishes? Where does the truth lie? Indeed, what is the truth? 
Are there not perhaps several answers, each valid from its own standpoint?  
Here, Ashton was challenging the lingering conception of African housing as a warehousing solution 
– a solution conceived primarily in economic and technical terms. He brought in a moral 
dimension, and argued holistically in terms of the general standards and expectations of modern 
users. He went on about the diversity of the community and how housing should reflect this, to 
allow for individuality and personal requirements to be met. A year later, he wrote in a journal 
that: “Housing is really a moral problem. What you do about it depends on your sense of 
values”.593 By taking this more progressive attitude, Ashton was able to be more resourceful.594 
 
590 He proposed significantly reducing detached, semi-detached and terraced houses from 2,800, 2,450 and 
1,750 square feet respectively, to 2,000, 1,800 and 1,200 square feet. 
591 Ashton, ‘Finance and Administration’, presentation at National Conference on Homes and Social 
Planning (Salisbury, 1968) 
592 Ibid. 
593 E.H. Ashton, ‘The Economics of African Housing’, Rhodesia Journal of Economics, 3, 4 (1969), p. 29 
594 Even with rental housing, costs were reduced by, for example, hiring African artisans instead of 
Europeans (Salisbury often favoured the reverse, adding hugely to construction costs (In 1961, when 
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The final speaker at the conference discussed above, was Mike Ndubiwa. His paper was 
on “The View of the Urban Dweller”, which, he said, was all too often overlooked. Based on 
extensive surveys he had conducted in Bulawayo, Ndubiwa presented a provocative account of 
township life and its hardships. He spoke of congestion, social awkwardness, conflict, and hygiene 
issues. He described the sad case of a family in Mabutweni struggling to fit their 7 members into 
a single room, and the awkwardness when the wife’s mother came to stay, requiring sleeping 
arrangements that would be unthinkable in a customary rural setting. He described communal 
latrines that were dirty, for which residents had “no sense of belonging or responsibility”, and he 
questioned whether such conditions were conducive to “easy adjustment and stability in urban 
areas”. He argued that even multi-roomed houses were sometimes too small; children were 
sometimes forced to sleep somewhere in the garden, kitchen or an outhouse, until the Health 
Department pounced on them. 
He criticised the layout and design of home ownership houses. In terms of layout: stands 
were generally too small and houses were “cramped together in mass-produced sameness” in 
Mpopoma. This flew in the face of Agnew’s suggestion to reduce plot sizes. Ndubiwa argued: “As 
residents, we feel that the true meaning of planning is the injection of diversity and variety into a 
meaningful pattern”. Barbour Fields was better in this regard but it suffered from semidetached 
dwellings; detached houses were “a must for home ownership schemes”. In terms of house design, 
he argued that bedrooms should not open straight into the sitting room or kitchen, that the water 
supply should be inside the house and there should be proper bathrooms.  
Recognising the limiting factor of finance in all of this, Ndubiwa argued that wages should 
be higher and housing should be a national concern, with Government providing low-interest 
loans for African housing. For the highest class schemes, Ndubiwa argued that they should be 
more exclusive – set quite apart from other Council schemes, should have freehold title, half-acre 
plots, minimum building values of £3,500, and owners should have more say in the design.   
After his exposé of residents’ grievances, Salisbury’s African Administration director, 
Rory Briggs, made a backhand comment to him along the lines of: “Are people not grateful?”. 
Ashton, on the other hand, was congratulatory. As Ndubiwa recalls: “I think I got some 
promotion after that. It can show you how two people in similar positions… one is appreciative… 
 
Salisbury CC awarded a contract to a much higher tenderer who employed only white labour, the Prime 
Minister criticised them for this, saying it contravened the Industrial Conciliation Act, and threatened the 
city’s future loans. ‘Contract Row in Council’, Bulawayo Chronicle, 21 Dec, 1960.)), and cost and land use 
efficiency were obtained through building multi-storey units, a first in the colony. One of the obstacles to 
this had been stereotypes about Africans’ living preferences. Ashton remarked: “The popularity of these 
flats does not support widely-held assumptions that Africans would not take to multi-double-storey 
buildings”. (Annual Report of the Director, 1959, p. 85) 
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Or even to take me up to Harare with them and Gargett and others…It just exposed me. I wasn’t 
a big influential person, but I said certain things that came my way.”595 
In fact, the AAD needed to know about Africans’ preferences for very pragmatic reasons. 
It was not the case that a housing backlog meant any new municipal schemes would automatically 
succeed. Their financial viability hung in the balance, meaning administrators wanted to ensure a 
scheme would be fully taken up by tenants who were not just financially solvent but also 
emotionally invested (see chapter 5). This meant they had to be sufficiently attractive. In addition 
to numerous inquiries before a scheme was carried out, they sometimes carried out audits 
afterwards. 
In Mpopoma, a detailed audit was undertaken shortly after occupation had begun in 
1958.596  It found many deficiencies: most tenants wanted verandahs (which had initially been 
planned and then scrapped) and ended up having to build them at their own expense. “Future 
schemes should include verandahs,” the superintendent noted. Shelving and ventilators in the 
kitchen, individual rubbish bins, imported doors and obscure glass in windows had all been 
considered in the planning stages, but shelved due to cost. All of these compromises were 
regretted. Cross ventilation had been provided by eliminating beam-filling between the wall and 
roof at front and back of the house, but within a few months of occupation, 10 to 15% of lessees 
had closed this ventilation with brick or newspaper. Thus it was recommended that “any future 
scheme should have gauzed air bricks installed”.  The toilet cisterns were poor quality, the 
superintendent complained, and furthermore tenants who could not afford to be hooked up to a 
domestic water supply, often put bricks into the cisterns to deliberately cause overflowing, which 
broke them.  
Some lessees without lodgers or with family members as lodgers preferred the lodgers’ 
external door blocked and an internal door opened, and contractors agreed to make the alteration 
at no charge if requested in advance of building.  But if lessees wanted to make their own structural 
alterations, there was strict control. They were not permitted to build outbuildings until the major 
portion of the loan had been redeemed, and in any case the limited plot sizes at Mpopoma 
inhibited such extensions. Furthermore, a constant watch was maintained to combat the 
“unsightly” poultry pens and ‘kitchens’, usually built from hessian and scrap corrugated iron. 
When found, lessees were made to demolish these unauthorised structures.597 
 
 
595 Interview with Mike Ndubiwa, 2nd August, 2016 




Pressure from African civil society 
 
It was not just through official consultations, surveys and audits that residents’ concerns became 
known. Both the Advisory Boards and the engaged civil society of Residents’ Associations and 
township publications constantly brought residents’ preferences and demands to the Council’s 
notice. Township residents did not accept the second class citizenship status bestowed upon them; 
they actively struggled for rights and entitlements to services in the city, politicising physical 
infrastructure in their relations with the state, in a way that the urban geographer Charlotte 
Lemanski calls “infrastructural citizenship”.598 Tensions arose from residents claiming 
entitlements that the AAD either could not financially provide, or chose not to prioritise, and 
from the AAD trying to enlist the energies and resources of residents in the process of developing 
the built environment, which the residents also sometimes resisted.  
The RAs were often very forthright in their requests, sometimes even posing them as 
straightforward demands. Residents had to choose between levelling their attacks at the AAD 
specifically, or the Council at large, and usually found the AAD to be a more effective target, 
because its interface bureaucrats – i.e. those at “ground level” interacting with residents – had to 
face the residents’ frustrations directly. In one case, a superintendent of Magwegwe, Mike Hove, 
made a specific note, that in one meeting, “The tone of the meeting was quite different from those 
held in the past, in that instead of fighting the administration at our level, they quarrelled with the 
Council as a whole.” In this meeting, the Magwegwe Tenants made a number of blunt demands, 
such as: “There is a growing need for both a vegetable market and a library in Magwegwe as well 
as a barber shop, and Council should provide these without further delay.”599 Ashton’s response, 
deferring to the Advisory Boards’ recent decisions on libraries, reflected his reluctance to 
recognise the RAs as legitimate channels of communication.  
Although Ashton’s responses to RAs were usually courteous and considered, he often 
either delivered disappointing news as a fait accompli, or else directed them to the Advisory Boards. 
This diversionary tactic was evidently a way to avoid dealing with citizens’ requests on multiple 
fronts. Ndubiwa argued that this non-recognition of the RAs was not helpful, and that the RAs 
should be given more of a hearing.600 Indeed, the RAs were infuriated that issues had to go 
 
598 C. Lemanski, ‘Infrastructural Citizenship’, paper delivered at the Summer Institute in Urban Studies 
Conference (Manchester, 2018) 
599 Report on Magwegwe Residents’ Association Meeting, 7th May, 1972/BCCA/S021/Magwegwe Tenants’ 
Assoc. 
600 Ndubiwa, ‘African Participation in Urban Management’. 
151 
 
through the impotent intermediary of the Board601. They often demanded that Ashton attend their 
meetings himself. In one case when he did not show up, he was accused of “hiding”.  
RA leaders also attempted to assert authority over superintendents. In one meeting of 
the Mpopoma Lease Holders’ Association, the chairman, Sidney Malunga, complained 
vehemently about the presence of three other (European) township officers, in addition to the 
superintendent. He called this a breach of protocol and an act of discourtesy. The superintendent 
said these other staff were there to learn the ropes, and that prior permission had been acquired 
for them to attend. When one of the Council officers tried to speak, Malunga instructed him to 
be silent. The officer protested that he had a right to speak, and the meeting was reported as being 
tense and confrontational.602   
Sidney Malunga became a 
leading voice for Mpopoma 
home owners, as well as a Trade 
Union activist, and took a strong 
oppositional stance towards the 
Council until, and indeed even 
after, independence.  
In addition to the RAs, a 
platform for expression about 
infrastructural grievances was 
Charlton Ngcebetsha’s African 
Home News, published out of 
Mzilikazi. The dominant voice in this publication was Ngcebetsha himself, and he frequently 
attacked the Council on basic infrastructural failings. He often took it upon himself to represent 
the down-trodden. For example, he attacked the City Health Department “on behalf of 
inarticulate Africans of Bulawayo” for its misplaced priorities: 
In the Old Location there are very, very few waterstands and the Africans who live there 
are frightfully inconvenienced by the fewness of waterstands, so much so that many of 
them find themselves compelled, willy-nilly, to resort to using W/C impure and 
admittedly unhealthy water for cooking purposes and yet this Health Department is fully 
aware of the shortage of waterstands in the Old Location whilst it worries itself about 
 
601 (though the Boards did gain a bit more power, after they united into the Joint Townships Board in 1968, 
whereafter nearly every Board decision was accepted automatically by the Council’s Housing and 
Community Services Committee (see chapter 5)). 
602 Meeting held on 31st May, 1965 /BCCA/SO6 Mpopoma Tenants’ Association. 
Figure 30: Sidney Malunga addressing residents in Gwabalanda. 
[Source: Bulawayo Chronicle, 19 October, 1981] 
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bottles of coca-cola which are being drunk by thirsty Africans in town. Does this make 
any sense at all?603 
Despite the highly vocal appeals of residents through newspapers, letters, petitions, advisory 
boards and confrontational meetings, their concerns were often simply deflected by a Department 
that was itself hamstrung. The Head Office staff often complained that they were caught helplessly 
in the middle, between a population with legitimate grievances, and a system that imposed 
extremely tight funding constraints on township development. In this context, some residents 
found few other ways to make themselves heard than through acts of sabotage on infrastructure, 
such as municipal water meters. The AAD’s response to this was simply that it would only hurt 
the residents. Therefore, although large and small acts of citizenship had some influence over the 
minor specifications of housing and services, when it came to major decisions about allocations 
of resources, rent rises, etc., their exclusion from the municipal franchise, due to the fact that 
townships were not “rateable areas” and the franchise was only accorded to ratepayers, meant the 
residents felt impotent when trying to communicate through official channels. 
There is evidence, however, that township residents sometimes noted tensions between 
Council and Government, and perceived them in different moral lights. At one Makokoba 
Tenants’ Association meeting, the Executive explained to its members the distinction between 
the Local Government and the Central Government. They warned that township superintendents 
could report individuals to Central Government and get them sent to Gonakudzingwa prison.604 
But they also explained that the Council’s hands were tied, as it was constrained by the policies of 
Central Government.605  Indeed, the tensions between councils and ministers in Rhodesia was 
quite obvious, to the point that the Minister of Local Government felt compelled to say to the 
Councils: “I would stress how important it is that both branches of Government, central and 
local, should be seen to be acting in concert” (my emphasis).606 
Dabengwa recalls people perceiving that “the Bulawayo municipality really had thought 
about the plight of the Black people and they wanted to make a difference, but they could only 
go that far, and because of discrimination and discriminatory laws in the country, they couldn’t 
proceed beyond that.”607 He recalls openly “having a go” at the Administration for the appalling 
conditions at the men’s township of Mshasha in the 1950s, saying “only animals were fit to occupy 
it”. This shaming had some effect: “I really got a consolation that it didn’t take long before those 
 
603 African Home News, October 5th, 1957. 
604 This prison was infamous for being the main detention centre of African nationalist leaders. 
605 Makokoba Tenants’ Association Meeting, Stanley Hall, 10th Dec. 1964, in BCC/A13/48 Makokoba 
Tenants’ Association 
606 Minister’s speech to Local Government Association, 26th May, 1975/BCCA/H7c 
607 Author interview with Dabengwa. 
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structures were pulled down”, he recalls. “At least we had a say. We could criticise our municipality 
openly. Harare didn’t have that sort of platform.”608  
 
Naming new housing schemes 
 
There was a newness, rawness and sameness to many of these townships when they were first 
occupied. In their planning stages, they had names that conjured the township space as a neutral 
container (in the sense discussed in chapter 1), within which the new schemes were ordered as a 
series, e.g. the Western Commonage areas were numbered 1-6; the areas around Makokoba were 
called “Urban Area A, B, C”. The Council was concerned about residents of these new schemes 
truly taking to them, and therefore relied on the residents themselves to supply names that may 
create some belonging. 
In 1952, the African Advisory Board Members voted to rename Barbour Fields 
“Ashtonville”, as a tribute to Ashton. It was the white chairman of the Board who declined this 
suggestion.609 The first home ownership scheme at Hyde Park took on the name “Pumula”, 
meaning “place of rest”, because it was popular with retirees. The Western Commonage No. 6 
scheme was renamed “Pelandaba”, meaning “Our problems are over”, because it symbolised the 
end of a long struggle by middle class residents for secure tenure and a more exclusive suburb.   
The majority of schemes – both rental and home ownership – were named after pre-
colonial Ndebele royalty and political/military figures. As Tsuneo Yoshikuni points out: 
The urban history of Bulawayo could hardly be more different to that of Harare. 
Bulawayo is an extraordinarily history-conscious city whose inhabitants take for 
granted…the interconnectedness of urbanism and the precolonial rural past…The 
nomenclature of city sites, streets and suburbs was markedly precolonial or indigenous, 
in contrast to colonial Salisbury.610  
The naming of the South-Western Commonage scheme involved some controversy. The 
Advisory Boards suggested Tshabalala after a prominent former chief of the area, and it was 
chosen despite complaints from the white owner of a nearby farm called “Chabalala”.611 The small 
cooperative scheme within Tshabalala, called “Mhlahlandlela”, was also named after a chief of the 
 
608 Ibid. 
609 AAB meeting, 2nd July, 1952/BCCA 
610 Yoshikuni, ‘Linking urban history with precolonial and rural history’, pp. 163-4. 
611 Council meeting minutes, 16th November, 1960/BCCA 
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area. The scheme at Curti’s Farm, begun in (1963), was renamed “Magwegwe” in 1965, after 
discussion with township leaders. 612  Magwegwe was one of the most famous indunas (governors) 
of King Lobengula. He was often referred to as Lobengula’s Prime Minister, and they allegedly 
drank poison together, following their defeat by the British. In the 1970s, King Lobengula was 
finally paid tribute with the naming of a large low-income rental scheme which was partly 
converted to home ownership. With this large low income township located next to Njube and 
Magwegwe, the Chronicle reported that, “naming it after the last Matabele king will complete a 
trio of illustrious Matabele names in the complex.”613 However, some Advisory Board members 
were not happy to name this low-income “shanty town” after such a venerated man, suggesting 
that it be named after his son Nyamande instead.614 But Lobengula stuck.  
Almost all of the rental schemes were also named after Ndebele heritage, apart from the 
earliest schemes of Makokoba (1912), named after the onomatopoeic nickname for a 
superintendent who walked around tapping his stick, and Luveve (1936), a type of butterfly, the 
nickname for Colonel Carbutt, a Chief Native Commissioner.615 The married scheme of 
“Mzilikazi”, built adjacent to Makokoba in 1946, was named after the first Ndebele king to settle 
in the area in the 1830s. Next, the new married scheme at “Urban Area B” was renamed 
“Nguboyenja” in 1952, who was a grandson of Mzilikazi. The single men’s schemes at Western 
Commonage numbers 1 and 2 (1950-51) were named after Ndebele regiments – “Iminyela” and 
“Mabutweni” – on the suggestion of the white chairman of the Board. The Western Commonage 
No.3 scheme (1954) was about to be called “Rufaro” – a Shona word meaning “happiness”, 
suggested by some residents –  but the Ndebele members of the African Advisory Board refused 
to accept this. They wanted it named after Mzilikazi’s grandson, “Njube”, and the Shona members 
“graciously” gave in.616 The “Sidojiwe flats” at the Light Industrial areas were named after Prince 
Sidojiwe, the last of the royal Ndebele princes.617 “Ejingeni” and “Emsizini” flats in Makokoba 
were named by the Advisory Boards after administrative districts of King Mzilikazi.618  
 
612 NAZ Byo / Masiye Pambili 1965; also BCC/N6A/39/Magwegwe home ownership 
613 ‘1700 new African homes’, The Chronicle, 1st Dec., 1971 
614 ‘Row over choice of name for township’, The Chronicle, 28th April, 1971 
615 West, The Rise of the African Middle Class, p. 109 
616 One member insisted it be “Prince Njube”, but acquiesced to the shortened name. (AAB meeting, 21st 
Feb, 1952). 
617 African admin Committee, 1961 p. 2415/BCCA 
618 Housing and Amenities Committee minutes, 5th Sept, 1972, p. 2050/BCCA 
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The Bulawayo Council evidently encouraged 
this extensive referencing of pre-colonial 
history. In its own campaign to become the 
capital city of Southern Rhodesia in 1954, it 
highlighted the fact that the city was built on 
the site of King Lobengula’s “Royal city”. It 
argued that, “Because of Bulawayo’s 
effective historical background it is 
impossible not to believe that the fact of its 
becoming the Territorial Capital of Southern 
Rhodesia would be of great importance in 
African psychology.”619 In 1968, Bulawayo 
also celebrated both its 75th anniversary as a 
colonial town and the 100th anniversary of the death of Mzilikazi, marking the occasion with the 
opening of the Mzilikazi Memorial Library. 
 
A spectacle of progress 
 
Whilst the contested processes of township development took place ‘behind the scenes’ through 
endless meetings of committees, Advisory Boards, planners, engineers, and extensive bureaucratic 
correspondence, the townships were on display for visitors. Township tours were conducted, with 
a list of every visitor being reported to council at the end of each month, and summarised in 
Ashton’s annual reports, under the heading “public relations”. A broad range of ordinary and VIP 
guests were taken around over the years. David Brokensha recalls proudly showing the authors 
Doris Lessing and Jan Morris the township of Mpopoma where he worked, whereupon Morris 
reacted with charm and appreciation, but Lessing “refused to be impressed.”620  
Not all councillors agreed on the value of these tours. There was a clash when Councillor 
Edmunds felt that they were time-consuming and wasteful.621  Councillor Hoyle responded that 
they were a public relations exercise not only for Bulawayo, but for Rhodesia. Visitors were not 
just “enlightened” but “staggered” at the level of development: “They go back with an entirely 
 
619 City of Bulawayo: Memorandum on the Siting of the Territorial Capital (1954), p. 26./BCCA 
620 Brokensha, Brokie’s Way, part 3. Indeed, Lessing commented in her book, Going Home, that Bulawayo’s 
townships in the mid-50s were as drab and generic as anywhere else. 
621 ‘Clash of Views on Township Tours’, The Chronicle, 17th October, 1974 
Figure 31: Mzilikazi Memorial Library, 1970 [Source: 
BCCA/Director's Annual Report] 
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different concept.” Councillor Sharland confirmed that the visitors often telephoned to say how 
much they had learnt, which could only be good for public relations. Alderman Kinleyside said 
that Rhodesia was not getting good press overseas, and the tours would do nothing but good for 
Rhodesia.  
The township development was also represented through reports, media and exhibits, 
creating symbolic capital for the Council. In 1967, a Bulawayo African housing exhibit at Rhodesia 
House in London was planned, with an official at Rhodesia House saying it would show 
Bulawayo’s “enlightened policies and sound development characteristics” which would be in the 
national interest.622 And in the city’s interest, it was used to attract industry, such as in a publicity 
campaign selling Bulawayo as the “City of Enterprise”, boasting good, affordable African housing, 
in what Robinson (referring to this phenomenon in Port Elizabeth) calls “place 
entrepreneurialism”.623 
It became an oft-repeated observation that Bulawayo led the way in home ownership. 
For example, the minister of Local Government Minister praised Bulawayo in 1961 for being 
“…well in advance of other areas in the provision of African housing, and particularly home-
ownership schemes”. The mayor boasted that, “Bulawayo pioneered the way and now has the 
highest percentage of home-ownerships in the country.”624  An advisory board member declared: 
“Can anyone dispute the fact that Bulawayo is second to none in the provision of decent 
accommodation in this country?”625 And on the eve of independence, the Chronicle even went 
so far as to proclaim: "City leads world in owned homes".626  Thus presenting these schemes as a 
spectacle of progress guided by an enlightened administration, the compromises, contingencies 
and cost-savings that shaped them were usually concealed.   
 
622 ‘Bulawayo Display for UK?’ The Chronicle, 14th Jan, 1967. 
623 Robinson, ‘Progressive Port Elizabeth’. 
624Mayors’ minutes, 1967/BCCA 
625 Masiyepambili, November issue, 1977 















Figure 33: Housing and Amenities exhibit at Central African Trade Fair, 1963 [Source: Director's 
annual report, 1963] 








The post-war development drive in Rhodesia was first and foremost about stabilising the African 
urban community in a context of fast-paced industrialisation and a housing crisis. This 
stabilisation drive was launched under conditions of extreme resource constraint and limited 
experience of housing settled, stratified communities on a large scale. In this context, the 
Bulawayo Council, particularly influenced by Hugh Ashton, found that by adopting a progressive 
attitude to African settlement in the city, it could enlist African resources and energies in self-
building and home ownership.  
But the process of building housing and services was riven with uncertainty about what 
Africans residents wanted and could afford, what the sandy soils would mean for the buildings’ 
longevity, how Africans would modify their homes, whether private finance would take an interest 
in African housing, etc. It also entailed contestation, with both African and European residents, 
about the location of schemes, the standards of housing and services, and ultimately what the 
grand scheme of township development should look like. There was no single authority that could 
easily resolve these issues, nor a clear plan before implementation.  
Various contingent and pragmatic solutions, combined with and mutually constitutive of 
progressive ideas about African urban citizenship, resulted in a more integrated pattern of 
development, with high rates of home ownership, to which Bulawayo could apply progressive 
intention ex post facto. Early decisions to build in a more spatially integrated way had path 
dependent effects, as it became cheaper to integrate future development with existing sewerage 
and road infrastructures, and it also created social preferences and expectations for more 
integrated townships. The next chapter shows how the secure tenure that home ownership offered 
also became a norm in Bulawayo, which was difficult to later curtail. 
It has been claimed that schemes like Pelandaba were in fact built “begrudgingly” by the 
Council for the African middle class627, but this was not quite correct. The evidence suggests that 
it was considered financially expedient to do so, and, as the next two chapters show, politically 
and morally expedient to do so, as well. 
 
627 E.g. J. Muzondidya, ‘Walking a Tightrope: A Political History of the Coloured Community in Zimbabwe, 












4. Tenurial Security and the Political Imperative 
to Appease the Middle Class 
 
Whilst industrial employers tended to support the post-war reform of the migrant labour system 
in the hope that the consistency and productivity of their workforce would increase, the 
Government and Bulawayo City Council came to recognise broader sociopolitical benefits to the 
stabilisation of African urban communities. In particular, they recognised the need to provide 
more security of tenure to the emergent African middle class. This class had long lobbied for 
secure tenure – preferably on a freehold basis – and more so in Bulawayo than elsewhere in 
Southern Rhodesia. Their campaign had heated up in the 1940s, when tenure security became 
“top of the elite African political agenda”.628 Politically astute members of the African middle 
class, like Jasper Savanhu, president of the Bulawayo African Workers Trade Union, forcefully 
articulated the need for Africans to have their own homes in order to be efficient contributors to 
Southern Rhodesia’s development, for the good of both European and African. As West argues, 
“For the first time in the history of the colony, elite Africans were beginning to attach conditions 
to their political loyalty.”629  
Thus, in addition to the economic rationale for promoting home ownership as a way to 
relieve the Council of some of the burden of housing costs (discussed in chapter 3), there was 
also a strong sociopolitical rationale put forward by Government and Council: that tenurial 
 
628 West, The Rise of the African Middle Class, p. 110 
629 Ibid., p. 111 
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security would appease the discontented African middle class.630 However, this rationale took on 
different inflections in the hands of the Council versus the Government, and changed over time. 
This chapter analyses these changing differences between the way Bulawayo councillors and 
officials, on the one hand, and Government ministers, on the other, promoted and rationalised 
tenure rights for middle class Africans in the urban areas, and the battles that these differences 
provoked. It shows how, in the 1950s, they both advanced instrumental sociopolitical 
rationalisations of tenurial security – that it would have a depoliticising effect on the middle class 
– though their reasoning differed in subtle ways. From the 1960s, however, Government ministers 
in the Rhodesia Front increasingly rejected the validity of African rights to the city, and in the 
ensuing conflicts the Bulawayo Council began to supplement its instrumental reasoning with a 
more principled defence of tenurial security – declaring it an intrinsic right. Furthermore, Ashton 
began to argue that tenurial security was valued by all socioeconomic groups, not just the middle 
class. Whilst the protracted battles between Government and Council saw both sides making 
concessions, the latter was able to put up a considerable degree of resistance. 
But providing tenure security through long-lease or freehold was not the end of the story 
in terms of the actual sense of security experienced by African home owners, who were subject to 
numerous regulations and restrictions, which they fiercely contested. Therefore, this chapter 
supplements the analysis of macro-negotiations around land laws with an analysis of the micro-
negotiations around the provisions of lease agreements and policies on eviction. 
 
1949-62: From short lease to freehold title 
 
The municipal councils of Southern Rhodesia agreed at a Native Housing Conference in 1953 
that, “refusal to permit Africans to own land in the urban areas would result in a political 
grievance”.631 However, as the conference report noted, there was a lone dissenter: 
Here again the main doubts seem to come from Salisbury. All other towns seem to accept 
the position that the native must be given greater security of tenure and the majority 
offered no objection to allowing him freehold tenure.632 
 
630 (also referred to as “the elites”). 





Although all municipalities (apart from Salisbury) theoretically accepted the principle of greater 
tenure security for a privileged few, the Bulawayo Council was the first to put words into action 
in 1952 (as we saw in chapter 3), with the others following its lead only slowly and much less 
enthusiastically some years later. Although Bulawayo’s first scheme of Pumula was a rather ad hoc 
‘austerity scheme’ with only a 10-years’ lease when it began, the next scheme of Pelandaba was, 
from its inception, conceived explicitly as a way to nurture a stable African middle class (although 
realising this vision was not without its setbacks, as we have seen). Ashton rationalised Pelandaba 
as follows: 
Even though it will not become a large scale township, it will provide the much needed 
social segregation on a voluntary basis that it is Council’s policy to foster. It has great 
potentialities and would provide within Municipal housing an opportunity for the 
leadership and development of a stable middle class which will be of invaluable value to 
the whole community.633  
Industrialists were also concerned about giving Africans a sense of security, but as noted above, 
they rationalised this more in terms of individual responsibility and initiative – enhancing 
productivity – than peace and harmony. For example, in 1953, the President of the Bulawayo 
Chamber of Industries discussed the “insecurity which the detribalised African experiences in the 
towns.”  He explained that, “if we are to eliminate absenteeism, theft, and all the other conditions 
that today militate against increased efficiency – if we are to make the African understand the 
continuity and dignity of labour, we have to ensure that he is decently housed”.634 In any case, in 
the 1950s, the industrialists and the Government commended Bulawayo Council for introducing 
long-lease options to the African townships, even if Bulawayo struggled sometimes to get the 
recognition from Government that it felt it was due. Winning the appreciation of the African 
“beneficiaries” of long-lease schemes, however, was not as easy, as we shall see below.  
The first 10-year leasehold scheme at Pumula was encouraged and commended by the 
Government for its prevention of social degeneration and potential political agitation. Even the 
Health Secretary focused on the political dangers over the health dangers. He warned that the 
squatter encampments in Bulawayo could become “breeding places of vice, crime and disease – 
in particular the disease of Communism.” He felt that moving and prosecuting the squatters would 
only lead to “an ugly situation in race relationships,” and was therefore relieved when 10-year 
leases were introduced to this ‘austerity’ site and services scheme, opining that, “The best way to 
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stop a man, black or white, from becoming a Communist is to make him a property owner, to 
give him a stake in the area in which he lives.”635 
But the degree of security that constituted “having a stake in the area” was heavily 
contested. African residents felt that the 10 years offered at Pumula, or even the 30 years offered 
subsequently at Pelandaba, were not sufficient security. The Advisory Boards had tried in vain in 
1952, as Pelandaba was in the early planning stage, to make it a 99-year lease scheme.636 Charlton 
Ngcebetsha (the publisher and public intellectual mentioned already in chapter 3) articulated the 
Bulawayo African residents’ general wariness of Council’s promises of secure tenure. He drew on 
the historical memory of evictions: 
Once beaten twice shy. When Bulawayo was smaller than it is now a good number of 
Africans were allowed to build houses for themselves in the Old Location on a freehold 
basis. During the time they occupied those houses they sincerely believed, as they had 
been made to believe, that they would own their houses for keeps. But, the unexpected 
happened: the Municipality changed its policy. It wanted the ground on which these 
houses were built….637 
In this way, Ngcebetsha poured cold water on the hype around the 30-year lease scheme at 
Western Commonage no. 6 (Pelandaba), saying, “[T]here is a fly in this beautiful ointment. And 
this is the fly: the scheme is a LEASEHOLD and not a FREEHOLD”.638  He also pointed out 
the irony in the way the Council framed tenure security as a privilege, rather than a right: 
We consider it a good thing for the Africans to be permitted to buy and own houses 
within the perimeter of the Municipality. In fact, the Africans, for a number of years in 
the past, have asked for this privilege. We use the world “privilege” deliberately because 
we realise that the Africans are not allowed permanently to stay in European towns unless 
they are of service to the Europeans.639 
 
635 Extract from Health Secretary’s annual report, 1952 NAZ/S2609/35/2. Native Housing Policy, vol. 1: 
1946-53.  Note: this association of squalor with the seeds of communism was espoused by churchmen as 
well. As Reverend Percy Ibbotson, the influential advocate of improved social welfare for urban Africans, 
wrote to the Reverend Carter in 1950: “The best means of combating communism and subversive 
activities is the provision of satisfactory housing and living conditions with adequate social and economic 
standards for all sections of the community…” (Methodist House, 1950, quoted in T. Devitte, ‘The 
Underdevelopment of Social Welfare Services for Urban Africans in Rhodesia: 1929-1953, with Special 
Reference to Social Security’, Assa Kwaluseni, 7th Annual Congress (Swaziland, 1976), p. 12) 
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When Ashton complained about “malicious propaganda” around Pelandaba at the outset, he was 
no doubt referring to Ngcebetsha, amongst others.640  
Michael West is correct to point out that Bulawayo’s home ownership schemes were “the 
most significant breach of the Land Apportionment Act since its promulgation in 1930”, and an 
“implicit renunciation of the segregationist fiction that Africans were temporary sojourners in the 
imaginary white city.”641 However, as the next section shows, there were still numerous 
restrictions within the leases themselves that undermined the security experienced by the home 
owner. These restrictions provoked fierce complaints from the residents, and internal negotiations 
between local councillors, officers and government officials, which in subtle ways redefined the 
citizenship status of the late colonial African home owner. 
 
Lease negotiations in the 1950s 
 
Home ownership leases were not straightforward documents, but complex processes that brought 
some hypothetical security but failed to remove many of the conditions that rendered African life 
in the late colonial city insecure. Successful applicants to a home ownership scheme had to pay a 
deposit whilst signing an agreement of loan and also an agreement of lease. The lease agreements 
in Southern Rhodesia were interesting, in that they incorporated all the relevant regulations within 
them, thus making each scheme’s lease almost sui generis,642 at least until the Pelandaba lease was 
standardised across all townships in 1963.643 Since Bulawayo pioneered home ownership, it could 
not find a precedent within the colony, and so Ashton sought copies of leases from municipalities 
in Northern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa. But the original agreements were modified 
through protracted negotiation between Ashton, Council committees and Government officials. 
In the process of negotiating lease conditions, which went on for years, officials and Councillors 
were forced to reconsider the historical conditionalities of African rights of residence in the urban 
areas. This section examines two key conditionalities – dealing with employment and liquor 
offences – that had a bearing on home owners’ sense of security.  
African rights to settle in the colony’s urban areas had always been conditional on formal 
employment (or registered self-employment).644 Africans had to obtain permission to reside in the 
urban areas from the municipal authorities, and these authorities were empowered to remove 
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643 BCCA/H7 (PP 310; TB 397) - Location home ownership scheme - native areas 
644 (This employment condition was briefly dropped when the LAA was amended in 1941, but reinstated 
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them when they were laid off or resigned, i.e., when they had become “loafers”. Bulawayo’s home 
ownership schemes were supposed to offer a new status of tenurial security and urban citizenship. 
But old colonial attitudes died hard, and so there was still a question of whether African home 
owners’ rights to remain in the town should be conditional on formal employment.  
For Bulawayo’s first home ownership scheme at Hyde Park (Pumula), the answer to this 
question was “yes”, the condition should remain. Therefore, the lease contained a cancellation 
clause in the event that the tenant became unemployed or did not want to work (pensioners or 
those retiring due to infirmity were exempted). But for the second home ownership scheme at 
Western Commonage No. 6 (Pelandaba), Ashton quietly dropped this condition from the lease 
agreement – an omission that did not go unnoticed. It caught the attention of the Government’s 
Acting Secretary for Native Affairs who was meant to approve it, and he asked for an 
explanation.645 Ashton explained:  
This clause was deliberately left out of the Western Commonage agreement because one 
of the objects of this scheme was to give the natives security of tenure and so to 
encourage them to assume responsibility for their own housing. 
Evidently, he deemed it insufficient or unpersuasive to simply defend the removal of the 
employment condition on principle, and instead justified it with the fact that Africans would be 
taking on responsibility. He then continued with his reassurances that removing this employment 
conditionality was not simply a concession to the leaseholder; the scheme served the Council’s 
interests as well: 
As the scheme is practically self-supporting (the rent is 7/- less than the estimated 
economic cost) the Council would not be subsidising loafing to any extent, so that, 
provided the tenant is able to pay his dues there seemed to be no reasonable grounds for 
interference. In any case, the risk of some tenants turning out to be loafers, in spite of 
being carefully “vetted” in the first instance, is worth taking in view of the many other 
advantages of the scheme, so cancellation of the lease would reduce it to very much the 
same level as the lease of ordinary Municipal accommodation and so would destroy any 
real security and undermine the very basis of the scheme.646  
The Council was persuaded by Ashton’s rationale and resolved to leave the clause out. In relaying 
this resolution to the Native Affairs official, the Town Clerk repeated the phrase, “it would destroy 
 
645 Acting Secretary for Native Affairs to Bulawayo Town Clerk, 22nd March, 1954, BCCA/H4/4/1. 
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any real security”.647 In this small but significant way, the home owners had earned an important 
new right to occupy their homes without the condition of employment.  But the Council persisted 
with the policy that Africans’ right to reside in the city should be conditional on their having 
worked at least at some point there. So when a retired African pastor from a rural area wanted to 
build a house at Pelandaba in 1955, the mayor declined, because he feared it would set a 
“dangerous precedent” (despite Ashton’s assurance that the pastor was a “desirable type of 
African” with sufficient assets).648 
The second key provision that was particularly controversial in the lease agreements was 
eviction for liquor offences. Liquor offences referred to the illegal brewing and sale of beer and 
moonshine, and the illegal consumption of ‘European liquor’, which included clear beer and 
wines. Until the passing of the Native Beer Act of 1952, Africans were not even allowed to 
consume any alcohol at home. In the existing rental schemes, liquor raids and evictions of illegal 
squatters by BSAP and municipal police had been a serious historical aggression that Ashton’s 
Department continued to sanction. Indeed, these continued liquor raids, combined with rent 
increases and evictions of illegal occupants, made the early ‘50s a difficult time for many residents. 
Charlton Ngcebetsha railed in his African Home News that the authorities were now worse than 
ever: “Bulawayo thou art indeed heartless and cruel to poor Africans! … Bulawayo was not like 
this before,” he protested in 1954.649  
One of the biggest grievances was the policy of “double punishment” for liquor offences. 
This meant that a tenant convicted of a liquor offence or other misdemeanour could be convicted 
in court and evicted by the Council.  Because liquor brewing and selling was a very important way 
for many residents to sustain their families under poverty conditions, double punishment was a 
grave threat to security. The home ownership schemes were therefore another opportunity to 
provide greater security by removing this clause.  
The Hyde Park (Pumula) lease, however, did not remove the cancellation and eviction 
clause for liquor offences and other misdemeanours. When it came to the 30-year lease for 
Western Commonage No. 6 (Pelandaba), double punishment became a very controversial issue. 
The reason it became so controversial was because it was inserted into the lease agreement after 
lessees had verbally agreed it. Before the transfer of property, lessees had to sign the ‘acceptance 
of loan’ agreement – a contract that protected the Council. Yet the lease agreement, which protected 
 
647 Town Clerk to Acting Secretary of Native Affairs, 17th August, 1954, in BCCA/H4/4/1. (Transfer Box 
210). Western Commonage Number 6 Housing scheme 
648 Extract from Minutes of African Administration Committee, 12 Jan 1955, in BCCA/TB 310 - Home 
ownership schemes - Native areas 
649 Home News, 13th November, 1954.   
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the rights of the lessee, was often withheld whilst negotiations about its provisions were ongoing. 
When a Government official claimed that “the agreement of lease and repayment of the loan 
frightens the natives who distrust pieces of paper which they are asked to sign by the 
Europeans”,650 he could not have been more wrong. Lessees were only too keen to sign a lease 
agreement, if only they were presented with one! And Ashton observed that there was “a class of 
tenant who prizes his lease agreement to the extent of framing and hanging it.”651  
This was the case for the Western Commonage (Pelandaba) scheme. When new tenants 
were supposed to sign their lease agreements, they were only given some type-written documents 
listing conditions of occupancy. Ashton explained that the Government was still considering the 
lease details. The residents complained to the Native Commissioner: “At the beginning of 1954, 
we began to buy houses, but when we asked to be issued with the lease of agreement it was said 
that we would get these soon. We asked repeatedly but all in vain.”652 By August of that year, the 
concerned residents had arranged to meet Ashton under an Indaba Tree (meeting tree). He 
assured the group of men, women and children that the physical document would be with them 
in two weeks. After the two weeks elapsed with no sign of the lease agreements, the residents 
were amazed to read in the press that they would lose their homes, with just three months’ notice, 
if they were convicted of liquor offences.  
All these Press reports run diametrically contrary to the agreement…The documents are 
type-writer-signed and are in the possession of the residents. To say how cruelly and 
shaken our confidences are in this Home Ownership Scheme is clear. Some of the 
residents have made alterations to their original rooms erected by Council, making them 
four times as big. The disturbance and anxiety caused by this delay in issuing the 
agreement memorandum of lease and other developments that have taken place are better 
imagined than said.653  
One African resident called it “repugnant to ideas of justice and fair play,” and wrote to the 
Bulawayo Chronicle: 
 
650 Extract from Dr M.H. Webster annual report, 1952, NAZ/s2609/35/2 volume 1. Native Housing 
Policy, 1946-53.  
651 BCCA/H7 (PP 310; TB 397) - Location home ownership scheme - native areas 
652 Western Commonage No.6 RA to the Native Commissioner, 22nd August, 1954/BCCA/SO 4 (Transfer 
Box 152) Residents' Association W.A.T 
653 Western Commonage No.6 RA to the Native Commissioner, 22nd August, 1954/BCCA/SO 4 (Transfer 
Box 152) Residents' Association W.A.T [p. 71] 
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This country, indeed the world, is saddled with criminals and offenders of the darkest 
character. But nowhere do we find a person serving a prison sentence or paying a fine 
and also losing his home.654 
The resident put the blame squarely on Bulawayo City Council for “sowing seeds of unrest, 
delinquency and racial friction”, and appealed for Government intervention: 
We pray that the Government will intervene and revoke this heartless law. In taking up 
this Western Commonage Scheme no. 6, we renounced our claims and rights to land and 
houses in the Reserves. We have come to this area as a permanent labour force with no 
exit from here. We ought, surely, to expect some security at least for 30 years.655   
Ashton had in fact recommended to the Council that mere possession of beer should not be a 
concern. Rather, it was the illegal brewing of “concoctions” and the sale of “European liquor” – 
practices deemed liable to cause “social degeneration” – that were a concern. In any case, however, 
he argued that administrative action should be a “last resort”, and for other misdemeanours, the 
powers of the courts should suffice, and the administration should stay out of it.  
The Council’s Native Administration Committee took a harder line. They wanted the 
lease to say that a tenant convicted of any liquor offence shall be given notice of termination. But 
the Town Clerk agreed with Ashton that this was suboptimal, because home ownership should 
provide a stronger sense of security. Why was he concerned about this stronger sense of security? 
Again, the reasons were both principled and instrumental: concerned by the pace of industrial 
growth and consequent housing backlog, the Town Clerk felt that, “Home ownership schemes, 
if encouraged, could help in a small way to take some of the burden”. The fact that home 
ownership was still experimental, that interest from residents had been “painfully small”, and that 
“administrative deterrents might slow it down altogether”, meant that compromises had to be made. 
These citizenship rights were deeply embedded in practical concerns. It was therefore agreed to 
word the agreement such that Council “may at its discretion” evict a leaseholder convicted of any 
liquor offences.656 
Despite this discretionary clause, the Advisory Boards were incensed that double 
punishment had been retained. The Board adjourned sine die, protesting that, “repeated requests, 
pieces of advice and recommendations regarding double punishment and eviction have been 
 
654 ‘Municipal Eviction Law is “Discriminating’, The Chronicle, August 31st, 1954 
655 After condemning Southern Rhodesia’s “ridiculous” restrictive liquor laws more generally the letter 
concludes with irony: “At our stage of development we look to British people to help us distinguish between 
justice and injustice”. 
656 Extract from Council Minutes, 21.4.1954, in BCCA/H4/4/1. (Transfer Box 210). Western Commonage 
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consistently ignored by the Bulawayo City Council since 1942 up to the present day.”657 They 
appealed to the Native Commissioner, who arranged a meeting with the African Administration 
Committee, and the issue was resolved by offering alternative accommodation for evictees at the 
Hyde Park Transit Camp.  
Meanwhile, Ashton had met with the Chief Native Commissioner who felt that the liquor 
regulations were “unduly drastic” given the lessees will have “sunk quite a lot of money into the 
property”.658 Ashton decided to use the Native Commissioner’s statements to lobby harder for 
the removal of the double punishment clause, asserting: “I am afraid I am unable to agree with 
the terms of this clause”. He expressed concern that those who had signed up for the home 
ownership scheme had not been forewarned. Persuaded by these arguments, on 17th August, 1955, 
the African Administration Committee finally resolved to recommend that the clause regarding 
liquor offences be rescinded, and on 24th August Council voted to delete the clause from the lease. 
Thus, through protracted negotiation and extensive pressure from RAs and Advisory Boards, 
another important concession was made to home owners.  
The first cohort of Pelandaba lessees had a strong sense of being the vanguard of a new 
class of propertied citizens, even referring to themselves jokingly as the Western Commonage 
“pioneer column”, claiming they deserved “some sense of security and wellbeing”.659 On this 
basis, they asked for some more concessions, such as that rent be payable any time of the month, 
not necessarily on the first day, and that the lease’s reference to “members of the family” include 
extended family, not just the nuclear family, so as not to “cut grossly across our sense of kinship”. 
Whilst these small concessions gradually enhanced the security experienced by home 
owners, there was still a fundamental question about the validity of long leases for Africans in 
what was legally classified as a ‘European area’. This thorny legal issue was raised by the Urban 
Affairs Commission (discussed further below), which consulted the Attorney General in 1957 
with respect to the new 99-year lease schemes at New Highfields in Salisbury and Mpopoma in 
Bulawayo. The AG expressed his doubts about whether the security of tenure for these schemes 
was “adequate in law” and whether the lessee’s investment was “secure in fact”.660 The agreements 
of lease promised the lessee “ownership” of the house and its improvements, but not the land. 
However, the laws stated that “immovable improvements” on a leased site belonged to the owner 
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of the land (which in the case of New Highfields was the Government; in the case of Mpopoma 
it was the municipality) and could not be purchased in the manner promised by the very language 
of the lease. The whole concept of the 99-year lease was a “virtual alienation of the property”, 
which would contradict the spirit of the Land Apportionment Act. Furthermore, the AG found 
the lease agreements for these 99-year schemes to be “unusual, to say the least”, for their 
provisions contradicted the very notion of long-term secure tenure. One section provided for 
cancellation by the Minister of Local Government forthwith in certain events; another entitled the 
lessee to terminate the lease with just 3 months’ notice. The AG therefore concluded, that these 
leases could not be said to be in longum tempus, yet he predicted that the courts would recognise 
them anyway.  
But since Bulawayo’s 99-year scheme at Mpopoma was on Council-owned land, unlike 
New Highfields, the Council asked to make its own interpretation of this tricky legal situation. 
The Town Clerk contradicted the AG’s assessment, saying that he could find nothing in the Land 
Apportionment Act that would exclude a long lease. Bulawayo, he argued, was offering a true 
“agreement of lease”, and not a “concealed agreement of sale”.661  Meanwhile, the Urban Affairs 
Commission had decided that every opportunity must be provided for Africans to acquire 
“homes, as distinct from houses”, in order to encourage a “settled and contented middle-class 
African population” in Southern Rhodesia. The commissioners therefore advised the Legislative 
Assembly at the earliest opportunity to validate these 99-year leases “with retrospective effect”.662  
But a year after their report came out, the legality of the lease agreements remained in 
doubt.663 Bulawayo’s legal advisors were unclear on the situation. They could not work out what 
the prohibition on Africans owning immovable property in the European area, under the Land 
Apportionment Act, actually meant. If they could not “own” the house, were they simply leasing 
both the land and the house? What did that mean in practice? Bulawayo’s Deputy Director of 
African Administration argued that revealing this fact to African “home owners” would have a 
huge psychological impact on them. Therefore, the Council’s legal advisors, Coghlan & Welsh, 
devised an ingenious way to avoid this demoralising revelation: they recommended retaining the 
words “owning”, “purchasing” and “selling”, “in the interests of the morale of the Africans”, even 
if they did not actually own their homes.  
Another precarious feature was the fact that the 99-year leases were not notarially 
registered.  One concerned official wrote to the Town Clerk, “These leases are tantamount to 
 
661 Ibid. p. 41 
662 Ibid. 
663 E.g. Coghlan and Walsh Attorneys to the Town Clerk, 18th Nov., 1959/BCCA/TB310 Home ownership 
schemes - Native areas [Dec 1954-May1962] p. 143-145; Urban African Affairs Commission, p. 48  
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Title and this department has no record whatsoever of who holds a long lease of Council land.”664 
The lessee should have “something more concrete than a lease which is floating around from 
office to office and likely to be mislaid”. But the Town Clerk, annoyed by the persistent fuss this 
official was making, predicted that Ashton would resist any such proposal, as it would add more 
costs to the lessee. (He had come to learn that Ashton was always trying to lower costs for the 
lessee, such as negotiating furiously with the Government to have the leases exempted from stamp 
duty.) By the mid-1960s, many lessees still hadn’t signed leases from a decade earlier. Pumula had 
long been upgraded from a 10-year to a 99-year scheme, yet many leases were still not up to date. 
The Mpopoma leases, which required giving defaulting lessees 3 months’ notice, were being 
standardised in accordance with the Pelandaba lease, which required only 1 month’s notice.665  
These vignettes about lease agreements have shown the protracted bureaucratic 
negotiations through which rights accrued to the home owner. This was not a clear centralised 
policy; low-level state actors played a subtle but key role. Furthermore, these rights remained 
precarious. Residents perceived this precarity, and they therefore tried to get their hands on 
actually signed documents – artefacts that gave some measure of assurance, given the history of 
municipal betrayal, that their homes were indeed theirs. This demonstrates that merely noting the 
period of lease does not provide a full picture of the actual insecurities that surrounded this form 
of “secure” tenure in the colonial context. 
 
Whittling away at the Land Apportionment Act at the end of the 
“liberal era” in Rhodesian politics 
 
Despite some progressive shifts in attitudes towards African urban citizenship in the 1950s, the 
Land Apportionment Act remained an obstacle to full African integration into the ‘white city’. 
Yet there was only so far that the municipality of Bulawayo could go with its promotion of tenurial 
security – the freehold rights that African residents had so long clamoured for were simply 
prohibited under the LAA, which was the bedrock of white privilege. In order for the rhetoric of 
‘racial partnership’ to mean something substantive, the LAA needed to be whittled away.  
But the legislators in the 1950s would not go so far as to allow freehold. As early as 1950, 
a Native Land Board had discussed the possibility of freehold in the Government-run ‘Native 
Village Settlements’ of Luveve in Bulawayo and Highfield in Salisbury. But there had been fears 
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that when the cities inevitably expanded, these native villages would be engulfed, and African 
freehold would become an obstacle to industrial or European residential expansion. The Land 
Board had suggested that Government should purchase European land outside the cities along 
railway lines, which could bring African workers to town. It was reasoned that, “the public, 
generally, would far rather allow more European land to be taken up away from the cities, rather 
than have a permanent settlement of Africans as close as the Village Settlements”.666 Although 
one freehold scheme along these lines was established in the early 1950s, in a ‘native purchase 
area’ far out of Bulawayo at Ntabazinduna, it was not attractive to townspeople. As we saw in 
chapter 3, a more integrated pattern of township development emerged in Bulawayo, and it was 
in these integrated townships that residents wanted freehold rights. 
In the late 1950s, various commissions, conventions and amendments to the Land 
Apportionment Act were testaments to Europeans’ realisation that the whole question of racial 
segregation needed to at least be discussed. This section shows how Ashton took this issue more 
seriously than most state officials and politicians – whose myopia he criticised – and how he tried 
to express the need for substantive change through various fora that were, ultimately, ineffective 
in preventing the rise of the Rhodesia Front, resulting in a shocking reversal of what Ashton had 
perceived as an inevitable, progressive trend towards ‘multiracialism’.  
The Urban Affairs Commission, appointed by the Governor of Southern Rhodesia (Sir 
Peveril William-Powlett) in 1957, was an important large-scale exercise in finding solutions to the 
colony’s urban African housing problem.667  A comprehensive questionnaire was sent out to 
municipalities, as well as chambers of industry, sectors of the African urban population, etc., but 
little or no response was received from these latter groups. Bulawayo responded enthusiastically 
to the questionnaire with a 168-page response, containing Ashton’s comparatively progressive 
prescriptions. He proclaimed his support for the rising African middle class, insisting that they 
“need a different approach for their ‘stability and development’. These people are those with more 
education, ambition, alertness, wealth or who are self-conscious and articulate…These members 
of the ‘elite’ have certain understandable and justifiable wishes: it would be right and plain 
common sense to meet them now.”668 Ashton proposed offering them freehold title; allowing 
widows and single women to own houses; removing the employment conditionality; exemption 
from restrictive laws and passes; urban courts etc. He emphasised that these were privileges to be 
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earned, not rights to be demanded by all, a view that would change with time and become more 
accommodating and universalising.  
But Ashton’s views were comparatively progressive for the time, contrasting spectacularly 
with those of some other influential figures in Southern Rhodesian municipal politics. Contrast 
this submission to the Urban Affairs Commission by an outspoken alderman of the Salisbury City 
Council, Charles Olley:  
It may not be wise to attempt to do for the blacks what God himself has not done. An 
examination of the veldt will show that animals, reptiles and birds keep to themselves. 
That largely arises out of the fact that animals are also at different stages of evolution. 
The situation should not be allowed to grow whereby two towns or townships are in 
close proximity- the one white and the other black. This unfortunate state of affairs has 
already come about in Salisbury. An overwhelming number of Natives too close to 
European towns can be the basis of much distress in the event of their being a clash 
between the two types of people at different stages of evolution. 669   
Olley, who was admittedly one of the most outspokenly segregationist and blatantly racist of all 
the councillors in the colony, advocated Government intervention to create Native areas far from 
European residential areas and “provide the necessary transport plus other amenities to keep the 
blacks out of mischief.”670 The Bulawayo Council certainly had its own segregationist councillors 
at this time, too, such as Jack Pain of the Dominion Party. 
As it turned out, the Urban Affairs Commission endorsed the more progressive 
perspectives put forward by the likes of Ashton, claiming that the evidence they had gathered 
“demonstrates forcibly” that the land laws were inhibiting “the full evolution of urban life in 
Southern Rhodesia”671:  
By restricting access to land the chance of creating what is universally regarded as the 
most conservative element in society – those who own land and property – is being lost 
and a footloose mass of human beings is coming into existence not because the people 
themselves are inclined towards that mode of life but because the laws do not allow them 
to develop otherwise.672 
 
669 NAZ S51/7 Urban Affairs Commission, Answers to Questionnaires, 1957: Memorandum from 
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It recommended “throw[ing] off those shackles which prevent urban Africans from becoming 
normal urban dwellers”, by providing freehold tenure and opportunities to participate in urban 
local government.673 At around the time of the Commission’s report, Prime Minister Garfield 
Todd was ousted in a cabinet coup. The dynamics of this coup are contested, but a commonly 
accepted reason was that his plans to repeal various racially discriminatory laws were deemed by 
his cabinet members to be too radical for the mainstream European electorate.674 Todd’s 
successor, Edgar Whitehead, largely ignored the commission’s 200-page report. This did not mean 
the report was inconsequential, for Ashton used it as a way to hold the Government to account, 
which was a reversal of the dynamics of earlier commissions pre-1949, where the Government 
was always holding the Bulawayo Council to account. 
Ashton felt the Government was completely out of touch with realities on the ground, 
of which the municipalities had been aware for quite some time. He criticised Prime Minister 
Whitehead for ignoring the Urban Affairs Commissions findings, and instead clinging to outdated 
views of urban society. Whitehead, he argued, was still thinking in binary terms, of ‘permanent 
townspeople’ versus ‘transient migrants’ – a binary that Ashton argued was no longer an accurate 
reflection of the complex social realities in Bulawayo. In his annual report of 1959, he accused 
Whitehead of thinking in terms of the “unrealistic equation”: “permanent = indigenous = married; 
whereas migratory = non-indigenous = single.”675 Indeed, based on this simplification, Whitehead 
had proposed two housing authorities with clear mandates in the African areas: his Government 
would take responsibility for “permanent” settlers, by building married accommodation for them, 
whilst the municipalities would continue with managing the “migrant labour force.”676 If the 
municipalities disliked the dual approach he was recommending, Whitehead offered to take full 
responsibility for all African housing.  
But the municipalities together, through the Joint Executive of the Local Government 
Association, resolved in September 1958 to totally reject the policy of dual control, and advocated 
instead that municipalities take over responsibility for all African townships (including the few 
existing government-run schemes) within their greater municipal areas.677 This contrasts starkly 
with the unwillingness of either local or central government to take responsibility for African 
housing in the interwar period.   
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The Government’s suggestion to take over housing responsibilities, and at the same time 
its dithering on the important issue of freehold tenure, provoked Ashton to complain about 
“doubt and confusion” in Government policy, which was stalling progress in Bulawayo. Ashton 
tried to influence national policy through the Action Group. He wrote to the Prime Minister of 
the Federation, Sir Roy Welensky, imploring him to bring some substance to the whole rhetoric 
about racial partnership, which had become hollow, saying: 
It is highly likely that propaganda will replace policy... Putting it bluntly, there is a danger 
that people will be lulled into thinking that African support will be won by simply telling 
them how much is being done for them rather than by facing and solving the real 
fundamental issues. 678  
The majority in the Group agreed with Ashton’s criticisms of Welensky and Whitehead for their 
“hectoring and lecturing approach to Africans, their failure to educate the European electorate ‘to 
face the new Africa’ and their tardiness in eliminating racial discrimination”.679 Indeed, the Action 
Group was painfully aware of its own tardiness, with the chairman acknowledging that, “Full 
credit must go to Dr. Ashton for bringing this home to members more than any other member.”680 
But the Group’s influence was on the wane at the end of the decade.681 Its 1959 annual report 
noted that, “Although speakers during the past year have been from Cabinet level on several 
occasions it seems fair to observe that the Group no longer enjoys the same degree of privilege 
as in the past.”682  
In his visit to West Africa in 1959 Ashton made some favourable remarks about the newly 
independent nations.683 But back home, as race relations deteriorated at the end of the decade 
with the heavy-handed clampdowns on alleged African political activists in 1959, the Action 
Group called for some kind of mutual racial consultation on civic security and progress, and gave 
support to a ‘national convention’ organised by Sir Charles Cummings and the Capricorn Society 
in Salisbury in 1960.684 This was a non-party assembly of citizens of all races, with cabinet ministers 
attending as observers.  
The National Convention – attended by 72 “Africans”, 89 “Europeans”, 9 “Asians” and 
5 “Coloureds” – presented itself as a happy multiracial “indaba” (meeting). Alison Shutt and Ian 
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Hancock argue that this convention was a way for liberal Europeans to be seen to be nice and 
concerned, avoiding deeper structural issues.685 The Bulawayo City Council was the most strongly 
represented of the municipalities, with delegates including Ashton, some advisory board members, 
the Town Clerk, and an ex-mayor. Most African nationalist leaders shunned the event, but Charles 
Mzingeli, Ndabaningi Sithole and some others attended. A number of papers were delivered, 
notably a forceful critique of the Land Apportionment Act written by the African lawyer Herbert 
Chitepo, in which he asserted that the Act was a source of serious and justifiable African grievance, 
and described the African townships of the colony as “nothing but enlarged and consolidated 
back quarters for servants”.686  The Convention agreed that the elimination of unfair racial 
discrimination was urgent, and debated issues such as tenure rights and participation in local 
government, generally supporting progressive changes. But the Convention turned out to be more 
symbol than substance, though it was an indication that liberal elements of European society 




The Government was still hesitant to actually deliver substantive policies in the form of repealing 
the Land Apportionment Act. Instead of heeding the Urban Affairs Committee report, a 
Parliamentary Select Committee report was published, proposing freehold for Africans outside 
municipal areas. Ashton called it a “disappointing document”.687 But in a parliamentary debate in 
1959, the Government extended the principle of freehold for Africans to any municipality that 
applied for it. Shortly thereafter, in October, 1959, the African Advisory Boards of Mpopoma, 
Pelandaba and Pumula approached the Bulawayo Council. The Bulawayo Council applied for it 
in December, but the enabling legislation (i.e. the requisite amendment to the LAA) had not been 
actually passed.  
Finally, on the 14th April, 1961, an amendment allowed Africans to own land on freehold 
in the urban areas, by reclassifying the township lands as “African” rather than “European”. The 
Bulawayo Council “regarded this amendment sympathetically” and immediately converted the 
rental scheme of Barbour Fields to freehold tenure on the 17th of May, 1961. Ashton called this 
the most significant event of the year for his Department. It represented the culmination of a long 
struggle by Africans for freehold title.  
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On the promotion of African freehold rights for Africans, Bulawayo had an ally in 
government – Minister Abe Abrahamson. Abrahamson was a “Bulawayo boy” who spoke openly 
about his bias towards the city he called home, and he frequently visited or liaised with the Action 
Group. When he became the Minister of Labour, Social Welfare and Housing in 1958, 
Abrahamson became a keen advocate of African freehold rights. He praised the Bulawayo City 
Council for being “well in advance of other areas in the provision of African housing, and 
particularly home-ownership schemes”.688  
Bulawayo was on a more integrationist trajectory than Salisbury, and they had petty 
disagreements over desegregation policies. For example, Salisbury wanted no more piecemeal 
amendments to the LAA until a detailed impact study had been carried out and if there was to be 
desegregation of town centres it wanted the Government to take responsibility, whereas Bulawayo 
chose to support the amendments to the Act and take responsibility for implementing them.689 
Whilst the amendments being proposed in 1961 were not of much consequence, they had political 
significance as “the first categorical rejection of the theory of segregation”.690  
Another desegregation issue was multiracial swimming baths. Bulawayo begrudgingly 
supported desegregation, to avoid the whole affair going public worldwide, whilst Salisbury and 
several other councils vehemently opposed it. Alderman Olley of Salisbury turned on the 
Bulawayo City Council at an LGA conference for not standing up to the government, and “taking 
the line of least resistance”, saying, “I think the Bulawayo Council must be packed with U.F.P 
members.”691 He went on to boast that one day he would visit Bulawayo and hold a public meeting 
to air his views about the Bulawayo Council: “And I will bet anything you like I will be cheered 
for it”. A Bulawayo delegate retorted: “Salisbury ratepayers would swop the Bulawayo Council for 
Salisbury Council any day.”692.   
These petty spats and their different housing policies show that Bulawayo and Salisbury 
had different development visions by the end of the 1950s. As for the European ratepayers of 
Bulawayo, they were not, in fact, too happy with some of the integrationist measures being taken 
by their City Council. The support for multiracial baths, the construction of Tshabalala African 
Township so close to the European suburb of Bellevue (see chapter 3), and the building of African 
beer gardens in the European suburbs for domestic servants (see chapter 6), meant they, like 
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much of the white electorate, perceived that the legislative bedrock of white privilege was being 
whittled away.  
In strong language in his annual reports, Ashton chastised whites for wishing African 
grievances would just go away, and implored them to “adjust to, and prepare for, life as it has to 
be lived in Central Africa…”693 At the same time he criticised African Nationalists, saying it was 
disappointing that ZAPU “showed little sign of a more constructive approach” than its 
predecessor the NDP.694  With white voters uncomfortable about desegregation and black voters 
unconvinced by Whitehead’s attempts at wooing them, the Bulawayo Action Group warned that, 
“The great challenge of the coming year will be the problem of keeping in power a Government 
of liberal mind and avoiding the certain disaster of a reactionary triumph.”695 But disaster came in 
the December 1962 elections, in the form of 35 seats to the Rhodesia Front, and just 30 to the 
UFP. Following this shock, the Action Group admitted that, “For the first time in its history the 
Group has found itself completely diametrically opposed to the policies of the government in 
power”.696   
 
1962-69: The rise of the Rhodesia Front and 
uncertainty in urban African Affairs 
 
With the coming to power of the Rhodesia Front, the piecemeal whittling away of the LAA was 
halted. The new Rhodesia Front Government campaigned to maintain or even reinforce racial 
segregation, but its policy direction on urban African affairs remained confused and uncertain in 
the 1960s, vaguely based on the concept of “community development” and “self-help”. As Ranger 
notes, at this point Bulawayo’s relation to the state inverted from the interwar period, as it now 
“irritated the State because of its too great liberality rather than because it was too reactionary”.697  
A colleague of Ashton’s recalls that in the early 1960s he “sort of almost despaired, at 
least for a period … he really saw no way of things going forward with the RF in control.”698  
Ashton would later refer to this moment as “an immediate, almost palpable change in 
atmosphere”, and a “reversal of the liberal trends of the previous governments and for the 
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introduction of a racial policy that would ‘maintain white supremacy for all time’.”699 It 
precipitated years of struggle with Rhodesia Front ministers over urban African policy.  
Just 6 months after the RF win, Ashton detected “a slowing down of the previous trends 
towards non-racialism” in Bulawayo.700 For example, moves to open the commercial areas of 
Bulawayo to all races, and to negotiate seats for Africans on the Council, were put on ice. Using 
its powers under the LAA, the Government was able to prevent further inroads of Africans into 
European areas and institutions, and reinforced segregation through “petty restrictions” such as 
the  banning of multi-racial sport in schools.701 
This dramatic shift in national politics and the Government’s dithering on its African 
urban policy orientation created a debilitating climate of uncertainty for the AAD. Ashton’s annual 
reports reveal an increasing disillusionment. In 1964, he complained that, “Uncertainties about 
the future still cloud the political scene and delay development.”702 He described his Department 
as positioned between the reactionary European community and the revolutionary urban African 
community, writing of the whites “riding rough-shod” over the views of Africans on the one 
hand, and of nationalists adopting an “all or nothing” policy that “rejected negotiation, gradualism 
and compromise”, on the other. This vision of a gradualist approach towards modernisation was 
unravelling. By 1965, when the Prime Minister declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 
Ashton felt the trends towards multi-racialism since the war were not just slowing, but now went 
into reverse.703  
And yet the Government still had no clear policy on township administration, which 
Ashton complained about perenially.704 Instead, it peddled the idea of ‘community development’, 
which, as discussed in the next chapter, Ashton dismissed as both a gimmick and a thinly veiled 
form of apartheid. In this climate of uncertainty, Bulawayo continued to emphasise home 
ownership. But unemployment was high in the early 1960s, and the economy was static. This 
meant that: 
Home-ownership, by which it was hoped several social and economic problems would 
be solved, and the people’s needs for higher standards of living would be met, has to 
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some extent, boomeranged through the depressed economic conditions we are 
experiencing, and is bearing heavily on many who can no longer afford it.705  
The Housing Department’s tight budgeting was unravelling too, as many tenants went into rent 
arrears, especially leaseholders, and ended up defaulting, which could lead to evictions. Before 
long, there was an expanding list of tenants in arrears. Ashton became ruthlessly pragmatic in 
seeking ways to streamline the eviction process. He noted that the lawyers had “set out the purely 
legal position with admirable clarity, but what we really require is advice on the practical issue. 
Eviction orders in Mpopoma alone now number 80 or more a month…”706  
But the Administration also realised that it would be more sensible to grant moratoria on 
loan repayments until occupants could find work; and after an eviction order had been issued, 
some tenants were allowed to stay in their accommodation if they could promptly pay the amounts 
due. (In many cases lessees weren’t actually dwelling in their houses).707 So for example, in 1963, 
thirty-nine occupants of Mpopoma A section, Mpopoma B section, and Mpopoma South, were 
granted moratoria of 3 to 6 months.  In 1965, the Council granted moratoria to 300 households 
comprising unemployable old and ill men, and widows and divorcees.  
As the rural areas began to develop in the early 1960s, the urban influx that had 
exacerbated unemployment in Bulawayo began to slow, and from the 1st of May, 1964, migrants 
from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became foreign nationals, thus removing their rights to 
work in Rhodesia’s urban areas. The employment situation improved somewhat after this. But 
African school-leavers continued to struggle to find work: 
The spectacle of thousands of young men and women with their school certificates 
roaming about in search of employment or turning to mischief as a means of dulling the 
pain of their apparent rejection is deeply striking.708  
The Council’s Home Industries and Arts & Crafts Centre were meant to absorb their energies. 
Government took over poor relief (leaving the Council’s welfare department to deal with 
matrimonial issues and other casework) but poor relief only served the absolutely destitute. The 
Council’s grant-in-aid to the African Welfare Society helped, but a considerable number of people 
were in distress. The impact was witnessed in family life and the occupation of houses: more 
 
705 Annual report of the Director, 1963/BCCA 
706 Ashton to Town Clerk, 16th November, 1964/BCCA/H7(PP 310; TB 397) - Location home ownership 
scheme - native areas  
707 Town Clerk to Coghlan and Welsh, 19th Oct., 1964/BCCA/H7 (PP 310; TB 397) - Location home 
ownership scheme - native areas [p. 206] 




grown children had to stay at home and households had to take in lodgers, leading to 
overcrowding.  
Nevertheless, demographically, by the end of the 1960s, the ratio of men to women in 
Bulawayo had decreased from a high of about 7 to 1 just after the war, to 215:100,709 and the ratio 
of singles to married couples was 1.7:2.710  In 1959, a fifth of Africans in Bulawayo had been born 
there; by 1969, it was a third.711 Ashton described this as a “more stable and healthy social 
situation.” In a comparison of urban labour situations in Southern Africa in 1968, Bulawayo was 
given favourable mention:  
Differences in policy to labour migration and the degree of residential stability expected 
of its labour force are apparent. In Rhodesia, only in the more progressive African affairs 
administration of the Bulawayo Municipality, has a definite pattern of urban family 
organisation begun to emerge with diverse associational roles.712   
On the 18th March, 1969, Mr C. Hlabangana (MP) became the first African lessee to complete his 
payments and took full transfer of his house.713 The population in general had become more stable 
in this decade.  
 
1969-77: ‘Black spots in the white areas’: National re-
entrenchment of segregation 
 
In 1969, the Rhodesian Parliament repealed the Land Apportionment Act, and replaced it with 
the Land Tenure Act. The Land Tenure Act severely curtailed African rights to own homes in the 
urban areas. It meant that the land upon which the African townships were built – classified as 
‘African’ since 1961 – reverted back to being ‘European’. It also became more difficult to declare 
any areas ‘multiracial’; only a 2% variation in racial land divisions could be made. Now that urban 
areas were declared European again, further provision of freehold tenure for Africans was 
prohibited, and leasehold was curtailed to a maximum 10 years.  However, because numerous 
schemes were already in existence, their home owners’ rights would not be repudiated. But the 
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procedures for any exemption from the new restrictive laws were tightened up, with more powers 
vested in the Minister of Local Government and Housing.   
Ashton called this “the year of the watershed”.714 It was the “most comprehensive degree 
of racial separation that had ever appeared on the Rhodesian statute book”, and a reversion to the 
original conception of African townships as “blackspots in the white areas, as temporary blotches 
that hopefully would one day disappear.”715 He and the Town Clerk were deeply suspicious of 
these new powers vested in the Minister. They anticipated far-reaching effects on urban African 
administration.  
A Ministry of Internal Affairs memo in 1971 stated in no uncertain terms that “the 
African is in the European area solely as a worker”, which meant “any policy which will lead him 
to think that he has any permanent home in the European area” should be disregarded. It argued 
that an African person advanced best in a “tribal atmosphere where his thoughts and actions are 
affected in terms of a general need or want.” To deprive the African of the “tribal blanket,” the 
Ministry argued, was to expose him “to the cold night air of confusion, leading to anarchy and 
revolution”. An African was considered “a product of natural selection suited to his environment 
and to continue his success as a human being, his environment should not be tampered with.”716 
This throw-back to the early colonial attitude reveals the emotional detachment of Government 
authorities from the urban township development scene; it was a shock to the officials and 
councillors in Bulawayo, who over many years had overseen what appeared to be the 
establishment of permanent African communities that were part and parcel of the city. 
Even the Government’s attitude to rental housing was extremely outdated by Bulawayo’s 
standards. As noted in chapter 3, the Government stepped in to Salisbury Council’s aid by building 
a large tied housing scheme called Glen Norah in the 1970s. When something similar was mooted 
in Bulawayo, it was heavily opposed by the African Advisory Board, on the grounds that tied 
accommodation heightened the insecurity of tenants (on losing their job, they would subsequently 
lose their accommodation). Ashton sympathised with their suspicion of what he described as a 
“double calamity, to which no one should be exposed”.717  Furthermore, the Boards argued that 
occupants of tied accommodation would be unlikely to take pride in their homes and gardens. 
Gargett accused the Government of sticking to the policy of tied accommodation, when it was 
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“detested” by Africans, and wrong on principle.718 Ashton called on employers to instead assist 
their trusted employees to acquire their own homes. The Rhodesia Cement Company did this by 
financing the building of houses for 13 of its employees with mortgage bonds, which Ashton 
hailed as a “pioneering breakthrough” and a way to make “a meaningful contribution to African 
housing and the stability of the African townsman”.719  
As the Government began to enforce the Land Tenure Act – in order to restrict new 
African housing developments in urban areas, to move them out to the tribal trust lands, and to 
whittle away tenure rights – Bulawayo’s existing pattern of more integrated township development 
proved exceedingly difficult to change. The Bulawayo Council found itself defending its 
integrationist approach from Government attempts to enforce segregation. Bulawayo continued 
with its policy of converting as many households to home ownership as possible, as requested by 
residents, even of the lower income schemes, such as Mzilikazi, whose Residents’ Association 
asked for conversion of their township to home ownership.720 The Council applied for these 
conversions to the Minister of Local Government and Housing, Bill Irvine, but he asserted that 
he would only approve home ownership in the outlying townships (parts of Hyde Park and 
Luveve), to leave space for industrial growth, and that he would only approve it for high-cost 
housing, so that Building Societies would be enticed to participate.  
In order to clear land for the expansion of industry, the Minister proposed forcing lessees 
to cede their leases to the Council at a fixed property value, converting the leasehold schemes 
back into rental schemes.  Ashton was angry at this misuse of the lease cession clauses, accusing 
the Minister of repudiating the commitments made to leaseholders that they would be able to 
cede freely and also acquire a cession. “If he is not prepared to honour these rights, what guarantee 
is there that he – or his successors – will not repudiate other rights later?” Ashton asked.721  He 
also argued that Africans should benefit from any property value appreciation that might accrue 
from industrial expansion, in the same way as any other property owners would. Finally, he 
pointed out that Africans will wonder why industrial expansion has to be westward, at the expense 
of the African townships. Why could it not be towards the south, south-east or north-east? 
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Is it because existing property values are too great or could it also be due to the political 
strength of these areas? The conclusion will be drawn, rightly or wrongly, that it is not so 
much a matter of equity and justice as political feebleness.722 
Using these points of objection, Ashton suggested the Council should continue opposing the 
minister on both moral and political grounds.723  
The Minister came to Bulawayo to discuss his policies. He stated that he would not allow 
any further leasehold rights in the Bulawayo African Township areas (Mzilikazi, Makokoba, 
Nguboyenja and Barbour Fields). He wanted a line to be drawn, on one side of which home 
ownership would be prohibited. This meant that future home ownership would be confined to 
Luveve and westwards in Hyde Park, far from the city centre and industry. Even the distant 
township of Pumula would not be allowed to expand home ownership.   
The councillors and Ashton were not happy with this.724 Councillor Mrs Castle stated 
that, “Any deviation from the present Council policy of encouraging Home Ownership would be 
detrimental to a settled community.” She stressed that the Council owned land in other areas that 
could be used for industrial development. Councillor Mrs Sharland argued that there would be, 
“a decline in standards because tenants did not give the same attention to a property as would an 
owner.” Councillor Hoyle felt that, “it would be a breach of faith if the Council’s policy was 
altered now”. Alderman Menashe warned that “antagonism would result”. When asked if some 
of various married rental schemes could be converted to 40-year lease, the minister said he would 
consider 10 years at most.725  
Ashton was offended by the minister’s attitude. He commented after the meeting that he 
didn’t like his tone, and did not appreciate being instructed what to do, instead of consulted first. 
He therefore rallied councillors to continue resisting the minister, saying his policies would only 
lead to ill-feeling and mistrust, since, “Already Africans resent the impression they get that they 
are not welcome in the cities and are not considered citizens of the towns in which they live.” 
Ashton felt that, “Home ownership has become a treasured thing in Bulawayo” and this should 
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It was not just exclusive home ownership for the well-to-do that Bulawayo defended. The 
Council promoted a more egalitarian home ownership policy than the Government. In the 1970s, 
Minister Irvine decided to restrict home ownership to high-income groups, hoping to thereby 
entice building societies and private sector investors, and restrict home ownership to houses worth 
a minimum $2250 (if construction was supervised by the municipality) and $3300 (if self-built). 
He wanted to maintain “standards”, and ensure there was a very clear physical separation of home 
ownership schemes from low-income rental schemes. He accused Bulawayo of risking slum 
development by encouraging low-income home ownership.  
Ashton inverted the Minister’s fearmongering about “slum development”, saying that 
restricting poorer people to rental housing would more likely promote slum conditions, since people 
lose the will to maintain their homes when they do not own them. He argued that poorer people 
are “just as proud of their modest homes as people occupying houses twice the value”, and that 
they could build perfectly good houses for less than $2,250, which could then be improved over 
time until they reached the Minister’s “magic figure”.727 
Whilst the minister wanted to dismantle numerically and sociologically important middle 
sections of the population, by “forcing them either upwards into the higher priced home 
ownership or downwards into tenancy”, Ashton argued that, “It is just as important to have a 
stable lower class as it is to have a contented middle class.”728 He therefore defended his policy of 
offering municipal loans to lower income groups who could not afford to build houses to the 
value that building societies required. This would spread capital as far as possible and keep costs 
within the narrow limits that people could afford. Finally, in a letter presented by the Local 
Government Association to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Local Government on 13th 
October, 1975, Ashton argued that home ownership rights are “appreciated, understood and 
valued by a wide range of Africans, not simply by a few of the wealthy and emancipated…It is 
tragic that our own Minister of housing should ignore widespread experience and force this 
retrograde step upon Rhodesian local authorities.”729 The mayor, Eugene Gordon, also 
proclaimed at an LGA conference: “We in Bulawayo pride ourselves that our townships evolved 
from the grass roots. More than 50 per cent of our African houses are home-ownership 
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buildings.”730 He asked that the high building society finance standards be dropped, and that 
medium and low density leasehold be replaced with freehold.731  
Another spat occurred over confusion about the meaning of “home ownership”. Ashton 
promised hundreds of Luveve leaseholders in the 1970s that they would be able to get freehold 
title to their properties after paying off their leases. When the Minister of Local Government and 
Housing, Bill Irvine, discovered this in 1975, he was irate, since freehold was contrary to 
Government policy and had not been approved. It turned out that when approval for “home 
ownership” had been given, Ashton interpreted this as freehold. But the minister only meant 
leasehold. So they were speaking at cross purposes, and several Bulawayo councillors confessed 
that they did not understand what was going on, which “greatly concerned” the minister.732  
Nevertheless, the Council insisted that it now had a moral obligation to grant freehold to 
these Luveve residents as promised. Eventually the Minister “reluctantly conceded” to grant 
freehold title based on moral obligation and the fact that Ashton had already solicited deposits 
from the lessees.733 The Minister was upset at having to acquiesce to this, given his strict policy 
that freehold would only be granted in very rare cases. Whether or not this situation arose from a 
deliberate misinterpretation on Ashton’s part, it clearly shows the confusions born out of ever-
changing policies on African tenure in the urban areas. 
Whilst Ashton diplomatically referred to “good cooperation” with the Minister in his 
annual report, these spats behind the scenes say otherwise. When I asked a former Bulawayo 
Councillor what he remembers of this period, he said, “I do remember that the Minister for Local 
Government was not well thought of in Bulawayo. A Scot if I remember correctly, after one or 
two committee meetings with him the chairman at the time vented his exasperation at the way 
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The final battle: ending racial segregation  
 
In 1975, the Quenet Commission reported on the removal of racial discrimination. Many African 
organisations refused to give evidence to this conservatively orientated commission, deeming it 
futile. As it turned out, the commission did suggest some fundamental changes to the Land Tenure 
Act. But all of these were rejected by the Government.735  Ashton wrote a provocative letter for 
a delegation to present to the Minister of Housing and to the Prime Minister, in which he finally 
defended freehold tenure not for instrumental reasons (to satisfy the African middle class), but 
squarely on the grounds of justice:  
Freehold tenure is firmly established in most Western European communities, especially 
those from which the Rhodesian heritage is drawn... Its denial to Africans is consequently 
regarded by them as a form of racial discrimination…It is no good saying that in many 
parts of the world, including Zambia, properties are held on long leasehold and not 
freehold, and that Africans should therefore be content with leasehold tenure as are 
millions of other people. The point is this argument does not apply to white Rhodesians 
– they have freehold and what is good for them is good for black Rhodesians too… It is 
no good saying that from the practical point of view 99-year or other long lease is as good 
security as freehold…it is irrelevant, because it is discriminatory.736  
It is impossible to know what impact he and others had “from below”. But in August 1976, the 
Secretary for Local Government and Housing conceded that there should be more freehold 
opportunities, but only for high-cost/low-density housing (on stands of 400m2), and clearly 
separate from other lower-cost areas.737 The Bulawayo City Council congratulated him for this.738 
Ashton and the mayor went to Salisbury and met the Minister of Local Government and the 
Prime Minister, Ian Smith, where Smith claimed to be in favour of freehold for Africans, and as 
though it were a throwaway remark, he instructed the minister to sort it out with the 
municipalities. Ashton used this affirmation from Smith to gain leverage in negotiations with the 
Minister thereafter.  
A month later, on the 24th September, 1976, Smith conceded majority rule within 2 years. 
By this point 40% of African families in Bulawayo owned or were in the process of buying their 
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homes. Ashton reported that, “This has contributed considerably to stabilisation of the population 
and to engendering a feeling of belonging to, having a loyalty towards and a stake in the city”.739  
Finally, in early 1977, the Land Tenure Act was amended. This fundamental change to 
racial segregation meant a reversion to the pre-1930 (pre-LAA) situation in the rural areas, where 
land could be acquired and occupied on a non-racial basis, and in the urban areas it did away with 
all the conditionalities pertaining to African ownership of land in multiracial areas, and allowing 
municipalities to open up more residential areas to all races.  In April, 1978 the minister proposed 
declaring certain neighbourhoods in Bulawayo non-racial; he preferred to do this in areas on the 
Western side of town. But the Council objected, saying it only made sense, given the imminence 
of independence, to declare all residential areas of the city non-racial at the same time.740  At this 
moment, the historic struggle by Africans to enjoy the same legal rights to the city as European 
citizens, and the internal bureaucratic struggles waged by the likes of Ashton to at least partially 




After independence, the Chronicle wrote of this period, “While the council accepted the idea of 
home ownership, the central government was not so easy to convince, and so began a series of 
battles, the fiercest following UDI, most of which were won by the council, with Dr Ashton being 
amongst those in the frontline.”741 This chapter has analysed some of those battles, and how they 
hinged on different ideas about the place of Africans in the city.  
 Beginning with a short-lease experiment in a time of crisis, by the end of the 1950s the 
city’s three main schemes had solidified the Council’s reputation as a ‘progressive’ promoter of 
tenure security. The micro-details of provisions and restrictions that applied to leaseholders were 
subject to protracted negotiations, in which ideas about the citizenship status of a home owner 
were revised in light of both practical and ideological considerations. Nevertheless, despite some 
loosening of the strict conditions with regards to employment, liquor brewing etc. that applied to 
renters, the actual experience of home owners remained far from secure – not least because the 
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very constitutional basis of African rights to own urban property was open to interpretation and 
subject to change.  
Nevertheless, the Bulawayo Council strongly defended tenurial security for instrumental 
(political) and later principled (rights-based) reasons, against the RF Government’s attempt to 
withdraw these rights and reconceptualise Africans as essentially tribal, not ready or deserving of 
the citizenship status accorded to Europeans. The ensuing battles between the Minister and 
Bulawayo Council about who should be allowed to own homes and where, revealed a fundamental 





























5. African ‘Participation’ and the Moral 
Imperative to Nurture ‘Responsible’ Township 
Residents 
 
The late colonial state was not just concerned with ensuring stability and contentment in the 
African townships; it also claimed to be equally concerned with improving the township inhabitants, 
by instilling in them a sense of responsibility associated with modern citizenship. This attempt at 
social engineering involved various modes and sites. A commonly studied mode of intervention 
was organised activities in township home craft clubs, community centres, sports organisations, 
etc., paternalistically designed to help African townspeople “transition” from tribal to modern life, 
by instilling in them bourgeois habits and a modern civic identity.742 In Bulawayo, it was the 
African Administration Department’s welfare section, headed by Dr Eric Gargett, that mostly 
dealt with these programmes, taking over a role formerly carried out by church groups.743  
However, another important way to promote individual responsibility was by reworking 
Africans’ relationship to land and property. This was conceived as turning the ‘tribal’ African into 
economic man – more individualistic, financially responsible and entrepreneurial. For example, the 
report of the 1953 East Africa Royal Commission (EARC) was dubbed “Adam Smith in East 
Africa.” It proposed individual land rights and the creation of a disembedded market where 
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“individual actors interact with each other through encounters regulated by contract rather than 
status or personal relationships”. (The Commission failed to recognise the extent to which such 
relations already existed.744) Sir Ernest Vasey, twice mayor of Nairobi, similarly argued mid-
century that sub-economic housing failed to “educate the African in basic economics”.745 
In 1950s Southern Rhodesia, these ideas were taken to rural society through the Native 
Land Husbandry Act. As Alexander explains, this Act “called for a significant ideological shift: 
Africans were no longer to be thought of as communal tribespeople, but as rational individuals 
operating in an impersonal market in the idealised guise of the yeoman farmer and proletarian 
family.”746 Similarly, Munro points out: 
The LHA posited free and equal exchange of property as the key form of social 
interaction, and personal incentive as the basis of personal responsibility with regard to 
occupation, employment and use of land. In effect, this vision linked responsible 
citizenship directly to responsible land use, and responsible land use directly to private 
property. 747 
This attempt to create responsible citizens through a “new pride of ownership” was closely linked 
to the goal of social stability discussed in chapter 4. As a Chief Native Commissioner asserted in 
the mid-50s: it would “ensure a contented and progressive Native” who would “disregard the 
political sirens of the industrial areas”.748   
But the NLHA, ironically, restricted the land market in various ways; it was a “vehicle of 
control rather than a harbinger of rights” and therefore did not give Africans much individual 
freedom, something which even Prime Minister Todd explicitly criticised.749 The NLHA 
provoked huge opposition from African farmers and the Government began to lose faith in its 
high modernist approach. It blamed the failures of the rural modernisation project on Africans’ 
stubborn traditions, and began to reconsider cultural and spiritual connections to land. Thus, 
“Within the space of a few turbulent years, a new orthodoxy had been entrenched in 
Government”.750 This manifested in the Whitehead Government’s adoption of ‘community 
development’ as its new policy framework in 1960. Two years later, the Whitehead Government 
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was toppled in an election where the profoundly segregationist Rhodesia Front party also hailed 
‘community development’ as the best way forward, and won. Thus, community development 
quickly lost its legitimacy in the eyes of African nationalists. As Alexander explains, “by 
underlining the essential difference between the relationship of Africans and Europeans to the 
land”, community development “entrenched territorial segregation”.751 
In Bulawayo, the Council associated property ownership with individual responsibility in 
the same way that the NLHA had done, and presented the townships’ high rates of home 
ownership as a sign of its dedication to creating a responsible African citizenry. The Central 
Government was in step with Bulawayo’s strategy in the 1950s, but the Rhodesia Front 
Government of the 1960s and ‘70s withdrew African rights to own property in the urban areas, 
and therefore had to present alternative modes of African participation in housing. 
Another important area in which Africans were expected to ‘participate’ and learn to be 
responsible, was in urban management. To this end, Bulawayo Council favoured a more 
integrationist “unitary city” model, with Africans either sitting on the mother council or on a 
unified, empowered township advisory board. On the contrary, the RF Government favoured a 
segregationist “two-tier” model, with Africans managing semi-autonomous and fragmented 
townships. Both sides rationalised their policies in terms of giving Africans more responsibility, 
yet their visions of urban development were diametrically opposed. This chapter analyses how 
these disputes about African participation and responsibilisation played out, firstly, in the domain 
of housing, and secondly, in the domain of urban management.  
 
The moral politics around housing finance 
 
African housing finance was always the subject of highly charged battles to shift responsibility. In 
the interwar period, as we saw in chapter two, neither the Bulawayo Council, nor the Government, 
wanted to take responsibility.  In this context, Africans had taken responsibility upon themselves, 
building their own houses, until the Council banned private ownership and wanted Africans to 
rent “proper” Council houses. Yet, the Council failed in its responsibilities to provide proper 
rental housing, and when the Jackson Commission of 1930 pointed this out, the mayor 
hypocritically retorted that Africans should bear some responsibility, saying it was “absurd” that 
“the native population should never have to bear any proportion of the obligations of citizenship”. 





“obligations of citizenship” on them. The acceptance of permanent settlement and greater state 
intervention after 1948 changed this dynamic. 
As we have seen, the Rhodesian Government came to connect individual property 
ownership in the 1950s – both in rural and urban areas – to development and modernisation. 
Lawmakers were still reticent about allowing freehold in the urban areas, however, even after the 
Urban Affairs Commission went to great lengths to explain the desirability of a “property owning 
democracy”, emphasising that, “[I]t is only by giving people responsibility that a sense of 
responsibility can be engendered”.752 The industrialists tended also to appreciate the connection 
between home ownership and a type of moral responsibility that they would value in their 
employees. When the AAD pioneered home ownership in the early 1950s, it received the high 
praises of the president of the Bulawayo Chamber of Industries, Abe Abrahamson.753 In his 
presidential address of 1953, Abrahamson said: 
I would commend to the Africans themselves the home ownership scheme instituted by 
the City of Bulawayo on the Western Commonage [Pelandaba]…It is certainly an advance 
in the achieving of self-help and responsibility. 754  
Whilst Abrahamson was to become a comparatively progressive Member of Parliament, and the 
Minister of Labour and Local Government in the later 1950s, he still espoused the typical opinion 
that subsidised rental schemes gave “no incentive to native labour”.755 The blatant contradiction 
of keeping wages low whilst condemning subsidisation was justified by the claim that Africans 
were ‘unproductive’. Indeed, the low rates of African worker productivity were a matter of 
consternation to employers, and for this reason they had supported the termination of the migrant 
labour system, accepting some of the costs of reproducing a stable labour force in the town that 
would hopefully become more productive. But they still wanted to pay only the bare minimum 
for the survival of this workforce. As Boris Gussman explained in his survey of African living 
conditions in Bulawayo, 1952:  
There are three possible ways of determining wage rates. The first gives the man what he 
is worth, the second gives him what he can obtain by collective bargaining with his 
employer and the third gives him what he is considered to need in order to maintain 
health and decency. In Southern Rhodesia the first method has never been attempted, 
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the second method is out of the question because Trade Union methods are illegal and it 
is, consequently, the third method that is used.756 
The National Native Labour Board decided what “maintaining health and decency” required, and 
African workers had little power to contest this. To be sure, real wages did increase after the war, 
due to changes in the structure of the capitalist economy – including its “qualitatively new man-
power requirements” – as well as greater African militancy in wage bargaining.757 But Africans 
were encouraged to better their lot and take some individual responsibility, not by contesting 
discriminatory labour laws or engaging in wage bargaining, but by becoming more productive 
workers. Consider the mayor of Bulawayo’s reasoning on the matter: 
The answer to the problem of relieving industrialists and other ratepayers of the burden 
of rent, must lie in the increasing productivity of the native himself so that, as time goes 
on, he can take over responsibility for housing himself and his family…758 
However, in a circular logic, property ownership or non-subsidised rental was hailed both as the 
means of inculcating individual responsibility, and as the outcome of individual responsibility. In 
other words, workers were expected to “take some responsibility” by working harder, earning 
more, and buying houses or paying economic rents. But the “sense of value” that stimulated a 
productive work ethic was said to derive from the experience of already owning property or paying 
economic rents. As the mayor put it, home ownership would “give the native some idea of the 
elements of the cost of housing” and in so doing, “help towards this sense of greater 
responsibility”.759  
Thus, Africans faced the unsympathetic injunction to bootstrap themselves out of the 
structural oppression that made their labour so cheap. Anyone who advocated better pay for 
African labourers instead of moral injunctions about hard work and responsibility, was reminded 
that, “Uneconomic labour costs would force enterprise to the wall”.760 Of course, African 
political/TU leaders battled to change these racial economic structures, and in a more tentative 
way, some white liberal groups, including the Bulawayo Action Group, lobbied for the gradual 
dismantling of some of the racially discriminatory legislation that perpetuated this structural 
oppression. 
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An opportunity to learn the “responsibilities of modern life”: home 
ownership and moral improvement in Bulawayo 
 
This section examines how Bulawayo’s home ownership programme was rationalised as a way to 
give Africans an ‘opportunity’ to take on some ‘responsibility’ and thereby improve as citizens. As 
noted, these ideas were circulating around the colonies around mid-century. Ashton was exposed 
to them when he attended a conference of the Institute of Administrators of Non-European 
Affairs of Southern Africa, in 1953. On his return, he reported enthusiastically on an “outstanding 
paper” he had heard by the Union’s Secretary for Native Affairs. The official emphasised “the 
need for the native to become and be treated as an economic person”.761 This meant breaking 
from the traditional attitude that housing and services should be sub-economic, through: 
a. Sale of houses from old sub-economic schemes, 
b. Home ownership, either by municipal or private building, 
c. Provision of site and services, i.e. services sites where natives can put up shacks, until 
such time as they can build proper houses.  
The speaker showed that “careful study of Bantu incomes” had proven that they could afford 
economic housing.762  
Ashton often emphasised that home ownership was not just about relieving the 
municipality of the financial burden of housing, or heeding the wishes of the middle class; it was 
also about instilling an enterprising spirit in people. For example, he spoke himself at a conference 
of administrators in South Africa in 1955, arguing that: 
It gives them a chance of assuming some of the responsibilities of modern life, of looking 
after themselves and doing something on their own. It helps to teach some of the facts 
of housing and an appreciation of costs, and gives an opening to the more active, 
enthusiastic and progressive to improve their position and better their standards of 
housing.763 
He associated self-building with freedom and self-expression:  
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A self-building scheme also gives an owner scope for taste and ambition and an 
opportunity to build what he wants, the way he wants it, and to the limit he can afford.764 
The operative word ‘ambition’ reveals the sense that freedom is to be an active, self-improving 
experience. Following closely the increase in African home owners’ extensions to their properties 
in the 1960s, Ashton was excited to see what he regarded as an enterprising spirit emerging:   
This indicates a growing interest in real estate and confidence in the continuance and 
development of private property as a form of saving and investment. This marks a 
growing acceptance of one of the fundamentals of western economic thought and is a 
basic departure from traditional attitudes towards land and housing.765 
(Whilst here he contrasts traditional attitudes with Western ones, elsewhere he argued that even 
in “traditional” communal tenure systems, Africans always had a sense of their home as their own 
property, like everyone else.766) 
When African home owners in Bulawayo began investing quite considerable amounts in 
home improvements in the 1970s, Ashton regarded this as a “considerable step forward in the 
exercise of self-expression and independence and a welcome participation in this field”767. This 
development of individual responsibility was also seen to promote urban belonging, social 
cohesion and a moral community. Thus, Ashton opined in his annual report of 1973 that whilst home 
ownership certainly helped Council to “share” housing costs with residents, 
More important still is the feeling of security this is generating and the degree of 
participation it is encouraging. People are now beginning to feel, literally, “at home” in 
the urban area and though this does not mean they have severed their rural ties, it does 
mean that they are not the rootless, irresponsible mass that they are sometimes thought 
and said to be. This is producing dividends in stability, development of community spirit, 
and concern with community mores and morals.768 
This reflects, again, the way in which property ownership was seen to address financial, political 
and moral imperatives all at once. Since the Bulawayo Council led the way in African home 
ownership in Rhodesia, throughout the post-war period until independence it was able to take the 
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moral high ground in debates about giving Africans a chance to become individually responsible 
by participating in their own development.  
On the other hand, the segregationist Rhodesia Front Government faced a dilemma in 
this regard. As we have seen, it was much more hostile to Africans buying houses and land in the 
‘white’ towns and cities, and therefore remained extremely ambivalent about the kind of modern 
urban citizen it sought to promote in the African townships. But with limited capital available for 
housing, it did see the financial advantage of enlisting the resources of Africans through home 
ownership. As the Local Government Secretary said in 1969: home ownership would “enlist the 
human and financial resources of the urban African to play his part in improving his 
circumstances”.769 This moral rationalisation – giving Africans an opportunity to improve their 
circumstances – was framed in terms of the “self-help” philosophy of ‘community development’. 
It was somewhat different from the modern individualism that home ownership connoted in 
Bulawayo. Bulawayo’s Senior Welfare Officer, Dr Eric Gargett, worried that the Government 
seemed to think that the “self-help” idea would be regarded as a panacea for all housing problems, 
a way of “getting a quart out of a pint pot”.770  Furthermore, the RF Government’s alleged support 
for African home ownership in the 1960s was disingenuous: as we saw in chapter 4, in 1969 it 
made drastic legislative moves to curtail Africans’ urban tenure rights. 
In the 1970s, the Government determined that only wealthy Africans to whom building 
societies would loan money could buy property, on leasehold not freehold, and on urban 
peripheries, not close to the CBD and industrial areas. In contrast, the Bulawayo Council still 
preferred to be heavily involved in “spreading capital” to as many income levels as possible, with 
strong justifications for allowing as many social strata as possible – not just the elites – to 
experience the pride and emotional investment that property ownership was said to engender. 
These fundamentally different underlying development agendas of the Government and Council 
also shaped their policies on the subsidisation of rental housing and the participation of Africans 
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Subsidised rents and the Services Levy: paternalism or pragmatism? 
 
When it came to rental schemes – which comprised the majority of township housing – a 
protracted dispute arose between the Bulawayo Council and the Government over how rents 
should be subsidised and paid. This dispute was also framed within a moral discourse about giving 
Africans some ‘responsibility’. With its policy from the mid-60s of phasing out subsidisation and 
putting African housing on an “economic footing” in order to entice the private sector into this 
field, the Government tried to take the moral high ground about giving Africans financial 
responsibility. It accused Bulawayo, which supported various types of subsidisation – mostly for 
pragmatic reasons – of “paternalism”. Bulawayo, on the other hand, accused the Government of 
being “sanctimonious” and ignorant of the complexities of housing economics in Bulawayo. 
Subsidisation of municipal African housing and the placement of rent-payment 
obligations onto employers began with the Urban Areas Act, which introduced a ‘pooled rental 
system’, whereby a standard rent was charged for both ‘single’ and ‘married’ accommodation. As 
single housing was much cheaper to construct than married housing, the standard rent for single 
housing was effectively “supra-economic”, and calculated to offset the losses on expensive 
married housing, for which the standard rent was “sub-economic”. In terms of the procedure for 
rent payment: the employer was responsible for paying the rent directly, on behalf of each 
municipally-housed employee, directly to the municipal council. Thus, rent was like a tax on the 
employer in respect of each employee, and the standardisation of rents prevented discrimination 
against married employees. This system balanced the books well at first, but in the 1960s this 
balance was increasingly difficult to maintain. 
Because employers usually paid the rent directly to the municipality’s centralised billing 
system (at township Head offices or the Treasury), the pooled rental system made workers 
dependent on their employers. However, Bulawayo chose to implement a different system, so that 
employees could pay their own rent, and thereby retain their homes after employment, without 
being tied to their employer. For this, it implemented a decentralised and indirect rent payment 
system, involving every employee receiving a rent card. If the employer chose to pay directly, he 
would gather the employees’ rent cards and send them with a cheque to the appropriate township 
administration office. The tenants would then pick up their receipted cards individually. If the 
employer paid indirectly, he would give each employee cash to go and pay his/her own rent at the 
township office (just as the self-employed residents had to do). So each township administration 
198 
 
office kept its own record of tenants and rents.771 Thus, there was still some dependency in that 
the tenant did not receive their rents in wages, but it was not as extreme as for tied 
accommodation. 
This not only aided the administration in terms of its “special rent” system for higher 
standard accommodation, but it was alleged to have wider symbolic value, as Ashton explained in 
his treatise on African administration in 1957. In his typical manner of infusing pedagogical value 
into everyday routine procedures, he argued that the rent card system would positively engender 
in the African tenant “some feeling of proprietorship in his house or lodging.”  Furthermore, the 
ritual of submitting the rent cards was said to turn the township office into “a cheerful place of 
public resort”, ensuring tenants met others in their community and the township staff regularly. 
This “invaluable” sense of community was believed to ease the Superintendent’s main function 
of helping “his people” deal with their personal problems.772 As we will see, this rent card system 
was also cited to rebut Government claims that Africans had no awareness of the costs of housing. 
But whilst this pooled rental system was an effective way to balance the African revenue 
account in the 1950s, it began to shift out of balance towards the end of the decade. In the early 
1950s, the ratio of single to married accommodation had been as high as 7:1, and many bachelor 
units were ultra-low cost “coffin-spaces”. The profits from charging £1 rents for the austere 
bachelor accommodation at Iminyela, Mabutweni and Mshasha had offset the losses on the 
married schemes of Njube, Mzilikazi and Nguboyenja, which also charged the standardised £1 
per unit, yet were about 4 times more expensive to build. But at the end of the 1950s, with the 
austere and rudimentary accommodation at Mshasha being dismantled and most of Mabutweni 
being upgraded and converted to married accommodation (see chapter 3), the surplus from single 
men’s accommodation diminished. This was particularly the case in Bulawayo, because it had 
prioritised married accommodation more than any other municipality. Thus, until the late 1950s, 
there were occasional annual surpluses on the African revenue account, but through the 1960s 
the deficit grew year on year.773  
In 1961, the Council proposed raising the rents for several single and married rental 
schemes slightly above the standardised rent paid by the employer, and to raise the existing 
“special” rents paid by many tenants in slightly better than standard housing at Nguboyenja, 
Mzilikazi and Barbour Fields. The City Treasurer tried to force this in, but Ashton, aware of the 
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extreme sensitivity of rent rises, insisted on further negotiation with the African Advisory Boards. 
The Board members were divided. Almost every scheme was running at a slight loss, i.e. the rents 
were not sufficient to recoup costs of building and interest. This meant that at Njube township the 
Council was losing £17.6.0d per house per year. One Advisory Board member thought it was a 
mistake to have ever charged sub-economic rents at Njube, because now tenants would resent 
any increase.774  Another, Mr Mathee, stated that, “while board members understood the 
economics of housing, it was very difficult to explain it to the average tenant”. In the end, it was 
decided to leave the matter in abeyance, as the Government proposed imposing a services levy 
on industrialists to help with the housing deficit.  
The Services Levy was introduced in 1961, initially set at 3d per week per male employee 
earning less than £22 (later R$44), with female employees exempted. To the Council’s annoyance, 
it was not consulted when this levy amount was decided between Central Government and the 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce.775 At first, housing officials deemed the levy 
administratively tedious and cumbersome. It was yet another source of revenue that had to be 
collected in addition to the rents from employers and special rents from 3,500 tenants. But the 
services levy soon came to be very much appreciated. It provided a vital source of revenue to 
balance the African Revenue Account and to subsidise the African bus service.  
But in 1963, the Government decided that it wanted to do away with the services levy 
and pooled rental system, and consolidate rents into African workers’ wage packets.776 Employers 
supported this because they were unhappy about the rising levy costs (in some municipalities other 
than Bulawayo) and the extra admin involved in paying rents for their employees.  Many African 
employees also supported consolidation, because it would enlarge their wage packets and thereby 
slightly increase holiday and overtime pay (which would be calculated on the enlarged amount). 
Another important incentive for employees was that it would end the unpopular practice of tied 
accommodation that was still so prevalent in areas other than Bulawayo. Thus, these national 
policies were often a response to conditions pertaining in other areas, such as Salisbury, which 
irked the Bulawayo Council. 
In order to justify its new policy, Government officials invoked the trope of ‘individual 
responsibility’: consolidating rent and levy into wages would encourage Africans to “pay their 
way” and not be “spoon fed”, they argued. But Bulawayo was annoyed at having foisted upon it 
policies that were tailored for the conditions prevalent in other cities, notably the capital. The 
Finance Committee chairman asserted that Bulawayo had already done its part in putting housing 
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on an economic footing: “Bulawayo has been in the forefront in promoting home-ownership 
schemes and about 50 per cent of our married houses are being sold on terms which do not 
involve any major subsidy”.777 His point was that Bulawayo could hardly be blamed for spoon 
feeding Africans. Bulawayo’s Town Clerk insisted that Government’s wage consolidation policy 
“stems from some very woolly economic and social thinking”, assuming as it did that lower paid 
employees could afford economic housing of a sufficient standard, which was unfounded. He 
told the councillors in a tone of resignation: “Whether these arguments are sound or not is 
unimportant. What is important is that they are held; even passionately held, in influential quarters, 
so that there is considerable pressure towards changing the present system.”778  
The proposed elimination of the pooled rents and services levy systems were hugely 
problematic for Bulawayo’s AAD, which feared increased administrative costs and an increase in 
bad debts. But the main problem was that it would require complete reorganisation of the rent 
structure, which did not correspond at all to the actual standard of properties. For example, a 
single man in Makokoba would find himself paying £1 a month for his rudimentary dwelling 
space, whilst his married compatriot would pay the same rent for a whole cottage. Thus, 
adjustments would need to be made so that tenants paid rents somewhat more commensurate to 
the standard of accommodation. This abandonment of pooled rents would mean that the built-in 
subsidisation of married accommodation from single accommodation would be eliminated, and 
the African revenue account would rely ever more heavily on the services levy. Alternatively, if 
rents were made “economic” (non-subsidised) then married housing would become unaffordable, 
unless wage levels were substantially increased, which apparently “no one was prepared to 
consider”.779 Ashton explained Bulawayo’s dilemma thus: 
[T]o a large extent we are the victims of our own efforts to improve standards. With 
possibly the finest ratio of married to single accommodation in Southern Africa, 
Bulawayo provides the kind of housing conditions that favour stability and decent family 
life and bears favourably in comparison with any other city in Africa…The old 
subsidisation of married accommodation dependent upon single housing is dwindling 
and we are having to rely increasingly on the Services Levy.780 
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In a confidential report, the Town Clerk warned that the proposal “strikes at the whole basis of 
the Urban Areas Act…It is revolutionary”.781  It did not augur well for some categories of African 
tenant and the health of housing finance, and sparked a dispute between Government and the 
Bulawayo Council that lasted until 1976. In this time, there were hundreds of newspaper articles 
on this services levy question. 
It was particularly the Town Clerk and Ashton who used their clout to rebut the 
Government’s ideological arguments about making Africans “responsible”. They argued that 
scrapping the levy would create a lose-lose scenario for everyone: the employer would end up 
more financially burdened; the municipality would be saddled with bad debts and increased admin 
costs; and tenants would be opposed to paying higher economic rents for accommodation of 
varying standards.782 Acknowledging that the consolidation of rents and the services levy into 
wages was a laudable goal that “all should strive for”, the Town Clerk nevertheless insisted that it 
“cannot be accomplished overnight, or by a dramatic stroke of the pen”.783  Ashton painted a 
picture of a carefully balanced financial ecosystem vulnerable to disturbance, and defended a role 
for the state in preserving this balance, against the Government’s attempt to bring free market 
forces into township housing develpment:  
Some employers have for a long time been urging this move, but though the Council 
does not oppose the principle of individual responsibility for rent payments, it is strongly 
opposed to making the poorest group of employee pay a disproportionate amount of 
rent on minimal accommodation. Economic housing is a laudable objective but it cannot 
be attained until the general level of wages is greatly increased. Moreover African housing 
funds are very delicately balanced. Our efforts to modernise and to provide satisfactory 
accommodation for all classes of urban dwellers demand that this balance should not be 
disturbed.  
By 1965, the Council had managed to convince the Bulawayo Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce that the pooled rent system and services levy should be retained. Having won them 
over, the Council and Chambers of Industry and Commerce formed a united front against the 
Government, threatening that consolidation would lead to “serious results, with thousands of 
Africans spending their increased wages on other things instead of rent, followed by large-scale 
evictions.” In addition to this paternalistic argument, Ashton warned that consolidation would 
lead to rent increases and consequent “alarm and despondency” in the townships which could 
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lead to disturbances. The Bulawayo Chamber of Industries president also said that the services 
levy should not be scrapped until all Africans earned at least £25 a month.784 At this point, other 
municipalities like Salisbury CC also joined in the attack on government.785 
The municipalities won this particular battle on the services levy front, and Ashton 
thanked the minister for dropping the proposal and the Chambers of Industry and Commerce for 
backing the Council in its fight. He praised the principle of “individual responsibility” but 
continued to defend subsidised housing as a “necessary evil”, one that also existed in advanced 
industrial countries. He lamented that,  
The slogan of economic rents is still being bandied about in official and political 
circles…The perpetuation of this unrealistic catchword distracts attention and dissipates 
effort that should be concentrated on solving immediate housing and other 
administrative problems.786  
But the war over rent consolidation continued. Ian Smith wanted to make all African housing 
“economic” to facilitate the entry of private enterprise into the African housing market.787 To that 
end, the Urban Areas Act was amended in 1966 to allow municipalities to charge differential rents 
that corresponded to the different standards of accommodation. The employer would pay the 
fixed standard rent and the employee would pay the differential, and would also be means 
tested.788  But it seems this amendment was never fully implemented. The next step was to try 
once again to consolidate rents into wages. In order to persuade municipal councils of this policy 
which they had earlier rejected, the Minister for Local Government, Mark Partridge, began 
preaching with astounding hypocrisy about the need for them to recognise that social change was 
happening in the African townships, and to stop perpetuating the “paternalistic” practice of 
subsidising housing. This went on for several years. For example, in 1971, he implored Councils 
to recognise that African communities were now “stable”, as though this were a novel insight:  
[S]urveys had shown there was a very real change in the attitudes and philosophy of the 
urban African. There was a marked stability in the population, a diminishing contact with 
tribal lands, a lessening of the social influence of this traditional culture [etc]. 789  
He went on that, despite this stability, Africans nevertheless continued to labour under a 
“subsistence mentality”, which should be broken down through the “progressive phasing out of 
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the remaining paternalistic patterns”, namely pooled rents and the services levy.790 His main 
concern was to entice the private finance to move into the field of African housing, since 
Government and municipalities could not keep up with demand; yet the private sector “cannot 
be expected to move into this field where subsidisation operates.”791 Removing subsidisation was 
therefore a “must”, but it meant wage increases so it could work792, given that the average African 
worker was “not in receipt of what can be termed an urban wage.”793  
But the Minister continued to face strong opposition from a united front of Council and 
Industry in Bulawayo. Whereas the Minister rationalised his policy in terms of the principle of 
‘economic housing,’ the councillors, industrialists and Ashton always emphasised how complex 
the balancing act of housing finance was (they managed to collect revenue of $3 million per year 
with only $100 of bad debts794), and how different categories of worker, especially low-wage 
married workers, would be unfairly affected by consolidation of rents and levy into wages, due to 
all kinds of rebalancing of rents.795  Furthermore, Bulawayo, as usual, had done things differently. 
It had a lower services levy than Salisbury and the other main towns of Rhodesia ($1.30 as opposed 
to $1.95), and it was the higher levy in other areas which had initially sparked industrialists’ ire and 
the Government’s political slogan of ending subsidisation. Bulawayo was therefore annoyed that 
it was affected by policies tailored to other cities’ situations.  
This was argued by the Chairman of the Bulawayo Council’s Finance Committee, Jurick 
Goldwasser, who also happened to be a leading industrialist: 
In Bulawayo, there is a strong consensus in industry, commerce and council, that 
consolidation should not be forced upon us…Salisbury started this hare… If our 
circumstances are different, let us go our own way. Let Matabeleland decide.  
This is where the graphic artefact of the ‘rent card’, mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
became important. It helped Bulawayo Council to defend its system against “paternalism”. Thus, 
Goldwasser argued that  
 
790 Ibid. 
791 Mark Partridge address to Local Government Association, 22nd May, 1973/NAZ/Proceedings of the 
Local Government Association Annual Conference, 1973 
792 ‘African wages must be improved to allow removal of subsidies – Partridge’, The Chronicle, 23 May, 1972 
793 Mark Partridge address to Local Government Association, 14th May, 1973 /BCCA/Proceedings of the 
Local Government Association Annual Conference, 1973, p. 67). 
794 J. Goldwasser, ‘Rent Allowance and Services Levy’, presentation at LGA Annual Conference (Fort 
Victoria, 1973) 
795 ‘Services Levy could force up wages’, The Chronicle, 14th April, 1973 
204 
 
There are very few employees who are not acutely aware of the economic facts of life. 
There is no need to be sanctimonious about this and pretend there is some educational 
virtue in consolidation. 
It was a “flimsy argument” to say that an African would be “more aware of the economic facts of 
life if he paid his own rent entirely”.796 Workers knew their rents were effectively part of the wage 
packet, and the rent card system in Bulawayo was a “documentary reminder” of this.797  
In May, 1975, the Government was finally able to push through with the phasing out of 
the Services Levy by reducing it from $1,30 to $0,30 from July 1975, and eliminating it entirely 
from 1st July, 1976. Municipalities would then need to simultaneously raise rents and service 
charges to balance the African revenue account. Rents were raised in Bulawayo by 75c from 1st 
July, 1975, and by $1,75 from 1st July, 1976. However, low earning employees (less than 
$44/month) would still pay lower rent and would be effectively subsidised by higher earners. 
Therefore, as Ashton pointed out, the whole principle of subsidisation was perpetuated, and 
furthermore Bulawayo would have to find $700,000 to balance the African housing account each 
year.798    
These tensions between City and Government show how disagreements about practical 
solutions to housing finance and how to distribute financial liability, were wrapped once again in 
a moral discourse about making Africans ‘responsible’. In this case, the Government invoked this 
trope to defend its policy of removing subsidisation of any kind, whilst Bulawayo dismissed its 
claims as “sanctimonious”. This also shows the consistent resistance to Government policies from 
Bulawayo, with the Council sometimes even uniting with industry. When it came to giving 
Africans responsibility in urban management, as the following section demonstrates, again, the 
Government and Bulawayo Council had very different policies based on different visions of 





796 J. Goldwasser, ‘Rent Allowance and Services Levy’, presentation at LGA Annual Conference (Fort 
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Conflicting models for African ‘participation’ in urban 
management 
 
Most British colonial urban authorities adopted some kind of system to give Africans “a say”, and 
a chance to become apprenticed in, urban management. Reluctant to give them seats on the 
municipal council, they usually adopted a version of an ‘advisory board’ system, which was 
designed for educated, middle class community leaders to sit on. The Advisory Board system in 
Rhodesia had a chequered and generally pitiful history. However, it took on a particular role and 
significance in Bulawayo. At the same time, Africans were clamouring for direct representation 
on the City Council.  Given that the municipal franchise was always based on owning property in 
a rateable area, this was always problematic, and Africans only first got the municipal franchise in 
1977. However, in the meantime, the Government mooted various policies of fragmenting the 
townships and making them semi-self-governing. This segregationist vision conflicted with the 
preferred unified model of governing in Bulawayo. This section analyses the disputes that ensued 
over these disagreements, and how again they revolved around the rhetorical use of the notion of 
“responsibility”. 
Bulawayo was the first Rhodesian municipality to establish African advisory boards in 
1940. The first Board consisted of 4 elected members from the Location, and 2 appointed by 
councillors. Many early board members were Malawian hotel workers, but they exercised very 
minimal influence over Council policy. In 1951, according to Government regulations, there were 
12 elected members per board, who would hold office for 1 year. In 1954 the second board was 
established for the Western Commonage; a year later this was replaced by three boards: for 
Pelandaba (4 seats), Iminyela and Mabutweni (4 seats) and Njube (8 seats), and in 1955 a board 
was established at Pumula (4 seats).799 And so with each new township, a new board was 
established. All official board meetings were held in the Board Room on top of the African 
Administration Department’s headquarters. Board rooms were also built in some of the 
townships. 
In the 1950s, township businessmen (shop-owners), artisans, clerks and drivers came to 
dominate the boards.800 The first female board member, Selina Lesabe, joined in 1956.801 A 
venerable member of the community, and an employee in the African Administration 
 
799 Urban African Affairs Commission, Bulawayo’s answers to the questionnaire, (1957), p. 73 
800 Ndubiwa, ‘African Participation in Housing Management in Rhodesia’  
801 In 1961 Ashton proposed awarding her civic honours for her long-standing contribution to the township 
community (African admin 1961, pp. 2185 + 2610/BCCA).  
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Department’s Welfare Section (1955-61), Lesabe was a “very active force” in women’s clubs in 
the townships. She was given some civic recognition on retirement.802 
The Boards’ enjoyed varying degrees of legitimacy in the different African townships in 
the 1950s, if election turnout is any indication. Wealthier schemes like Barbour Fields and 
Pelandaba would typically have higher voter turnouts (45%, which was higher than turnout for 
the City Council elections), whereas the single men’s schemes showed barely any interest (0.5%).803 
But most board members had some standing in their communities, even if this did not translate 
into enthusiastic voting.  
Although councils in Southern Rhodesia  and South Africa were legally obligated to seek 
advice from boards on a wide range of matters (and boards could make proposals and consider 
annual estimates of expenditure), the system was generally regarded as unsatisfactory, even by 
European officials.804 Board members often protested at their toothless advisory status. In the 
rest of Anglophone Africa, due to the influence of the British Government, the boards gained 
some executive powers in the 1950s, but not in S. Rhodesia or South Africa. 
The Bulawayo boards experienced an on-and-off turbulent relationship with the Council, 
as well as some bitter in-fighting.805 Although the members discussed the full range of township 
affairs, AAB meeting minutes in the 1950s evince the members’ frequent frustration at their 
impotence with respect to key township policy issues, such as double punishment and evictions 
(see chapter 4). Council often disregarded their advice. For example, in 1952 the members raised 
the issue of poor road conditions in Makokoba. The Board Chairman (a white councillor) said the 
City Engineer was short-staffed and it would be a while before tarmacking could be done. Mr S. 
Juba said this was “unjustifiable” since he had raised the issue 4 years prior. He was asked to 
withdraw the statement or the meeting would be closed. Mr A. Mazibisa said they were tired of 
asking for road upgrading and should perhaps drop the issue; but Dick Masunda said that pursuing 
such issues was what they were there for – persistence was key.806  
During the 1950s, Ashton tried to give the Boards some more hearing and therefore 
legitimacy, for which he received praise from the usually critical Charlton Ngcebetsha: the Boards 
and the AAD had enjoyed “very splendid collaboration”, Ngcebetsha gushed in the Home News in 
 
802 African administration Committee minutes, 3 Oct, 1961/BCCA 
803 Answers to Urban Affairs Commission, appendix B 
804 Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs Annual Conference programme, 1958/BCCA 
805 Charlton Ngcebetsha particularly liked to pick fights, and was cautioned for defaming other members as 
well as councillors a few times. (e.g. Town Clerk to Ashton, 19th October, 1953./BCCA/SO 3 (Transfer 
Box 153) 
806 BAT Advisory Board meeting minutes, 17th Jan, 1952 
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1958, “mainly because of the right man at the head of the Department.”807 Ashton constantly 
tinkered with the Board system to give it additional powers. 
But Africans and European officials alike recognised the inadequacy of the Advisory 
Board System.  The Rhodesian Government and Bulawayo Council increasingly recognised, in 
the late 1950s, the need to involve urban Africans more directly in urban management.808 There 
were two ways to do this – one integrationist and one segregationist. The first ‘unitary city’ model 
meant extending the municipal franchise to African residents and offering them seats on the 
‘mother council’; the second two-tier model would retain the (all-European) mother councils and 
introduce separate semi-autonomous African councils for each township, which would acquire 
some executive powers but still be subordinate in various respects to the mother council. 
Bulawayo favoured the first approach, the Government and Salisbury the second.  
Both systems raised tricky questions: for the integrated model, how would the Council 
ward system (whereby European neighbourhoods were grouped into wards, each returning 2 
councillors) work in the African townships? Traditionally, only property-owning ratepayers were 
enfranchised. The strange exclusions of the Land Apportionment Act meant Africans in urban 
areas could not own property on freehold until the 1960s, and even then it took many years before 
any sizeable number did so. For the separate development model: how would the autonomous 
African township authorities coordinate with the mother council? Would they end up in 
competition? And was it even feasible for townships comprising a few hundred houses and a 
handful of shops to be financially independent?  
Already in the mid-50s, the government considered introducing autonomous councils at 
Mpopoma and New Highfields, whereby a “class of African property owners” in these schemes 
would pay rates to ‘native councils’, who would contract services from the European municipality 
(the two-tier model). This system of “responsible local government” for urban Africans would 
“not only provide an outlet for the more educated Africans, but should also make the African 
more self-reliant”.809   
But the first serious national discussion on how to give Africans more say in the 
management of their urban affairs came with the 1958 Urban Affairs Commission. The 
Commission believed that gradual integration into the mother council should be the ultimate goal, 
 
807 Home News, 1 January 1958, in Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 186 
808 Meanwhile, a significant change in local government administration in the rural areas came in 1958, with 
the establishment of ‘Native Councils’ to whom various responsibilities, including raising funds, were 
transferred from European officials of the Native Affairs Department. This was hailed as the “ending of a 
long period of ‘paternalistic’ government.” (Wits Historical Papers/AD1715/27.3.12/Rhodesian Institute 
of African Affairs monthly bulletin no. 18, Dec 1957 and Jan 1958.) 
809 The Chronicle, 19 February, 1955 
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but that the time was not yet ripe for full representation of all African residents. Rather, African 
Advisory Boards’ decision-making powers should be increased, and members should sit on 
municipal councils’ finance and African administration committees.810  
Ashton wrote a comprehensive account to the Urban Affairs Commission of his ideas 
about African participation in urban management. He had serious objections to the segregationist 
two-tier model811  
[U]rban Africans are, more and more, becoming part and parcel of the whole urban 
community, and are much closer to their European fellow citizens, with whom they share 
the same basic problems of housing, recreation and employment than they are to Africans 
in the rural areas. All town dwellers have a wide sphere of common interest, and it is not 
easy to separate the interests of different sections of the community. If the principle of 
integration is to be accepted, there must be a gradual venture under a single and not dual 
control – there must be one authority, and that not central government, so that the 
transition can proceed gradually and smoothly.812 
This was to be the basis of Council policy – an integrated city under a single mother Council, 
resisting Government interference. Without going so far as to call for direct representation for 
Africans at this time (1957), the Bulawayo Council submitted to the Government its plan of 
delegating more and more powers to the African Advisory Boards on an increasing scale as they 
gained experience. However, its “prodding” received no response from Government.  
Meanwhile, there was pressure “from below” for direct representation. The Mpopoma 
Leaseholders’ Association and Mpopoma Advisory Board collaborated to put pressure on 
Council. Ashton also reported that he had noticed some talk about these issues amongst the 
African community, and especially in the African Home News and African Daily News. He 
complained to the Town Clerk that the Government had not given due consideration to Africans’ 
desire for direct representation: “The major issue has not been faced. Would it not be a good 
thing all round to do so?”813  
 
810 Gargett, The Administration of Transition, p. 175.  A distinction was made between the power to 
execute/implement things, and the power simply to decide. The first required a civil service, but the second 
merely meant the board’s advice would be automatically heeded in certain matters. 
811 One of them was that in partly managing their own townships, Africans would be tempted to act 
corruptly, unless and until they were paid significantly more than at present. But more importantly, he did 
not like the idea of a fragmented city where the autonomous townships would be more answerable to the 
Government than the municipality. This was the centralised South African approach which he repudiated. 
812 Answers to the Urban Affairs Commission, Appendix B, p. 9. 
813 BCCA/L2/78. Local Government Bill. p. 63 
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Ashton consulted lawyers to ascertain the legality of creating wards out of the African 
townships814, whereupon he was advised that this should, theoretically, be possible. His proposal 
was to give African home owners “ratepayer” status, thus granting them the Municipal franchise 
in the ordinary way. For rental townships, he proposed creating elected Councils with delegating 
powers, similar to a system in Kenya.815 All of this would require new legislation and new financial 
calculations. The basic problem was that the Municipal Act did not apply to the African areas, 
which fell under the Land Apportionment Act and the Urban Areas Act. Ashton therefore proposed 
that the Municipal Act should be amended to enable a new system of African direct 
representation.  
In the meantime, concerned by the growing urgency of the matter, Council resolved on 
3rd July, 1960, to delegate various executive powers to the Advisory Boards as an interim 
measure.816 The Monckton Commission of 1960 then went further than the Urban Affairs 
Commission, arguing that limiting the municipal franchise to European ratepayers was inadequate. 
Africans should be enfranchised and should be able to stand for elected office on urban councils. 
In 1960, due to the Government’s non-responsiveness on the issue of direct representation, the 
Council resolved (3rd July) to give the African Advisory Boards various executive functions and 
powers. The Bulawayo boards were the only ones to work closely with the Council in preparing 
capital estimates for African administration.817 In 1961, Ashton convinced Council to let board 
members elect their own African vice-chairman, instead of a European councillor being 
appointed.818 He also suggested the press should be admitted to board meetings.819  
The Whitehead Government introduced a Local Government Bill in that same year, 
promoting autonomous townships, run by ‘Local Government Boards’.  This was not what the 
Bulawayo Council favoured. The Town Clerk, Eddie White, complained in a confidential report 
that it would “carve up the Municipality into black and white autonomous areas”; it would “lead 
to the severing of the Municipal limbs”. He likened this political separation to the bantustans of 
the Union of South Africa, which, unlike in Bulawayo, were geographically removed from the 
European towns. Given “the Government’s avowed intention of abrogating the Land 
Apportionment Act”, White was confounded by this Bill’s promotion of ‘separate development’.  
 
814 Ashton consulted John Stirling of Coghlan and Welsh, in September, 1960. BCCA/L2/78. Local 
Government Bill. p. 64 
815 BCCA/L2/78. Local Government Bill. p. 63 
816 Ashton annual report, 1960/BCCA 
817 Passmore, Local Government Legislation in Southern Rhodesia, p. 20 
818 African Administration Committee minutes, 27th Feb, 1961/BCCA 
819 African Administration Committee minutes, 8th Nov., 1961/BCCA 
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The Government was at pains to present the Bill as non-racial, saying it was equally 
applicable to undeveloped European townships on the urban periphery as well. But the town clerk 
disputed this: “There is no doubt that it has been designed principally to deal with African 
townships, despite its non-racial flavour”.820 He went to Salisbury for what turned out to be “a 
whole day of argument” with Government officials and other municipal representatives. He was 
shocked by officials’ ignorance of the Bill’s actual contents – none of them had a good overview 
– and their statements frequently contradicted clauses in the Bill. After some probing, the Town 
Clerk ascertained that the Bill envisaged almost full autonomy for the townships.  
Reporting back to his Council, White described Bulawayo as being in “a battle with the 
Government”, lamenting that, “this duality will cause no end of harm and trouble…”  
It will be a perpetuation of the policy of separation which has given rise to so much 
bitterness and hatred. It will set up an enclave of people who believe that they have been 
fobbed off with something inferior; that they do not belong to the town and that they are 
only of any use to the white man to help him to make money for the economy of his 
white city. Above all it deprives them of that human factor – “a sense of belonging”. I 
cannot see it working in an alleged multi-racial society…821 
This was surprisingly integrationist language for someone who later joined the Rhodesia Front. 
But we should not interpret his views purely in terms of political ideals, for they were also 
pragmatic. Whilst the Town Clerk publically expressed his concern that the Bill “evades the vital 
issue of direct African representation” and “makes a mockery of so-called partnership”822, he also 
warned in a confidential report that it would require the municipality to relinquish “vast assets” 
(buildings and services) to the proposed Local Government Boards of each township, and that 
these boards would be able to specify trading rights and hours in competition with the city, which 
could be “detrimental to established interests”.823 It would “unwittingly set up autonomous bodies 
in competition with the economics of towns as they exist”, which he perceived as a grave danger. 
Furthermore, the Bulawayo Council was deeply concerned, as always, about threats to its 
autonomy. White warned that the Bill would usurp the Council’s power over its African 
townships, which should be resisted, since “past experience” had shown that Government would 
pay mere lip-service to consulting the Council before interfering in the townships. 
 
820 The TC in a confidential report, 17th October, 1960/BCCA/L2/78. Local Government Bill 
821 BCCA/L2/78. Local Government Bill. [p. 131] 
822 Town Clerk report of 13th September, 1960 to delegates to the Municipal Association Executive Meeting, 
19th September, 1960/ BCCA/L2/78. Local Government Bill. [p. 136] 
823 Confidential report, 17th October, 1960/BCCA/L2/78. Local Government Bill. p. 137 
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It is interesting how Bulawayo Council officials spoke of the townships in an almost 
sentimental language of inclusion. The town clerk lamented how the Townships Bill would turn 
the townships into “enclaves working out their own destiny, security and evolution apart from 
the main town where they work and have their economic being”, whereas, “Normally one would 
regard these townships as being part and parcel of Bulawayo, leading eventually into their 
incorporation into the Municipal area and their representation on the City Council”.824 As in so 
many areas of African affairs, the capital city took a different tack. The Bulawayo council noted 
how, “Salisbury, almost all on its own, believes that the Bill can work…but is somewhat horrified 
at the financial aspects.” 825   
Salisbury and Bulawayo were always the two dominant voices with most voting power in 
the Rhodesian Local Government Association (LGA)826, and they often sparred in that forum, 
with Salisbury begrudging any loss of influence. On the Townships Bill issue, two much smaller 
local authorities – Marandellas and Fort Victoria – rallied behind Bulawayo, with the Secretary of 
the Marandellas Town Management Board writing to Eddie White that the Bill “can result only 
in chaos”. He therefore suggested that Bulawayo, Marandellas, and Fort Victoria should unite 
behind the back of the LGA, and “renew the attack against the Government policy”.827  
But in the end the Bill was passed in 1961, with Bulawayo complaining that everything it 
had opposed in the Bill was retained, and so in a spirit of resignation, the Town Clerk decided 
that, “as the Bill is now an Act there is no point in labouring this aspect…What now remains is 
for the Council to decide what attitude it intends to take towards its implementation”.828 It turned 
out that the Council’s attitude was obstinate; it never implemented the Bill, but instead continued 
to pursue its own agenda of direct representation for Africans.  
As for the Advisory Boards, they also opposed the Bill. At this point the Boards were 
dominated by political figures; every member was a nationalist.829 Whilst they sought more 
executive power, which the Bill would have accorded them, they opposed this policy of splitting 
the African urban communities off from the parent city. They claimed it entrenched racial 
segregation, and furthermore they hadn’t been consulted during the drafting of the Bill. This 
stance differed from Salisbury’s African Advisory Boards. At a conference of all the African 
 
824 Ibid.  
825 Ibid.  
826 Also known as the Municipal Association. 
827 Marandellas Town Management Board to The Town Clerk, Bulawayo, 4th Feb, 1961. BCCA/L2/78. 
Local Government Bill. p. 69 
828 BCCA/L2/78. Local Government Bill. p. 19.  
829 Palley, The Constitutional History, p. 631. Some members were also municipal employees, which caused 
controversy, not only amongst councillors and residents but also within the boards. (BCCA/African 
Administration Committee minutes, 8th November, 1961, p. 2413). 
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Advisory Board and Residents’ Association members from across the country in 1962, when the 
Bulawayo delegates proposed a motion to integrate the African townships rather than separate 
them, they faced strong opposition from Salisbury. Salisbury’s AABs were divided, with Harari 
township favouring integration and New Highfields requesting autonomy.830  
Bulawayo’s African leaders kept their eyes on the main prize: acquiring seats on the all-
European City Council. Bulawayo Councillors had proposed this at a Municipal Association 
conference in 1961, for which the Mpopoma Advisory Board expressed “deep appreciation.”831 
In 1962, the Advisory Boards decided to send a delegation to the BCC to negotiate direct 
representation. They were offered 4 seats on the Council (out of a total of 16). To the Council’s 
surprise, the African delegates responded by demanding 20 seats (more than at that time existed) 
as a fairer representation of the city’s demographics.  Since the Municipal Act allowed only 24 
seats to a Council, acceding to this request would have given a significant majority to Africans. 
Consequently, the councillors asked the African delegates to moderate their demands, but 
deadlock ensued.  
In November, 1962, the Minister of Local Government and Native Affairs came with his 
secretary to informally discuss this whole issue with the Bulawayo City Council. He accepted that 
there could be no uniform policy; every municipality would have to figure out its own plan – 
whether to pursue integration, or separation/autonomy for the townships. The Bulawayo Council 
said there was no time for such a long-winded process, and direct representation was a matter of 
urgency. It set up a panel of inquiry, which devised a way to incorporate the townships into the 
municipality as housing areas, which would be subject to different rating, tariffs and by-laws from 
the rateable area where Europeans lived. The franchise would be based on the concept of responsible 
occupancy of prescribed property, with careful definitions of “occupier” and “immovable property”.832  
The newly defined municipal area would be divided into 12 wards returning two 
councillors each, with the wards delineated according to a weighting of residential property 
value.833 This system would have returned 8 seats to Africans. But the Panel’s proposals were a 
non-starter, as the right-wing Rhodesia Front had just come to power in December 1962 on a 
platform of halting all integrationist policies. The question of direct representation for Africans 
 
830 In any case, to both requests the Government did not respond. (Ndubiwa, ‘African Participation in 
Housing Management’, p. 77) 
831 Council Meeting minutes, 7 February 1962/BCCA 
832 Representation in Local Government Area under the Jurisdiction of the City Council of Bulawayo (City 
of Bulawayo, Report of the Panel of Inquiry, Feb. 1963. Mimeographed), in Passmore, Local Government 
Legislation, p. 8 and Palley, The Constitutional History, p. 651 
833 Passmore, Local Government Legislation in Southern Rhodesia, pp. 8-9 
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on the “mother” council was therefore put on ice, and so began a long battle between City and 
Government over integrated versus separate political development for urban Africans.  
Various commissions – such as the Peterson Commission of 1962, and the Lloyd Panel 
of 1963 – proposed different forms of African participation without actually giving them direct 
representation.834 And so Bulawayo councillors had no option but to learn from elsewhere how 
direct representation could work. Therefore, Ashton and the town clerk, medical officer of health 
and city treasurer went south and visited Benoni835, which was one of the few towns in South 
Africa that had a separate local authority for Africans – what was called an “urban Bantu Council” 
– for an area called Daveyton.836 They were impressed by its civic centre, sports stadium and 18-
hole golf course, but this did not make them more amenable to the separate development idea. 
As the town clerk argued, Bulawayo’s geography was much more integrated than that of South African 
cities. In the end, however, their plans for African seats in the Council never materialised as it 
contradicted the Rhodesia Front’s policies. 
With this failure to acquire seats on the Council, as well as failure to prevent another rent 
increase to offset deficit on the revenue account (see above), all 38 members of Bulawayo’s 6 
advisory boards unanimously chose to disband the boards in 1964. As one African businessman 
told the Chronicle, “The African wants direct representation, and that does not mean in an 
advisory capacity”.837 At this time, only one of Salisbury’s three boards was functioning. 
Rhodesia’s advisory board system was in a sorry state. Claire Palley argues that, 
Bulawayo, of all Southern Rhodesian municipalities, gave most encouragement to the 
Boards, consulting them closely on the framing of estimates and accepting Board 
recommendations on details on the estimates. The failure of the Boards must be 
explained on political grounds.838 
In response to this decision, Ashton displayed his vision for gradual integration, and his 
conception of the boards as a form of African apprenticeship as much as representation: 
To those who believe gradual integration offers the best long term solution to our 
political problems, this outcome of all earlier negotiations has proved a great 
disappointment…Time alone will judge its wisdom. But its adoption has for the time 
 
834 E. Gargett, ‘Welfare Services in an African Urban Area’, p. 174-175. 
835 As well as Germiston, Pretoria and Johannesburg 
836 ‘City Team on SA Visit’ The Chronicle, 12 May, 1965 and ‘Delegation returns from SA’, The Chronicle, 15 
May, 1965.  
837 ‘Africans complain they have no voice in local government’, The Chronicle, 16th Sep. 1964 
838 Palley, The constitutional history, p. 670 
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being put “paid” to orderly African advancement, and to immediate African 
apprenticeship in the problem of Local Government.839 
Meanwhile, the Government kept reviving and shelving the idea of semi-autonomous, self-
governing African townships. This was couched within the Rhodesia Front’s broad policy 
framework of ‘community development’, namely:  
plac[ing] responsibility for decision-making in local affairs on the freely chosen 
representatives of responsible people at the community and local government levels, and 
to assist people to acquire the attitudes, knowledge, skills and resources required to solve, 
through communal self-help and organisation, as wide a range of local problems as 
possible in their own order of priority.840 
The semi-autonomous townships would give an opportunity for urban Africans, whom the 
Minister of Local Government vividly described as in a state of moral confusion – “uprooted 
from his traditional social order based on a communal way of life” – to nurture community spirit 
and take on some responsibility.841 As noted in the last chapter, Ashton and others suspected that 
community development was a thinly veiled form of apartheid and a gimmick, arguing that it was 
“no new arrival” and “unfortunately it has become something of a political philosophy instead of 
simply a sensible administrative attitude…”842 He noticed how it had “so far stultified 
development rather than promoted it”, and promoted Bulawayo’s administrative philosophy 
instead: 
Here in Bulawayo, within the limits of practical possibility, the Council has done its 
utmost to run the African Townships not merely as a housing scheme for city labourers, 
but as a real home and a place where its people can realise the maximum of their human 
potentiality. It has always been sensitive to the views of the residents themselves, and has 
encouraged them to come forward with constructive schemes for the improvement of 
their suburbs.843  
The Ministry of Internal Affairs defended community development as non-racial, asserting that it 
was merely an attempt to apply social scientific knowledge to administrative problems.844 It took 
credit for helping Africans to “help themselves”. Yet the powers being offered to these 
 
839 Annual report of the director, 1964/BCCA 
840 Prime Minister’s Directive of 1965, paragraph 7, quoted in Minister’s speech to LGA, 26th May, 
1975/BCCA/H7c, p. 104 
841 ‘Govt. will encourage local authorities in African townships’, The Chronicle, 31 Aug, 1967.  
842 Annual report of the director, 1963 /BCCA 
843 Annual report of the Director, 1964 /BCCA 
844 Passmore, Local Government Legislation in Southern Rhodesia, p. 8 
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autonomous township councils were extremely circumscribed. Ashton said the Government’s 
proposals “suffer from the same built-in flaw that they are too timid and circumscribed and so 
fail to catch the imagination and interest of those who could play a significant part in this field.”845 
The Minister justified these circumscribed powers on the basis that, “[T]he African must learn to 
walk before he can run, and any suggestion of this sort of representation cannot possibly occur 
until he can prove that he can run his own township.”846 Each side accused the other of not giving 
Africans enough responsibility. 
Interestingly, several African parliamentarians pushed hard to have this segregationist 
policy implemented. Mr Josiah Gondo complained of much talk and no action. Mr P. Rubatika 
argued that, “The Africans found dignity in separate identity” and “would like to see areas like 
Highfield and Harari ultimately with their own councillors and mayors”.847 Salisbury City Council 
was also in favour848, and by 1966 it proposed converting Harari – the only Salisbury township 
with an advisory board – into the country’s first autonomous African urban area.849 By contrast, 
a Bulawayo MP and former mayor argued that if the advisory board system worked better in 
Bulawayo, then Bulawayo should be allowed to retain and enhance it.850  
As the parliamentary debates became more heated, even the African members who 
supported separate autonomous townships endured condescending remarks from European RF 
members, who felt they expected too much autonomy. Mr I. Samuriwo (UPP) insisted that, “We 
want to decide what to do with our own townships”, to which Mr D. Divaris (RF, and also a 
Salisbury Councillor) retorted, “They are not your own townships”. Mr B. Ponter (RF) asserted 
that, “as a race and as a people they have not enjoyed the experience of the art of government at 
any level”. Mr R. James (RF) accused the Bulawayo Council of “irresponsible” behaviour, for 
having offered council seats to Africans in 1962, which he described as “a time when the Bulawayo 
council was very liberal, almost Communist”. 851   
Meanwhile, back in Bulawayo in the mid-60s, Jimmy Ncube, a clerk in the Housing and 
Amenities Department,852 was “working behind the scenes trying to resuscitate the boards”.853 
 
845 Annual Report of the Director, 1967, para 12/BCCA 
846 ‘Policy on Township Boards outlined’, The Chronicle, 3 August, 1967 
847 ‘Municipal Bill may be applied to cities – Partridge’, The Chronicle, 30th August, 1968 
848 (following a year-long inquiry into the matter and secret talks with the minister (‘Council has secret plan’, 
Chronicle, 26th October, 1965)). 
849 ‘Self-rule plan for African townships will be put to minister today’, The Chronicle, 16 March, 1966 
850 ‘Govt. will encourage local authorities in African townships’, The Chronicle, 31 Aug, 1967. [Local Govt. 
2, p. 35] 
851 R. F. James to the House of Parliament ‘Gondo pleads: drop advisory board system’, The Chronicle, 24th 
August, 1967.  
852 As the African Administration Department was then called (1963-75). 
853 Interview with Jimmy Ncube, Bulawayo, 1st March, 2017 
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But this took 4 years. In 1967, Ashton noticed that some interest in the advisory boards was 
rekindled amongst “the older, conservative element in the population”, whom he praised for 
“risking public odium by standing for election”.854 But only in 1968 did the boards finally 
resurrect. Ashton reported this as, “Perhaps the most important single event of the year”.  
When the Boards were resuscitated, they decided to unite as one Board with 20 seats for 
all of Western Bulawayo – called the Joint Townships Board – and between 1969 and 1974 the 
Council only over-rode one Board recommendation (on a key rent issue again). Dauda claims that 
this made Bulawayo “the only urban area that gave boards legitimacy by accepting most of their 
recommendations.”855 The “almost automatic” acceptance of the Joint Board’s proposals gave it 
de facto powers of approval over most everyday administrative policies. Dabengwa believes the 
Boards were considered legitimate: “They were legitimate. You can’t run away from that. But I 
think your question should be: were they effective?”856  Indeed, many found the Joint Board 
system still woefully inadequate, including department officials such as Gargett.857  
In contrast to Bulawayo’s clear rejection of semi-autonomous townships, and choice to 
empower the Boards instead, Salisbury seemed to sit half-heartedly on the fence. Its advisory 
board system was all but defunct by the 1970s, according to Chitofiri.858 In June, 1971 the first 
semi-autonomous African local authority was established at St Mary’s township, which was 12 
miles south of Salisbury CBD.859 By 1972, Minister Partridge proclaimed that he would introduce 
10 of these local authorities by the end of the year as part of “community development”. He was 
now calling them “Township Boards” instead of Local Government Boards.860 These boards 
would focus on social problems and take responsibility for minor local services, but all engineering 
services would remain outside their remit.861 But there is evidence that there was disagreement 
about this policy, not just between Councils and Central Government, but even within the Central 
Government. The Ministry of Internal Affairs did not like the Ministry of Local Government’s 
whole Township Boards idea. It preferred to establish African Councils under the African 
Councils Act, which would mean that “tribal leaders” – chiefs and headmen from surrounding 
areas – would rule in the townships.862 
 
854 Annual report of the Directory, 1967, para. 11/BCCA 
855 C. Dauda, Meeting the Requirements of a New Localism: Local Government in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of 
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857 E. Gargett, The Administration of Transition, p. 163. 
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Nevertheless, by 1975, Partridge’s policy was under way, with Township Boards in 
Marandellas, St Mary’s, Bindura, Norton, Umvukwes, Shabani, Chipinga and Amandas, and 
proposals to create them in Fort Victoria, Que Que, Umtali and Salisbury’s Kambazuma. In 
Bulawayo, however, they were conspicuously absent. Partridge’s successor, Bill Irvine, continued 
to drive this policy, which was clearly designed not just to encourage African apprenticeship in 
the art of governance, but also to offload responsibility. As Irvine explained: “At present, any time 
anything goes wrong in one of the townships, it is the European who is blamed. I believe it is high 
time that the African should be put in the position of proving whether he can do better…”863  
The Bulawayo Council, under the influence of Ashton and the African Advisory Boards, 
continued to resist the system. Ashton advised the Minister of Local Government that “there was 
no reason to suppose that the Africans would support the idea of having individual township 
boards for the different townships” in Bulawayo, especially since it had the country’s most 
effective and unified Joint Townships Advisory Board by this time. He asked the Minister to 
maintain direct contact with himself and his department (i.e. to bypass the Bulawayo council). 
The Joint Townships African Advisory Board rejected the Minister’s two-tier approach, 
preferring a unitary ‘one-city’ model to a fragmentation of the townships. The minister came to 
Bulawayo and the Councillors and Boards sat together in the council chamber for the first time 
ever. They were united in defying the minister.864 Thus, forming a united front, Ashton and the 
Boards claimed to have the backing of the African residents in rejecting separate development. 
Ashton then asked rhetorically why direct representation on the mother Council was not allowed. 
But he knew this was “contrary to Government thinking”.  
Under pressure to adopt the Government’s two-tier policy, Ashton argued that it would 
not work unless there was one board for the whole township area (instead of boards for each 
township), with wider powers than heretofore proposed. Ashton was also loathe to allow undue 
Government interference in Bulawayo through its township boards policy, warning the Local 
Government Minister to “accept the bona fides of Council’s officials and not insist on bringing 
its own people into the townships”.865 The Minister rejected his call to create one board and confer 
more powers on it. He chastised Bulawayo for not giving Africans governing responsibilities in 
their own townships, and Bulawayo chastised the Government for not allowing Africans to sit on 
the mother Council itself – which was the ultimate position of responsibility. As independence 
became imminent, Bulawayo was the only City Council in 1979 to unequivocally endorse a unitary 
 
863 Minister’s speech to Local Government Association, 26th May, 1975. BCCA/H7c [p. 107] 
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model of local government, rather than the two-tier model, by merging its experienced Joint 
Advisory Board with the Council. Although this unfairly favoured whites, and on this basis was 
heavily criticised by Sidney Malunga of the Bulawayo Progressive Residents’ Association866, it was 




This chapter examined how the Bulawayo Council and the Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing rationalised their respective policies on African ‘participation’ in housing and local 
government in terms of affording the detribalising African an opportunity to practice and acquire 
the ‘responsibilities’ of modern citizenship. The Bulawayo Council was able to present its 
extensive home ownership programmes as evidence of its enlightened recognition of Africans’ 
need to learn about “economic value” and the “responsibilities of modern life”. The 
comparatively liberal Governments of Todd and Whitehead between 1953 and 1962 gave verbal 
and material support to Bulawayo’s efforts – which mirrored the encouragement of a responsible, 
property-owning rural citizenry through the Native Land Husbandry Act. However, the 
segregationist RF Government became hostile to Africans owning property in the urban areas, as 
it sought to re-establish them as white spaces, in which Africans should reside merely as workers 
on sufferance. It was therefore ambivalent about the type of responsible citizen it wished to 
promote in the urban areas, and from the 1970s it was clear that only a privileged wealthy few 
would be allowed to become propertied citizens.  
Meanwhile, in the domain of rental housing, the Government increasingly sought an end 
to subsidisation of any kind, seeking to place African housing on an economic footing to remove 
barriers to private finance entering this field. This policy was rationalised as encouraging Africans 
to fully ‘participate’ in their housing and thereby become more financially responsible. Bulawayo 
was accused of being paternalistic, for defending pooled rents and the industrial services levy for 
pragmatic reasons (administrative efficiency, preventing bad debts, and maintaining the delicate 
financial equilibrium of its rental schemes). But the Bulawayo Council managed to win over the 
support of the city’s leading industrialists, launching a counter-attack on the Government for 
being muddled by “woolly economic thinking”, ignorant of local economic realities, misguided in 
its application to Bulawayo of policies that were tailored more to Salisbury’s situation, and 
generally sanctimonious about its claims to responsibilise Africans. Further in its defence, the 
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Bulawayo Council pointed to its unique ‘rent card’ system as proof that its workers were well 
aware that their rents were taken automatically out of their wage packet, i.e. they were already 
“acutely aware of the economic facts of life” and did not need to be further educated on the 
matter.  
When it came to proposing models of local government that would enable Africans to 
participate, Bulawayo favoured either some limited African representation on the ‘Mother 
Council’, or a united, empowered Advisory Board, in which township leaders would be 
apprenticed in urban management. The RF Government, on the other hand, proposed a 
segregationist vision of semi-autonomous townships, in accordance with its ‘community 
development’ agenda, and claimed that this would give Africans more responsibility. Ashton and 
the Town Clerk portrayed the Government’s model as a “severing of the municipal limbs”, 
claiming in sentimental language that, “Normally one would regard these townships as being part 
and parcel of Bulawayo”. Of course, there were pragmatic reasons for Bulawayo’s preferences, 
too. If the townships were autonomous the municipality would lose vast assets; furthermore, 
Ashton found the Boards administratively useful as a way to deflect the demands of the RAs, or 
alternatively as a way to obstruct authoritarian moves by state officials, by claiming fastidiously 
that the Boards needed to be consulted first.   
These battles about African participation in housing and urban management, show how 
the powerful moral notion of ‘responsibility’ could be used to rationalise fundamentally different 
visions of urban development. Bulawayo envisaged a more integrated city with heavy municipal 
involvement in development. The RF Government envisaged a segregated city with the state 
retreating from its role in financing housing wherever possible. Their different underlying visions 
reflected not just deep ideological disagreements but also different pragmatic concerns. In these 
battles, local state agents held their own, challenging top-down policy directives, as being 




















































6. Municipal Beer Gardens and the 
Contradictions of Promoting Drinking for 
Development 
 
Colonial urban authorities obsessed about Africans drinking alcohol. They were concerned about 
the type of alcohol they drank, the effects it had on them and their communities, and where they 
drank it. Beer drinking was integral to most Southern African societies in pre-colonial times. It 
was therefore inevitable that it would become an integral part of African social life in colonial 
towns. This was something that British colonial authorities sometimes tried to prohibit in the early 
days, but in vain, and so they devised ways to control and profit from it. The ubiquitous model 
for the control and profit of African beer was the ‘Durban system’, named after the city where it 
was pioneered.  
The Durban system was implemented immediately after the Natal Native Beer Act was 
passed in 1908, ending a prohibition on African liquor consumption in the urban areas of Natal, 
which had allowed an illicit trade to flourish. The Act gave municipalities a monopoly on the sale 
of beer in the areas under their jurisdiction, provided all revenues went to a special ‘Native 
Administration Fund’, to be used for welfare provision in the African township areas (schools, 
hospitals, hostels, etc.). According to Swanson, this system ensured that,  
Beer revenues became the key financial support of a more intensive and comprehensive 
programme of paternalistic administration than ever before, tending with relative 
efficiency to restrain Africans to barracks and locations.867  
 
867 Swanson, ‘The Durban System’, p. 174 
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Typically, alcohol was sold and consumed in municipal ‘beer halls’ – cavernous, austere venues 
where punters drank opaque beer made in a traditional style from sorghum and rapoko, from 
large plastic mugs. This municipal beer monopoly system was to spread to several colonies to the 
north, including the Rhodesias, and right up to Uganda and Sudan.868  
The Bulawayo Council developed the most elaborate infrastructure of beer gardens in 
the country, if not the continent, turning the conventional municipal beer monopoly system into 
a sizeable business enterprise for a city of Bulawayo’s size. Bulawayo’s home ownership schemes 
were funded mostly from loans from municipal ‘beer profits’, as were its African welfare, health, 
education and recreation programmes. But promoting beer drinking in order to fund township 
development seemed deeply contradictory. The African Administration Department therefore 
tried to assimilate beer gardens seamlessly into its township development vision, presenting them 
as places of respectable, responsible, supervised sociality, in contrast to the “evil” illicit drinking 
dens that were so often preferred by drinkers (especially the middle classes). This chapter 
examines how the municipal beer monopoly system was incorporated into the township 
development strategies of the Bulawayo Council, the contradictions that arose therefrom, and 
how administrators tried to resolve them. 
 
The early days: alcohol and social control 
 
Beer drinking was integral to pre-colonial Zimbabwean societies, but in the context of 20th century 
colonial towns, new moral judgements about who should drink, and where, evolved. African 
residents, European residents, and state officials developed conflicting moral judgements about 
drinking. The state tried to simultaneously control African drinking patterns and profit from them, 
whilst the latter exerted their own social controls over one another, on the basis of class, gender 
and age.  
The municipality’s control of liquor in Bulawayo went back to its earliest days. Section 27 
of the 1895 Location Regulations869 prohibited the consumption of any alcoholic liquor in the 
Bulawayo Location, including the traditional opaque brew referred to by officials as “native beer”870. 
This complete prohibition resulted in rampant illicit brewing and drinking. Brewers were always 
women, continuing the gendered pre-colonial brewing tradition, many of whom relied heavily on 
 
868 Rogerson and Tuck, ‘A Strange Case of Beer’, p. 16 
869 These were Bulawayo bye-laws 
870 It was also referred to as “kaffir beer”, and from the 1950s also commonly referred to as “African beer”.  
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this illicit business to feed themselves and their families in the context of widespread poverty and 
structural oppression in the urban setting.  
Bulawayo’s prohibition remained in force, despite Ordinance 13 of 1902 allowing native 
beer to be brewed and sold in the colony.871 After a few years, the municipalities of Southern 
Rhodesia, as in Durban, saw the value of establishing their own breweries to control the extensive 
drinking in the African community and profit from it themselves. The first municipal brewery in 
the colony was built in Salisbury, in 1908.872 Bulawayo Council built its first brewery in the centre 
of the Location in 1913 to counter the “evils” of illicit brewing. This turned out to be “an instant 
success, not only as a valuable source of revenue, but as a means of providing a much needed 
amenity.”873 It was immediately expanded to create the iconic and enormous Main Beer Hall, 
known as the “Big Bar” or “Big Bhawa”. At this time, African women, who were the most 
competent brewers of traditional African beer, were employed by the Council to brew on a 
commercial scale.  
The Main Beer Hall was the only venue for legal drinking in the African side of Bulawayo 
for the first half-century of the city’s existence. It was oppressive. A township resident described 
in 1929 how, “...[W]hen you go to the beerhall, you are like prisoners. You must stand in a row 
like at the Pass office. The Bulawayo treatment is very bad”874. The Main Beer Hall facilities were 
extended with two kiosks in 1940, leased to Africans. Finally, a saloon bar was built in 1951 to 
provide a more congenial setting for higher class customers. It started off well, but ended up 
swamped, especially on Saturdays and Sundays, by “rough elements”. By this point the Main Beer 
Hall had 3 bars, the saloon bar, various halls, the 2 kiosks, and an eating house called the 
Hollywood Café.875  
African elites were extremely embittered by the discriminatory legal restrictions on the 
types of alcohol they could consume. They demanded the same drinking rights as Europeans, in 
accordance with Rhodes’ famous dictum: “Equal Rights for All Civilised Men”. But they were 
wont to exclude their less educated brethren from the ranks of the “civilised”, and support 
continued restrictions on them. Thus, as West has cogently argued, there was a strong class 
 
871 The sale of any other liquor of more than 2.75% alc/vol to Africans – including spirits, wine, cider, hop 
beer, or any fermented or distilled liquor – was prohibited. The various ad hoc laws controlling the sale of 
liquor to Africans after the 1902 Ordinance were consolidated in the Liquor Act of 1930. 
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dimension to the African struggle for drinking rights in the interwar period – a struggle in which 
many leading nationalists cut their teeth.876  
Meanwhile, the Council’s brewery failed to keep up with demand in the 1940s. It doubled 
production between 1941 and 1949, in the context of the massive influx of workers during the 
industrial boom. But the demand was too great, and illicit brewing of both beer and skokiaan 
became rampant, fuelling parties of up to 1,000, to which the Special Police ‘liquor detachment’ 
responded with armoured vehicles and tear gas.877 In 1948, the Mayor announced that a “new and 
up-to-date brewery” would be erected.878 But since extensions to the original plant were not 
feasible, an entirely separate brewery was built in a malt factory in the industrial areas, in 1949. 
Production was so much higher there that, in October 1950879, the old brewery at the Location 
was shut down after 37 years in operation.  
In the 1950s, whilst municipal beer production massively increased, restrictions on 
African alcohol consumption were gradually relaxed. With the passing of the Native Beer Act in 
1952, Africans were allowed to acquire a permit from the superintendent to purchase municipal 
beer for consumption in their homes. The Advisory Board Members were deeply divided on this 
issue.880 At one meeting, Mr Mazibisa hailed it as a welcome result for “decent Africans”, who 
had waited years to be able to drink at home instead of the Beer Hall. The Chairman of the Board, 
a European councillor, thought the law could be abused, but he “could not see why a good 
respectable African could not have his beer at home”. Several others agreed. Mr Ngazimbi, for 
example, said that it was a chance for Africans to prove that they were not “irresponsible”.  
Charlton Ngcebetsha, on the other hand, opposed the legislation very strongly, seeing it 
as a gateway to illicit skokiaan brewing.881 Mr Tengeletu and Mr Dick Masunda were in 
Ngcebetsha’s camp, worrying that it would lead to trouble and fighting in the townships. Masunda 
expressed his surprise that the Board endorsed this new law. He argued that there were enough 
beer gardens for drinking, and introducing home drinking would only encourage illicit brewing. 
Indeed, the Council had many allies amongst the African middle class, when it came to 
condemning the underground brewing world.  
The restriction on Africans to drinking only ‘native beer’ lasted until 9th August, 1957, 
when the Liquor Amendment Act allowed Africans to obtain European beer and wine for the 
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first time. The removal of this restriction produced very little immediate change in drinking habits 
in Bulawayo. After an initial rush to obtain the newly available beers and wines, sales were 
negligible in the first year and the municipal beer sales were not negatively affected.882 A select 
few Africans could also obtain permits to buy spirits, based on highly exclusive criteria – usually 
possessing a university degree or being a Member of Parliament.883 Consequently, by the end of 
the 1950s, there were only about 25 Africans in the whole country who had a permit to buy hard 
liquor.884 These restrictions were abolished in 1961, thus finally ending all racial restrictions on 
alcohol consumption. According to the Chief Native Commissioner, this delay in extending this 
right to Africans of all classes was to allow “a widespread responsible leadership to emerge in the 
drinking of hard spirits which could pass on experience to the masses for whom it was a 
novelty.”885 
As we saw in chapter 4, whilst negotiating the lease conditions for Pelandaba in the early-
mid ‘50s, Ashton and councillors had argued that European beer (as well as other spirits and 
“concoctions”) had social degenerative effects. Yet, Ashton came out in strong support of the 
liberalisation of the liquor law. At the Annual Conference of the Brewers’ Institute of Southern 
Africa, 1960, he branded the “reactionaries and missionaries” who opposed it as “jeremiahs” with 
“entirely unfounded” fears of Africans drinking slightly harder stuff.886  He also lambasted the 
European legislators for being ignorant about the social dynamics of African drinking, putting on 
his anthropologist’s hat to make the case that colonial statutory laws were “superimposed on the 
indigenous social structure…As a result, they reflect more what the legislators think should be 
done than what the social situation itself needs”. African communities had always had their own 
customary liquor laws, he argued, often “similar in scope and content” to those introduced by 
Europeans. Ashton advocated scientific study of the “social situation” to minimise the “downright 
harmful” effects of racialized legislation. He acknowledged, however, that drinking was “a field 
strewn with passionately held principles and prejudices, which often prevent dispassionate study”. 
Yet for all his support for liberalisation and slightly softening the regulations for liquor 
offenders in home ownership schemes (discussed in chapter 4), Ashton continued to demonise 
illicit brewers and shebeen queens, and tolerated the police raids to flush them out. When there 
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was an upsurge of illicit brewing in 1953-4, and a consequent spate of convictions (100 in that 
year), the Council evicted many of these unfortunate offenders, sending them to Hyde Park for a 
rehabilitation period. This was the “double punishment” that was so unpopular in the African 
community. Ashton reports that the African Advisory Boards “courageously” supported the 
Council in this controversial purge, but their meeting minutes suggest they did so extremely 
reluctantly and not for long. 887 Subsequently, the conviction rate dropped dramatically. The 
Council surmised that this illicit brewing must be a result of its poor quality beer, and so spent 
£20,000 to upgrade its brewery.888  
Profit and social control were significant motives behind the Council’s moral attacks on 
its illegal competitors in the brewing business. These motives are emphasised in the literature on 
colonial urban governance. But they were not the only motives behind the Council’s general 
alcohol-related policies. Recognition of the need to remove racialized liquor laws trumped fears 
that municipal beer profits might take a hit; and regard for the “social needs” of particular 
communities meant that some beer gardens were operated at a loss.889  And ultimately, in the late 
colonial period, the whole concept of municipal drinking facilities as spaces for control and profit 
was entirely re-worked by the Council’s African Administration Department. By developing a 
system of elaborate beer gardens in every neighbourhood, serving high quality, “authentic” African 
beer (above all other alcoholic and non-alcoholic products), the Council aimed to create places 
that not only brought in extensive revenue for welfare and housing, and enticed residents away 
from the “evil” shebeens, but also provided a convivial setting for social upliftment. It was this 
vision that they tried to sell, and it was not easy. 
 
The late colonial beer gardens: from control to 
conviviality 
 
In most British colonial cities that adopted the ‘Durban system’, the iconic venue for the sale and 
consumption of municipal beer was the beer hall. And so it was in Bulawayo until the Second 
World War. But in the 1950s, Ashton regarded these large, austere places to be of limited social 
and financial potential, and envisaged smaller, more picturesque beer gardens sprinkled 
throughout the residential areas. Over the 28 years of his tenure, his vision gradually materialised, 
and whilst not all beer gardens were very picturesque, they nevertheless became an iconic feature 
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of the landscape of Bulawayo. These beer gardens created a host of new moral dilemmas, 
however, which the Council had to navigate in an attempt to assimilate them into its township 
modernisation project.  
It was in the early 1950s that Ashton and the town planning officer hatched the idea to 
abandon the classic beer hall model, and instead establish a number of smaller beer gardens. The 
smaller venues were designed to be both more convivial, and more administratively practical, as 
they would prevent big groups of people congregating in one place and creating a “nuisance”, 
particularly in European areas where there were facilities catering to domestic servants.890 So from 
the early 1950s, beer gardens began to proliferate, with one or two bars and canteens built in all 
of the new emerging neighbourhoods. Indeed, Ashton stated in his annual report of 1952 that it 
was Council’s policy to build recreational facilities and beer gardens pari passu with housing 
schemes. There already existed some small canteens and recreation centres from the 1940s, some 
of them truly rudimentary, which were replaced with permanent structures, such as the 5 
temporary beer canteens built of asbestos in Mzilikazi in 1948, which were in a dilapidated 
condition when demolished in 1952, to be replaced with a permanent structure.891  
There had also been some “recreation centres” for domestic servants in the European 
areas. It was actually some European residents from the suburb of Hillside who had taken the 
initiative in 1946 to suggest to Council that it provide domestic employees with some recreational 
facilities in the vicinity (playing fields and sports fields) because the Location beer hall at 
Makokoba was too far away. Council agreed to this in principle. After two years of dithering, the 
mayor, police and provincial native commissioner noted “the serious extent to which illicit 
brewing and sale of skokiaan and similar concoctions was taking place” in and around European 
neighbourhoods like Hillside. So the Council decided to provide, “without delay, canteens at 
suitable points on the Commonage so that natives employed in outlying suburbs could obtain 
their reasonable requirements of kaffir beer without having to walk miles to the beer hall in the 
location.” 892 A rudimentary canteen and a football pitch were built in Hillside in 1948, another 
canteen at Gifford’s Grant to the north of the CBD in 1949. In the 1950s, several more “recreation 
centres” were built in European areas: Greenspan, Khumalo, and Inkunzi in 1950, Northend in 
1952, east of Essexvale Road in 1955, and Hillside in 1958. They were also built in the Coloured 
area of Barham Green and at the Railway Compound in 1956. European residents objected not 
so much to their existence, as their specific siting. In the late 1950s a huge controversy erupted 
 
890 Native Administration Committee, 12th Feb 1952/BCCA 
891 Native Administration Committee, 16th Jan 1952/BCCA 




over the beer garden in Hillside, with the Council effectively steamrolling over the European 
residents’ objections (see below).  
Establishing beer gardens in the African areas was less controversial. In general, the home 
ownership schemes had fewer beer gardens: Pelandaba had no beer gardens (just a bottle store 
and the high class Ikhwezi cocktail lounge on its border), nor did the smaller higher class 
neighbourhood of Barbour Fields. However, the large home ownership scheme of Mpopoma had 
5 beer gardens, a bar lounge and a bottle store.893  By 1957, there were 24 beer gardens and 6 off-
sales premises in the whole city. With the guiding principle of building a beer garden for every 
700 to 1000 housing units894, the number grew (despite some closures) so that, by the mid-70s, 
there were 31 beer gardens, 4 “cocktail lounges” and 11 off-sale bottle stores in Bulawayo. A 
feature of the bottle stores was that customers would drink on public lawns nearby – especially in 
Pelandaba, Makokoba and Mpopoma. Indeed the Pelandaba Bottle Store acted as a “mini beer 
garden”.895 The Council’s brewery also served many off-site customers, including the Army, Police 
and several rural African Councils in the areas surrounding the city. 
 
893 J. May, Survey of Urban African Drinking Patterns in the Bulawayo Municipal Townships (University of Rhodesia, 
1970), p. 1-2 
894 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens,  p. 224 
895 M. Ndubiwa, Urban Community Study (Bulawayo, Housing and Amenities Department, 1974), p. 
79/BCCA 
Figure 34: Municipal Liquor Store [Source: Housing and Amenities Dept., in Wolcott, The African Beer 
Gardens, p. 116] 
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Ashton described beer halls as “depressingly uniform and uniformly depressing”, and advocated 
“abandoning the Beer Hall in favour of the Beer Garden.” This should include:  
extensive areas of maybe several acres or opening on to parks, with plenty of scattered 
shelter, trees and lawns. Games facilities can cover a wide range, from tsoro or 
morabaraba boards, deck quoits, jukskei pitches to football fields for scratch games.896   
Not all beer gardens were as landscaped and picturesque as this description; some were quite 
austere. But each was “either subtly or markedly” different from the others – in terms of location, 
design, landscaping, opening hours and sports facilities – and these differences inspired patrons 
to venture beyond their neighbourhood amenity.897  For example, Burombo, Manwele, Mvumila 
and Petsheya opened early in the day, so they were popular with shift workers and those requiring 
a hair of the dog (“bhabhalazi”). Most beer gardens opened in the morning and closed at dusk 
(around 6:30), but some stayed open till 10:30pm.  
 
896 E.H. Ashton, ‘Liquor Laws in Central Africa’, paper delivered at the 9th Annual Conference of the 
Brewers’ Institute of Southern African (Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia, 14-19 August, 1960). 
897 Ndubiwa, ‘Urban Community Study’ p. 78 
Figure 35: Beer garden scene, Housing and Amenities Department [Source: H. Wolcott, The African Beer 
Gardens p. 112] 
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Greenspan was particularly 
popular with nurses, staff 
and patients of Mpilo 
hospital. The most popular 
venues for football were 
Greenspan, Inkunzi, Aisleby 
and Lone Star, whilst 
Mashumba and Manwele, 
located in the green valley of 
the Bulawayo spruit, were 
popular in summer months. 
Inkunzi was popular with 
industrial workers at the 
Cold Storage Commission.898 The Big Bhawa was not only the main watering hole for the residents 
of Makokoba, but also a convenient drop-in place for visitors from/to the rural areas and workers 
commuting home, as it was located near the Renkini bus terminus. It was estimated to be the 
largest beer hall/garden complex in southern Africa899, with 52, 000 patrons recorded passing 
through the gates on one busy Saturday in 1970.900 In 1972, this beer hall was renamed 
“MaKhumalo”, a reference to the women who had originally brewed the beer there.901 
The beer gardens were complex social institutions where all kinds of revelry, business, 
associational activity, theft, and altercation took place. But they were not, generally, places of overt 
political activity, in contrast to the shebeens. In the 1950s, it was possible to talk politics in the 
beer gardens, but by the 1970s, under the Smith dictatorship, it was extremely risky to talk politics. 
Anyone could be an informant.902  
Business on the other hand, was conducted all around. It was brisk at the “immensely 
popular” dry canteens, built into the beer garden complexes, and run by African traders, who sold 
snacks, cigarettes etc. These canteens often brought children onto the beer garden premises to 
shop on behalf of their parents, which was a subject of controversy. Business was also conducted 




900 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 26 
901 The name “Khumalo” had long been used by customers, but the Committee felt that it was masculine 
and therefore “contrary to African tradition” which associated brewing with the woman, so “MaKhumalo” 
was deemed more appropriate. BCCA/Municipal Liquor Undertaking Committee minutes, 14th July, 1962, 
p. 1718. 
902 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 185 




meeting over a beer to discuss deals, and of course by the Municipal Liquor Undertaking itself. 
Associational activity was primarily burial societies. By 1973, there were 248 burial societies with 
formally approved constitutions.903  
 
The AAD also established cocktail lounges, mindful of the exclusive preferences of the African 
middle class. The higher end lounges were located in home ownership neighbourhoods – Ikhwezi 
near Pelandaba, Mvumila in Mpopoma, Luveve in Luveve, and Hlanganani in Tshabalala. These were 
distinguished by table service and “Western-style” dancing. Ikhwezi was the most elite of these 
locales – “as good as the best bar lounges anywhere in the country” – and men’s evening dress 
was restricted to jacket, collar and tie, or safari suit with cravat. Most of these venues hired house 
bands.  In 1961, Ikhwezi Cocktail Lounge and Happy Valley Hotel bar were opened to multiracial 
drinking. This was the culmination of a long debate since the mid-50s, when the Government 
found it embarrassing that international non-European VIPs could not easily be hosted in 
Southern Rhodesia under the Land Apportionment Act.904 But the exclusivity of these venues 
sometimes made even their privileged patrons feel uneasy, given that they were publicly funded 
 
903 Ndubiwa, ‘Urban Community Study’, p. 80 
904 ‘Minister defends mixed gatherings and social segregation’, Rhodesia Herald, 25 June, 
1954/NAZ/s3609/35/2 
Figure 37: Ikhwezi Club, 1970 [Source: BCCA/Director's Annual Report] 
232 
 
facilities. For several months in 1962, the Joint African Advisory Board discussed the closed policy 
of the Ikhwezi Club, and eventually voted to open it to all.905 Around this time, too, Africans 
leased two exclusive venues to compete with municipal facilities: Marisha Cocktail bar in 
Magwegwe, and Happy Valley Hotel in Nguboyenja. Happy Valley was leased by the prominent 
citizen, footballer and man-about-town, Jerry Vera, from 1963 until the late 1970s.  
 
905 African Administration Committee minutes, 9 April, 1962/BCCA 
Figure 39: A Bar Lounge Facility [Source: Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 
117) 
Figure 38: Cocktail Lounge [Source: Annual Report of the Director, 1964] 
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These lounges had an audience beyond the intended African patrons, because they were also 
meant to “demonstrate to outside visitors not only the increasing progress and sophistication 
evident in the urban native population but also the administration’s accommodation and 
sensitivity to change.”906 On the covers of Masiyepambili magazine, Council beer ads often depicted 
upper class lifestyles – such as a set of golf clubs, a young polo player on a pony with his proud 
father holding a trophy, or a modern radio set.  Many ads also featured local football stars or 
sketches of weightlifters, promoting beer for strength and fitness.  
 
 
Bulawayo’s vision with respect to drinking facilities was different to Salisbury’s. Salisbury had a 
sparser distribution of beer gardens, and more cocktail lounges. It was therefore more polarised, 
as a report in 1970 suggested: “Whilst Salisbury probably has a larger sophisticated element…it 
has a much larger unsophisticated population which is inadequately catered for and which is, 
therefore, to a degree induced to turn to European beer.”907 Another report by the same authors 
found that Bulawayo’s policy was to improve the beer gardens rather than provide more high-
class lounges, so as “to meet the growing sophistication of the average working class African”.908 
 
906 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 31 
907 J. Howard, Report on tour of liquor undertakings: Salisbury and Gwelo, prepared for the administrative officer, liquor 
sales and Distribution. (Bulawayo, housing and amenities department, 1970), p. 4, quoted in Wolcott, 1974, p. 
31 
908 J. Howard, Report on tour of liquor undertakings: Pretoria, the Reef and Durban, prepared for the administrative officer, 
liquor sales and Distribution. (Bulawayo, housing and amenities department, 1970), p. 11, quoted in Wolcott, 
1974, p. 31 
Figure 41: Masiyepambili, September 1972 Figure 40: Masiyepambili, back cover, May 1970 
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Indeed, these two approaches reflect the different policies of these two cities with respect to 
township development in general: Salisbury provided a few elite housing schemes, whilst the 
majority were housed in undifferentiated low-cost rental schemes.  Bulawayo focused on 
providing for multiple socio-economic strata.  
 
The Municipal Liquor Undertaking: production and 
profit 
 
The beer monopoly system was a huge financial boon to the cash-strapped African 
Administration Department. It met the twin desiderata of funding township development without 
inviting undue Central Government interference. It provided the Department with funds for 
housing, specifically loans to home owners, and occasional grants to low-cost schemes; health 
services (subsidised by Govt.); and welfare and recreation. The Welfare sub-department had the 
broad remit of helping Africans “adjust” to urban life; in practice this mostly involved family case 
work and counselling, and community-building activities in various clubs, from women’s clubs to 
numerous youth clubs to pre-school groups. The facilities that beer profits funded included 
libraries, home craft centres, community centres, an arts and crafts centre at Mzilikazi, a few 
schools (from the 1960s), and an array of sports facilities, such as football stadia, swimming pools, 
tennis courts, a golf course, football pitches, gyms, basketball courts, etc.  
 
Figure 42: Annual Report displaying township activities: boxing, weightlifting, chariot racing, ceramic pottery and 
swimming at Barbour Fields [Source: Director's Annual Report, 1967] 
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As we saw in chapter 3, the AAD found ways to save money through home ownership, 
experimenting with house designs and materials, re-siting housing schemes closer to town, 
employing African builders.  But Ashton saw that for his ambitious development plans to come 
to fruition, these cost-saving measures needed to be supplemented with the substantial and regular 
revenue flow that a ramped up beer monopoly system could provide. Ramping up Bulawayo’s 
beer production and sales involved constant upgrades to the brewery, the services of a highly 
skilled brewer, and a ruthlessly efficient bureaucracy that sacrificed the job security of its staff. 
Together, these factors produced one of the highest rates of municipal African beer production 
in central Africa, and became the focus of the Department’s energies.  
Beer profits were one of four main funding sources available to Rhodesian municipalities 
for African housing, namely:  
a) Loans: Special funds, such as money lent by the British Government specifically for 
African housing; or allocations from the Government’s general borrowings; 
b) Loans raised by the Municipality in the open market. 
c) Internal Municipal Sources: the amounts available were limited. 
d) Profits from Municipal Liquor Undertakings (also known as ‘beer profits’.909) 
It was only in 1938 that, for the first time, loan money amounting to £5,000 was used.910 Thus, in 
the early colonial period, the main sources of funding for African housing were revenue from 
rents, and some money from beer profits. But Central Government imposed all kinds of 
restrictions on the use of beer profits.911 The larger municipalities that had managed their own 
beer halls for years deeply resented these centralised powers. As noted in chapter 2, the Bulawayo 
Council fiercely contested them, and so when it won a concession in 1945 to spend 50% of its 
unappropriated beer profits on housing for 3 years, “honour was restored”.912  
Until 1944, rent and beer accounts were not kept separately, so it is impossible to say 
what proportion was taken from each source. When the Bulawayo Council inveigled the 
Government to permit it to use beer profits for housing, the rents from such housing went back 
into the Council’s general revenue account, rather than the beer account, which Government 
 
909 Ashton, ‘The Economics of African Housing’, p. 34 
910 Ashton, African Administration in Bulawayo, p. 11 
911 Municipalities greatly resented this top-down interference. Up until 1922, Bulawayo’s beer profits could 
only be spent on services; from 1922-42 they were also used for housing. Under the Native Beer Act of 
1942, copied from the Union without much thought of adapting it to local conditions, expenditure was 
once again restricted to services and welfare; housing expenditure was only permissible with special 
Government authority. The Government also had the power to fix minimum selling prices. 
912 Ibid., p. 12 
236 
 
officials considered “rather immoral”.913 There was apparently a suspicion in the African 
community that the municipalities were not spending their beer profits on African development 
as required (see final section of this chapter). 
In the post-war period, options (a) and (d) were the main sources of funds. But external sources 
were limited. The Colonial Development Corporation provided £160 million in loans (1945-55) 
to most British African colonies, but not Southern Rhodesia. The Federation was also not a reliable 
source of loan funds for the municipalities (see chapter 3). The Bulawayo Council was averse to 
Government interference in its affairs, and was therefore persuaded by Ashton to invest heavily 
in option (d). Ewen Greenfield recalls that, “Ashton saw that a really well-run outfit could generate 
huge amounts of money for all sorts of good enterprises in the townships.”914 
In 1951, the new brewing plant was upgraded. To save significantly on costs, the Council 
decided on Ashton’s recommendation to do the milling and malting itself. For this, a new malting 
plant and grain store were built. 915  In 1955, the brewery was further expanded. This was claimed 
to be the reason for a dramatic 31% increase in sales that year, to over 2 million gallons.916   The 
brewery had changed significantly from the days when it was operated by African women applying 
their traditional skills. The Municipality began investing heavily in technical upgrades to the 
brewery.  
These developments gave Bulawayo a distinct advantage over other municipalities in 
funding home ownership schemes. For example, the Native Housing Conference of 1953 noted: 
It was generally agreed that beerhall profits should be made available for housing, but 
only Bulawayo had substantial profits to this end, rendering the proposal “largely 
academic” for the other municipalities.917  
It remained the only municipality with substantial beer surplus at the end of the 1950s.918 In 
general, where beer profits were used for housing, it was for home ownership loans.919 Table 2 
shows the substantial increase in sales from the early 1950s.  
 
913 Extract from Health Secretary’s annual report, 1952. NAZ/S2609/35/2; Vol. 1. Native Housing Policy, 
1946-53 [p. 11]. 
914 Greenfield, personal correspondence, 10.12.16 
915 Report of the Director of Native Administration for the Month of August, 1951/BCCA/Council 
minutes, 1952, p. 341 
916 Annual Report of the Director, 1955/BCCA 
917 Conference on Native Housing, 21 May, 1953. NAZ/S2609/35/2; Vol. 1. Native Housing Policy, 1946-
53 
918 Report of the Urban Affairs Commission, 1958/BCCA 
919 However, £100 000 of beer profits were appropriated from the fund for the building of Njube married 











1913 737 1925 7,413 1937 6,364 1949 74,251 
1914 4,595 1926 6,979 1938 10,229 1950 88,814 
1915 6,211 1927 6,517 1939 11,633 1951 150,812 
1916 5,504 1928 8,100 1940 20,369 1952 208,926 
1917 5,517 1929 6,417 1941 30,682 1953 216,087 
1918 4,678 1930 6,655 1942 36,688 1954 173,083 
1919 3,947 1931 7,444 1943 43,851 1955 229,586 
1920 4,548 1932 6,523 1944 40,663 1956 357,520 
1921 5,363 1933 9,274 1945 48,963 1957 431,421 
1922 6,617 1934 5,916 1946 48,963 1958 528,412 
1923 7,340 1935 9,207 1947 54,987 1959 605,825 
1924 7,417 1936 8,558 1948 64,284 1960 698,634 
















Table 3 provides a breakdown of annual income, expenditure and surplus in the native beer 
account, during the rapid expansion in the second half of the 1950s:  
 
 1954/5920 1955/6 1956/7 1957/8 1958/9 
Income: 
Sale of Native beer 
Sales of European liquor 
















 241,250 371,405 453,275 696,271 851,574 
 
Expenditure: 
Brewing of native beer 
Purchase of European liquor  
















 103,301 137,558 181,787 338,804 453,374 
Trading profit for year 137,949 233,847 271,488 357,467 398,200 
 
Contributions: 
REVENUE DEFICITS:  
Health services 





















Welfare and Recreation Services 
Brewery and Beer Halls 





















Total 117,880 63,065 62,580 107,651 170,878 
 
Net transfer to Beer reserve  23, 264 120,915 140,782 148,474 81,598 
Balance in Beer Reserve (as at 30th June) £177,349 298,264 439,046 587,520 £669,118 
Table 3: Annual native beer accounts. [Source:  BCCA/Finance Committee Minutes, 1961. [vol. 1 p. 8] / City 
Treasurer’s Department introductory memorandum to the abstract of accounts for the year ended 30th June, 
1959.] 
 
In Council and Committee minutes, as well as Ashton’s annual reports, the brewery began to take 
up a significant amount of space. Indeed, far more than law and order. It became an extensive 
and important undertaking.  By the early 1960s, Bulawayo’s brewery was clearly in a league of its 
 
920 Note in the year 1954/5 there were no European liquor sales, because this only became permissible after 
a law change in 1957. 
921 Note that these expenditures are just from the beer fund. 
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own. Table 4 compares beer production levels, staff numbers, and depots/beer outlets of several 
municipalities in South Africa and the Rhodesias, in 1960.  The Chairman of the Technical 
Committee for Kaffir Beer Research that compiled these statistics, commended Bulawayo for 
having the best results in the Central African Federation, much to the Council’s delight. 
Particularly noteworthy are the facts that Bulawayo had more sales depots than any other 
municipality, including Johannesburg, and employed the second highest number of African staff 
at its beer halls/gardens. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Municipal African Beer Production and Employment [Source: Technical Committee for 
Kaffir Beer Research/BCCA/African Administration Department Minutes, 2nd Feb, 1960, p.252] 
 
Rivalry and protectionism 
 
It seems to have been particularly important for Bulawayo to compare its liquor undertaking with 
Salisbury’s. Every year, the Council’s African Administration Committee and Liquor Undertaking 
Committee took note of Bulawayo’s brewery output compared to Salisbury’s. It always produced 
much higher quantities of African beer, whereas Salisbury achieved higher sales of ‘European 
Town  Staff employed  
Gallons 
of Beer 
Brewery Beer halls Production 
















Benoni 1,993.3 3 16 4 25 123.2 2 9d-11d 86,906 
Durban 5,121.1 7 100 24 173 103.3 10 9d-11d 205,000 
Germiston 2,288.8 5 14 9 37 106.2 14 Under 
9d. 
90,000 
Jo’burg 12,883.7 5 100 10 334 90.9 15 “ “ 560,408 
Pretoria 4,188 4 18 6 84 100 3 “ “ 120,000 
Springs 2,475.9 4 12 3 14 110.3 3 “ ” 100,213 
Welkom 1,349.9 4 9 4 25 133 2 “ “ 75,000 
Bulawayo 5,736.9 8 58 12 300 125 26 “ “ 124,500 
Salisbury 3,487 5 43 6 70 101.1 15 9d-11d 125,000 
Umtali 671 1 33 2 33 75 2 13-18d 30,000 
Que Que 69.9 - 6 - 2 65 1 “ “ 5,100 
Livingstone 
(NR) 
860.8 3 54 - - 96 5 13-18d 27,000 
Lusaka 
(NR) 
821.8 4 13 7 - 73.6 4 “ “  60,000 
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liquor’ (wines, beers and spirits).922 Incomes in Umtali and Gwelo, the third and fourth largest 
municipalities, were a sixth and nearly a tenth of Bulawayo’s, respectively. But Salisbury’s income 
from the sale of ‘European liquor’ exceeded its own African beer sales and exceeded Bulawayo’s 
European liquor sales by about 250%. The ratio of African to European liquor sales was therefore 
much higher in Bulawayo than Salisbury.923 But Bulawayo took the highest income overall.   
As Table 5 shows, these different emphases on African vs European beverages continued 
in the 1970s. However, Salisbury overtook Bulawayo in overall sales. Bulawayo’s African beer 
became more expensive to produce ($1,86 per litre compared with $1,75 in Salisbury924), but it 
was sold more cheaply ($5,36 per litre compared with $6,37 in Salisbury).  
  
 
 Bulawayo Salisbury 




Clear beer $1,268,297 $4,200,990 
Wines and Spirits $145,458 $149,140 
Aerated waters $13,724 $110,286 
Totals $6,412,769 $8,698,229 
Table 5: Sales comparison of the Bulawayo and Salisbury Liquor Undertakings [Source: LIquor Undertaking 
Committee minutes, 20th Feb, 1976, p. 316] 
The anthropologist Harry Wolcott noticed this rivalry between the two heavyweight cities whilst 
conducting his ethnography of Bulawayo’s beer gardens in 1970-71:  
Contemporary rivalry between the two cities did not appear to be divisive but it did result 
in a constant tendency for drawing comparisons between them. In the face of Salisbury’s 
obvious lead [in other respects], Bulawayans were quick to call attention to any facet of 
municipal life in which they equalled or excelled their more favoured twin. Their success 
in developing a municipal brewing industry equal to Salisbury’s provided them with 
considerable satisfaction in this regard.925 
 
922 For example, in 1960, 1961 and 1962, Bulawayo’s annual incomes from African beer alone were 
£698,634, £734,668 and £737,174 respectively. Salisbury’s were less than half of that amount – £348, 524; 
£341,961 and £323, 549 (Passmore, Local Government Legislation in Southern Rhodesia p. 22). 
923 Approx. 4:1 in Byo and 1:1.3 in Salisbury. These ratios changed each year. I have calculated a rough 
average to indicate trends.  
924 Note that according to the statistics in Table 5, Bulawayo’s African beer was cheaper to produce in 1960 
than Salisbury’s. 
925 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 23 
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It was not just superior production levels that the African Administration Department was proud 
of, but also the supposedly superior quality of its beer. This was the result of high quality malt 
production combined with the skill of a highly trained brewer from Poland, called Paul Brettler, 
who was the chief brewer from the 1950s through the ‘70s. Ashton saw an inverse correlation 
between the quality of municipal beer and illicit brewing, as we saw in his analysis of the 
recrudescence of illicit brewing in 1953 and 1954, which he attributed partly to social and partly 
to economic factors, but mainly to the poor quality of municipal beer.926   He also argued that one 
of the main reasons why Africans were turning away from African beer towards European beer 
in other municipalities, was because the African beer was often brewed badly, and in inadequate 
quantities. He cited Salisbury as an example.927 Indeed, Wolcott observed that, the farther up the 
hierarchy in the administration department, the stronger the opinion that Bulawayo’s beer was 
superior to Salisbury’s. At the very top, he observed that: 
The Director unabashedly argued the quality of the beer. “Have you compared our beer 
with Salisbury’s?” he once asked an interested official visitor from the capital city. “I 
would be ashamed of Salisbury’s figures if I were a brewer.”928  
A former township administrator told me that Ashton would get very concerned when there was 
a poor brew929, and any allegations of tampering with the beer at beer gardens often resulted in 
staff dismissals. The Senior Welfare Officer, Gargett, described vividly in the journal Zambezia 
how important the brewing business was to the self-identity of the Housing Department:  
In Bulawayo, where senior staff of the city's Housing and Community Services 
Department meet weekly to plan and review their work, an unremitting climax to their 
meeting is provided by graphs of liquor consumption, among which African beer sales 
provide the focus of interest. If they are good, the beer has been good and the customers 
have been satisfied. ‘Euphoria’…has prevailed. People have relaxed, exchanged news and 
views, conducted business, dissolved tensions built up over the week, listened to music, 
danced, loved, and fought. Bad beer spells discontent, expressed in immediate strife, or 
stored grievance.930  
The brewery system was not just a subject of rivalry between the cities, but also a source of tension 
between municipalities and Central Government. Municipalities were extremely defensive of their 
 
926 Ashton, African Administration, p. 39 
927 There was suspicion that Salisbury’s rebranding of its municipal beer – Rufaro – in the 1960s was an 
admission that it needed a serious quality upgrade. 
928 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 159 
929 Interview with Ewen Greenfield, London, 18 Jan, 2017 
930 E. Gargett, ‘Drinking for Pleasure – and whose profit?’ Zambezia, 4, ii (1975-6), p. 115.  
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rights to retain a monopoly within their jurisdictions, and spend profits as they saw fit, without 
ministerial interference. Ashton really fought for this autonomy. He complained that,  
The Minister regards beer monies as comprising a trust fund which he alone is entitled 
to administer… I recommend that a strong protest be entered by the Municipal 
Association against this attitude of the Minister’s.931 
In 1965, the Minister of Local Government, John Gaunt, permitted all local authorities to use 
their beer profits for low-cost housing schemes. Whereas previously they could only loan the 
money to homeowners, with grants offered in exceptional circumstances, now grants could be 
made from beer profits for capital expenditure on low-cost African housing and services (up to a 
maximum of one third of total profits).932 This allowed Bulawayo to further leverage its superior 
beer profits for housing development. 
However, the Minister also threatened municipal monopolies with legislation to allow 
competition from private enterprise within the township areas. This again reflected the 
Government’s policy of promoting private sector solutions and a retreat of the state. The councils, 
especially Bulawayo, put up a spirited resistance. Councillor Jack Pain of Bulawayo asserted that 
the Local Government Association, of which he was the president, would defend “to the last 
ditch” municipalities’ rights to retain what he called their “benevolent monopolies” on African 
beer brewing.933 Indeed, so focused was Bulawayo on this issue, that the Salisbury Council found 
itself unable to draw attention to other matters,  complaining that the LGA was “only interested 
in propagating Bulawayo’s viewpoint” and “flatly refused to forward Salisbury’s proposals…”934 
There was also a furore when the Central Government introduced excise duty on municipal beer 
in 1973.935 Such disputes continued after independence, when centralisation increased and 





931 Ashton’s comments on the agenda of the 17th Annual Conference of the Municipal Association: Vic 
Falls Hotel, 12th-14th May, 1958/BCCA/Minutes of the Council  
932 The Chronicle, ‘Gaunt “frees” beer profits’, 14 April 1965  
933 The Chronicle, ‘Beer: “Last ditch” warning’, 6 January 1965. 
934‘Lovatt resigns in protest’, The Chronicle 26 Nov., 1964 




Huge amounts of energy went into ensuring productivity, profit and accountability in the Liquor 
Undertaking, through a rigidly hierarchical administrative structure. In addition to the Council’s 
Liquor Undertaking Committee, significant proportions of Finance Committee and African 
Administration Committee minutes were taken up with the Brewery operation. The African 
Advisory Board (Joint Townships Board) also had its own Liquor Undertaking Committee. These 
committees considered reports on sales, endless technical upgrades (the brewery premises were 
so designed as to accommodate frequent extensions, as technology was growing rapidly in this 
field), and meteorology, as good or bad rains could significantly affect the harvest of rapoko, 
sorghum and other key ingredients, and this in turn determined whether extra storage silos were 
required, etc. Bulawayo had to adapt to its climate by experimenting with different drought-
resistant strains of sorghum, such as “Red Swazi”, which was said to be “one of the few 
commercial types of sorghum suitable for growing under the very erratic rainfall conditions of 
Matabeleland…”936 
The beer garden bureaucracy grew disproportionately to other Council sub-departments. 
Until 1951, a single “Brewery Superintendent” oversaw both the manufacture and distribution of 
the beer. Then the Brewing Director took charge of the brewing side and answered directly to 
Ashton, whilst a ‘Beer Hall Superintendent’ was responsible solely for distribution and 
administration of the various beer halls and canteens, collecting cash, etc.937 In 1961, it became 
more decentralised, with the appointment of African ‘bar managers’ in each township.938 A few 
years later, the 13 African townships were clustered into 6 ‘liquor-selling areas’. Full-time assistants 
called Area Controllers were introduced – mostly European – who supervised the African clerks 
and bar managers. The positions of ‘Administrative Officer, Liquor’ (AOL) and ‘Administrative 
Assistant, Liquor Undertaking’ were introduced in 1968.  Head office staff were all European, and 
bar managers were all African. The first African supervisory staff were only introduced in the mid-
70s.939  
There was a ruthless approach to accountability. Bar managers, who generally coveted 
their reasonably well-paid jobs (relative to the low-wage standards for Africans in Rhodesia), 
reported feeling constantly insecure about the prospect of being held responsible for unavoidable 
errors at their respective beer gardens.  If accounts did not add up, the entire staff of a beer garden 
were routinely fired on the spot. If sales dropped, they were investigated under presumptions of 
 
936 BCCA/African Admin Committee minutes, 21st Jan, 1961, p. 281 
937 Report of the Director of Native Administration for the month of August, 1951/BCCA/Council 
minutes, 1951-2, p. 337 
938 African Administration Committee minutes, 3rd October, 1961, p. 2177/BCCA 
939 Ashton, ‘A Tale of Three Cities’, 1977, p. 15 
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“manager trouble”. The head office cited internal performance studies to justify this harsh 
approach, such as one conducted in 1960, which found that when an entire staff was replaced at 
one suspiciously poorly performing outlet, within 2 months sales increased by 67%.940  
There was a “staggering” intensity of oversight; the vast sums of money earned were 
collected, counted and deposited by area controllers.941 Reports were prepared daily, showing 
performance at each beer garden. Many of these procedures became symbolic rituals: area 
controllers’ daily reports dutifully noting “African beer fresh and good”, although the Controllers 
never actually drank the beer; graphs were regularly presented to the Director, plotting ever-
increasing sales, and it became commonplace to make jokes about “how the beer was doing”.942 
It was not just the accounts, but also practices and procedures in the beer gardens that 
were micro-managed for maximum efficiency. Internal studies found, for example, that it took 
0.542 minutes to collect, wash, rinse, and stack a beer mug, and that it took 0.24 minutes to serve 
a half gallon customer, versus 0.28 for a gallon customer. Bar managers often used their own 
initiative to improve sales, such as lifting the lid off storage containers to let the beer breath, 
something they were actually prohibited from doing.943   
Buoyed by ever-increasing sales figures entering the millions by the mid-60s, those at the 
top “exerted a usually infectious enthusiasm and sense of commitment on those as far below them 
as assistant bar managers and even upwardly mobile bar hands,” holding out the promise that 
profits could translate into promotions.944 However, some of this enthusiasm was tempered by 
the African Advisory board’s Liquor Undertaking Committee, which included some teetotallers 
who were not so enthralled by the whole enterprise. In fact, there were several sectors of society 
that were not as enthralled as the African Administration Department was, including many of its 
intended customers, and beneficiaries of its beer profits. It was to these customers and 
beneficiaries that the Department was especially keen to justify the whole enterprise, navigating 
through difficult moral terrain as it did so.  
 
 
940 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 161 
941 Muchadenyika Masunda remembers an area controller called Tiberius Ngwenya, who was the only one 
who could handle the complex accounting of the Bulawayo African Township beer garden revenues. He 
couldn’t take leave because those who would fill in for him were “completely flummoxed” by the accounts. 
However, being good at maths and able to work out the system quickly, Masunda managed to take over 
temporarily so Ngwenya could take leave. (interview with Much Masunda, Harare, 24th June.) 
942 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens., p. 171 
943 Ibid.  
944 Ibid., p. 157 
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Contradictions in the beer finance system 
 
The beer finance system threatened to undermine the moral integrity of the Council. The very 
notion of a welfare and housing fund based on liquor profits was regarded by many people to be 
irresponsible. Far from being a subtle way to raise funds whilst monitoring drinking behaviour, 
the beer finance system was transparent and therefore open to ridicule, even by state officials. The 
transparent contradictions in this system led to the politicisation of the act of drinking municipal 
beer, in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere where the system operated.  
Bulawayo’s African Administration had to reconcile its shameless marketing of Council 
beer with its paternal role of nurturing responsible and respectable citizens. Ashton explained his 
dilemma thus:  
I have tried to steer between the Scylla of driving people to drink through aggressive 
salesmanship and the Charybdis of starving the social services through hypersensitivity 
to the questionable source of their finances. 945 
Nevertheless, the Council faced criticism from African residents, European residents, the police, 
doctors, churchmen, sociologists and even Government ministers – interest groups that rejected 
it on both moral and practical grounds. These criticisms were typically countered with the 
argument that it was better to have a legal market for African beer, and that the profits therefrom 
go to the public purse, than to have an underground trade or corporations profiting.946 The public 
use of beer funds, after all, had enabled the “extensive provision of community amenities such as 
libraries, pre-school centres, school-leaver programmes, youth centres, swimming baths, clubs, 
parks, community halls and stadia” that Ashton boasted of at the end of his time in office.947 But 
the immoral connotations, and logical contradictions, were hard to shake off. 
 
The immorality of the beer finance system 
 
A number of moral critiques were levelled at the Council for its policy of ever-proliferating beer 
gardens, along lines of religion, class-respectability, and gender. The Council’s deflection of many 
of these critiques reveals how integral the beer finance system was to the township development 
programme. Rather than scale down this system, it chose to build alternative venues for the elites, 
 
945 Ashton, ‘Introduction’, in Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. xx 
946 E. Gargett, ‘The welfare of the urban community’, Report of the National Conference (Rhodesia: Council of 
Social Services, 1968). 
947 Annual Report of the Director, 1977, para. 3/BCCA 
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and improve the beer quality and atmosphere at the gardens, as we have seen. The result was a 
reversal of the regulation-resistance relationship usually attributed to the colonial urban situation, 
with many residents imploring the council to introduce more controls and regulations, and the 
Council resisting.  
The most persistent critics were particular religious groups. Black and White churchmen 
and women, especially of the Apostolic faith, found the drinking behaviour that beer gardens 
encouraged intrinsically immoral. One such was Charlton Ngcebetsha, the Advisory Board 
Member, publisher and provocateur who also happened to be a teetotaller, and railed against the 
socially degenerate behaviour he claimed to witness in beer gardens.  
 But several of the leaseholders’ associations also opposed beer gardens in respect of their 
violation of respectable bourgeois family values. For example, the Mpopoma Leaseholders’ 
Association resolved that beer halls should only be open from 11am to 7pm: 
The decision was reached after taking into consideration the social evils that result in a 
nation of drunkards. The paramount consideration must be given to the family life that 
is so necessary as a basis for a Nation with a strong will and character. According to the 
structure of our society, mother derives satisfaction when and if father will have breakfast 
and supper whilst still warm. That satisfaction entrenches the marriage.948 
Then there were complaints about specific immoral aspects. One of these was the influence of 
beer gardens on youth. Many children had to pass by rowdy beer gardens on their way to school. 
The Magwegwe Tenants and Leaseholders Association rejected a proposed beer garden in 1972 
that would have been sited close to Mhali Primary School. When, in 1973, it came to their notice 
that a mini beer garden was to be established in the new shopping centre, “under the guise of a 
bottle store”, they rejected this too. It had been approved by Advisory Board Members some 
years earlier, but the Leaseholders’ Association felt it was still too close to the primary school, and 
insisted that the present facilities (beer garden, bottle store and cocktail lounge) served all their 
needs. To make their authority in the matter clear, they emphasised that “we remain the legitimate 
tenants of Magwegwe Township.”949  
Many teenagers entered beer gardens. In this regard, interestingly, it was the residents 
who often implored officials to be more rigorous in enforcing regulations, whilst European 
administrators seemed less convinced that enforcement was effective.950 Enforcement certainly 
 
948 Mpopoma Leaseholders Association meeting, 4.11.74/ BCCA/SO6 
949 Magwegwe Tenants Association Meeting, 9th Sept, 1973/BCCA/SO21/Magwegwe Tenants’ 
Association, p. 16 
950 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 221 
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faced obstacles: firstly, 19 years was the minimum age for drinking European beer, wine and 
spirits, enshrined in the Liquor Act that applied to all races. The African Beer Act, on the other 
hand, had an 18-year age restriction. Another issue was verifying patrons’ age. Wolcott observed 
many youths contesting their age with security guards. Since they didn’t have IDs, it was 
impossible to tell their age.951  
Mothers were also allowed to bring their children into the beer gardens, with officials 
reasoning that it was probably better than leaving them alone at home. In Salisbury, by contrast, 
the Council took a strong position against pregnant women or mothers with young children 
entering the beer gardens, claiming they were vulnerable to jostling crowds. Bulawayo’s 
administrators rejected this line of argument, claiming that jostling was less of a problem in 
Bulawayo, which had “more adequate facilities”.952  This laissez-faire attitude often came across as 
blasé or indifferent, which irked many African residents, particularly the “respectable, religious 
and rather puritanical” residents, as Ndubiwa found in his urban study of 1974.953  
Another issue was women drinking amongst men. Struggling for status in the racist and 
structurally oppressive colonial context, particularly in the interwar period when there was little 
differentiation in housing and amenities, men in the townships often invoked “traditional” 
drinking norms and codes of respectability to control women’s drinking behaviour. West 
conceptualises this as a “politics of sexual control”.954 African elite men frequently complained 
about “joint drinking” of men and women in the municipal beer halls. The Bulawayo Council 
tried to accommodate these traditional drinking norms in the early days, in order to legitimise the 
beer hall as a venue. In 1920, it introduced separate drinking hours for men and women to appease 
the traditionalists. But from 1932, joint drinking was allowed again. Many male patrons were not 
satisfied with this, claiming that it contravened “tribal custom”, and so the Council determined 
that women must leave the Beer Hall an hour before mid-day closing time.955  
In the 1940s, a more concerted campaign to end joint drinking enjoyed some success in 
Salisbury, but not in Bulawayo, where the Council feared it would lose its lower class clientele.956 
The campaign died down as more elite neighbourhoods and more beer gardens were established 
in the 1950s, and drinking was allowed in the home from 1952. But it remained an issue. For 
example, at an Advisory Board Meeting in 1952, Mr Ngazimbi argued that it was an insult to have 
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952 Ibid.,  63 
953 Ndubiwa, ‘Urban Community Study’, p. 79 
954 M. West, ‘Liquor and Libido: “Joint Drinking” and the Politics of Sexual Control in Colonial Zimbabwe, 
1920s-1950s’, Journal of Social History (1997), p. 651-655 
955 Ashton, African Administration in Bulawayo, p. 37 
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old men drinking beer at the same time as women and younger men. He argued that this was 
never allowed in the days of his forefathers, and as for women, “they mostly make men spend 
more money, and fights often result.” Other members agreed, but an argument ensued, with Mr 
Mazibisa and Mr Masunda insisting that there was nothing wrong with women drinking alongside 
men.957 Attitudinal differences with respect to the morality of drinking did not just fall along class 
and gender lines; there were clearly disagreements even within the middle class/elite circles. 
Another criticism was that the Council had misplaced priorities. Many residents asked: 
why should the first amenity provided in a new township be a beer garden? One resident claimed 
that the Superintendent was always responsive to issues with poor quality beer, but prevaricated 
whenever residents raised issues of poor quality roads.958 Some people suspected that the 
government promoted beer drinking to pacify the population.959 In the 1970s, the Advisory 
Boards in general became more critical of the principle of ever-more liquor outlets, unless justified 
by new housing expansion.960 Wolcott spoke to people who felt that “the Government” promoted 
beer too much, pretending that beer halls were community centres for social upliftment, but their 
real function was to make people forget their oppression.961  
In fact, even the Minister of Local Government and Housing accused local authorities of 
selling excessive quantities of beer. This sort of ideological disagreement has been documented 
by Atkinson in the case of South Africa. She points out how the State Department of Native 
Affairs had moral qualms about beer profits being used for schools, as it might encourage Africans 
to drink purely for the purpose of funding their schools. But municipalities often had no such 
qualms, arguing that the ends justified the means entirely.962 Gargett, a bit more tactically, pointed 
out that the Minister himself was appreciative of the valuable contribution that beer profits made, 
and so to take the moral high ground was hypocritical.963 
But even if the ends did justify the means, there was a general suspicion in the African 
community that some of the beer profits were being used corruptly, creamed off for expenditure 
in European areas. This suspicion may have lingered from the interwar period when indeed, the 
council’s use of beer profits was suspect. Until the late 1940s, Location beer profits and even rents 
were merged with the European ratepayers’ account.  In 1930, the Jackson commission was not 
satisfied that all beer profits were being spent on “native uses” as prescribed, and they therefore 
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proposed that Council relinquish responsibility for use of beer money to the Governor-in-
Council. The Council was predictably enraged, accusing the Government of also spending 
revenues from “purely Native sources” on things that were not “purely Native purposes”.964 
Whilst I haven’t found evidence that beer revenues were misappropriated in Bulawayo after 1949, 
township gossip suspected otherwise, such that at independence the new housing minister, Edison 
Zvobgo, confessed his disappointment in finding out that the beer profits were not as great as 
everyone believed.965  
Then there was the condemnation of municipal amenities as a symbol of colonial state 
oppression. This has been documented in several colonies. Chimhete has shown how in Salisbury 
in the 1960s and ‘70s, in the context of the liberation struggle, African nationalists orchestrated 
boycotts of municipal beer outlets in Salisbury, valorising shebeens instead as spaces of resistance 
– symbolically and literally (they were safe havens to plan political actions).966 Mpofu mentions 
the same valorisation of shebeens as sites of resistance in Bulawayo967. However, there were also 
many residents who condemned shebeens. The Magwegwe Leaseholders’ Association, for 
example, complained to the Council in 1972, that “Shebeen queens are a nuisance to public peace 
and order and should be stopped soonest”.968 
 I do not have evidence that the beer gardens in Bulawayo were boycotted in the same 
way as in Salisbury. According to ZAPU leader Dumiso Dabengwa, they were not:  
No I don’t think it happened. The only time it happened was during Zhii. During those 
riots, when in frustration people targeted the only thing that you could call government 
were things like the beer halls and so on, and people wouldn’t make a difference between 
those establishments belonging to the city council and government. So they became 
targeted and yet it was government that was under attack.  
Wolcott mentions that in the early 1960s, some nationalists sent envoys into the beer gardens to 
tell people to stop drinking and kicked over their mugs, chasing them out. He claimed that of all 
the people he spoke to in 1970-1, none abstained for purely political reasons, but he reckoned 
there were such people, though they would have been underground in any case, given the tense 
circumstances.969 There were, however, occasional armed attacks on beer gardens, but these 
appear to have been for purposes of stealing cash. The Council archives contain muted reports 
 
964 Source unidentified, quoted in Ashton, African Administration, p. 37.  
965 The Chronicle, 23rd Nov., 1981 
966 Chimhete, ‘African Nationalism’.  
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969 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 184 
250 
 
of grenade attacks on beer gardens, barely distinguishing such events from the other mundane 
obstacles that hampered administration on a day-to-day basis.  
 
“Not in my Back Yard”: European Objections to Beer Gardens in their Residential 
Areas 
It was not just African residents who had various moral qualms about beer gardens. Many 
European residents were paranoid about beer gardens in the vicinity of their neighbourhoods. 
One particularly inflammatory beer garden policy was put forward in 1957: the Council once again 
tabled the construction of various “Native Recreational Centres” in European areas to cater to 
the thousands of African domestic servants there.970 Receiving no response from the Government 
on the matter, the Council went ahead identifying 14 new sites. A Special Committee was 
convened, arguing that, “It is in the interests of the European – even if at some slight 
inconvenience – that such centres must be established in proximity to residential areas if they are 
to be of any value.”971 Three of the proposed sites were advertised in the Chronicle, eliciting a 
wave of petitions from the European public.   
The complaints ranged from nuisance and danger factors, to depreciation of property 
values. But at least 10 of the complainants expressed paternalistic concerns about the centres’ 
impact on the physical, financial and moral health of Africans themselves, e.g. “African women 
complain that African males spend too much money on beer”; “beer centres attract the less 
desirable type of African woman”; “beer centres could be a breeding ground for tuberculosis”;  
“it is undesirable that native children should attend beer centres”; “the recreational side should be 
emphasised rather than beer”. There were a few submissions wholeheartedly supporting the 
Council; the Sandwich Club, “comprising a broad cross section of the community” supported the 
centres, because “this is a small inconvenience compared with the value of having somewhere for 
Africans to go and enjoy themselves in their spare time”.  
Whilst some objectors came to the interviews well-briefed, the Special Committee 
reported that all of them went away with “a fuller appreciation of the problem”. The plan, as 
explained to the objectors, was for each centre to be on a 40-acre site, ensuring a buffer between 
the actual centre and the nearest European residences. The centres would be on 10 acres with 6-
foot security fences, and their elaborate landscaping would include: 
 
970 City of Bulawayo, Report of the Special Committee re: District Native Recreational Centres, Bulawayo, 
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971 Ibid., p. 12 
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1 standard size football field, 1 or 2 tennis courts, a children’s play area with swings, slides 
and other play equipment and paddling pool, 1 standard basketball pitch, various tsoro 
boards and pitches, and a large open area for outdoor cinema. An area reserved for 75ft 
x 50ft swimming bath. The beer garden itself would be 2,5 acres, consisting of a single 
canteen, 3 open shelters, 1 WC block, 1 large store room, a welfare and admin centre, 
skittle alley, change rooms and WCs for outdoor sports, living accommodation for staff. 
The whole of the 10-acre site would be laid out in parkland, with large shade trees, big 
expanses of lawn, etc. The beer garden to be surrounded with a tall hedge.  
The Committee did not accept complaints about noise, since Europeans insisted on their servants 
living close to hand for convenience, and must therefore “in fairness, accept some of the 
responsibility – even inconvenience” to provide recreation for them. The Committee did concede, 
however, that the past policy of providing beer canteens and de-emphasising sporting and other 
facilities must be re-balanced. And it proposed having only “dry” canteens at some centres.  
What is interesting is the manner in which this controversial policy was shoehorned in, 
despite opposition from ratepayers. Behind the scenes, it was Ashton who moulded the Council’s 
stance. Based on the first round of written submissions (55 letters received, including one signed 
by 4,782 people), he compiled a 15-page report (whose recommendations the Council adopted 
unconditionally) for the Special Committee to use in subsequent interviews with 50 different 
groups of objectors over the course of 4 days. Ashton had no truck with prejudiced objectors. 
From the outset, he stated that, “Most of the letters merely asserted the writer’s opinion without 
putting up a reasoned case”. He dismissed many letters as simply “the usual objections”, and 
lamented that “no alternatives were suggested”. He then proceeded to dismantle and rebut every 
objection. Only the constructive advice by those who generally supported the centres was 
considered.972  
The Committee declined to offer a referendum on the issue, arguing that those who vote 
are likely not to be representative, and would not possess “a clear picture of the problem…” It 
furthermore argued that Councillors were elected by ratepayers to take “unpopular decisions”, 
and so should “not shelter behind a referendum when a particularly thorny and contentious 
subject requires solving”.973 In the end a recreational centre was controversially established north 
 
972 It should be noted, however, that Council had already re-situated some recreation centres due to 
complaints. 
973 City of Bulawayo, Report of the Special Committee re: District Native Recreational Centres, Bulawayo, 
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of Essexvale Road, which was several hundred metres from the nearest European suburb (but it 
had to be demolished some years later when a new European suburb was built there.974) 
The Council’s dismissive approach to the complainants clearly irked many in the white 
community. One objector laid it out in plain words: “Black and White partnership will never be 
achieved by such methods as the Bulawayo Municipality propose – rather will such methods result 
in the withdrawal of the Europeans from the Federation.”975 Certain segregationists capitalised on 
this discontent and fear of African encroachment to win seats on the Council.976 In 1967, the 
Minister of Local Government and Housing, Mark Partridge, reiterated that African recreational 
facilities should not be provided in European residential areas: “You have got to be quite hard-
headed. The African domestic servant is entering a European area and as such he must accept 
that he is entering on a basis that it is European and not African.”977 Thus, even in recreation as 
much as housing, the Bulawayo Council and the Central Government had differing views on 
Africans’ rights to, and in, the city. 
 
The illogicality of the beer finance system 
 
The Council was dismissive of most moral condemnations of the beer gardens, but found it more 
difficult to rebuff those who pointed out the sheer illogicality of promoting drinking to fund 
health978, welfare and development. Gargett’s entire sub-department was funded from beer 
profits, and he was not afraid to admit the contradiction. For example, he made the following 
confession in an academic journal: 
High sales mean money for housing, health and welfare services: perhaps also more 
drunkenness, more beaten wives, fewer school fees paid, and a hard day’s night for the 
traumatic surgeon at Mpilo Hospital. Officials (and elected representatives) are faced with 
an intractable dilemma. The social rewards make the beer-garden seem desirable and 
possibly inevitable; the social ills that accompany it prompt demands for reform, if not 
prohibition.979 
 
974 City Engineer memo to Town Clerk, item 10, ‘Recreational facilities for Africans’, 25th October, 1972, 
BCCA/A13/3 (box 703), Local Govt. Assoc. 
975 Ibid., p 46 
976 Greenfield interview, London, 18th Jan, 2016 
977 ‘“Unwise”’ to Provide African Facilities’, The Chronicle, 3 August, 1967 [Loc Govt. box 2, p. 38] 
978 There were 7 municipal clinics by the mid-70s, to supplement Mpilo and Luveve Hospitals, run by the 
Ministry of Health (Ndubiwa, ‘Urban Community Study’, p. 77) 
979 Gargett, ‘Drinking for Pleasure – and whose profit?’, p. 115.  
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Indeed, doctors at Bulawayo’s Mpilo Hospital, which was the largest hospital in Africa when it 
was built, attributed a significant proportion of patient health problems to alcohol consumption. 
They claimed that it was often difficult to differentiate between the three main causes – alcohol 
content, nutrient content or alcohol-fuelled behaviour – and cautioned that their impressions were 
not based on thorough research. However, it is such impressions, I would argue, that defenders 
of the beer system had to contend with.  
By far the worst problem reported by doctors was severe head injuries and stab wounds 
from drunken altercations. One fifth of all admissions to Mpilo related to trauma (in the sense of 
physical injury) – three and a half times more than the second highest cause. Doctors informally 
estimated about 75% of personal violence was alcohol-related, and described fine summer nights 
when two to three dozen men came through with head and stab injuries, and paydays when the 
ward had “blood all over, and drunks lying everywhere”.980 Other drink-related injury was caused 
by accidents with cars and bicycles, carbon monoxide poisoning from in-door fires without proper 
ventilation, exposure to the elements, etc.  
Physicians increasingly saw correlations between malnutrition diseases such as pellagra 
and scurvy and high consumption levels of African beer (especially when substituted for meals), 
but the degree of causation was never clear. It seems that the medical wisdom shifted over time, 
with the practical wisdom of the administrators following behind. A professor of medicine at the 
University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Michael Gelfand, confessed in 1966 that, “We 
used to think that African-brewed beer is rich in vitamins and very nourishing…We never realized 
that if taken in excess, such as upwards of one gallon a day, the beer might affect the health of the 
individual.”981 The Alcoholism Research Unit claimed that the nutritional quality of municipal 
beers had declined over the years with cheaper ingredients being substituted for sorghum. But 
Bulawayo disputed this accusation: “We’re using a wider variety of products and more expensive 
products than any other brewery – and our beer costs more to produce than anyone else’s”.982 
In light of the concerns of medical practitioners, Bulawayo’s administrative top brass 
seemed fairly blasé about alcohol-related health impacts such as drunken violence, disease and 
malnutrition. For example, in a meeting in 1962, when Ashton and some welfare officers debated 
an invitation to attend a conference in Salisbury on alcoholism amongst Africans, Ashton stated 
that he was “not aware that alcoholism was a serious problem at this stage in Bulawayo” and he 
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was “not particularly anxious to attend the conference.”983 In discussion, he and the African 
Administration committee members felt that although some insights might certainly be gained 
from the conference, these were not enough to justify the costs.  
Of course, the Welfare Department officers were concerned, as the health effects of 
excessive alcohol consumption directly undermined the domestic harmony and development they 
sought to promote.  Furthermore, there was a very active encouragement of sports and promoting 
health and fitness. Much Masunda recalls: 
There was no excuse for anyone who grows up in Bulawayo not to have an exposure to 
a variety of sporting disciplines. And one of the main things that came out of all that was 
that sense of purpose, discipline that was inculcated in us. And we learnt at a very early 
age to win and lose with grace.984 
Drinking was not exactly compatible with sporting discipline. But the administrators always 
argued that drinking would happen in any case, independently of the existence of municipal 
amenities and aggressive marketing. Unsurprisingly, contemporary social scientists waded in to 
these debates, for, as Gargett put it, the complexities of the issue “create a deep well for social 
scientists and reformer alike to fish in.”985 
The AAD was open to social scientific investigation of its activities. In 1970, a sociologist 
at the University of Rhodesia was sponsored and aided by the housing department to conduct a 
survey of drinking patterns in Njube, Mabutweni, Mzilikazi, Pelandaba, Mpopoma, and Barbour 
Fields.986 Her survey gathered extensive quantitative and qualitative data on alcohol consumption 
patterns and expenditure amongst 692 residents (411 male, 281 female), according to several 
demographic variables. She discovered, unsurprisingly, distinctive gender differences (overall, 
53% of men and 19% of women said that they drank beer987), but minor class differences.988  
 
983 African Administration Committee minutes, 9 April, 1962, p. 714/BCCA 
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988 Higher earners and older people were actually slightly heavier drinkers. And of the 4 education levels – 
1. no schooling; 2. primary to standard six; 3. secondary to junior certificate; and 4. further education – the 
third had the lowest rate of drinkers. 
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Overall, the majority of drinkers preferred African beer (higher income brackets and 
younger people drank relatively more European beer). Spirits were generally unpopular. African 
beer was regarded by many as a food. Interestingly, little stigma was attached to being in a state 
of drunkenness, but the harmful consequences thereof, especially to dependents, was popularly 
condemned. The study did not overtly indict the Council, but it did conclude that there was “a 
substantial amount of daily drinking, which increases considerably over weekends”. It implied that 
beer gardens encouraged undue expenditure on drink.989 This was a criticism that had been 
levelled since at least the Jackson Commission of 1930 – that beer halls led to overspending, and 
therefore poverty and unhappiness. Again, the standard response of the Department was to 
downplay its part in encouraging drinking:  
Personally I doubt very much if the availability of a wholesome brew at a reasonable price 
causes people to spend more than they otherwise would. Attendance at shebeens and 
house parties, where the tariff is high, suggests that other factors predominate.990  
As for crime, the BSA Police were not unduly concerned by the crime rates compared to cities 
elsewhere in Africa.991 However, they were convinced that there was a direct correlation between 
drinking levels and crime rates. Yet, they did not discourage the beer gardens, as they concurred 
with Department officials that in their absence, residents would brew and consume the same 
amounts of alcohol illegally. Their greatest crime concern was gang attacks, and they could not 
account for the fact that Bulawayo had a higher rate of stabbings than Salisbury. Indeed, Ashton 
himself was perplexed by this statistic, given that conditions in Bulawayo were less crowded, and 
that the higher consumption of African beer relative to European beer lessened rates of 
drunkenness.992   
The police in Bulawayo directly addressed these issues to the Administration Department. 
They recommended limiting draught beer sold for home consumption, adding more lighting, and 
providing more club and cinema facilities for youth. They were satisfied their recommendations 
were carefully considered, including doubling down on shebeens: for both renters and home 
owners, the Council complied with police suggestions to toughen the laws so that after a first 
offence, the lessee or owner would be evicted.993  
 
989 J. May, Survey of African Drinking Patterns in the Bulawayo Municipal Townships (Salisbury, Institute for Social 
Research, UR, 1970), p.25.  (Note: the Housing Department’s estimates of average individual alcohol 
consumption, derived from sales figures, were higher than what May’s informants’ self-reported.) 
990 Gargett, ‘The welfare of the urban community’’ 
991 In Bulawayo in 1969, amongst the African population of around 170,000, there were 571 serious assaults 
(4 deaths) and 223 group robberies. (Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 129). 
992 Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. 162 




Resolving the moral and practical contradictions 
 
The Council tried to resolve these moral and practical contradictions. It tried to reconcile its 
promotion of drinking with its moral authority as the nurturer of responsible and respectable 
township citizens. As with every other aspect of township administration, the beer garden policy 
reflected not just key practical imperatives like control and finance, but also the particular 
modernising ethos of Ashton and Gargett. As we have seen, they regarded the townships as spaces 
of transition – at a stage between tradition and modernity. Accordingly, they regarded the beer 
gardens as offering both a traditional right to drink, and a place to turn this practice into a 
respectable, modern form of sociality. Even the common notion amongst urban administrators 
in southern Africa, that Africans had a right to consume beer because it was part of their 
tradition994,  appears to have been reframed. Ashton referred to it more as a universal right, saying, 
“The provision of a good beer at the right price [is] a part of the provision of the amenities of 
life”.995  
As noted in chapter 2, they were self-reflective, and had some misgivings about their roles 
as directors of social change. These misgivings were certainly heightened in the case of municipal 
beer policy. Their confident stock responses to criticism of the beer gardens belied their moral 
qualms and acute awareness of the image problem the lucrative beer business created. Gargett 
admitted that the beer gardens had “grave implications for the image of local government…”996 
Thus, when Harry Wolcott proposed his ethnography of the beer gardens, Ashton welcomed the 
chance to have them “critically and impartially surveyed” by a reputable anthropologist. But he 
confessed afterwards that the experience of being a research subject for the first time was 
unsettling: “I have been an anthropologist myself and have turned the searchlight on others. Now 
the searchlight was turned on me. It was an embarrassing and salutary experience.”997 He 
confessed: 
The ambivalence of my position is obvious. How can one maintain a healthy community 
and a healthy profit at one and the same time? I can almost hear the critical reader 
 
994 Atkinson, ‘Contradictions of Community’, p. 157 
995 Moreover, the Director argued, almost every aspect of African administration is ambivalent – such as 
whether to spend scarce resources on more low quality housing or less high quality housing. Wolcott, The 
African Beer Gardens, p. 164 
996 Gargett, ‘Drinking for Pleasure – and who’s profit?’ p. 115 
997 Ashton, Introduction, in Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens, p. xvii  
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questioning my morality and even my sanity. And why not? I have often done so 
myself.998 
But the beer garden system represented the Department’s in-between position, between a rock 
and a hard place, and indeed Ashton called it the “symbol of our dilemma”; the dilemma being 
the lack of funds that always forced compromise, in this case a moral compromise. But Ashton 
was always highly pragmatic, and was not one to wallow in self-doubt. The junior administrators 
were indoctrinated into the Department’s valuation of the whole system. For example, in order 
to gain an administration certificate999, they had to answer questions such as: 
1. From time to time influential organizations allege social evils stem from the consumption 
of African beer and liquor. To what extent is this true and, if so, what are the 
compensating factors? 
2. Discuss the part played by beer in the life of the African population and say to what 
extent a Municipal Liquor Undertaking can fulfil the needs of African urban communities 
in this regard. 
3. Discuss the trend in Rhodesia and elsewhere of the swing from African beer toward 
European liquor. What are the causes and what can be done to maintain or increase sales 
of African beer?1000 
Thus, despite the administrators’ ambivalence, the drive to expand the liquor undertaking was 
strong.  Much of the literature on the municipal beer system emphasises control and profit 
motives, and has therefore framed municipal beer hall politics in terms of domination and 
resistance.1001 The seemingly universal colonial depictions of the shebeens and illicit brewing as 
“evil” can easily be interpreted as a pretext to intervene in civil society and expand municipal 
control. Certainly, in Bulawayo, fundraising and social control were strong motives. However, this 
range is too limited. More recently, authors such as Atkinson and Whelan have sought to 
problematise this dichotomous narrative, and recognise other motives of urban authorities.1002 As 
 
998 Ibid, p. xx 
999 (awarded by the Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs in SA, but instructed and examined 
in Bulawayo by Ashton and one other examiner) 
1000 Wolcott, The African beer gardens, p. 159 
1001 See e.g. P. la Hausse, Brewers, Beerhalls and Boycotts: A History of Liquor in South Africa 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1988); P. Du Plooy, ‘African Reaction to the Beer Halls’ in J. Labland and R. 
Haswell (eds), Pietermaritzburg 1838-1938: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg, Shuter 
and Shooter, 1988); J. Gewald, ‘Diluting Drinks and Deepening Discontent: Colonial Liquor Controls and 
Public Resistance in Windhoek, Namibia’, in D. Bryceson (ed.), Alcohol in Africa: Mixing Business, Pleasure, 
and Politics (Portsmouth, Heinemann, 2002), pp. 117-139. 
1002 See e.g. Atkinson, ‘Contradictions of community’ and ‘Complex negotiations in local governance: The 
municipal beer hall debate in East London, 1956 to 1962’, New Contree, 55 (2008), pp. 93-113;  D. Whelan, 
‘eMatsheni: The central beer hall as social and municipal infrastructure in twentieth century 
Pietermaritzburg’, Historia, 60, 1 (2015), pp. 75-91 
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Atkinson notes: “[T]he motivations of the City Councils are usually presented very one-
dimensionally, thus losing sight of the intense debates and contradictory sentiments which 
characterised the positions of all the parties,” and, “The normative perspectives of municipal 
officials have never been explored.”1003 She finds, in addition to control and profit, that there was 
often a sincere belief, occasionally well-founded, that shebeening led to suffering and moral decay, 
and the local authorities therefore felt “morally obliged to intervene.”1004  
Atkinson argues that the increased sophistication of beer research and brewing processes 
from the 1950s, producing high-quality, nutritious beer in “modern, gleaming, hygienic brewing 
plants” gave officials moral succour when they contrasted the “primitiveness and squalor” of the 
shebeen queen’s “grubby 44-gallon drum.”1005 A key forum where urban administrators from 
Southern Africa shared ideas about these processes was the Institute of Administrators of Non-
European Affairs (IANA), with whom Ashton had regular correspondence, and whose annual 
conferences he attended. IANA discussed the technicalities of brewing from crop-growing to 
distribution tankers, and was the patron of the Technical Committee for Kaffir Beer Research 
established in 1955 (which compiled the statistics shown in Table 5).  
Sophistication and respectability were associated not just with the brewing processes but 
also, even more importantly, with the settings – shebeens versus municipal amenities. The 
Bulawayo Council was engaged in a moral contestation to legitimise the municipal amenity and 
condemn the degenerate shebeen. Unlike in South Africa, where there was some loosening of 
restrictions on shebeening and home brewing in different cities, in Rhodesia the laws and by-laws 
remained strict. (Whether Ashton actually believed they were degenerate is a moot point. On his 
trip across the USA to study race relations, he went to the home of a lecturer to drink an illegal 
beer in a dry county, and joked that it was like shebeening in Bulawayo.)  
In any case, prohibiting the shebeens was not sufficient to legitimise and thereby entice 
customers to the municipal amenities. The classic colonial beer hall was bleak., and it was only by 
replacing this model with more congenial beer gardens, that the Council could introduce an 
aesthetic dimension that would create an air of respectability to entice drinkers, from a range of 
social classes, away from shebeens. As Ashton argued:  
Hitherto there has been a tendency to regard these centres simply as beer drinking places. 
But they are much more than this – they are real recreation centres where people can 
 
1003 D. Aktinson, ‘Contradictions of community’, pp. 150 and 152 
1004 Ibid., p. 154. In South Africa, she argues that there were some “glimmerings of universalist and liberal 
reasoning” in 1950s policies on beer, but from the 1960s, this morphed into more coercive “Verwoerdian 
social engineering” (ibid., p. 168) 
1005 Ibid., p. 155 
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relax, gossip, have small parties, sing and dance. This aspect should be greatly 
encouraged... More attention should be paid to the appearance of these centres to raise 
their tone, and encourage the attendance of self-respecting people who at present avoid 
them. 1006 
But it is important to note that this moral dichotomy between the respectable municipal amenities 
and the degenerate shebeens was not the same as a dichotomy between tradition and modernity. 
Whilst trying to help people “transition” from tradition to modernity, Ashton valorised both of 
these states of social evolution. Thus, he placed great emphasis on ‘authentic’ African beer in 
Bulawayo, and he de-emphasised ‘European liquor’. Furthermore, “tribal” dancing in the beer 
gardens was also encouraged, with the municipality sponsoring dancing competitions. In 
Mzilikazi, a tribal dancing arena was built in 1960, and it was found to be more popular than jive, 
which was on the wane. Ashton said it would “assist in the preservation of a customary art form 
which was beginning to disappear for lack of encouragement.”1007 A prime example of the attempt 
to bridge the traditional and the modern can be seen in the way officials agonised over the dance 
classes to teach at one of the African Girls’ Clubs. They felt that there was, “a definite need to 
assist the African community to develop a form of dance which would retain the traditional 
pattern but which could be wedded to modern conditions.”1008   
As Nugent argues, the experience of consuming alcohol takes meaning from the social 
context and the spatial setting: “The issue of modernity is germane to both of these 
dimensions”.1009 In Bulawayo, administrative officials tried to associate the beer gardens and 
lounges with a respectability deriving from the quality of the beverage and an atmosphere that 
bridged tradition and modernity, whilst stigmatising the shebeens and their corrupting 
“concoctions” as zones of vice. In this respect, the Council had some allies in the African middle 
class and puritanical Christian communities, who were equally condemnatory of the “evil” 
shebeens. However, these groups tended to condemn the beer gardens too, claiming that the 
Council’s reliance on beer profits for township development laid the colonial state’s indifference 
to African welfare bare. The added suspicions about whether these funds were appropriately spent 
left the Council on shaky moral ground.  
Therefore, shebeens remained attractive. Until 1957, when Africans were prohibited from 
drinking European liquor (even clear beer), the shebeens were especially attractive for the middle 
 
1006 Ashton, African Administration in Bulawayo, appendix C [p.79] 
1007 African Admin Committee minutes, 31st January, 1961, p. 233/BCCA 
1008 Finance Committee minutes, 5th December, 1961, p. 2662. (My emphasis)/BCCA 
1009 P. Nugent, ‘Modernity, Tradition, and Intoxication: Comparative Lessons from South Africa and West 
Africa’, Past and Present, 222, 9 (2014) p. 126 
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class to imbibe European clear beer, and thereafter they retained that appeal, combined with being 
a safe space to discuss subversive politics.1010 And so, despite the municipality’s efforts to entice 
residents of all classes away from the “underworld”, the shebeens continued to do a roaring trade. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed how the beer garden system in Bulawayo was devised as a way to address 
financial, security and improvement imperatives at once. In a context of extreme resource 
constraint, and with limited involvement from Central Government, the Bulawayo Council 
focused on the beer monopoly system as an effective way to sponsor the more elaborate projects 
of home ownership, health, welfare and recreation envisaged by the modernising directors of 
Administration and Welfare, Ashton and Gargett.  
Riven with moral and practical contradictions (such was the nature of the colonial beer 
hall system), Ashton envisaged a resolution in more congenial, aesthetic beer gardens – attractive 
to a range of socio-economic strata. Nevertheless, this system created moral anxiety for Head 
Office staff and employment anxiety for those lower in the liquor undertaking’s administrative 
hierarchy, who were subject to instant dismissal if discrepancies were discovered in their beer 
outlet’s accounts. Contra the tendency to apply simple motives of control and profit in debates 
about the beer finance system, this chapter found the actors involved to be morally conflicted, 
forced to make unpalatable choices, in what Atkinson identifies as a “dirty hands” moral conflict 
faced by colonial administrators.1011 Similarly, it found many African residents to be in the 
contradictory position of actually requesting more control and regulation from the Council, in order 
to protect the youth, women and the generally irresponsible from the beer gardens’ corrupting 
influences. 
Whilst the beer gardens continued to attract all manner of criticism and objection, 
including from the very social classes to whom the beer profits were meant to provide loan capital 
for home ownership, the considerable size of these profits ultimately attested to the success of 
the municipality’s enterprise. As with every other aspect of township development and policy 
discussed in this thesis, it was the African Administration Department’s particular way of melding 
pragmatic strategies with modernising ideals that produced this controversial but ubiquitous and 
iconic social amenity of the African townships in late colonial Bulawayo.  
 
1010 Mpofu, ibid., p. 484 














By 1977, as systems of racial segregation in Rhodesia were finally being dismantled, and Dr Hugh 
Ashton retired after 28 years at the head of Bulawayo’s African Administration Department, the 
townships of Bulawayo had been transformed from squalid and overcrowded slums to extensive, 
stratified neighbourhoods with ‘modern’ amenities, community centres, recreational facilities, beer 
gardens and bars. To be sure, this turnaround was never enough to house the more than 10-fold 
increase in population that had taken place in that time, and most African residents still lived 
under fairly austere conditions, with a sizeable proportion experiencing extreme hardship and 
precarity, not to mention political repression. Nevertheless, the post-war development that had 
taken place signified a profound reorientation of the City Council, since the days when councillors 
hyperbolically protested that allowing African male workers to bring their wives into town would 
result in “the end of the white race”. A new basis of African urban citizenship, albeit of a second 
class status, had been constructed in these three decades, and this thesis unpacked the contested 
processes involved. 
Whilst Bulawayo’s experience fitted within a continental pattern of post-war reform, the 
city’s particular transformation took on several characteristics that distinguished it within 
Rhodesia and the region – implying a heterogeneity in colonial/Rhodesian urbanism that needs 
to be better accounted for. I have argued that the comparatively “progressive” approach in 
Bulawayo, in terms of constructing townships that were much more spatially integrated, 
socioeconomically stratified, available on leasehold and freehold title, well serviced with welfare 
and beer garden amenities, and conceived as part of a unitary – rather than segregated and 
fragmented – municipal government, was shaped by post-war liberal modernist ideas embedded 
in complex administrative problem-solving practices.  
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By problematising the notion that the colonial state operated as a unitary, intentional 
actor in the urban arena, the thesis makes both a methodological and theoretical contribution to 
the literature on late colonial urbanism. The methodological contribution was to open up the 
‘black box’ of the state bureaucracy to enable close examination of how township development 
was actually envisaged and executed over an extended period of time. By examining the practical 
and political struggles to get things done in Bulawayo – and the actors, ideas, negotiations, 
experiments and institutional culture/norms that arose therefrom (particularly in the Bulawayo 
Council’s African Administration Department) – we came to “see like the second city”, rather 
than seeing like “the state” in aggregate.  
With this disaggregated and decentralised perspective on post-war urban development, 
the thesis poses a theoretical challenge to essentialist notions of ‘colonial modernity’, and a call to 
nuance overly schematic models of ‘colonial governmentality’.  The interesting case of Bulawayo 
brings to light three main features that such schematic accounts tend to elide: firstly, that authority, 
influence and decision-making power were not as concentrated in the Central Government as 
often portrayed; local state actors captured a considerable degree of authority to pursue their own 
development visions that sometimes profoundly contradicted centralised agendas. Secondly, that 
the post-war context of resource and knowledge scarcity required considerable experimentation, 
resourcefulness, and compromise; normative developmental discourses were often employed 
more as ex post facto rationalisations for pragmatic action, than guiding principles for action. 
Thirdly, that the planning decisions, practices and rationalities introduced at the experimental 
juncture of the 1950s soon became entrenched, and subject to strong path dependent effects 
thereafter. The following sections recap how each chapter brought these characteristics of 
township development to light, concluding with a discussion of how a liberal, anthropologically 
trained low-level state agent like Ashton could exert such influence, and how this liberal influence 
shaped the specific colonial legacy in Bulawayo.  
 
The ideological basis of post-war development  
 
The thesis began by discussing some of the general trends of post-war developmental thinking 
and policy that the historiography of the period has elucidated. This provided a broad context 
within which to make sense of the reorientation that took place in the Bulawayo City Council. It 
explained how the Department’s head office staff, particularly Ashton – who was later joined by 
Dr Eric Gargett at the head of the Welfare Section – were instrumental in introducing an ethos 
of modernisation to the fledgling institution, and employing academically-trained ‘experts’ on 
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social change, including many more qualified African staff than was usual in Rhodesia. The 
concept of ‘modernisation’ (and its attendant concepts of ‘detribalisation’, ‘stabilisation’, 
‘urbanisation’, etc.) was examined in this thesis as a ‘native’s’ or emic category of analysis used by 
urban colonial state actors both to make sense of social change and to rationalise and defend their 
(often ad hoc and pragmatic) interventions to direct its course. This aligned with Fred Cooper’s 
eschewal of ‘modernity’ as a useful analytical category and an essential condition; and his 
preference for analysing it rather as a native’s category, employed as a means of claim-making.1012 
What distinguished the new approach to urban administration from the earlier approach, 
was the general acceptance of permanent African settlement in the city, and the commitment to 
providing conditions more conducive to settled community life. In other words, it involved new 
(but still highly gendered) conceptions of African urban citizenship.  These conceptions were 
informed by the idea that the African male workers and their families that needed to be settled, 
were in a precarious stage of transition from the stable tribal village to the bewildering 
environment of the modern city. This inspired paternalistic interventions – often deeply resented 
by the African “beneficiaries” –  in numerous domains of everyday life, in order to help these 
migrants “adjust”. Such ideas about social change and how to manage it (captured in numerous 
“-isations” like detribalisation, urbanisation, stabilisation, modernisation) were being propagated 
by various organisations at the time, with which Ashton and Gargett were regularly in contact, 
including the Rhodes Livingstone Institute and the Institute of Administrators of Non-European 
Affairs.  
But the urban administrators in Bulawayo did not just adopt these theories in an uncritical 
fashion. They critiqued and reworked them over time. Ashton also developed his own style of 
administration – balancing the imperatives of control and upliftment according to more liberal 
principles (but sometimes also authoritarian ones) than most of his counterparts in other 
municipalities. This entailed relaxing pass law procedures and home raids, and engaging with 
residents in a more conciliatory fashion, forging close yet ambivalent friendships with some 
township leaders. These specific local styles of administration were inflected by two key 
continuities from the earlier period: resistance to Central Government interference in local affairs, 
and rivalry with Salisbury. This study went on to show how this radical and ongoing reorientation 




1012 See F. Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 2005), chapter 5: ‘Modernity’. 
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Development in practice 
 
Since the African Administration Department’s mandate of stabilising, uplifting and 
paternalistically improving the African population was partly decoupled from direct control and 
law enforcement (for which the British South Africa Police took most responsibility), its staff 
were primarily concerned with expanding housing and amenities, providing tenure security, and 
nurturing ‘modern’ urban citizens – all with extremely limited resources and initially limited 
experience.  
Chapter 3 examined the AAD’s attempts to address the first imperative – to ramp up 
housing building, with limited capital, in a context of labour stabilisation and an end to the migrant 
labour system that had relied on the rural subsistence economy bearing the costs of reproducing 
the industrial labour force. The chapter focused particularly on Bulawayo’s distinctive emphasis 
on ‘home ownership’ as a means to enlist the resources and energies of African residents (amongst 
other rationalisations discussed in chapters 4 and 5). It revealed the origins of this home ownership 
trend to be an emergency squatter camp converted to an unglamorous, self-build, 10-year lease 
‘austerity scheme’ at the beginning of the 1950s, experimentally established in the context of a 
housing crisis. From here, it traced the shift towards “better-to-do” home ownership schemes 
and more spatially integrated development, resulting from the need to reduce infrastructural costs 
and satisfy home buyers’ “consumer preferences” to be closer to the industrial areas and CBD.  
The need to continually audit and improve upon existing strategies and learn about 
residents’ habits and preferences, and to experiment with house designs to minimise capital costs, 
never ceased. Meanwhile, well-organised residents’ associations and the African Advisory Board 
members contested their continued structural oppression, actively demanding rights and 
entitlements as urban citizens, whilst state officials disagreed fundamentally on the living standards 
that African ‘citizens-in-the-making’ should be afforded in the city. In the end, Bulawayo achieved 
a notably socially stratified pattern of township development, at no undue cost to either industrial 
employers or European ratepayers. This spectacle of progress was presented as the outcome of 
enlightened, modernising ideals, eliding the ad hoc, experimental and compromised nature of the 
development process. Moreover, the evocation of precolonial Ndebele royalty and political and 
military figures in the naming of these new, raw and often monotonous schemes gave them a 
semblance of noble history. 
Chapter 4 showed how home ownership was also promoted as a way to appease the 
discontented and politically active middle class. Secure tenure rights for Africans was always a 
controversial policy, however, because of the lingering hostility towards African settlement in the 
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cities, and the racialised land laws designating urban land as “European” for much of the colonial 
period. Furthermore, not only were African urban land tenure rights subject to change, but 
innumerable regulations and conditionalities for African urban residence remained in place; 
therefore, the de facto status of home owners remained unstable. And in the harsh economic 
conditions of the early 1960s, many home owners had no option but to default on their loan 
repayments, thus facing eviction.  
Nevertheless, Bulawayo’s policy of promoting African home ownership continued into 
the 1960s and 1970s under the Rhodesia Front, whose urban policy framework was at first 
ambivalent and vague and then unambiguously and aggressively segregationist – reverting to a 
notion of African townships as undesirable “black spots” in the white towns and cities. Thus, the 
presence of long-lease and freehold schemes in the proximity of Bulawayo’s expanding industrial 
areas became an obstacle to the Government’s segregationist vision. Ministers of Local 
Government trying to dismantle and curb the further growth of these African home owning 
communities were confronted by a Council that now defended home ownership as a “right”, and 
not just a privilege, and as a “treasured thing” for high and low income families alike. Numerous 
battles ensued until the segregationist Land Tenure Act was finally repealed just a few years before 
independence. 
Chapter 5 examined how both Government and Council rationalised their fundamentally 
opposing policies on African ‘participation’ in housing finance and urban management in terms 
of a common moral discourse about making Africans “responsible”. In the domain of housing, 
Bulawayo boasted about giving Africans an opportunity to experience the “responsibilities of 
modern life” and develop an “enterprising spirit” through its promotion of home ownership, for 
which it won accolades from a fairly supportive Government in the 1950s. But from the 1960s, 
the segregationist Rhodesia Front Government was not so amenable to Bulawayo’s project; it 
became actively hostile to the principle of African home ownership in the ‘European’ urban areas 
(restricting it to the wealthy, to whom private investors might extend (high interest) loans). 
Instead, it promoted a different kind of responsibilisation – through the removal of all subsidies 
in the rental housing sector. For pragmatic reasons, the Bulawayo Council tried to resist the 
removal of subsidisation schemes. The Government branded the Council “paternalistic”; the 
Council called the Government “sanctimonious”. Both sides claimed the moral high ground in 
making Africans responsible, through different means.  
When it came to African participation in urban management, the Bulawayo Council 
preferred to offer Africans either some direct representation on the Mother Council – according 
to a unitary city model – or else to empower the united African advisory board. The Government 
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preferred separate, semi-autonomous townships – a two-tier model. Again, both claimed that their 
policies would make Africans more responsible. These examples show how the same powerful 
moral discourse about ‘responsibility’ could be used to rationalise entirely divergent policies – 
Bulawayo’s, based on a vision of a more racially integrated city with heavier municipal involvement 
in development, and the RF’s, based on a vision of re-establishing the cities as white spaces and 
diminishing state involvement in the financing of township development.  
Chapter 6 analysed the lucrative municipal beer monopoly system and its inherent 
practical and moral contradictions. Whilst facing searing criticism from numerous sectors of 
society, this system was vital to the Council’s funding of health, welfare and home ownership in 
the African townships, and skilful PR was required to integrate this system into the spectacle of 
modernisation and moral improvement of township communities. Therefore, the conventional 
austere beer hall system model was drastically revised, leading to a proliferation of more congenial 
beer gardens with various facilities for wholesome pursuits, and an effort to make the municipal 
‘African beer’ higher quality. These spaces were justified as a places of social upliftment more than 
control, and their revenue-generating potential became something of an obsession of the AAD. 
These beer gardens epitomised the Department’s way of melding pragmatism with progressivism. 
Collectively, the chapters demonstrate the interconnected ways in which the Bulawayo 
Council addressed the political and moral imperatives of development in a context of scarce 
material and knowledge resources. Each chapter bears evidence of the decentralised and path 
dependent ways in which this development unfolded in Bulawayo, and the perpetual conflict that 
ensued with Central Government authorities. The chapters reveal how, despite the loose reference 
by most Rhodesian state actors to universal late colonial developmental tropes – detribalisation, 
stabilisation, responsibilisation and participation – the municipalities and the Government actually 
envisaged African urban citizenship in profoundly different ways, inspiring them to pursue 
divergent policies. To this end, local state actors asserted their superior on-the-ground expertise 
and kept the gate to localised knowledge. These actions reconfigured authority and influence in 




Reason, expertise, authority and influence: the legacy 
of liberal administration in Bulawayo 
 
Whereas Harare after independence continues to be a deeply divided place, dominated by the enormous 
distance which colonial planning established between Black and White and between the wealthy suburbs 
of the north and the townships and Chitungwiza south of the city, Bulawayo appears much more coherent. 
Segregation between races and between rich and poor is less spectacular, and there is more of a gradual 
transition between the city and its western townships, indicating a history of different interaction and 
providing other possibilities for contact.1013  
To a significant extent, the trajectory of township development in Bulawayo was determined by 
the ideas and actions of Dr Hugh Ashton, from the moment of post-war reform until the eve of 
independence. The close observations of departmental activities by the anthropologist Professor 
Harry Wolcott evince this central role of Ashton: “The personality of the [African Administration] 
Department was his personality, its conscience was his conscience…The townships had 
developed largely under his direction…”1014 Ashton’s more liberal ideas about African urban 
citizenship shaped and were shaped by his pragmatic and political strategies for getting things 
done under the political and economic conditions of an industrial second city. Ashton’s increasing 
clout enabled him to wield significant influence over the Council, and even sometimes the Central 
Government.  
His guiding vision for African township development in Bulawayo was to ‘modernise’ 
the built environment and its inhabitants according to a comparatively integrated ‘unitary city’ 
model, encouraging social stratification and property ownership, with intense municipal 
management of these processes. Ashton’s Department and the City Council at large marched 
fairly in step with the ‘liberal’ Governments of the 1950s, despite the latter’s detachment from the 
complexities of development in Bulawayo. But as the right-wing Government of the 1960s and 
‘70s aggressively ‘reversed’ the progressive trends of the 1950s, by reviving the conception of 
Africans as essentially tribal and of townships as “black spots in the white areas”, the established 
policies, practices and planning models in Bulawayo increasingly came under pressure. As we have 
seen, the Bulawayo Chronicle characterised this period as “a series of battles, the fiercest following 
UDI, most of which were won by the council, with Dr Ashton being amongst those in the 
frontline.”1015  
 
1013 Kaarsholm, ‘Si Ye Pambili?’, p. 228 
1014 See chapter 2. 
1015 The Chronicle, October 26, 1987 (also cited in chapter 2). 
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With his espousal of trendy teleological theories – much like his liberal anthropologist 
contemporaries at the Rhodes Livingstone Institute – Ashton is easy to caricature as an archetypal 
modernist, beholden to dogmatic conceptions of the inevitability and desirability of 
‘detribalisation’ and ‘urbanisation’. Some scholars have felt called to come to the defence of these 
anthropologists, notably Hugh MacMillan, who argues that the RLI researchers never were so 
dogmatically teleological.1016 However, as James Ferguson points out: 
It is hard to see why it should be controversial to assert that [James Clyde] Mitchell and 
[Godfrey] Wilson, like other liberals in white colonial society, considered the spread of 
what both unabashedly called ‘the civilized way of life’ to be both a natural and a desirable 
development. Since the only alternative that either author could envisage at that time to 
such a process was a racist and fascist segregationism, one could even say that such a faith 
was to their credit.1017 
Indeed, Ashton held on tenaciously to his original 1950s vision of ‘modernising’ the townships, 
but not without a degree of reflexivity and adaptability, concerned most of all with resisting what 
he considered the reactionary segregationism of the Rhodesia Front.1018 By examining this low-
level state actor straddling the social worlds of academic anthropology and the colonial state, this 
thesis has shown how theories of social change were put to work within the everyday practical 
and political struggles of colonial administration – both to guide action and to rationalise it ex post 
facto.  In these struggles, Ashton called upon his anthropological expertise to claim a richer 
understanding of African urban society – akin to what George Steinmetz calls ‘ethnographic 
capital’1019 – and tapped into knowledge exchange networks from across the continent, to devise 
development solutions with no precedent in Rhodesia.  
These actions “from below” reoriented the Council’s whole approach to African affairs. 
Whilst councillors and officers did not always speak with one voice, there was less politics and 
greater harmony in the Bulawayo Council than in Salisbury. The Council displayed economic and 
practical self-reliance in township development, in contrast to the earlier days when it had 
demanded that Government take responsibility for African housing. It also displayed localised 
expertise and knowledge; whereas previously the Government had relied on its own commissions 
 
 
1016 H. Macmillan, 'The Historiography of Transition on the Zambian Copperbelt -- Another View', 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 19, 4 (1993), pp. 681-712. 
1017 J. Ferguson, ‘Modernist narratives, conventional wisdoms, and colonial liberalism: reply to a straw 
man’, Journal of Southern African Studies 20,4 (1994), p. 636. 
1018 And on the other hand, the too-revolutionary change of African nationalists. 
1019 G. Steinmetz, ‘The colonial state as a social field: Ethnographic capital and native policy in the 
German overseas empire before 1914,’ American Sociological Review 73, 4 (2008), pp. 589-612. 
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of inquiry to find out about housing conditions that the municipality had failed to acknowledge, 
the reformed Council – especially its AAD staff but also the town clerk, town planners and city 
engineers – engaged in extensive auditing, surveying and experimentation that produced superior 
localised knowledge of African “consumer preferences” with respect to styles of housing and 
social amenities, political preferences with respect to a unitary versus fragmented city model, 
economic realities with respect to the viability of rental and home ownership schemes, 
construction methods on sandy soils, cost-cutting measures in planning and layout, etc.  The 
spectacle of significant development arising therefrom enabled the Council to assert its autonomy 
in directing the city’s affairs – and to defend “treasured” local traditions like African home 
ownership, which had ensured the “townships evolved from the grass roots.”1020  
In addition to asserting their expert authority, we have seen how it was necessary for local 
state actors to establish persuasive developmental visions and regimes of truth with which to 
rationalise their actions. Thus, in the protracted bureaucratic negotiations over every aspect of 
township development, truth claims were made about the ability of Africans to “transition” to 
modernity, and administrative action was rationalised in terms of the stabilisation, participation, 
and responsibilisation necessary to achieve that goal. For example, ‘frills’ in African house design 
(such as electrification) were rationalised by Ashton in terms of the desires and aspirations of a 
modern citizen-in-the-making, in an attempt to counter the efforts of Government officials (and 
some within the Bulawayo Council’s own ranks) to rationalise African house design in terms of 
economic multiplier effects and minimum sociologically-determined standards for habitation. 
Michael Ndubiwa, one of the AAD’s most ambitious and talented administrative assistants, went 
even further than Ashton in presenting graphic details of the hardships and social indignities 
suffered by township dwellers under the allegedly ‘sufficient standards of living’ defined by the 
state.  
 Tenure security in the 1950s was rationalised in terms of appeasing, responsibilising and 
integrating African townspeople – especially the burgeoning middle class – into modern urban 
society. These instrumental modes of reasoning had the effect of presenting home ownership as 
a privilege more than a right (the irony of which was exposed by the astute Charlton Ngcebetsha). 
But as we have seen, in the 1960s and ‘70s, Ashton and a comparatively liberal cohort of 
councillors (notably a series of progressive mayors from the Jewish industrialist community) began 
to raise more principled (not merely instrumental) defences of tenure security – defining it as an 
intrinsic right, and not just a privilege. This contradicted the Rhodesia Front’s portrayal of 
 
1020 Mayor of Bulawayo, Eugene Gordon. (See chapter 4). 
270 
 
Africans as essentially tribal, ill-suited to urban life and undeserving of any such ‘privileges’ in the 
white city – a powerful truth claim used to revoke African tenure rights in the urban areas.  
RF local government ministers claimed that the extension of home ownership to low-
income groups and in areas close to the CBD and industrial sites created “slums” and stifled 
industrial expansion, whilst Ashton argued the opposite – that it created a responsible citizenry 
invested in their homes and communities. The RF’s alternative way to responsibilise residents was 
to remove subsidisation in rental schemes (whilst branding Bulawayo ‘paternalistic’ for resisting 
this); whilst Bulawayo rationalised its subsidised rental policy in terms of the maintenance of a 
delicate equilibrium in the housing accounts for a structurally impoverished urban community.1021  
Bulawayo rationalised its schemes for African participation in local government in terms 
of an integrationist ‘unitary city’ model conducive to a multiracial society, with imagery of 
Bulawayo as a coherent whole, from which the separation of the African townships would be like 
the “severing of the municipal limbs”. It  condemned the RF Government’s segregationist vision 
of a fragmented ‘two-tier’ city as a way of “fobbing [Africans] off with something inferior”.1022 
Bulawayo’s strong resistance to the RF’s segregationist vision contrasted with Salisbury City 
Council’s willing adoption of the two-tier model. 
When it came to the controversial policy of building African beer gardens in the vicinity 
of white neighbourhoods, Ashton steamrolled over “prejudiced” white residents’ complaints by 
presenting the availability of on-site domestic help as a white privilege, that came with the 
obligation to tolerate domestic workers recreating in the ‘European’ areas (rather than expecting 
them to commute to the distant townships for a drink). The RF Government, by contrast, 
defended its self-described “hard-headed” approach to African domestic life in the European 
areas, in terms of the paramountcy of white interests.   
These examples of competing rationalities of development, embedded in pragmatic and 
political struggle, wherein low-level state actors acquired significant clout and influence, should 
provoke us to question overly functionalist accounts of the supposedly top-down process of post-
war township development, which imply a unitary, intentional state actor. Whilst at a certain level 
of generality, such accounts have yielded many insights into general developmental patterns across 
the continent, they have also served to elide disjunctures within the state, the diversity of 
 
1021 These alternative arguments for ‘responsibilising’ citizens (whilst offloading housing costs onto them) 
presaged the neoliberal ideology that emerged globally in the later 1970s. However, Bulawayo’s preference 
for heavy state involvement and the RF’s antipathy to African land ownership in urban areas, meant that 
neither would fully promote the neoliberal ideology of unregulated market-led development. 
1022 See chapter 5 
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institutional cultures and practices that emerged in different towns and cities as a result of these 
disjunctures, and therefore also the heterogeneous legacies bequeathed at independence.  
Many administrators continued to work in the Bulawayo City Council long after 
Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, including Michael Ndubiwa, who became the first Black 
town clerk in Southern Africa, only retiring in 1999. To some extent, they reoriented the City 
Council to suit a new, constitutionally non-racial society. But they also carried over their 
experiences from many years as African Advisory Board Members and officers in the African 
Administration Department, thus perpetuating many aspects of the colonial Council’s governing 
style and normative models of urban citizenship in the townships – dubbed “high density areas” 
after independence.  
From interviews with some of the people who carried over this legacy, it was evident that 
they regarded Bulawayo to have its own, distinctive, long-term tradition of comparatively 
progressive urban administration. Some of this was disseminated to other towns: Much Masunda 
claims that, “The template which Hugh Ashton and his team set in Bulawayo was then replicated 
throughout Zimbabwe in the way local authorities were run”, citing several administrators who 
went on to head Housing and Amenities in Salisbury, Mutare, Kwekwe and Masvingo.1023 
However, Bulawayo continued to display its particularity and distinctive autonomy1024, 
establishing a robust reputation as the most effective local authority in the country.1025 The tension 
between this autonomous second city and Central Government, especially with regards to 
providing housing and services in the high density areas, is an issue that has “remained constant” 





1023 Interview with Much Masunda, Harare, 24th June, 2018 
1024 Bulawayo was the only local authority to resist the takeover of water supplies by the parastatal 
Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) in the early 2000s. 
1025 When council housing awards were introduced in 1988, Bulawayo took the first prize for 3 out of the 
first 4 years, and there have been numerous references in the post-independence public sphere to its 
superior reputation. This would make it an important Council to study as a “pocket of effectiveness”. See 
e.g. the research group at Manchester University: Investigating 'pockets of effectiveness' in developing countries: a new 
route to building state capacity for development, available at 
https://www.gdi.manchester.ac.uk/research/groups/politics-governance-management/investigating-
pockets-of-effectiveness/ retrieved 20th September, 2018.  





This study has some limitations. Whilst the key actors in this study, notably Hugh Ashton, 
undoubtedly played a significant role in township development, there were other structural 
factors, such as the dominant industrial sector as a lobby group, and the particularities of 
Bulawayo’s social demographics, that undoubtedly impacted its African housing policies in ways 
that were alluded to, but beyond the scope of the study to explore systematically. The influence 
exerted by industry, and the differences in the types of labour and the connections of workers to 
the rural hinterlands in Bulawayo and Salisbury, no doubt impacted the types of worker stability 
sought by both employers and workers, independent of the facilitative role played by the councils.  
Secondly, a more systematic analysis of civil society would have shed further light on the ways in 
which residents influenced municipal policies and practices. Whilst I focused on the archival 
evidence of African residents impacting administrative decisions and processes through their 
collective action in residents’ associations, advisory boards, and orchestrated rioting, there were 
obviously other ways in which they shaped housing and administration policy that the archives 
did not register, requiring further historical inquiry through literary and oral sources outside the 
archive. Residents no doubt influenced administrators, “timed” the temporal rhythms of the 
township administration and intervened at strategic moments to secure resources.1027   
Thirdly, women are under-represented in this historical account. This was a result of both the 
gendered nature of the archives and my inability to locate women who had worked in the AAD. 
Furthermore, since men dominated the residents’ associations and advisory boards, the role of 










1027 See A. Ghertner, ‘When is the state? Topology, temporality, and the navigation of everyday state space 
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Appendix A: Rental Housing Development, 
1949-1977 
 
As noted in chapter 3, despite Bulawayo’s emphasis on home ownership, rental schemes still 
comprised the majority of housing units until independence. As this overview of rental housing 
development in this appendix shows, Bulawayo focused on massively expanding the ratio of 
‘married’ to ‘single’ rental housing. Immediately, the newly established African Administration 
Department at mid-century began to build married housing schemes, beginning with Barbour 
Fields in 1949 (described in chapter 3) and then Nguboyenja – a married township built between 
1950 and 1952 (with the help of the National Building and Housing Board). Nguboyenja 
comprised 554 semi-detached houses with 2 rooms, a kitchen and individual aqua privies, built 
out of ‘no-fines’ concrete.1029 They were described by Mayor Newman as composing “an attractive 
village”1030  – a heretofore rare epithet for Bulawayo’s African housing, and a sign that the Council 
was starting to regard its own housing estates with a modicum of pride rather than shame and 
defensiveness.  
But it was imperative to address the massive backlog in single men’s housing. Since 
Barbour Fields and Nguboyenja had filled the proclaimed ‘Native Urban Areas’ on the Bulawayo 
Commonage, the next large scheme for single men was planned for Hyde Park on the 
Commonage Boundary, which, as mentioned, Council had earmarked for future development. 
But immediately, there were obstacles to this segregationist plan. Firstly, the Government 
disapproved of the remote siting, preferring some development on Bulawayo’s massive Western 
Commonage land first.1031 Secondly, the Bulawayo Council made its own extensive financial 
considerations, and realised that by re-locating the proposed scheme to the Western Commonage, 
it would save £600,000, which as the mayor put it, was “too great a price to pay for the ideal of 
residential segregation”.1032 Therefore, the whole scheme was relocated closer to town and became 
two adjacent townships –  Mabutweni and Iminyela – each accommodating 4800 men, 
constructed between 1950-52. 
Being some distance from the industrial sites and inadequately served by public transport, 
and with strict celibacy conditions, these schemes were not easy to fill. The mayor, who was also 
Chairman of the African Advisory Boards, begged the Board Members to give every 
 
1029 No-fines concrete housing was invented by the George Wimpey company in Britain after World War 
II for mass social housing. It is concrete with no fine aggregates. 
1030 BCCA/Mayor’s Minute, 1952, p. 3 
1031 Ashton, African Administration, and Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 187 
1032 BCCA/Mayors’ minute, 1950, p. 3 
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encouragement to bachelors in the Old Location to move over to these two new schemes.1033 But 
the members explained that even when employees were officially resident in Mabutweni or 
Iminyela (with their employers paying their rents), they often snuck back to the old ‘Bulawayo 
African Townships’ at night.1034 Moreover, the new townships were not exactly enticing, with four 
men to a room. Board Member Dick Masunda argued that it should be three at most, as there was 
no room for bicycle storage or even a table.1035  The Old Location of Makokoba was even more 
cramped, but it was at least a home, a community, and a livelihood to many.  The AAD soon 
discovered that housing solutions had to pay at least some regard to ‘consumer preferences’, even 
if the consumer was generally impoverished and disempowered. 
Ashton soon found his plans frustrated. He presented 3 years of building plans from 
1951-54 to house 15,000 single men and 4,800 families1036, but the Finance Committee put a 
damper on them – only expenditure for the ensuing year could be approved, nothing beyond that. 
The discrepancy between 4-year physical plans and only 1-year budgeting plans (which could be 
changed at short notice) posed a serious problem for long-term development, adding to the ad hoc 
nature of housing development.1037 In 1952 and ‘53, no major rental schemes were initiated as 
there was a dearth of loan funds from government. (It was in this context of financial stringency 
that Bulawayo pioneered home ownership, discussed in the next section.)  The rental housing 
backlog was growing again, and the mayor blamed Government for this “tragic situation”.1038 
Restricted to infrastructural development (e.g. street lighting for most townships) and 
small-scale schemes, the Department engaged in cost-cutting experiments. One of these was 
employing African construction workers. The Urban Areas Act No. 20 of 1951 (section 69) 
allowed local authorities to employ African artisans to build houses (under European supervision) 
at wage rates and conditions different from those specified under the Industrial Conciliation Act, 
so as to be able to reduce building costs in African areas1039. The Bulawayo City Council took 
advantage of this. Having hired African labourers to successfully build a 300-room block, Ashton 
mocked “the scepticism of many who doubted their capacity to build a three-storey building.” 
And thereafter, contracts were usually awarded to the cheapest tenderers, who employed African 
 
1033 BCCA/African Advisory Board Meeting, 22nd Sept., 1952 [p. 46] 
1034 The Bulawayo African Townships (BAT) was an umbrella term for Makokoba, Mzilikazi, Nguboyenja 
and Barbour Fields. 
1035 BCCA/African Advisory Board Meeting, 22nd Sept., 1952 [p. 46] 
1036 Involving converting single units to 1,200 married ones. 
1037 See this discussed in Finance Committee minutes, 1960 vol. 1 p. 89 
1038 BCCA/Mayor’s Minute, 1953 
1039 (Urban Affairs Commission report, 1958, p. 47) 
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labour.  But this form of cost-saving was contentious. The Salisbury CC which was more inclined 
to hire white artisans, adding to its development costs.1040  
By 1953, Bulawayo still lagged behind Salisbury in terms of the married to single housing 
ratio: it had accommodation for 21,000 singles and 3,000 families (and 120 single women), 
whereas Salisbury had accommodation for 17,912 single men and 4,673 families. This meant 
Salisbury had a much greater backlog in single housing whereas Bulawayo had a greater backlog 
in married housing.1041  
But within a few years, Bulawayo had overtaken the capital in its ratio of married to single 
housing. This shift began with the 1953 departure of Donald Macintyre, who had epitomised the 
early colonial opposition to permanent Council housing for Africans. As noted in chapter 3, the 
construction of the massive Njube housing scheme – the largest in the colony to date – began in 
1953. In 1955, Bulawayo’s mayor proclaimed, “[W]e can justifiably point with pride to the fact 
that over the last five years the Council has provided and planned more housing for Africans than 
during the whole of its previous existence since 1897”.1042 It had been a low bar to beat, but still 
this positive attitude was a profound turnaround from the beginning of the decade.1043 He 
optimistically predicted that by 1957, the backlog would be fully absorbed and an additional 1,400 
dwellings per year thereafter would suffice to house the expanding population – displaying an 
optimism that proved unfounded.1044 
Ashton’s assessment was somewhat more tempered. He drew up daunting estimates of 
African housing requirements for the next 5 years:1045 



















Total needed by 1959 7,450 10,600 
 
 
1040 In 1961, when Salisbury CC awarded a contract to a much higher tenderer who employed only white 
labour, the Prime Minister criticised them for this, saying it contravened the Industrial Conciliation Act, 
and threatened the city’s future loans. [‘Contract Row in Council’, Bulawayo Chronicle, 21 Dec, 1960].  
1041 S2609/35/1/vol.1 Native Housing Policy, 1946-53 [p. 1-2] 
1042 BCCA/Mayor’s Minute for the Year Ending 31st July, 1955 
1043 In 1955 Bulawayo spent £470, 000 on African housing, which was more than Salisbury (£430, 000). 
NAZ/s3602/35/2. Vol. 2. Native Housing Policy [p. 18] 
1044 BCCA/Mayor’s Minute for the year ended 31st July, 1955, p. 2  
1045 Note that in addition to these municipal housing figures, there was a significant number of “bachelors” 
(25,300) accommodated in private premises (mostly domestic). 
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These estimates were based on a conservative growth estimate of 5%. Ashton emphasised, “Our 
efforts should be concentrated on the creation of married accommodation”, and he claimed that 
if his programme was achieved, it would shift the ratio of married to single men down to 1 to 2.5 
by 1959, which would be “very much better than any Municipality in Rhodesia has yet achieved”, 
but would still be behind the “more advanced South African towns”.1046 Ashton’s housing 
proposals would very conservatively cost £2 262 500 (with just minimal service provision). This 
estimate included 7,400 bachelors accommodated as lodgers, a new system the council was not in 
favour of but would come to accept. The costs also excluded upgrading of the austere bachelor 
accommodation at Mshasha, Iminyela and Mabutweni. Thus, Ashton beseeched the Council to 
accept that “the housing programme envisaged, formidable though it is, is neither extravagant nor 
complete”. But the Council considered that it was “extremely unlikely that there will be sufficient 
money to finance the whole of the Director’s proposals”.1047 
A windfall came in 1955 with a loan of half a million pounds from the Prime Minister’s 
UK fund raising efforts. This was spent on a massive home ownership scheme called Mpopoma 
(discussed in the next section). Whilst Mpopoma preoccupied the Department, no rental schemes 
were built until 1958, but all townships underwent maintenance work and infrastructural 
developments to roads, sanitary facilities, shopping and recreational/beer garden amenities. By 
1957, Ashton boasted that Bulawayo’s African residents had been accommodated in “better 
conditions than they have ever known”, with a far healthier married to single ratio, and that the 
“appalling conditions in the town and Commonage have been virtually eliminated”.1048  
This was not, however, how all of the residents viewed it. The rental schemes remained 
monotonous, and stereotypes about African housing preferences still inhibited innovation.  But 
in 1958, the first “high-density” housing was created, in the form of 300 double-storey 4-roomed 
terraced units for families in the B.A.T, explicitly to “relieve the monotony of endless 
bungalows.”1049  Flats were also built above shops for the first time. Ashton remarked that, “The 
popularity of these flats does not support widely-held assumptions that Africans would not take 
to multi-double-storey buildings”.1050 This was the beginning of a densification trend that 
continued in the 1960s as land became scarce.  
 
1046 BCCA/African Administration Department report to His Worship the Mayor and Councillors, 11th 
March 1955/Council minutes 
1047 BCCA/“Siting of future native housing schemes”, report submitted to Council by the Town Clerk’s 
Department, 1st March 1955, in Council Minutes, 1955, p. 2.  
1048 Ashton, African Administration in Bulawayo, p. 15 
1049 BCCA/Annual report of the Director, 1959.  
1050 Annual Report of the Director, 1959, p. 85 
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Meanwhile, old styles of bachelor accommodation began to be phased out. The austere 
bachelor township of Mshasha, housing nearly 2000 men, was earmarked for removal. The 
Department reluctantly built 4-storey “hostels” for single men in the B.A.T to accommodate 1,326 
men in total.  Ashton opined, “I hope no more hostels of this sort will be built and that in future 
bachelors will be accommodated as lodgers or in bachelor flats, scattered throughout the 
townships.”1051  
In 1959, Ashton pronounced “doubt and confusion” over the country’s urban African 
administration policy, and for this reason the steady rate of expansion slowed considerably.  The 
official African population housed in municipal schemes in 1959 was 9,498 families (about 45,000 
men, women, children), 25,347 single men, and 133 single women, but the actual number of 
dwellers was estimated to be about 15% higher than this. An additional 500 families were 
estimated to be squatting on Hyde Park Farm.1052 The Railways housed 15,0001053; other 
industrialists 6,000; and a further 20,000 were housed by domestic employers.1054   
As for the industrial employers in Bulawayo, their role in housing dwindled as the 
municipality preferred to take charge and administer a more coherent, unified township 
community. The Railways, however, did continue with its own large-scale schemes. It had always 
housed its own railway employees since setting up shop in the city in 1897. However, the quality 
of railway housing had always been variable. During the Second World War, it was totally 
inadequate, but the wake-up call from a 1945 railway workers’ strike led to considerable 
improvements in the late colonial period. There were some disagreements in the 1950s between 
the Bulawayo Council and the Railways over who should be responsible for employee housing – 
indeed in 1951 the Council refused to house any railway employees – but a more coordinated 
effort was made thereafter, with the Council leasing whole sections of its townships to the 
Railways.1055  
There were also about 25,000 domestic employees in Bulawayo by the mid-1950s. Men 
outnumbered women 13 to 1 in this sector, though this gender balance shifted in favour of women 
over time. Domestic worker housing was regulated by the Municipality through licencing and the 
 
1051 Annual Report of the Director, 1960, [p. 34] 
1052 For comprehensive housing statistics for the year 1959, see appendix A. 
1053 This figure may be in accurate, as the figure for the following year was 12,500. 
1054 Annual Report of the Director, 1960, [p. 34] 
1055 The Railways leased 116 acres at a very low rent from the Municipality in the late 1950s, to build a 600-
house scheme called Matshobana. It was modelled on the best municipal housing, but fell short in terms of 
social amenities. In Tshabalala township, the Council offered more than a thousand units to the Railways 
in the 1960s. (BCCA/Housing and Amenities Director’s Annual Report, 1964 [p.72])  
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imposition of minimum dwelling standards. In theory, domestic employees’ spouses and children 
were not supposed to live with them, though in practice this was common.  
 
1960s: Slum upgrading and conversions from single to married 
housing 
 
The increased stability of the labour force meant married housing was much more important than 
single men’s housing. Ashton emphasised the “crying need” for more subeconomic married 
housing. It was particularly hard for workers earning less than £10 a month to find 
accommodation. Despite the prioritisation of married schemes (both rental and home ownership) 
in the 1950s,  there were still 5,000 applicants on the married housing waiting list, a backlog that 
would cost about £3 million to address.1056 Ashton therefore asked the Council in 1960 to accept, 
in principle and before funding had been considered, the necessity of building housing for a 
further 10,000 families and 3,000 single men (in two areas on the Commonage called Curti’s Farm 
and Paradise Farm).1057   
The Council realised that ordinary Government loans for the plans would not suffice; 
special funds from overseas would be required – preferably £1 million per year for 5 years. It 
appears that somewhat arbitrarily revised funding requirements were being periodically put 
forward with unwarranted optimism. As it turned out, these funds were not forthcoming, and so 
two cost-saving strategies had to be employed: firstly, converting substantial portions of single 
men’s housing into married housing, and secondly, converting planned rental schemes into home 
ownership schemes, where the financial burden would fall on the lessee. This second strategy is 
discussed in the next section on home ownership schemes. A third major development was the 
“slum upgrading” of Makokoba. 
Substandard bachelor’s accommodation needed to be demolished or upgraded and 
converted to married accommodation, which would affect about 7,000 single men. On the first 
strategy of converting single housing to married housing, Ashton believed that, “This would 
contribute to the twin desiderata of increasing married accommodation and reducing troublous 
spots such as Iminyela and Mabutweni.”1058  This made sense in light of the fact that single men’s 
townships were emptying anyway, due to both a slowing down of industry and commerce 
(particularly construction), and a drift of single men to the lodgings offered in home ownership 
 
1056 BCCA/Council Meeting Minutes, 18.10.61, p. 2255 
1057 BCCA/Joint Finance and Special African Housing Committee, 29.11.60, p. 3596 
1058 BCCA/African Admin Committee meeting, 1961 vol 4 p. 2578 
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schemes like Mpopoma (see below). In fact the Department estimated that it was actually losing 
substantial money from single men’s units that were lying empty. Part of this drive to reduce single 
men’s schemes involved demolishing the sub-standard, austere single men’s houses at Mshasha 
(103 dormitories housing 2900 men) and the C.M.U (former Royal Air Force Central Maintenance 
Unit which had housed approx. 500 men).1059  
It was, of course, poorer families that were moved to the vacated units at Mabutweni – 1 
family to a room formerly occupied by 4 single men. After 572 families had begun to settle in and 
develop their gardens, Ashton reported that, “the improvement in the general atmosphere of the 
area has been striking”.1060  By 1963, Mabutweni was fully converted to married accommodation 
for 1,184 families. Mabutweni’s neighbouring “trouble spot” of Iminyela, which was largely tied 
accommodation – i.e. blocks of units were rented to employees of one company – was converted 
to individual tenancies, further reducing Bulawayo’s already minimal ratio of “tied 
accommodation” compared to other municipalities in the country.   
These conversions as well as incremental building in existing schemes meant that by the 
mid-60s, Bulawayo had provided a much higher ratio of married (family) housing than the 
Salisbury Council. As Palley noted at the time, the cities’ different policies in this regard meant 
that Bulawayo had accommodation for 15,967 families and 13,303 single men, whereas Salisbury 
accommodated 8,109 families and 25,578 single men.1061 Ashton reported that Salisbury’s 
townships of Highfield and Harare were under states of emergency due to overcrowding, but 
luckily Bulawayo was spared.1062  
Meanwhile, another form of improvement to existing schemes that did not cost the 
municipality, was residents taking their own initiative to extend and improve their houses, with 
Council encouragement but no guarantee of compensation, proving that it was not just the “home 
owners” who were beginning to invest considerable time and money in their place of residence. 
For example, in 1963, tenants of 300 houses at Nguboyenja extended them by one room.  
Mzilikazi was “ceasing to be a township purely for the lower income group”, evidenced by 
residents spending between £5 and £200 on improvements to their houses and requesting a 
domestic electricity supply.1063  
Finally, in the neglected Old Location of Makokoba, the Department undertook “slum 
upgrading” – which entailed both renovation and redevelopment. The area of Makokoba had 
 
1059 BCCA/African Admin Committee meeting, 1961 vol 4 p. 2578 
1060 BCCA/Annual Report of the Director, 1962 
1061 C.S.R 19-1965, p. 23 in Palley, The Constitutional History, p. 649 
1062 BCCA/Director’s annual report, 1965 
1063 BCCA/Annual report, 1963 
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been settled by African townspeople since the birth of colonial Bulawayo. It was where the first 
council housing appeared in 1912, but most of its houses were built in the 1940s. Despite official 
neglect, since the 1930s the township had been a place of rich political and cultural expression, 
including jazz, dance and fashion. Many rural women came there to experience the glamour of 
town life: “It was good to be young and in the swing even if you had to live in crowded 
Makokoba”, recalled MaNcube, who had left the “quiet life” of her rural home (to her father’s 
fury) to become one of the “chief dancers” of Makokoba.1064  
 
The township experienced a demographic shift in the 1950s: originally designed for single men, 
by 1960 families outnumbered bachelors,  and many of the latter lived with unofficial wives, also 
referred to as ‘sit and get’ girls. Rooms that had once housed 8 men (although official capacity 
was 4) now often housed 8 women and children. The living conditions were bad. A Bantu Mirror 
reporter described them thus: 
 
1064 Hloniphani Ndlovu interview with MaNcube, New Magwegwe, Feb, 2000, quoted in Ranger, Bulawayo 
Burning, p. 177. 




I went around the township in the early hours of the morning and what I saw was 
appalling. Everywhere from Fourth Street to Eighth Street were bundles of human beings 
wrapped up in flimsy blankets sleeping outside in the biting weather.1065 
The majority of these outsleepers were unemployed youths, but included some families. The 
Bantu Mirror blamed the overcrowding of Makokoba on the immorality of these single men taking 
in unofficial wives – reflecting a more general moral judgment of Makokoba at this time, that it 
was a “den for all runaway girls”.1066  
In  1961, the Council renovated 1,041 houses and 9 public lavatories, and in 1962, finally 
devised a masterplan for the renewal and redevelopment of the whole of Makokoba. By this time, 
12,650 people occupied the married housing and 4,800 the single men’s blocks.1067 The masterplan 
aimed to house just 10,000 registered occupants, and gradually move the remaining 9,000 
elsewhere. This policy of urban renewal was pursued “with vigour” over the next few years.1068 
 
1065 Bantu Mirror, 14 May, 1960, quoted in Ranger, Bulawayo Burning, p. 177. 
1066 Bantu Mirror, 9 July ,1960, quoted in Ranger, ibid. 
1067 Annual report of the Director of African Administration for the year ended 30th June, 1963: 7 
1068 First 64 flats were built to rehouse Municipal employees; then 5 blocks of 24 flats each were built. These 
blocks were 3 storeys high – the first of their kind in Southern Rhodesia, with individual toilets and water 
connections replacing ablution blocks. 
Figure 44: Detached Houses in Makokoba [Source: NAZ/undated/courtesy of Paul Hubbard] 
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The aim was to reduce existing densities to 37 dwelling units per hectare, and build upwards at a 
density of 65 units per hectare. A slow policy of re-accommodating people in other townships, 
until there would be only one family per room in Makokoba, was discontinued when the Advisory 
Boards reported the inconvenience that this reshuffling was causing to tenants.1069  
As land became scarce in the 1960s, the Council began increasingly to pursue 
densification in other townships as well. By 1965, Ashton announced that, “We have reached a 
stage where unoccupied building land within reasonable reach of the City and Industrial areas is 
becoming very scarce, and to make the best use of the limited space available it has become 
necessary to build upwards”.1070 Two and three-storey blocks of flats were built at Nguboyenja 
and the home ownership schemes of Mpopoma and Tshabalala. The Council’s Building Director 
calculated that two storeys was the most economical: 
Table 6: Housing costs in relation to Density. [Source: R. Agnew, Planning Urban Homes, presentation to the 
Homes and Social Planning Conference, Salisbury, 1968] 
Type of House Cost Factor Density Factor 
Detached 1 1 
Two Storey flats 1.3 1.46 
Three storey flats 1.9 1.6 
 
Meanwhile, the installation of ‘modern’ home infrastructure like water closets, reticulated 
sewerage, domestic electricity continued in piecemeal fashion throughout the 1960s. 12,000 
houses were connected to electricity by the end of the decade. For some townships such as 
Nguboyenja, Mabutweni and Iminyela, water closets could not be installed until funds became 
available in the mid-60s; in the meantime, their existing aqua privies were simply connected to the 
reticulated sewerage system (in 1960, 61 and 62 respectively) and the effluent discharged into the 
system. This proved “satisfactory and economical”, reported Ashton. By 1964, only Njube and 
Pumula remained with the aqua privy system. Mzilikazi had individual toilets, water standpipes 
and electricity installed in most homes by the late 1960s. The large rental schemes of Njube and 
Mabutweni had to wait until 1970.  The tarring of township roads began in an incremental fashion, 
beginning in 1967 with the Barbour Fields loop road. Street lighting was greatly expanded across 
most townships, and the City Engineer designed enormous tower lights in 1967, and they became 
 
1069 Annual Report of the Director, 1963: 7 
1070 Annual Report of the Director of Housing and Amenities for the year ended 30th June, 1965: 7 
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a feature of most townships over the years.  It was not always the case that the higher-income 
schemes enjoyed quicker or superior infrastructural upgrades than the lower income schemes.1071  
 
1970s: low cost rental and conversions to home ownership 
 
Most municipal rental schemes were full or near capacity by the 1970s, and the Housing 
Department focussed on the considerable expansion of the existing home ownership schemes. 
However, with a housing application rate of 150 per month, it was deemed important to continue 
with some low-cost family rental housing as well.1072  
The historic township of Makokoba continued to undergo redevelopment as planned and 
initiated in 1962, to accommodate more low-income families. In 1973, Ashton pushed for the 
updating of the Town Planning Officer’s original masterplan and the Council’s Town Planning 
Branch produced a report on ‘The Replanning of Makokoba’. The overall population of 
Makokoba had actually reduced to about 15,000, and only a fifth were single men (in 1944 it was 
nearly half1073). The density of family flats (2 and 3 rooms) was on average 9.1, because many 
poorer families were forced to share some of the 3-roomed flats.1074 Housing Department staff 
continued to go around with the Advisory Boards to find areas to erect new flats (where the least 
demolition was required). For example, in one area 20 rooms housing 10 families and 30 single 
men were demolished and replaced with 48 flats for 48 families.1075  
 
1071 For comprehensive housing statistics for the year ending 30th June, 1969, see Appendix A2. 
1072 The actual backlog in housing compared favourably to Salisbury. In 1973 Bulawayo’s backlog was 5,000, 
compared to 13,000 in Salisbury, 3,000 in Umtali and 2,000 in Gwelo. (Mark Partridge address to Local 
Government Association, 14th May, 1973 /BCCA/Proceedings of the Local Government Association 
Annual Conference, 1973, p. 64). 
1073 Extract from Hansard, 28th November, 1944, p. 24. Motion: Natives in Urban Areas. (BCC/Transfer 
Box 4: rent, native admin). 
1074 Report: The Replanning of Makokoba (Town Planning Branch, City Engineer’s Department, December 
1973), in BCC/N6A-81a/Flats at Makokoba 





Meanwhile, other rental schemes also underwent incremental redevelopment, and several were 
converted to leasehold schemes. For example, in 1976, Mzilikazi, Nguboyenja and Njube 
townships were converted to 15, 25 and 30-year lease respectively, after much lobbying by the 
City Council to the Minister of Local Government and Housing. By the end of the decade, as the 
country transitioned to independence, Makokoba was the only township which had not been at 
least partly converted to home ownership.  
The only new rental schemes to be constructed in the 1970s were Sizinda (448 flats, 
constructed from 1971-75) and the large-scale township of Lobengula. Lobengula was started in 
1972 for low-income families. The contract of $1,200,000 was awarded to John Sisk and Son 
(Ltd)1076, but the original plan to build single-storey detached terraces had to be scrapped because 
of soil conditions. It ended up being semi-detached units. Of the first 1,867 applicants for the 
scheme, 1,492 earned under $44/month; with just 245 earned between $44 and $60, and 130 
 
1076 ‘$1200000 contract awarded’, Chronicle, 14th Jan, 1972 





earned over $60.1077 In the first year, 1,690 semi-detached family houses were built of concrete 
blocks and 148 units with goliath brick. The Housing Department continued to experiment with 
house designs in order to appeal to ‘consumer preferences’. For example, for one extension to 
Lobengula in 1976, they built 10 experimental core houses “to gauge public reaction to this type 
of design…” The demonstration houses showed various stages of development from the core 
house with living/bedroom, kitchen, and bathroom, to the final 3-bedroom house with additional 
lodger’s room.1078 By the end of the decade there were over 4,000 houses in Lobengula. Putting a 
positive gloss on this monotonous low-income scheme, Ashton remarked: “A very pleasing aspect 
of this new Township is the number and quality of gardens that have been developed”.1079  
In 1974, the Central Government sponsored a much-publicised scheme in Salisbury called Glen 
Norah, intended mostly as tied accommodation for employers. When a similar scheme was mooted 
in Bulawayo, it was heavily opposed by the African Advisory Board, because tied accommodation 
heightened the insecurity of tenants: on losing their job, they would subsequently lose their 
accommodation. Ashton empathised with their suspicion of what he described as a “double 
calamity, to which no one should be exposed”.1080  Furthermore, the Boards argued that occupants 
of tied accommodation would be unlikely to take pride in their homes and gardens. Gargett also 
accused the Government of sticking to the policy of tied accommodation, when it was “detested” 
 
1077 BCCA/Housing and Amenities minutes, 6th July, 1972, p. 1638-9.  In respect of the first group, 
employers were liable to pay a services levy of $1,50 per employee per month. The rent charges for such 
employees were thus $5,90, supplemented by $1,50 from the services levy; those earning $44-$60 were 
charged $7,40/month; and those earning $60+ were charged $10,00. The last group received no rent 
allowance.   
1078 Housing and Amenities Committee minutes, 2nd December, 1976, p. 1768 
1079 Annual Report of the Director, 1976 
1080 BCCA/Annual Report of the Director, 1974 
Figure 46: Lobengula Extension: 1976 [Chronicle, 17th March, 1976] 
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by Africans, and wrong on principle.1081 Instead of tied accommodation, Bulawayo encouraged 
employers to assist trusted employees to acquire their own homes. The Rhodesia Cement 
Company did this by financing the building of houses for 13 of its employees with mortgage 
bonds, which Ashton hailed as a “pioneering breakthrough” and a way to make “a meaningful 
contribution to African housing and the stability of the African townsman”.1082  
This processual analysis of the development of rental townships has shown how much 
original plans were altered, compromised, and sometimes scrapped, such as the initial one of 
housing 100,000 Africans on the urban periphery. Ashton introduced a more progressive vision 
of creating stratified family schemes, and whilst this vision did ultimately materialise, it was 
considerably altered by short-term budgeting; learning-on-the-job; developing in an integrated 
way, or building upwards, to save costs; having to overcome stereotypes such as that Africans 
would not want to live in double storey flats, or that African builders would not have the skills to 








1081 Gargett, The Administration of Transition, p. 53 
1082 BCCA/Annual Report of the Director, 1974 
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Appendix B1: Municipal Housing Statistics for 
the Year 19591083 
 
Municipal Housing Statistics as at 30th June, 1959 
 Houses Estimated 
approved 
population 
Married Accommodation:   
(a) Home ownership schemes   
Mpopoma (4 rooms) 2,580 11,352 
Pumula (2-5 rooms) 587 3,000 
Pelandaba (2-7 rooms) 331 1,655 
(b) Rented Houses:    
Makokoba:  
• Houses (3 rooms) 
• Compound Cottages (3 rooms) 
• Sundry accomm. occupied by BMC employees (3 rooms) 
• “             “ “ “ “            (stands) 
• “ “ “ “ “ “          (room + 
kitchen) 
• Chalets (semi-detached, 2 rooms) 
• Houses originally privately owned  
• Room and kitchen 
• Single rooms 






























Mzilikazi:  (2 rooms – 232) 
   (3 rooms – 201) 





Nguboyenja:  (3 rooms) 554 2,770 
 
1083 All statistics sourced from annual reports of the Director of African Administration (1959)/Housing 




Barbour Fields  (4 rooms) 292 1,460 
Njube:   (360 x 2 rooms; 2,440 x 3 rooms) 2,800 14,000 
Total Married: 9,498 45,957 
 
Single Accommodation for Men Rooms Occupants 
Chabalala Hostels:  3 x 4 storeys (442 in each hostel) 174 1,326 
Municipal compound:  (205 rooms in blocks) 205 1,100 
3 compound hostels:  2 x 3 storeys 




Makokoba:  (3 rooms in blocks of various sizes) 1,614 5,721 
Mshasha:  73 dormitories x 30 
  29 dormitories x 24 





C.M.U (Old RAF central maintenance unit): 29 huts – large rooms 29 496 
Iminyela:            (300 x 4-roomed houses) 1,200 4,800 
Mabutweni:      (300 x 4-roomed houses) 1,200 4,800 
Mpopoma:        (lodgers) 2,000 3,083 
 
Single Accommodation for Women Rooms Occupants 
Gertrude Macintyre Hostel: rooms of various sizes 58 133 
Total Singles: 6,744 25,347 
Total Population (Married and single)  71,304 
Estimated Actual Population  82,600 




Appendix B2: Municipal Housing Statistics for the year ending 30th June, 1969 
 
 
Family Accommodation: Home ownership (1969) 
  Number of rooms per dwelling unit Estimated Population  






















228 }     3139 
280 











38 1565  }    1597 
32 
3520 6080 9600 
Pelandaba Houses - 29 235 443 98 805 1760 3040 4800 
Magwegwe Houses - - - 600 - 600 1190 2210 3400 
Pumula Houses 2 171 282 435 106 996 2200 4400 6600 
Hyde Park Kraals - - - - - 420 970 2230 3200 
Barbour Fields Houses - - - 292 - 292 660 1140 1800 
TOTALS 7429 Units 2 200 617 6468 242 7849 17200 31000 48200 
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Family Accommodation: Rental (1969) 
 Number of rooms per dwelling unit Estimated Population 
Township Type of Accom. 1 2 3 4 5 & over Total 
Families 





















Municipal (tied) Flats 
Houses 





































































Njube Houses - 360 2440 - - 2800 6160 10640 16800 
Mabutweni Blocks of 4 rooms w/ 2 
kitchens 





















Magwegwe Houses - 2870 - - - 2870 5760 8640 14400 
Mpopoma Flats - - - 96 6 102 220 380 600 
Tshabalala Flats 
Houses 
- - - 680 
131 
- 680 } 811 
131 
1800 3100 4900 
TOTALS 12924 units 1875 4072 3286 3681 10 13310 29640 44960 74600 





Single Men and Women (1969) 
  Number of rooms per dwelling unit   
Township or Hostel Area Type of Acomm. 1 
(large) 
2 3 4 Total Units Total 
Makokoba Rooms 
Flats 



















Municipal (tied) Rooms in blocks 













Burombo Hostels Rooms 159 - - - 159 1326 
Sidojiwe Hostels Rooms 159 - - - 159 1326 
Gertrude Macintyre Hostel Rooms 18 - - - 18 133 (women) 
Iminyela Blocks of 4 rooms 588 - - - 588 2352 
Total tenants: 9170 
Lodgers: Home Ownership Schemes                                                                                                                                                                     
Mpopoma Lodgers room - - - - - 4300 
Tshabalala Lodgers room - - - - - 2688 
Pelandaba Lodgers room - - - - - 896 
Magwegwe Lodgers room - - - - - 890 
Pumula Lodgers room - - - - - 396  
Total lodgers: 9170 
TOTAL  1479 747 - - 2226 18804 
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GRAND TOTAL AUTHORISED 
POPULATION (MARRIED AND 
SINGLE) 
      141600 
Estimated actual 
population 
      153600 
 
Note: of the approximately 12000 unauthorised residents, some would have been permanent dwellers, whilst others would have been a floating population 




Non-Municipal Housing within Municipal Area: 
Railways (on Railway owned premises):   11400 
Industry (Cold Storage Commission – 870 units) 1300 
Domestic & commercial 19400 




Appendix B3: Municipal Housing Statistics for the year ending 30th June, 1977 
 
Family Accommodation: Home ownership (as at 30th June, 1977) 
 Number of rooms per dwelling unit  Estimated Population 
Township Type of Accomm. 
(HIGH DENSITY) 


















































Pelandaba Houses - 23 181 433 63 165 865 865 1730 3450 5180 
Magwegwe Houses - - - 1213 4 45 1262 1262 2700 4600 7300 
Pumula Houses 4 135 402 708 84 82 1415 1415 2830 7970 10800 
Lobengula Houses - -  97 - 4 101 101 198 326 524 




Family Accommodation: Rental (1977) 
 Number of rooms per dwelling unit  Estimated Population 
Hyde Park Kraals – variable 
- Sinyoka  
- Methodist 
- St Peters 
























TOTAL HIGH  
DENSITY 
 4 313 924 8007 1778 1049 12075 12073 24755 48667 73422 
                                 
                                                                   (LOW DENSITY) 
Pelandaba Extension  - - - - 6 16 22 22 66 66 132 
Barbour Fields  - - - 194 42 57 293 293 900 1150 2050 
Luveve  - - - - - 39 39 39 78 156 234 
Mhlahlandlela  - - - - 38 - 38 38 80 150 230 
TOTAL Low Density  - - - 194 86 112 392 392 1124 1522 2646 
Grand Total Home Ownership  4 313 924 8201 1864 1161 12467 12467 25879 50189 76068 
I I I 
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Municipal (tied) Flats 
Houses 



















































































Njube Houses - 360 2440 1 3 - 2804 2804 6173 10756 16929 
























Iminyela Blocks of 4 rooms w/2 kitchens 
Flats 
















































































































































TOTAL RENTED 2592 8315 3387 5553 24 1 19872 20128 43727 76572 120299 
GRAND TOTAL HOME OWNERSHIP 4 313 924 8201 1864 1161 12467 12467 25879 50189 76068 
TOTAL FAMILY ACCOMM 2598 8628 4311 13754 1888 1162 32339 32595 69606 126761 196367 







Single Accommodation: Rented (1977) 










Total Pop. Municipal 
Housing 



















Municipal (tied) Rooms in blocks 

















Burombo Hostels Rooms 159 - - - 159 1611  1611 1611 
Sidojiwe Hostels Rooms 159 - - - 159 1219  1219 1219 
Gertrude Macintyre 
Hostel 
Rooms 77 - - - 77 207 (women)  207 207 
Iminyela Blocks of 4 rooms  - - - - -  - - 
Barbour Fields Flats, Bachelor, 
Luxury 
  24  24 24  24 24 
Sub-totals  800 439 24  1263 5568  5568 5568 
Lodgers: Home Ownership Schemes                                                                                                                                                                        
Mpopoma Lodgers room - - - - -  4440 4440 4440 
Tshabalala Lodgers room - - - - -  3146 3146 3146 
Pelandaba Lodgers room - - - - -  1541 1541 1541 
Magwegwe Lodgers room - - - - -  2378 2378 2378 
Pumula Lodgers room - - - - -  1295 1295 1295 
Luveve Lodgers rooms - - - - -  2276 2276 2276 
Hyde Park Estate Lodgers rooms - - - - -  122 122 122 
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Lobengula Lodgers rooms - - - - -  75 75 75 
Iminyela (flats) Lodgers rooms - - - - -  118 118 118 
Subtotals  800 439 24 - 1263 5568 15391 20959 20959 
Total Home Ownership       12467    76068 
Total Rented       19872    120299 






Consolidated Housing and Population Statistics as at 30th June, 1977 
Township Type of Accomm Municipal Houses Municipal 
Flats 
Total Population (excl. 
lodgers) 




Makokoba Rented 2475 600 3075 19294   19294 
Mzilikazi Rented 1651 331 1982 14800   14800 
Nguboyenja Rented 555 288 843 6000   6000 
Barbour Fields H.O. + Rented 293 348 641 4574   4574 
Mpopoma H.O. + Rented 2910 856 3766 20314 4440  24754 
Pelandaba Home Ownership 887  887 5312 1541  6853 
Njube Rented 2804  2804 16929   16929 
Mabutweni Rented 1232  1232 3873   3873 
Iminyela Rented 1458 320 1778 9956 118  10074 
Lobengula H.O. + Rented 3937  3937 22734 75  22809 
Magwegwe H.O. + Rented 4146 384 4530 25504 2378  27882 
Tshabalala H.O. + Rented 1695 712 2407 14690 3146  17836 
Sizinda Rented  448 448 3140   3140 
Pumula H.O. + Rented 1423  1423 10890 1295  12185 
Hyde Park Estate Home Ownership 388  388 3270 122  3392 
Luveve H.O. + Rented 3461  3461 20655 2276  22931 
SUB TOTALS  29315 4287 33602 201935 15391  217326 
ADD: Floating pop. In municipal 
townships 
     14219 14219* 
Matshobana and Sizinda Railway 
townships (2200 units) 
     11000 11000 
Industry: Cold Storage Commission      1300 1300 
Domestic and Commercial      36155 36155 
Sundry (Hospitals, Police, Prisons)      5000 5000 
GRAND TOTAL – Greater BYO      67674 285, 000 
 
*Fluctuates according to various conditions in urban and rural areas. 
 
